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Daily report
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 3 January 2019
- Source:
- OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (closed)
- Our work:
- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Regions:
- Eastern Europe
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Between the evenings of 2 and 3 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
- The Mission recorded about 450 ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area and observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s access was also restricted near non-government-controlled Izvaryne and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (seven), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (12), compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion).
Disengagement areas[2]
On the morning of 3 January, positioned 1.8km north of Petrivske for about an hour, the SMM heard about 450 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and three shots of small arms fire 1km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
On 2 January, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in a revetted position west of road T1316 and north of a railway bridge, inside the Zolote disengagement area (about 900m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. During the day on 3 January, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).
During the day on 3 January, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
2 January:
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:
- three tanks (T-72) south-west of Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
2 January:
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- four tanks (T-72) about 1.5km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk); and
- a probable heavy weapon (type undetermined) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
3 January
- A tank (type undetermined) near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)
Weapons storage sites beyond withdrawal lines
Heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
3 January
- A self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing
- New weapon observed present for the first time
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]
Government-controlled areas
2 January
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- two probable armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and one probable IFV (BMP variant) about 1km north-west of Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk)
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) north-east of Artema (26km north of Luhansk)
3 January
- An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on a military truck in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)
- An IFV (BTR-3) near Myrne (63km south of Donetsk)
Non-government-controlled areas
2 January
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- an APC (MT-LB) fitted with an anti-aircraft (ZU-23, 23mm) about 1km west of Molodizhne.
SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
Border areas not under government control
While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.
While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine and 29 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*
While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six pedestrians entering Ukraine and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
- At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding towards the city centre or from traveling east. The SMM saw civilian cars passing the checkpoint.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.
[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.