Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 11 October 2016
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region as in the previous reporting period, with many concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and areas north-east and east of Mariupol. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period. It followed up on reports of shelling and civilian casualties in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas. The SMM observed numerous Package- and Addendum-regulated weapons beyond the withdrawal line but outside assigned areas in government-controlled areas, in particular Rubizhne. The SMM monitored long queues of pedestrians at entry-exit checkpoints Stanytsia Luhanska.
The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including 355 explosions compared with 329 explosions in the previous reporting period. Nearly 200 explosions were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, and over 140 explosions were recorded in areas north-east and east of Mariupol.
During the night of 10-11 October, in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 8-10km south-west and one explosion assessed as caused by the impact of a 120mm mortar round 4-5km west.
On the same night, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, within four hours, 34 explosions (22 assessed as impacts from undetermined weapons and 12 undermined explosions), more than 238 bursts of anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire (233 fired from west to east and five from south-south-west to north-north-east) and 20 undetermined rocket-assisted projectiles (all fired from west to east) at an undetermined distance north-north-east.
The following day, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 94 explosions (84 of which were undetermined and ten were assessed as caused by impacts of automatic grenade launcher rounds) 2-8km south-east. The most intense fire was recorded between 13:44 and 14:00, when the SMM heard 74 undetermined explosions. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 102 undetermined explosions all but one 2-5km west-south-west, 72 of which were recorded between 13:43 and 14:00.
Positioned 2km east of Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard, at 12:20, three undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance north (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard, at 14:48, 10-12 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-7km west(assessed as outside the disengagement area).
Positioned in areas north-east and east of Mariupol, the SMM recorded a total of 110 explosions. Positioned between government-controlled Lomakyne and Lebedynske (15 and 16km north-east of Mariupol, respectively), the SMM heard 78 explosions, including eight assessed as outgoing and 35 as impacts of artillery rounds, all 1.5-5km in a clockwise arc from the north to south-east. Positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske the SMM heard 28 explosions, 21 of which were assessed as caused by impacts of artillery rounds all 2-2.5km east-north-east.
In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions). On the night of 10-11 October, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 5km west. The following day, positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk, outside the disengagement area), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 5-10km south and south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk, inside the disengagement area), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-10km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned at the closed “LPR” checkpoint on the “LPR” side of the closed Zolote/Pervomaisk crossing route, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-10km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the TCG on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result, SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to monitor parts of them, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles.
On the “LPR”-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed two trucks (Ural) transporting sand to a fortified position 150m north of the Prince Ihor monument (outside the disengagement area). The SMM was not able to reach the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) from either side of the contact line on three separate occasions, nor “LPR”-controlled areas south-west of the pedestrian bridge (inside the disengagement area), on three separate occasions, due to the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement).*
Positioned in three separate locations in and around the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM recorded a total of nine undetermined explosions (assessed as outside the disengagement area, see above). Due to the lack of security guarantees that the area had been demined the SMM could not proceed through the potential Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from either side.* At the crossroads, where the closed “LPR” checkpoint on the “LPR” side of the Zolote/Pervomaisk crossing route is located, the SMM observed for the first time four mine hazard signs (red boards with white letters stating “Mines” in Russian) on both sides (two each) of the road.
The SMM was not able to proceed from the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske towards the disengagement area as “DPR” did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* While in Petrivske, the SMM observed several armed “DPR” members walking around in the village (outside the disengagement area). In government-controlled Bohdanivka, the SMM was not able to proceed east towards the disengagement area as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM because, according to him, mines on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) had yet to be removed.* He added that he had no information regarding their removal.
The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties and observed the result of shelling. In a hamlet between “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka and Uzhivka (formerly Leninske) (both 24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed two impact sites. At the first site the SMM saw the totally destroyed roof of an inhabited house. Based on the damage and shrapnel, the SMM assessed it as caused by a 122mm artillery round possibly fired from a north-westerly direction. At the second site the SMM saw a fresh crater next to a road and assessed it as possibly caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a north-westerly direction. The “head” of Sakhanka “village council” told the SMM that a woman (in her late seventies) had been killed during shelling which occurred on the previous night, and as a result her husband (in his late seventies) had suffered a heart attack, adding that two women (aged 53 and 47) and a man had been injured and taken to a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol). In Sakhanka, the SMM observed, for the first time, an unexploded 120mm mortar shell stuck in the middle of the asphalt road.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on a trailer (MAZ-537) together with other hardware heading east in government-controlled Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk).
