Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 June 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period, following a renewed commitment to ceasefire for 24 hours from midnight on 1 June. The Mission observed multiple impact sites in Lukove. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere.* The Mission saw anti-tank mines and new trenches in Pervomaisk and an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted new trenches in Stanytsia Luhanska. In violation of the withdrawal lines, the Mission saw howitzers near Metalist and Novooleksandrivka. The Mission facilitated and monitored electric repairs in Pervomaisk. It visited a border area not controlled by the Government in Luhansk region. The SMM monitored a public gathering in Dnipro and followed up on reports of the reconstruction of houses in Balakliia.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions).

On the evening and night of 1 and 2 June, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, one illumination flare in vertical flight, one illumination flare from east to west, one projectile in flight from north to south, two illumination flares in vertical flight from north to south, seven tracer rounds in flight from north-west to south-east, nine projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, two projectiles in flight from north to south, one tracer round in flight from east to west and seven tracer rounds in flight from west to east, followed by aggregated totals of 20 projectiles in flight (11 from north to south, two from north-east to south-west, one from south-west to north-east, three from west to east and three from north-west to south-east), 14 tracer rounds in flight (seven from north to south, five from south to north and two from north-west to south-east), and one undetermined explosion, all 3-5km east-south-east. On 2 June, the same camera recorded one explosion assessed as impact and two airbursts 4-5km east-south-east, followed by two explosions assessed as impact 3-7km south.

On the evening and night of 1 and 2 June, the SMM camera at the “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded, in sequence, one projectile in flight from west to east, one undetermined explosion, one illumination flare in vertical flight, one illumination flare in flight from south-west to north-east, one undetermined explosion assessed as impact, one projectile in flight from west to east, two tracer rounds in flight from west to east, one illumination flare in vertical flight from west to east, one undetermined explosion, one projectile in flight from east to west, one projectile in flight from west to east and two undetermined explosions, all 6-8km north-east. The following day, the same camera recorded ten explosions assessed as impacts, 12 undetermined explosions and one airburst, all 2-7km north east.

On the evening and night of 1 and 2 June, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, nine tracer rounds in flight from east to west, three tracer rounds from west to east, 28 undetermined explosions, four tracer rounds from west to east, one from east to west and seven from west to east, all at unknown distances north-north-east.

On the evening of 1 June, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), in about 15 minutes, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 8-10km north, four undetermined explosions 7-8km south-west and eight shots assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher fire 6-7km west.

On 2 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and two shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, 3-5km west.

In Luhansk region the SMM observed two white flares near Stanytsia Luhanska on 2 June.

The SMM continued to follow up on allegations of damage to civilian properties in residential areas caused by shelling. On 2 June, the SMM observed a number of fresh impact sites in “DPR”-controlled Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) and assessed that they were all caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a west-south-westerly direction.

Also in Lukove, inside the courtyard of an agricultural compound east of road T-0519, the SMM saw five fresh craters, two tractors, two trucks and five trailers all with broken windows, flat tyres and perforations from shrapnel, and a storage building at the north-west corner of the courtyard which had a one-metre hole in its south-facing wall and a section of its roof measuring 8m by 1m had been blown off. A warehouse about 20m south-east of the courtyard had broken windows on its north-facing wall. The SMM saw a collapsed 5m section of concrete wall north-east of the courtyard and a fresh crater (1m in diameter and 30cm deep) 3m north of the wall. The SMM saw a grain elevator adjacent to the courtyard, with its corrugated steel walls blown sideways and assessed that it had sustained a direct hit. It also had shrapnel damage to the roof. The concrete surface surrounding the grain elevator was broken in places. The south-facing windows of a small building 30m north of the grain elevator were broken. At the north-eastern edge of the compound, about 100m from the courtyard, the SMM saw a minibus with broken windows, flat tyres and holes caused by shrapnel, as well as a truck with its engine and front cabin destroyed. About 10m south of the vehicles, the SMM saw a fresh crater (3m in diameter and 0.5m deep). There was also damage to a building about 5m north of the vehicles, with indentations of various sizes in its south-facing wall. The SMM saw technicians repairing damaged electricity lines on the south-west, south, and north-east edges of the compound.

Outside of the same agricultural compound on road T-0519, about 100m south-south-west of the entrance and 20m south of a bus stop, the SMM saw a crater (3m in diameter and 0.5m deep). The bus stop also had several indentations to its south-facing concrete wall. At an abandoned gas station south-west of the compound, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the asphalt (60cm in diameter and 10cm deep), 10-15m south-west of the gas station.

At 8 Radianska Street, the SMM saw a house with a broken window frame and a barn with several holes on its south-facing walls. About 50m from the house, in a field 120m west of road T-0519, the SMM saw three fresh craters (all about 3m in diameter and 0.5m deep).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

While present in the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM noted a calm situation.

