Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 9 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The Mission observed fresh damage from gunfire to a garage door in a residential area of Yasynuvata. It continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The SMM observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside the area, on the northern side of the road bridge. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and again near Bezimenne and Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water and electrical infrastructure in Luhansk region.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (160 explosions).

On the evening and night of 8-9 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from west to east, two projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east and an undetermined explosion, followed by a total of one explosion assessed as an outgoing mortar round, two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, seven undetermined explosions, 211 projectiles in flight and six muzzle flashes, all 0.5-4km south-south-east to south-west. Two explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds were also recorded 100-400m south-east.

The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, two projectiles from east to west and two projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by a total 197 projectiles in flight and one burst, all 2-4km south-south-east and south.

The SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 12 undetermined explosions and a projectile in flight from west to east, followed by a total of 22 explosions assessed as airbursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) rounds, five projectiles, two bursts and ten muzzle flashes, all 3-5km north-east.

The SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, 14 projectiles in flight from west to east, 17 projectiles from west-north-west to east-south-east and eight projectiles from east-south-east to west-north-west, followed by a total of 87 projectiles, all 1-5km north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period the SMM recorded six ceasefire violations (all were explosions)

The SMM observed fresh damage from gunfire in a residential area of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). At 33 Hoholia Street, the SMM saw a bullet hole in the upper left corner of the west-south-west-facing door of a brick garage that stands next to a residential building. The SMM also saw that two bricks left of the garage door were chipped. A woman (in her fifties) who introduced herself as resident of the house told the Mission that the door had been damaged around 20:30 on 8 August during nearby shelling.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 8 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two bursts in vertical flight assessed as anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) rounds 1-1.5km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 9 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two people assessed as probable Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on the northern side of the road bridge. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily 19 July 2018.)

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 8 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 8 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk). On 9 August, the SMM saw a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) moving in a north-westerly direction near Minkivka (78km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 8 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four tanks (T-64) on railway flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 8 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (SNAR-10) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk). On 9 August, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of anti-tank mines. On 8 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across a road approximately 3km east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). The same UAV also again spotted 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) (eight laid in two rows across and four scattered on the same road) on the north-western edge of Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). On 9 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted a total of 18 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on road H21 leading to the Shchastia bridge, 14 about 1.8km north-east and four about 2.3km east-north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) respectively.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to water distribution infrastructure near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk) and Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk); to electrical infrastructure in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka; and to a parking lot at the railway station in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). In addition, in Luhansk region, the Mission monitored and facilitated a transfer of funds in relation to a water payment from non-government to government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (nongovernment-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, claiming that “it was for the SMM’s safety”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.