Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed a similar level of violence in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous day. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons and noted heavy weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM also noted armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected.* The Mission observed a peaceful protest in Ivano-Frankivsk, organized by family members of soldiers.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region as observed during the previous day. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, during the night hours of 31 May- 1 June, the SMM heard 24 undetermined explosions and around 40 bursts (anti-aircraft-gun fire) 5-7km north and north-west from its position.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions 2-10km north, north-east and north-north-east of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east and about 100 bursts assessed as small arms and heavy machine-gun fire 2-5km south-east of its position.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region mainly during the night hours of 31 May-1 June. Whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM heard 244 undetermined explosions 2.5-6km south-south-east, south and south-west of its position.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, in violation of the respective withdrawal lines, an SMM long-rage unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted in “DPR”-controlled areas: 12 tanks in Budonivskyi district (6km south-west of Donetsk city centre); eight tanks in Leninskyi district (4km south of Donetsk city centre), and four tanks in Kalininskyi district (5km east of Donetsk city centre).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM UAV spotted five weapons systems assessed as multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in “DPR”-controlled Budonivksyi district of Donetsk city, four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in “DPR”-controlled Mineralne (10km north-east of Donetsk), three towed artillery systems (assessed as 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in “DPR”-controlled Yakovlivka (10km north of Donetsk), and one surface-to-air missile launcher (9K33 Osa, 210mm) in “DPR”-controlled Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.          

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 19 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm). The SMM noted two towed howitzers missing (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; one first observed missing on 9 July 2015 and the second on 22 April 2016).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon, and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM) near Mykolaivka (76km north-west of Luhansk), one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-70) near Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk) and one APC (BTR) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), six APCs (BTR), 19 command vehicles (military-type trucks with multiple antennas), 18 military-type trucks with portable command space with additional eight portable command space offices on trailers, ten other military-type trucks (eight Kamaz, two ZIL) and one bus with armed members in a residential area in Luhansk city centre. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed an automatic grenade launcher (30mm) loaded on a military-type truck (Ural) in Donetsk city and about 20 military-type trucks (Kamaz) of which most were marked with “7”, and three fuel trucks under camouflage netting in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).  In addition, the SMM UAV spotted three APCs and 15 military-type trucks in Mineralne, 18 APCs and 30 military-type trucks in Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city, six APCs and 26 military-style trucks Kalininskyi district of Donetsk city, one APC in Leninskyi district in Donetsk city and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) along the contact line and observed in Kominternove (“DPR”-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) one piece of UXO, assessed as an 82mm mortar round, stuck in the ground of a private garden. The SMM saw two other craters, but due to safety reasons the SMM could not conduct analysis. A resident told the SMM that the craters resulted from shelling which had taken place at the end of March and beginning of April 2016. At an “LPR” checkpoint in Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed 12 anti-tank mines (see SMM Daily Report, 30 May 2016).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to monitor the repair of gas pipelines in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and the repair of water pipelines between Artemove (government-controlled, 42km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka (“DPR”-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the queues at entry-exit checkpoints at the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed a line of approximately 50 civilians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and a similar number of civilians waiting to enter non-government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the average time of waiting was 20 minutes per person. The SMM spoke to people in the queues, who complained that they felt trapped in the line-up for several hours.

At a government-controlled checkpoint on H15 near government-controlled Marinka, the SMM observed 100 civilian vehicles waiting to enter government-controlled areas. After a few minutes being at the checkpoint the SMM heard ten shots of outgoing small-arms fire ten metres north of its position. No casualties or damages occurred and the SMM immediately left the spot.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In Novooleksandrivka (60km west of Luhansk) the SMM spoke to several residents who complained about the inability to move freely to and from the village. Their main concern for was the limited availability of food or medicine. An “LPR” member at a checkpoint located near “LPR”-controlled Marivka (67km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that, upon his supervisor’s decision, movement to and from Novooleksandrivka was restricted due to security concerns, without giving further explanation.

In Ivano-Frankivsk, the SMM observed a protest of about 20 women (middle-aged) in front of the regional administration building. They complained that the contract of their relatives serving in the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) had been automatically prolonged for additional three months (15 instead of 12 months). Representatives of the regional military headquarter, present at the protest, replied that extensions were in accordance with the presidential decree (dated 14 January 2015 – No. 15/2015) on partial mobilization. The SMM did not observe any police presence at the protest, which ended peacefully.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected as they have been since 20 May. As a result, SMM remote monitoring equipment at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine and in government-controlled Avdiivka are disabled (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2016).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.