Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 30 November 2016

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations as in the previous reporting period in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but fewer explosions than during the previous reporting period in each of them. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and faced restrictions of its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded ceasefire violations within the disengagement area on the night of 28 November and on 29 November. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Avdiivka and Makiivka, and damage to civilian infrastructure in Uzhivka. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM monitored repairs to essential infrastructure. It visited two border areas currently not under government control.   

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region as in the previous reporting period, but fewer explosions (about 150 compared with some 550 in the previous reporting period).

The SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (“DPR”-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) during the day on 30 November recorded an illumination flare from north to south, followed by four undetermined projectiles in a sequence of: two in flight from south to north, one from north to south, and one from south to north.

The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), on the night of 29 November and over the day on 30 November, recorded seven tracer rounds in flight from north to south, followed by aggregated totals of: four undetermined explosions, four rocket-assisted projectiles (three in flight from north to south and one from south-east to north-east), 14 undetermined projectiles of direct fire (12 in flight from west to east and two from south to north), and 23 tracer rounds (15 in flight from west to east, one from east to west, and seven from south to north), all 3-6km east-south-east.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard, within four hours during the day, 27 undetermined explosions at locations 2-7km ranging from north to north-west. Positioned 3km west-north-west of government-controlled Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard and saw 14 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher followed by as many impacts of rounds from the same weapon, as well as heard and saw uncountable overlapping bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 25-500m north. The SMM assessed them as part of a live-fire exercise at a training area outside the security zone.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 29 November, the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 3km north. In addition the SMM heard 36 explosions (27 undetermined and nine assessed as artillery rounds) and uncountable overlapping bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 3-8km south-west.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), in the evening hours of 29 November, recorded 20 tracer rounds in flight from south-east to north-west, followed by a total of: 77 tracer rounds (21 in flight from south-east to north-west, 41 from south-west to north-east, 13 from north-east to south-west, and two from north-west to south-east), two indirect rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west-south-west to east-north-east, and two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons, all at an undetermined distance north-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) for about five hours, the SMM recorded five explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 3-4km north and another five assessed as impacts of mortar rounds 3-4km north-north-east, as well as 20 undetermined explosions and 15 explosions assessed as impacts of multiple-launch rockets system (MLRS) rockets at an unknown distance north-east and east-north-east. Positioned near government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard four explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds and more than 350 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at unknown distances in locations ranging from north to east.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region as in the previous reporting period, including 25 explosions compared with 30 during the previous reporting period. The SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded several ceasefire violations assessed as inside the disengagement area. Positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 5km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Following reports by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) the SMM saw at a hospital in Avdiivka a 49-year old man who was wounded by shrapnel in the morning of 30 November in Avdiivka. The police reported also damages to houses in Avdiivka.

Medical staff at a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) informed the SMM that a 33-year-old man had been brought to the hospital on 21 November. According to the medical staff, the man had sustained multiple shrapnel wounds on his entire body when an explosive device that he had brought home detonated.

In “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed ten relatively fresh craters, which it assessed as caused by artillery rounds (122mm) and possibly mortar rounds (120mm) fired from a westerly direction. Almost all craters were within a 300m long stretch on the eastern side of the village. Of the ten craters, three were seen on the yards of houses. At one of the houses the SMM saw that the west-facing wall of the bedroom had been destroyed. The owner said that she had been covered by debris, but had sustained no injuries. The SMM also noted broken windows and cracked walls in other civilian houses. Six of the ten craters were along the main village road, and one at a field. The SMM also saw a reinforced concrete pole which was broken in half and had torn down power lines that were being repaired by a civilian repair team. Six residents (women and men, between 30-60 years old) and one of the electric utility workers told the SMM that they had heard shelling in the early morning hours of 30 November for about an hour, adding that it was the worse shelling they had heard since March 2016.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas and to pursue full access to the areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The Mission’s access to most of these areas remained restricted. The SMM did not note any signs of further disengagement or any demining activity in the three areas during the reporting period.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activity would be conducted before disengagement took place in Stanytsia Luhanska. On the night of 28 November, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded ten explosions (six assessed as outgoing rounds and four as impacts, of mostly mortar rounds), as well as 11 flashes and two undetermined projectiles. During the night and day of 29 November the same camera recorded four undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, one airburst and several flashes. All ceasefire violations recorded by the camera on both 28 and 29 November occurred at undetermined distances at locations ranging from east-south-east to west-south-west. They were all assessed as within the disengagement area.