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: four tanks (T-72) each loaded on a stationary flatbed truck near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) on 10 October; four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) each loaded on a truck traveling near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) on 10 October; as well as nine tanks (T-64) each loaded on a flatbed truck heading south near Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk), and one mortar towed by a truck (GAZ-66) heading north near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk). At the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed the following weapons off-loaded or in the process of off-loading: 14 self-propelled howitzers (eight 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm; and six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm); six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 20 tanks (T-64), together with more than 25 armoured vehicles.
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed nine MLRSs (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM also noted as missing two MLRSs (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), which it had observed as missing on 22 December 2015 (one 2S1) and 5 April 2016 (two BM-21). At one heavy weapons holding area, after the SMM checked the serial numbers of present weapons, an armed “DPR” member arrived and told the SMM to leave the premises immediately, citing lack of “order” from his superiors to allow anyone to enter.*
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and an anti-aircraft weapon in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two stationary armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-3) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk); one stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area); one stationary IFV (BMP-1) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); three APCs (BTR-70) heading south-east near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military-type truck (Zil) heading east near Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk).
In “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) a resident told the SMM that a shooting incident had occurred at the edge of the village on 2 October, resulting in the killing of four people. At an “LPR” checkpoint in the village an “LPR” member stated that four armed “LPR” members had been killed by unknown persons while driving a private car across a nearby field.
The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 08:50 at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,200 pedestrians queuing to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas. An hour later the SMM noted the number of people in the queue had increased to approximately 1,500 pedestrians. A man (aged 40) told the SMM that he had waited for two hours. At the same time the SMM saw 25 pedestrians waiting to pass the checkpoint in the other direction. In the morning at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 200-250 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 400-500 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction.
At the government checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed an engineering vehicle clearing ground and two cranes installing concrete fencing on the north-eastern side of the road, ostensibly for the construction of a new entry-exit checkpoint. At the government entry-exit checkpoint in government-controlled Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw a crane dismantling the concrete fencing and loading it on a truck, which then travelled to the checkpoint in Maiorsk and unloading it there.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access
- On 10 October, on the eastern edge of government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM was not able to proceed further east as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that demining work had yet to start in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM was unable to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as the Russian Federation officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In government-controlled Bohdanivka, the SMM was not able to proceed east towards the disengagement area as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM because, according to him, mines on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) had yet to be removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not proceed further from both sides of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On four separate occasions on the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska (inside the disengagement area) the presence of mines and mine hazard signs restricted SMM’s freedom of movement. At the T-junction of a road leading west from the Prince Ihor monument (at a location 850m west-north-west of the monument) with the road leading north the SMM saw an anti-personnel fragmentation mine (MON-90) attached to an unarmed warhead (a part of BM21 rocket) on the ground at the side of the road, which prevented the SMM from proceeding further north. The presence of a mine hazard sign at the side of the same road leading west (at a location 1.15km west-north-west of the monument) prevented the SMM proceeding further west. An armed “LPR” member in the area advised the SMM not to proceed along the road, citing the presence of mines. On the road leading to the north from the above-mentioned location – near an “LPR” checkpoint – the SMM saw four mine hazard signs over a stretch of approximately 150m on the edge of the road. Two “LPR” armed members at the checkpoint advised the SMM not to proceed further as the area was mined. The SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge) as it observed a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the bridge. On each occasion the SMM informed the JCCC.
- On two separate occasions on the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area the possible presence of mines and UXO interrupted SMM’s attempt to reach the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area). While on foot patrol on Moskva Donbas Street the SMM was not able to proceed further to the railway bridge due to the presence of mines and contamination of UXO. On Donetska Street, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel advised the SMM not to proceed further to the railway bridge due to the presence of mines and booby-traps. The SMM also observed mine hazard signs. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas as “LPR” members present on the spot informed the SMM that demining had not taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side as the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel informed the SMM that demining had not taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
Conditional access:
- A “DPR” member initially allowed the SMM to enter a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area. After the SMM checked the serial numbers of present weapons, another armed “DPR” member arrived and told the SMM to leave the premises immediately citing the lack of an “order” from his superiors to allow anyone to enter. The SMM informed the JCCC.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.