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Spot report
OSCE SMM Spot Report 11/2021: Long-range unmanned aerial vehicle damaged in emergency landing due to dual GPS signal interference
- Source:
- OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (closed)
- Our work:
- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Regions:
- Eastern Europe
At 19:00 on 23 April, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, upon take-off from its base in Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). Subsequently, at 19:05, while flying over areas near Yablunivka (government-controlled, 49km north of Donetsk), the long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming.
At 19:09, while flying over areas near Oleksandro-Kalynove (government-controlled, 47km north of Donetsk), having registered persistent dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, and being unable to find an interval in jamming in which to effect the transfer between short- and long-range antennae, the SMM commanded the UAV to return to its base in Stepanivka. Between 19:09 and 19:50, the Mission conducted an orbit manoeuvre in order to regain a GPS signal to allow the safe landing of the aircraft but was unable to do so. At 19:30, the Mission requested, on both sides of the contact line, that jamming be ceased; however, it persisted. At 19:51, due to the risk of a loss of spatial control, the Mission enabled the Emergency Control Mode over the aircraft.
At 19:52, the aircraft completed an emergency landing at its designated landing spot in Stepanivka. As a result of the impact, the aircraft sustained damage to its internal fuel tank, landing gears, and underslung camera pod. Long-range UAV flights are now suspended pending a technical assessment, including to identify any additional damage to the aircraft.
Since 21 March 2021, the SMM’s long-range UAVs have been experiencing increased levels of GPS signal interference on take-off and landing, affecting both of their GPS receivers, in areas near their base in Stepanivka (See SMM Spot Reports of 7 April 2021 and 9 April 2021). The Mission notes that, in each case, the source of GPS signal interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.
The SMM yet again notes that OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117 specifies that the SMM shall have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. Unrestricted and unconditional access to all areas is essential to ensure effective monitoring and reporting of the security situation, the ceasefire, the withdrawal of weapons, demining, as well as disengagement. The mandate also tasks the Mission to report on any restrictions of its freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate.
These incidents hinder the Mission’s ability to conduct effective monitoring and reporting of the security situation in line with its mandate. Long-range UAVs are an essential part of SMM operations, especially at night and in areas where the Mission’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted. While the SMM cannot identify the precise source of jamming, it has observed the presence of jamming equipment on both sides of the contact line.