The SMM observed a calm situation in the Zolote-Pervomaisk and in the Petrivske disengagement areas.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines the SMM observed one surface-to-air-missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) at a checkpoint in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), facing north-west. About three hours later, the weapon was no longer there. The SMM also observed two tanks (T-64) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces training area near government-controlled Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk). After 20 minutes the tanks were no longer there.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed two surface-to-air-missile systems (9K33 Osa, 120mm) in government-controlled Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed nine towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) present and noted as missing another 21, as previously noted missing. The SMM observed that another such area continued to be abandoned, as first noted on 19 August 2016, with 14 towed howitzers (eight 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and six 2A36 Giantsin-B, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponds with the respective withdrawal line and noted that five tanks (T-64) were missing, as first noted on 13 November 2016.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone.[2] In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: three armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR) covered by camouflage nets and/or tree branches, one parked at a checkpoint in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), and two parked at a checkpoint in Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk); one APC (BTR-2) in Avdiivka; one APC (BTR-3) in Artema (26km north of Luhansk); and two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-2), one in Katerynivka and one in Popasna (64 and 69km west of Luhansk, respectively). In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk), and one APC (BTR-70) in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol). In “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM noted tracks of what it assessed to be an IFV (BMP-2).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints and of civilians living close to the contact line. In addition to the persisting long queues of pedestrians waiting - in below zero temperatures - to cross at the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM continued to note no improvement to the wooden ramps connecting the broken parts of the bridge. On the contrary, part of the right-hand railing, which used to be there until recently, was missing and the unleveled concrete part between the two ramps was covered in ice.

In Novooleksandrivka residents told the SMM that they were allowed to cross to government-controlled Popasna and back, after having submitted a list of residents to the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint personnel in Popasna.

The SMM monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM monitored repair works on water pipes between government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk) and government-controlled Leninske (40km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 30 November), and on the water system at two different locations near “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk), which consisted of new pipes being added to increase the pumping capacity and provide additional support in case of freezing of pipes.

The SMM visited two border areas currently not under government control. The SMM noted that the pedestrian border crossing points in Krasnodarskyi-1 and Krasnodarskyi-2 (58 and 57km south-east of Luhansk, respectively) continued to be abandoned (See SMM Daily Report 29 August 2016). During its respective 45-minute visits the SMM observed people exiting and entering Ukraine. Several of them reported crossing without difficulties, mainly for shopping or to visit relatives.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to proceed towards the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to the presence of a mine hazard sign. An armed “LPR” senior member told the SMM that the area was demined, but could not confirm recent demining. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Positioned at the edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area south of the bridge, the SMM observed that the road to the west was blocked by an anti-tank obstacle (“Czech hedgehog”). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At an “LPR” checkpoint on the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, the SMM was not able to access fields and areas off of main roads located in the disengagement area as armed “LPR” members present said that they could not guarantee the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in those areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed from government-controlled parts of Zolote towards the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area due to concrete blocks and barbed wires, as well as mine hazard signs on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to travel further west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske as two armed “DPR” members told the SMM that demining activity had not taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not cross the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia from either side. A Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that mines were still present in the area. Armed “LPR” members south of the bridge told the SMM that they could not guarantee its security as the area was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel on the road between government-controlled settlements of Popasna and Katerynivka (69 and 64km west of Luhansk, respectively) due to the presence of mines and obstacles on the road. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that, although the day before it was allowed to proceed on foot, that day he had orders not to allow the SMM to pass by vehicle or on foot. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk) two armed men prevented the SMM from proceeding further, citing ongoing shelling in the area and that they could not guarantee its security. The SMM did not hear any shelling during its stay in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 29 November at a checkpoint in Yasynuvata a “DPR” member did not allow the SMM to take a road to Donetsk stating that the road was not safe. The SMM observed civilian traffic using the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.   

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.