Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 18 June 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city.
• Small-arms fire in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle flying east of Shyrokyne, in areas between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations
• The SMM observed small-arms fire impacts inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance in an asphalt road near Marinka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (125), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 280 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), at westerly and southerly directions of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and in areas south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city

At 70 Bashkyrska Street in the northern outskirts of Donetsk city, the SMM observed a single-storey residential house with its roof missing and its north- and west-facing brick walls partly burnt down. It saw a hole (1m in diameter) in the upper northern corner of the house, about 3m above ground, as well as two broken north-facing window panes and a broken west-facing window pane. It also saw that glass panes from a north-facing door were missing. At the same address, the SMM observed a second residential single-storey house, located 5m west of the first one, with two broken window panes and glass panes missing from a door, as well as multiple holes (0.5cm-5cm in diameter), all on its east-facing side, assessed as caused by shrapnel. The SMM assessed the damage to both houses as caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a north-westerly direction. The owner of the second house (a woman in her thirties) told the SMM that her mother, who lived in the first house, had been absent when the damage occurred on the evening of 16 June, while she and her husband had been at home when she heard an explosion, gone outside and seen the roof of her mother’s house on fire.

Small-arms fire in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying east of Shyrokyne

Positioned about 1km north-west of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km west of Mariupol) while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard seven bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as at a distance of 3.5km east and as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 3.5km east of the patrol’s position in areas between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On 15 June, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska(government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed ten holes (1-2cm in diameter, 20cm-4m above ground) in and around an observation post of a Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position: two in its south-facing inner and two in its south-facing outer wall, as well as six more in two military barriers (one made of sandbags and the other of concrete) located immediately south of the observation post. The SMM assessed all holes as fresh and caused by small-arms fired (for previous observations from the area see SMM Daily Report 10 June 2019).

On the morning of 18 June, the SMM camera near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk)recorded an airburst 3-5km south-south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). During the day on 18 June, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM recorded an undetermined explosion 2-3km west, assessed as inside the abovementioned disengagement area. On the night of 17-18 June and during the day on 18 June, positioned in three locations, the SMM recorded 15 explosions and about 20 shots within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

18 June 

The SMM noted that:

• 92 tanks (36 T-64B, 26 T-64 and 30 T-72), seven towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm) and six mortars (three2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and the rest undetermined) were again missing; and 
• seven mortars (four M120-15 Molot, 120mm and three PM-38, 120mm) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Non-government-controlled areas

17 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk), and
• an IFV (probable BMP-1) near Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk).

Government-controlled areas

17 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) parked between residential houses in Svitlodarsk.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two ACVs(types undetermined), an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

On 17 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted for the first time a 450m-long extension of a Ukrainian Armed Forces trench (not visible in imagery from 21 April 2019) about 500m south-east of the south-eastern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-east of Donetsk), as well as two additional trenches (100m each) running towards the north-east and south-east, assessed as new forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces located about 400m west of the nearest forward positions of the armed formations. 

Other weapons observed[4]

The SMM observed a towed anti-tank gun (type unknown) near Seleznivka (government-controlled, 97km north of Donetsk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance near Marinka and mine hazard signs near Marinka, Novomykhailivka and Olenivka

The SMM observed for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a rocket from a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21, Grad122mm) and as not recent, embedded in the middle of the asphalt of road H15, 10m north-west of a fortification belonging to a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces located about 1km south of Marinka. 

The SMM observed a red and white mine hazard sign with instructions on what to do when finding a mine/UXO in Ukrainian, 5m east of a road next to an uncultivated field about 2km south of Marinka (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 19 December 2018).

The Mission observed for the first time three red mine hazard signs with the words “Danger, Mines” in Ukrainian, Russian and English placed 4m east from the edge of an asphalt road in an adjacent field, 200m, 400m and 1.5km north of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed for the first time two wires, assessed as trip wires, attached to a red mine hazard sign in the median strip of road H20, about 1.2km south of a checkpoint of the armed formations in Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It also saw that eight anti-tank mines previously observed in the eastern lane of the same road, about 200m north-east of the aforementioned mine hazard sign, were no longer present.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) and to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 17 cars (five with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), two buses (with Russian Federation licence plates), and seven pedestrians (five men and two women, aged 20-50) entering Ukraine, and 20 cars (six with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring inKherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro,Chernivtsiand Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• During the evening of 17 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk) and Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).[5]
• On 18 June, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km west of Mariupol), the SMM heard seven bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at its UAV, which it landed safely.
• On the same day, on three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Shyrokyne. 
• On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre. 

[5]The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.