Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM saw deminers from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and from non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
- SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a cargo train heading west in non-government-controlled areas near the border with the Russian Federation.
- The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to water infrastructure and electric lines, as well as the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Kreminets.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 14 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), in areas south of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations (and no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (26 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
On the afternoon of 7 August, the SMM saw six deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities in areas west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). At 18:35 and at 18:45, the Mission heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonations of explosive devices, near the broken section of the bridge. These explosions occurred after the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) (inside the disengagement area) had been closed (at 18:00).
On 8 August, the SMM saw deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine cutting vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the road, north of the broken section of the bridge. About 100m north of the broken section, the Mission saw a truck and a crane and it also observed ten people removing the guard rail on each side of the road and cutting grass on the road’s shoulders, in the area where the shuttle bus turns.
On the same day, the SMM saw deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities in areas east of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge. It also saw three members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]
Other disengagement areas[3]
On the evening of 7 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).
On 6 August, aerial imagery available to the Mission revealed the presence of at least 30 craters (not seen in imagery from 22 July 2019) about 100m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, about 2km west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on its southern edge.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
7 August
An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
7 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- eight tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk) (on the same day the SMM also saw three tanks (type undetermined) firing in the training area, which was assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone);
- three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), about 600m east of a residential area in Zuhres (36km east of Donetsk); and
- five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
7 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted three anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) without missile launchers in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk).
8 August
The SMM saw:
- 19 tanks (T-72) stationary at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and
- six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
6 August
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four tanks (type undetermined) in a training area Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk).
7 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- eight tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 3 August 2019); and
- three tanks (T-72) and 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65) in two compounds near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
On 6 August
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote.
7 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (two BMP-2, two BMP variants and one BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 5m trench near the most forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 19 July 2019).
8 August
The SMM saw:
- an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk) and
- an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
7 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted seven IFVs (BMP-1) near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in a compound near Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk) and
- an APC (MT-LB) in a compound in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).
Cargo train in non-government-controlled areas, near the border with the Russian Federation
On the night of 8 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a freight train with at least 50 hopper cars passing the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), located about 3km north-west of the border with the Russian Federation, and heading west.
SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and power lines in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), and to a water pipeline near Yasynuvata, as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).
The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- On two occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing operations in the area”.
Conditional access:
- On two occasions, at a checkpoint on the southern edge of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after presenting the vehicles’ registration documents and the drivers’ driving licences on the first occasion, and after inspecting its trailer on the second occasion.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On the night of 7-8 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) assessed as caused by probable jamming. On three occasions, the same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of central and southern Donetsk region.[5]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.