Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 January 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including 16 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds, were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (six explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).  

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned in the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khersones (87km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) at a compound in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

5 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) and a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) and six IFVs (BMP-2) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), an APC (MT-LB) and two IFVs (BMP variant) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

8 January

• An APC (BTR-60) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)
• An APC (BTR-60) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) moving east in a residential area of Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

6 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and to water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) (for previous related de-mining activities near Nyzhnoteple see SMM Daily Report 15 November 2018). It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Ozerianivka (non-government controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that it was not allowed to continue towards Ozerianivka without written permission from senior members of the armed formations. After about 20 minutes at the checkpoint, following an intervention by senior members of the armed formations, the Mission was allowed to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational. In the reporting period winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.