Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 23 November 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM recorded multiple ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In Kherson and Kyiv, the SMM continued to follow up on the situation at the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea.

Positioned at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation post at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk), between 10:34 and 13:11hrs[1], the SMM observed numerous ceasefire violations, namely 21 explosions and several bursts of small arms, light-infantry and light-anti-aircraft fire. In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 explosions (including outgoing and incoming mortar fire), small-arms fire and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-10km south-east of its position. In “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard fire from small-arms and light anti-tank weapons 2-5km west of its position. The SMM also recorded kinetic activity (including explosions) in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), and “DPR”-controlled Petrovskyi district (20km south-west of Donetsk city centre).[2] Whilst in government-controlled Rivnopil (56km north-west of Mariupol), the SMM heard ten explosions, assessed to be mortar shells, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, approximately 5km south-east of its position. The JCCC office in Mariupol said these explosions were consistent with a live-fire training exercise at a site which was not communicated to the SMM.

The situation remained generally calm in most areas of Luhansk region. The SMM did, however, record ceasefire violations in three locations. While in government-controlled Chervonyi Zhovten (40km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 explosions, 3km north of the SMM’s position. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in Chervonyi Zhovten told the SMM the explosions were related to engineering works. Positioned in “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a single undetermined explosion approximately 2-3km west of its position. Located between the Prince Igor monument and the “LPR” checkpoint near the bridge leading to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion north-east of its position followed by 20 bursts of small-arms fire 100-200m south-east of the SMM’s position originating from an “LPR” position near the monument.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited one Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The serial numbers of four anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm) did not match the serial numbers in the inventory and one mortar (2B9, 82mm) was missing.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal and movement of heavy weapons. Neither “DPR” nor “LPR” members have yet provided the requested inventory or locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons as requested by the SMM on 16 October. The Ukrainian military authorities have also as of yet to provide such information. Nonetheless, the SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

Revisiting one such holding area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM observed 12 previously recorded towed field guns (152mm, 2A36, Giatsint) present.  

Revisiting such holding areas controlled by “DPR”, the SMM observed that nine mortars (120mm, PM-38) and 13 towed artillery (D-30,122mm) were present. Eight previously recorded towed artillery (D-30,122mm) and five previously recorded mortars (120mm, PM-38) were missing.

In government-controlled Sloviansk (94km north of Donetsk), the SMM attended the closing hearing in the trial against the head of the village council in government-controlled Krasnotorka (76km north-west of Donetsk) accused of “facilitating the activity of a terrorist organization” under Article 2583(1) of the Criminal Code. The court found him guilty of assisting the “DPR” and informing the “DPR” about individuals who did not support “DPR” activities, and sentenced him to eight years of imprisonment.

Concerning the conditions for civilians waiting at checkpoints at the contact line, the SMM met with the deputy head of the Mariupol department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to discuss their initiative to construct four “warm up” places at checkpoints in government-controlled Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk); Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk), Novotroitske (36 km south-west of Donetsk) and Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk). The interlocutor said the department will inspect the area around the four checkpoints for mines and, if necessary, put warning signs in place.

On 23 November, the SMM followed up on explosions and the disruption of power supply across the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea (see Daily Report 20 November 2015). In Chaplynka (70km south-east of Kherson), the SMM observed that the damaged pylons were in the same condition as the previous day. Six activists representing Crimean Tatars and Right Sector in military attire who were guarding the pylons preventing their repair said they had no instructions from their superiors to allow the repairs. In Kyiv, the SMM met the acting director of Ukrenergo, the energy company responsible for the pylons, who said that repair works could start once the blockade activists, comprised of several groups, including Crimean Tatars, would sign an agreement with Ukrenergo that had been discussed before. He said the agreement regarded repair works and it was not foreseen that electricity would be switched on after a successful repair. According to him, the two nuclear power stations in Zaporizhzhia and Yuzhno Ukrainsk were not affected by the incidents.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• On 23 November, armed “LPR” members denied access to the SMM through an "LPR" checkpoint (52km north-west of Luhansk) and to Zholobok (48km north-west of Luhansk) citing security concerns.

Conditional access:

• While in “LPR”-controlled Sverdlovsk (61km south-east of Luhansk) armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint and informed the SMM that they would escort the SMM during their monitoring in the city. The escort consisted of two armed “LPR” members who monitored all the SMM conversations with interlocutors.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfillment of its mandate”.

[1] All times are in Kyiv time unless otherwise specified.

[2] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.