Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 19 August 2015

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The number of ceasefire violations observed at and around Donetsk airport decreased. The overall situation in Luhansk remained relatively tense with a similar level of ceasefire violations observed in comparison with the previous day. The SMM observed damage caused by shelling and conducted crater analyses in several locations.

The overall security situation at and around “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk airport (9km north-west of Donetsk) remained tense; however the number of ceasefire violations observed there by the SMM decreased in comparison with the previous day. Between 08:00 and 16:57hrs, from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at Donetsk railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM recorded a total of 31 explosions – both incoming and outgoing - mostly consistent with mortar (88mm and 120mm) at distances ranging between 2 and 15km south-west, west, north-west, north and north-east of its position[1].

The SMM visited “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (38km north-north-east of Donetsk), where it was informed by residents about shelling in their neighbourhood on 16 August. The SMM saw one tree in a garden, hit by shelling, with all branches cut off. It examined the impact location, but no remnants of the ammunition or shrapnel were found. The owner of one house damaged by shelling showed the SMM a piece of shrapnel allegedly found in one of the affected rooms. The SMM analysed the shrapnel and assessed that it was shrapnel of 125mm main battle tank (MBT) ammunition.

In government-controlled Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed that all buildings were heavily damaged by shelling and seemed abandoned. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer present informed the SMM that there were approximately 20 residents remaining in the village, living without electricity. Five residents - mixed gender, mostly elderly - told the SMM that they had difficulty leaving the village due to checkpoints that were blocking the surrounding roads, and that the village had been shelled every night.

The SMM went to government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol), where at 14:34hrs it heard three explosions and small-arms fire 4-6km east of its position.   Subsequently between 14:48 and 14:55hrs, seven explosions were heard from an easterly direction.

The overall situation in Luhansk remained relatively tense with a similar level of ceasefire violations observed by the SMM in comparison with the previous day. The SMM recorded several ceasefire violations in areas north and north-west of Luhansk city including government-controlled Zolote-3 (near Zolote, 60km north-west of Luhansk), at government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), south of government-controlled Nyzhni (58km north-west of Luhansk), and near “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR)”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).  

In Shchastia, following up on information received from local residents about alleged shelling on 18 August, the SMM observed two fresh craters near buildings in a residential and commercial area. It assessed that 82mm mortar - fired from a south-easterly direction - had caused the craters.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer in Shchastia told the SMM that at approximately 14:10hrs on 18 August, in government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (25km north of Luhansk), railway tracks had been blown up while a train was travelling to Shchastia. According to the interlocutor, the train had consisted of 45 wagons loading coal from an “LPR”-controlled area to the Shchastia power plant. He added that the last two wagons and 20m of railway track had been destroyed. He told the SMM that the incident site is a mined area located around 1km from the contact line. 

The SMM visited the “LPR”-controlled southern side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), where an “LPR” member told the SMM that their position had been shelled several times during the previous night. The SMM could verify one fresh crater on the bridge. It assessed that the crater had been caused by 82mm mortar fired from a northerly direction.

The SMM revisited two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations comply with the respective withdrawal lines. In the first holding area, all weapons were present and their serial numbers matched the SMM’s records. In the second holding area the SMM observed that four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM also revisited two Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas whose locations comply with the Minsk withdrawal lines. It observed that the first area was completely empty and six previously recorded Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS, 122mm) were missing. In the second area, the SMM verified that all previously registered weapons were present.

The SMM observed the following weapons in areas that are non-compliant with the Minsk withdrawal lines: in “DPR”-controlled areas, 1 military-type truck towing a 122mm artillery piece (D-30), 4 military-type trucks towing covered artillery pieces (most likely 120mm mortar or 122mm howitzers) – in the same area. 

The SMM met with representatives of the Department of Education of the Mariupol city administration who stated that there are 2000 children of internally displaced persons (IDP) currently enrolled in schools and kindergartens in the city. According to the interlocutors, all 68 schools are ready to open on 1 September and courses on landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) awareness will be introduced in the school. 

The SMM attended the Dnepropetrovsk regional state administration weekly co-ordination meeting, where the First Deputy Governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region suggested to the attendees that some candidates have tried to persuade IDPs to vote for certain parties in the October local elections by offering them material incentives. According to the social protection department of the regional administration, there are 72,768 registered IDPs in the region.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.

*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the “LPR”, have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM.

Denied access:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), the SMM was stopped by a “DPR” member who ordered them to leave the area, accusing them of being “spies”. The SMM turned around and departed the area in his escort and subsequently he stopped them again and threatened to “blow up the SMM vehicles”, if they would not leave immediately.
• At a “DPR”-controlled checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Shirokyi village (6.5km south-south-west of Donetsk city), the SMM was stopped and not allowed to proceed by a “DPR” “traffic police officer” who cited security reasons and the need for clearance from relevant “authorities”. After two hours when the SMM intended to leave the checkpoint to return to the base, it got blocked by two armed “DPR” members. After another five minutes, the SMM was allowed to turn around and depart.
• In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM was not allowed to proceed further by an “LPR” member due to alleged “on-going fighting” in the west of the town and in the direction of “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk). The SMM had to turn around and could not verify the information about “on-going fighting”.
• At an “LPR” checkpoint on the outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Kirovsk (50km west of Luhansk), the SMM was not allowed to proceed further by “LPR” armed personnel who cited incoming heavy-mortar fire in the area.   

Conditional access:

• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint 4km west of Hranitne (48km north-west of Mariupol) the SMM was stopped and asked by checkpoint personnel about nationalities of its monitors. After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to proceed further after the patrol leader had informed of his nationality.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions on SMM access and freedom of movement” for further information.