Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 23 July 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• A boy was injured due to the detonation of an explosive device in Khrestivka and a girl was injured due to shelling in Pervomaisk, reportedly on 15 and 20 July.
• The Mission saw recent damage caused by shelling to a Cultural House in Pikuzy and to a residential building in Pervomaisk, reportedly on 20 July.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to monitor the operation of a shuttle bus service in government-controlled areas north of the bridge.
• It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• An SMM UAV spotted the presence of a train and aerial imagery revealed the presence of vehicle tracks and a trench extension near the border with the Russian Federation.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines, some for the first time, near Krasnohorivka, Staromykhailivka, Marinka and the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including the drilling of wells in Raivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Shevchenko and in Nova Marivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (35) compared with the previous reporting period (seven). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and east-south-east and south-south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).        

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (one) compared with the previous reporting period (five) (see other disengagement areas section below).

Following the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 21 July, the SMM recorded in total 524 ceasefire violations (54 explosions, 82 projectiles in flight and 388 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire).

Boy injured by explosive device in Khrestivka on 15 July

The SMM followed up on reports of a boy injured by the detonation of an explosive device in Khrestivka (formerly Kirovske, non-government-controlled, 45km east of Donetsk). At building 9b in the Molodizhnyi neighbourhood in Khrestivka, the SMM saw a boy (aged 11) with splinter marks and red scratches on both legs and two small holes on his left thigh and left thumb. The boy and his grandmother (aged 50) told the SMM that he and his sister were in the yard of the building in the early afternoon of 15 July when the boy had picked up what he thought was a bicycle part from a pile of logs next to a picnic gazebo. According to him, a small pin dislodged from it, and he heard a sound similar to a firecracker. He dropped the object and, as it was falling, he heard a louder detonation and he said that his legs were hit by shards and lumps of metal. According to the grandmother, she was not present when the explosion occurred and took the boy to the local hospital after learning about the incident. On 21 July, a nurse at the hospital in Khrestivka told the SMM that the boy was treated for minor injuries on 15 July.

Damage due to shelling in Pikuzy reportedly on 20 July

The Mission followed up about reports of damage caused by shelling on 20 July in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). In Pikuzy, at 31 Akhmatovoi Street, within a 30m radius of the Cultural House, the SMM saw three craters, one of which had a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in it, as well as pieces of the concrete curb lying on the ground near the craters and shrapnel marks on the concrete surface near one of them. The SMM assessed two of the craters as caused by 120mm mortar rounds (one of which was unexploded in one of the craters) and the third one was assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire. Seven residents (six men and a woman, aged 50-60) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning of 20 July (for previous observations near the same building, see SMM Daily Report 9 July 2019).

Girl injured and recent damage due to shelling in Pervomaisk reportedly on 20 July

At 40 Rokiv Peremohy Street 14 in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a hole in the middle of a window pane in a north-facing wall on the third floor of a five-storey residential building. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a projectile (weapon type unknown) that had exploded near the building (but could not assess the direction of fire). The SMM spoke with three residents of the building (a man and two women, aged around 70) who said that they were in their apartments in the early evening hours of 20 July when shelling had occurred. On 23 July, a woman who had been admitted to the hospital following shelling in Pervomaisk on 20 July told the SMM that her daughter (aged 14) had also suffered a minor injury to her left hand but had not been hospitalized. On 21 July, another woman who had also been hospitalized and a man who was present at the scene following the incident told the SMM that the girl had suffered a minor injury to her hand. The SMM previously reported  eight civilian casualties (including a deceased woman and an injured girl, aged 4) and damage to a residential building assessed as caused by shelling on the same street on 20 July (for more details, see SMM Daily Report 22 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 22 July, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six people in military-type clothing, two of them digging, about 650m south of the checkpoint of the armed formations.

On 23 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a parked car and four deminers in a field about 250m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska (and 350m west of the road). On the same day, also inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2]  at the former Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the broken section of the bridge and two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge.

The Mission again saw a bus transporting people in government-controlled areas north of the bridge from an area about 250m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and back, leaving approximately every 20 minutes.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the morning of 23 July, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion at an assessed range of 1km north-north-west, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 21 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM again revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) 300m west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see below) and a vehicle position seen for the first time near previously observed trenches on the western outskirts of Petrivske about 100m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area. On 23 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

21 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM again revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) 300m west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (see above).

