Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 June 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw demining activities inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and further withdrawal of forces and hardware.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and damage to houses due to shelling in Pikuzy.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicles near Sakhanka and Staromykhailivka.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines near Talakivka and Pikuzy, including some for the first time.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near non-government-controlled Starolaspa, Shevchenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), and in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including however more explosions (about 50) compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 26 June, at 19:52, positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a truck (Ural type) drive from a southerly direction to the checkpoint. From 19:58 to 20:15, at the same location, the Mission observed about four members of the armed formations loading boxes and small arms onto the truck.

On 27 June, at about 07:00, positioned at the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the south-eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On the morning of the same day, the SMM observed that the queuing shelter, inside the disengagement area, about 700m north of the wooden ramp at the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was empty of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel or hardware. In the afternoon, the SMM observed demining teams composed of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, representatives of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and members of an international demining organisation conducting demining activities at a distance of up to 15m on both sides of the road that leads from the entry-exit checkpoint to the wooden ramp. At 15:10, a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that all planned demining activities had been completed for the day.

At 10:10, positioned at the Prince Ihor Monument, the SMM saw a demining team composed of four members of the armed formations depart to an area about 500m west of the monument inside the disengagement area, reportedly to conduct demining activities there. At 11:15, senior members of the armed formations told the SMM that demining activities in the area inside the disengagement area west of the Prince Ihor Monument were complete for the day. At 12:15, the SMM saw a truck (Ural type), with six armed members of the armed formations and an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) on board, drive out of the disengagement area from a westerly direction to a position of the armed formations near the Prince Ihor Monument. In the afternoon, accompanied by senior members of the armed formations, the SMM saw that two positions of the armed formations on top of a hill south and south-west of the bridge were empty of personnel or hardware.

Throughout the day, the SMM saw people queuing to enter and exit government-controlled areas at both the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, and subsequently crossing the bridge. (For recent observations, see SMM Spot Report 27 June 2019 and SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019).

Fresh craters and damage to houses due to shelling in Pikuzy

On 26 June, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in the centre of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). In the courtyard of a Culture House located on the southern side of the road on Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw four fresh craters about 20-30m from each other, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction. It also observed shrapnel pockmarks on the wall of the two-storey building of the Culture House about 5m south-south-east of one of the craters and numerous trees with their bark stripped within 2-5m of two of the craters, all assessed as caused by shrapnel from the same explosions.

About 15m north-east from one of the craters, at the corner of Akhmatovoi and Cherniakhivskoho Streets, the SMM saw a recent crater (about a couple of days old) on the south-eastern edge of the road, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a westerly direction.

About 30m further south-east, at 2 Cherniakhivskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the south-south-east facing side of the roof of a one-storey house. About 70m further south-east, at 3 Cherniakhivskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a garden 6m south-south-east of a one-storey house. The SMM assessed the damage at both locations as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

About 115m further north-east, at 37 Akhmatovoi Street, the Mission saw large branches cut off from a tree and leaves on the ground, as well as a fuse and the tailfin of a self-propelled grenade on the ground below the tree. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a self-propelled grenade fired from a westerly direction. About 9m north-west from the tree, it observed a shattered window and a broken window shutter on the south-east-facing wall of an inhabited house, assessed as caused by the shockwave from the same explosion. A group of four residents of Pikuzy, told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 26 June.

Small-arms fire aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

During the day on 27 June, positioned near Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol) and conducting a mini-UAV flight near Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) , the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 3.4km east-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 3.4km east-north-east of the patrol, above positions of the armed formations. While flying the UAV back towards the patrol to retrieve it, the SMM heard two more bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 3.2km east-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 3.2km east-north-east of the patrol.

On the same day, while conducting another mini-UAV near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 900m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 900m south-east of the patrol. In both cases, the SMM landed the UAVs safely and immediately left the area.

On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person in a previously reported position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces aiming a rifle at the UAV and firing a burst near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk).*

Other disengagement areas[2]

During the night and early morning hours of 26-27 June, while in Popasna, the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions and 75 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km east and east-south-east. During the day of 27 June, positioned 1.7km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and six shots. All of the above ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Residential houses on fire in Zaitseve

In the early morning hours of 27 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four residential houses burning in the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM was unable to determine the cause of the fire.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

27 June

The SMM noted that:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were present and
• 15 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 44 self-propelled howitzers (23 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and 21 2S1), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine tanks (T-72) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

27 June

The SMM noted that 51 tanks (24 T-72 and 27 T-64), a towed howitzer (D-44, 85mm), two anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and 49 mortars (12 M120-15 Molot, 120mm; seven 2B11 Sani, 120mm; eight KBA-48M, 82mm; 12 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm; three 2B14 Podnos, 82mm; one 2B10, 82mm and six BM-37, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

25 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) and five armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (an MT-LBu, two BMP variant and two undetermined) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

27 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-2) 2m from a residential house in Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Troitske.

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (Spartan) in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Talakivka and Pikuzy

On 26 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 80 anti-tank mines laid in four rows in a field south of a local road about 5km east of Talakivka (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) and about 2.2km west-north-west of Pikuzy, between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations. About 170m further north-west, the same UAV again spotted 13 anti-tank mines laid in a single row across the same road.

On the same day, the same UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines laid in a single row in a field on the western edge of Pikuzy, about 20m south of a road leading to Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk, government-controlled). About 1.5km south-west of the previously-mentioned mines and about 5km south-east of Talakivka, the same UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines laid in a single row across the same road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west towards Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), citing “orders form their superiors not to let the SMM through because of ongoing shelling in the area”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• In Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing the fact that the SMM “did not have a patrol plan with an official stamp”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again only allowed the SMM to proceed after 42 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• While conducting mini-UAV flights near Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), on three occasions, the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the UAV. The Mission landed the UAVs and left the area (see above).
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a person in a previously reported position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces aiming a rifle at the UAV and firing a burst near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk).
• During the day on 26 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and both government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas of northern Luhansk region.[6]
• During the night on 27 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and non-government-controlled areas of northern Luhansk region.
• Two SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) and the Kyivskyi District of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled).

 

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site was abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.