Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 29 July 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, including multiple launch rocket systems and tanks, on both sides of the contact line.
- In areas beyond government control, an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a convoy of eight trucks near the border with the Russian Federation where there is no official border crossing facility.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to power lines and water pipelines on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Zaichenko, Novolaspa and Tavrycheske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 23 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas west and north of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), where almost all of the explosions were recorded.
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous 24 hours, it had recorded ceasefire violations, including ten explosions.
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
On 29 July, inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern part of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).[2]
Other disengagement areas[3]
On 29 July, positioned near the disengagement areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
26 July
An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
- ten tanks (T-64) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) traveling north on a road about 3km north-west of Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk) and
- four tanks (T-64) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
29 July
The SMM again saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
27 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-72) near Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
26 July
An SMM mini-UAV spotted 20 tanks (11 T-72 and nine T-64), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).
Weapons permanent storage sites
At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
29 July
The SMM noted that four mortars (three BM-37, 82mm and one 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing.
Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
26 July
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near houses in Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk).
28 July
The SMM saw an acquisition radar system (P-19) and an APC (MT-LB S) west of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).
29 July
The Mission saw:
- an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
- an IFV (BMP variant) in the western outskirts of Popasna.
Convoy spotted near the border with the Russian Federation
On the night of 22 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy consisting of eight trucks (three probable tanker trucks), four of which with trailers attached. They were all stationary and facing east on a dirt road that runs along a tree line adjacent to the border with the Russian Federation about 2km south-east of Stepne (non-government-controlled, 72km south-east of Donetsk), where there is no official border crossing facility (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 13 July 2019).
Mines near Starohnativka
On 26 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted eight anti-tank mines laid across the road about 4km east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and to power lines near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s safety”.
- At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west into the village, citing “no prior information about the visit”.
- At a checkpoint east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delay:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again only allowed the SMM to proceed after about one hour of waiting.
Other impediments:
- On the night of 28 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
- On two occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).[6]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s positions.