Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 July 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- The SMM saw damage to houses due to shelling in Pikuzy and in Avdiivka.
- Small arms fired in direction of SMM unmanned aerial vehicle in Khreshchatytske.
- The SMM continued to monitor activities related to disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The Mission saw weapons in violations of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its freedom of movement was also denied near non-government-controlled Shevchenko, Sosnivske and Tavrycheske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 330), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 140). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at north-westerly and south-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly and southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion).
Damage to residential houses due to shelling in Pikuzy and in Avdiivka
On 1 July, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in the Kyrpoty area on the eastern edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a completely burnt civilian house with rubble and scorch marks on the remains of brick walls, as well as melted window glass inside of the structure’s remains. In the yard of the aforementioned house, about 3m west of the west-facing wall, the SMM saw a fresh crater (with a fuse from a 122mm artillery shell and shrapnel inside of it), assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 5m north of the house, the Mission also saw a collapsed brick structure, assessed as recently damaged by the shelling. Three neighbours (women, aged 30-70) told the SMM that the house was abandoned and that shelling had occurred in the evening of 28 June.
About 60m west from the previously-mentioned house, at a single-storey house also on Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw that the majority of corrugated asbestos panels on the west-facing side of the roof, as well as the supporting wooden structure, had been blown off by what was assessed to be the impact of a 122mm round of an undetermined weapon. Inside of the house, the SMM saw that the inner walls and ceiling had fresh cracks and that three west-facing windows were shattered, all assessed as caused by the impact on the roof. About 10m south of the house, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to trees and bee hives. A 70 year-old man, who introduced himself as the owner of the house, told the SMM that he had been in his house on the evening of 28 June when he had heard an explosion.
About 270m west, on the same street, the SMM saw a fresh impact hole between two shattered west-facing windows of a single-storey house, assessed as caused by a 12.7mm incendiary bullet. The owners of the house (a man and woman, aged 70-80), told the SMM that shooting had occurred in the early morning hours of 30 June, adding that the windows had been shattered by shelling in late March. (For previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 25 March 2019).
On 1 July, in a residential part of the south-eastern outskirts of Avdiivka, at 13 Nakhimova Street, the SMM saw that several corrugated asbestos panels on the west-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house, as well as wooden planks underneath it, had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a mortar round fired from an east-south-easterly direction. A resident of the house, a woman in her fifties, told the SMM that that shelling had occurred in the early evening of 30 June when she was in the yard of the house.
About 140m north of the previously-mentioned house, at two residential houses located 10m apart at 1 and 3 Nakhimova Street, the SMM saw three shattered south-facing windows as well as multiple penetrations in the plastic and asbestos fences of both houses. About 50m south-west of the houses, on the western side of Nakhimova Street, the SMM saw burned vegetation, assessed as fresh. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by shrapnel from a round of an undetermined weapon. A resident of one of the houses (woman in her fifties) told the SMM that, in the early evening of 30 June, together with all five members of her family they had to hide in the cellar due to shelling.
Disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
The SMM continued to monitor activities related to disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska. On 1 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw nine men in military-style clothing, who were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them in both Russian and English languages, two of them inside the forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps at the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and seven others standing at the parking lot near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM saw no presence of military-type hardware.
At the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM continued to note throughout the day a constant flow of people travelling in both directions through the processing booths, where it saw personnel in civilian clothing checking documents of those crossing.
The SMM saw the continuation of the installation work of the previously observed six booths and one container at the parking lot about 50m south of the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the disengagement area.
The SMM continued to observe that the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the queuing shelter about 700m north of the wooden ramps, inside the disengagement area, remained empty of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel or hardware (see SMM Daily Report 1 July 2019). Inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers refilling public information boxes south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, comprised of five people and two vehicles (one armoured personnel carrier and a truck), moving from the EECP up to the forward position and back again. About 10m north of the above mentioned most forward position, the SMM saw an electrician ascend a pole to dismantle a camera.
On 30 June, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted that a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the railway bridge was empty of personnel or hardware.
Other disengagement areas[2]
On 29 June, inside the disengagement near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a long-barrelled weapon near a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and seven anti-tank mines (TM-62) under a camouflaged net across road T-1316, all about 1km south of its northern edge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019). On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time a concertina wire stretched across the same road about 350m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint on the area’s southern edge. Despite an SMM request, the armed formations refused to remove it. The presence of the wire rendered the road impassable to the Mission due to security considerations.*
During the evening of 30 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded eight projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2.5-4km south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area.
On 26 June, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of what was assessed as preparations for new defensive positions (not seen in imagery from 9 June 2019) near previously observed trenches of the armed formations, about 10m north of the area’s southern edge and about 100m west of its eastern edge. Imagery from the same day also revealed a trench extension about 30m in length running from east to west, about 700m east of the eastern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.
On 1 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Small-arms fire assessed as aimed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
While conducting a mini- UAV flight in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of about 100-200m north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 100-200m north-east of the patrol. While flying the UAV back, the SMM heard six additional shots of small-arms fire assessed as at the same distance and direction. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area.*
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
29 June
An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya,152mm) about 4km north of Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
26 June
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) near Zernove (70km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.
27 June
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 30 May 2019).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
1 July
The SMM saw two tanks (T-72) in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
30 June
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) with components of a radar system (1S51M3-2) attached near Zhytenko (70km east of Donetsk), in an area where an SMM long-range UAV had gone missing in October 2018 after spotting a surface-to-air missile system and a convoy of trucks on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities (see SMM Daily Report 18 October 2018 and SMM Spot Report 27 October 2018).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
27 June
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a trench extension of about 67m in length just outside the northern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area (35m south-west of residential house), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
29 June
An SMM mini-UAV spotted an air search radar system (P-19 1RL134) on a military truck near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
26 June
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) in a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.
27 June
Aerial imagery available to the SMM observed the presence of two ACVs in a training area near Novoselivka.
1 July
The SMM saw again an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).
Presence of anti-tank mines
On 28 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 15 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows across road M-03 near previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 5km south-east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).
SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
Public gathering outside SMM Mariupol office
In Mariupol, on 1 July, the SMM monitored a gathering of approximately 70 people (men and women, aged 40-65 years old) in front of the Mission’s office. Some participants held signs or banners against the Russian Federation and others expressed concern about a statement from the Joint Forces Operation related to possible disengagement in the Mariupol area. The SMM received a letter from some participants expressing the abovementioned concerns. The gathering ended peacefully.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, again denied the SMM passage westward towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing ongoing shelling in the area.
- At a checkpoint east of Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), six members of the armed formations, five visibly armed, denied the SMM passage to Sosnivske, citing orders from those in control.
- At a checkpoint east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations, two visibly armed, denied the SMM passage to Tavrycheske, citing orders from those in control.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
- The SMM was prevented from proceeding northward on road T-1316 inside the Zolote disengagement area due to the presence of a concertina wire stretched across the road about 350m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area (see above).
Delayed:
- At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed after about 20 minutes of waiting.
Other impediments:
- While conducting a mini-UAV flight in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which landed safely and left the area (see above).
- An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 30km north-east of Mariupol). Both above mini-UAV flights were conducted in search of the lost SMM long-range UAV (which has not yet been located, see also SMM Spot Report 28 June 2019).
- On two instances, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and at Oktiabr mine were non-operational during the reporting period.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.