22 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019);
• two towed howitzers (2A36 Giantsit-B, 152mm), two MLRS (BM-21) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a training area near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk);
• three MLRS (BM-21) and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019);
• seven MLRS (BM-21) at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2019); and
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

18 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks in a training area near Ternove; and
• ten tanks and 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

19 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks and four surface-to-air missile systems at a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

22 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Ternove (see above);
• 19 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten towed howitzers (D-30) at a training area near Miusynsk; and
• 26 towed howitzers (types undetermined) in Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019).

Other weapons observed[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

18 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four probable pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and three probable pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

19 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 33 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and 21 pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[6]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

23 July

The SMM noted that:

• 26 MLRS (eight 9A52-2 Smerch-M, 300mm, 12 BM-27 Uragan, 220mm; and six 9A53 Uragan-1M, 220mm) remained missing and
• 14 MLRS (six 9A52-2 and eight BM-27) were present.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

23 July

The SMM noted that 92 tanks (26 T-64, 36 T-64B and 30 T-72), ten mortars (six 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and four M120-15 Molot, 120mm), seven towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm) and three towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

21 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-variant) east of Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk) and an armoured combat vehicle (probable BMP variant) north-east of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) .

22. July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) in a residential area of Krasnohorivka.

23 July

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk).

22 July

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), three new positions and a newly fortified trench, about 750m north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska (not seen in imagery from 16 June 2019), as well as a recent position about 50m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 350m east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP (not seen in imagery from 2 June 2019), all outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

A train, vehicle tracks and a trench extension near border with Russian Federation

On 18 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a trench extension and recent ground levelling about 3km west of Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, non-government-controlled, 28km east of Luhansk) and about 2.3km south of the border with the Russian Federation. The same imagery revealed the presence of recent vehicle tracks, likely from non-agricultural vehicles, on a dirt road that leads to the border with the Russian Federation (in an area where there are no official border crossing points and no roads) about 1km east of Korolivka (58km south-east of Luhansk) and about 700m west of the border.

At 01:28 on 23 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train, including 23 tank cars and 13 open rail cars, stationary at a railway station in Kvashyne (non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Donetsk) and at 01:46 of the same day, it again spotted the train moving south-east near Vyselky (72km south-east of Donetsk) heading towards the border with the Russian Federation.

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs 

On 21 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 20 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 60m in a field about 1.5km north-east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) as well as 34 and 21 previously seen anti-tank mines, all near forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of and about 3.5km east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

The UAV spotted for the first time three anti-tank mines on the north-western outskirts of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) laid across the road leading towards Krasnohorivka and ten anti-tank mines laid across a road on the north-western outskirts of the area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre).

About 700m north of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed for the first time an improvised mine hazard sign (consisting of two wooden planks and a stick with “MINES” written in Russian language) in a field next to a local road.

On the eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM saw that a previously seen mine hazard sign which had been attached to a rope extending across a road leading to a cemetery, was on the ground by the side of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk),

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). On 23 July, positioned near the DFS, the SMM heard nine shots and bursts of small-arms fire, at an assessed 1km southerly direction from its location and eight undetermined explosions, at an assessed range of 5-6km west-south-west of its location.

Security situation along Sea of Azov coast in Donetsk region and south-east of Kherson region

The SMM continued to monitor the security situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Donetsk region and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At the eastern entrance of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol) citing orders from his superior.
• In Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the settlement citing a “special operation” in the area, or to wait for a senior member of the armed formations to “authorize” the presence of the SMM.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again  allowed the SMM to proceed after about 17 minutes of waiting.   

Other impediments:

• On 23 July, a mid-range UAV flight experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).
• On the evening of 22 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Nyzhnia Krynka (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), Sadove (non-government-controlled, 44km east of Donetsk), Kvashyne (non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Donetsk) and Vyselky (non-government-controlled, 72km south-east of Donetsk). The same UAV experienced signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk).[8]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.  Between the evenings of 22 and 23 July, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.