On the morning of 1 June, at a checkpoint 800m north of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three barriers partly obstructing the road and observed three unarmed “LPR” members digging a trench on the side of the road. In the afternoon, the Mission observed two trenches converging toward the middle of the road, leaving about 2m of unbroken surface. Two armed “LPR” members removed a wooden plank with five anti-tank mines from each trench to allow the SMM vehicles to pass through.

On 2 June, at the same checkpoint, the SMM saw the same three barriers partly obstructing the road.* Beside two of the barriers, within each trench, was a wooden plank with six TM-62 anti-tank mines. Two Russian officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), who were also present, photographed the barriers and told an “LPR” member at the checkpoint that the placement of anti-tank mines was a violation of the Framework Decision on disengagement. One of the officers told the SMM that the mines would be removed by the morning of 3 June.

On 31 May, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted new trenches with indications of recent excavations about 40m inside the disengagement area near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska. On 2 June, while present in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed two white flares assessed as outside the disengagement area, 100m north-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, on 31 May an SMM mini UAV spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near “LPR”-controlled Metalist (7km north-west of Luhansk). On 2 June, near “DPR”-controlled Novooleksandrivka (75km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 13 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that six towed howitzers (D-30) and 15 mortars (PM-38, 120mm) were missing, as previously observed.

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that eight tanks (T-72) were missing, as previously observed. The SMM also observed weapons present for the first time.

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle[2] in the security zone. The SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-4) near government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). About 200m from the southern entrance of “DPR”-controlled Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw again an unexploded 120mm mortar round half embedded on the right side of the asphalt road.

The SMM observed demining activities on 2 June at the road junction near government-controlled Ozerne (formerly Illichivka, 100km north of Donetsk). The SMM saw areas marked with red wooden sticks in the woods and a sign that said demining was ongoing by a mine-clearance organization.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC.  On 1 June, 1km north of Pervomaisk, the SMM monitored in order to facilitate employees from the Luhansk Main Power Transmission Lines repair pylons on the Mykhailivka-Almazna power line. The SMM saw 11 workers and five members of a demining team doing repair work. The SMM observed that the work was still ongoing on 2 June.

On 2 June, in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM monitored in order to facilitate an assessment of the water quality and supply from the Siverskyi Donets river at the Luhansk Power Plant pumping station. The SMM saw four employees of a power supply company carrying out assessments.

The SMM visited a border area currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk), in about one hour, the SMM saw ten civilian cars (nine with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), one covered minivan (with a Ukrainian licence plate driven by a man in civilian clothes) and five passenger buses with Ukrainian licence plates (one marked “Krasnyi Luch-Rostov” with about 35 passengers, one marked “Luhansk–Rostov” with about 30 passengers, one marked “Luhansk-Krasnodar” with about 40 passengers, one marked “Gorlivka-Moscow” with about 50 passengers, and one marked “Stakhanov-Yalta” with about 45 passengers), and three covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM saw eight civilian cars (five with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates), and two covered cargo trucks and trailers with Ukrainian licence plates queuing to enter Ukraine. At the same crossing point the SMM saw five pedestrians (all men) exiting Ukraine and seven pedestrians (all women) entering Ukraine.

The SMM observed the transport of coal in government-controlled areas. While on road T1306 near government-controlled Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed six empty trucks travelling towards government-controlled Sievierodonetsk. A while later, on the roads T-1306 and H-21, the SMM saw at least five of the same trucks loaded with coal and moving towards Shchastia. According to a representative of a power supply company, the trucks were carrying coal from Sievierodonetsk to Shchastia.

On 1 June, the SMM monitored a public gathering in Dnipro and followed up on reports of the reconstruction of houses in Balakliia.

On 1 June, the SMM monitored a gathering in Dnipro of about 300 people (70 per cent men, various ages) in front of the City Hall. Speakers expressed opposition to the appointment of a former Berkut commander as municipal police chief. About 30 police officers were present at the event, which ended peacefully.  

On 1 June in Balakliia (94km south-east of Kharkiv), the SMM monitored the reconstruction of residences damaged during the explosions that occurred at an ammunition depot on 23 March. (See SMM Daily Report 15 April 2017.) In a district about 1km from the depot, the SMM saw one completely burnt house and three partially damaged houses. Ten residents told the SMM that reconstruction of the houses had not yet begun. In another district 3km from the depot, the SMM saw workers fixing the roof and windows of an apartment building. Three residents of the building told the SMM that construction was proceeding slowly but that they were satisfied with its quality.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Kyiv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the Mission’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed as no demining had taken place. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed “LPR” members told the SMM that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said no demining had taken place and that the road south of the bridge remained mined. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to a lack of security guarantees and the possible presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC. 
• At a checkpoint 3km north of Pervomaisk, the SMM could not proceed due to three new barriers partly obstructing the road. Armed “LPR” members did not allow the SMM to photograph the barriers.
• At the western edge of a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk), an unarmed man denied passage to the SMM. The Mission informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.