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Daily report
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 13 October 2015
- Source:
- OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (closed)
- Our work:
- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Regions:
- Eastern Europe
This report is for the media and general public.
The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM revisited eight heavy weapons holding areas and a weapons storage site. The SMM observed the recovery of human remains from the Donetsk airport.
The SMM observed a generally calm situation in Donetsk region. At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation post at Donetsk railway station (“Donetsk People’s Republic”(“DPR”)-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard one explosion and three bursts of small arms, 3-4km north-north-east and north-east of its position, and 24 explosions approximately 10km south of its position. The SMM also heard and saw 52 explosions 3-4km south of its position, which were assessed as possibly related to demining activities.[1] At a JCCC observation post in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard one machine-gun burst from the general direction of Opytne (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk). Later, at the same observation post, the SMM heard two additional heavy-machine gun bursts from the direction of “DPR”-controlled Spartak (10km north-west of Donetsk). While in the vicinity of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint (government-controlled, 26km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard sustained small-arms fire. The Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC representative told the SMM that the source was Ukrainian Armed Forces training activities.
The SMM observed the recovery of unidentified human remains at the destroyed Donetsk airport (8km north-west of Donetsk) by “DPR” members. Representatives of the Russian Federation Armed Forces at the JCCC, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the media were also present. “DPR” members inspected several locations and the remains were eventually located in a burned armoured personnel carrier (APC). “DPR” members claimed that the APC had been destroyed in 2014.
At two Government checkpoints near government-controlled Novotroitske (32km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed long queues of civilian vehicles (similar to previous days, see SMM Daily Report 11 September 2015). At one checkpoint (36km south-west of Donetsk), 337 vehicles were waiting to proceed in the direction of government-controlled areas, while 55 were waiting to proceed in the opposite direction. At the other newly-opened checkpoint (41km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 10 October 2015), 130 vehicles waited in line to cross in the direction of government-controlled areas, while 25 trucks labeled as ICRC humanitarian aid and seven civilian vehicles were waiting to proceed to “DPR”-controlled areas.
The SMM was for the first time able to monitor the security and humanitarian situation in “DPR”-controlled Mineralne and Yakovlivka (10km and 8km north-east of Donetsk). Residents related to the SMM concerns with regard to their economic situation and the need for timely repairs of the school and kindergarten. The SMM visited the Yakovlivka grade school (grades 1 through 9), also attended by children from Mineralne. The SMM observed extensive damage to the building: many windows were covered with plywood and plastic sheeting. A teacher at the school informed the SMM that currently some 33 children attended the school, compared to about 50 pupils before the conflict.
In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a relatively calm situation. Nonetheless, the SMM noted a number of explosions: in “Lugansk People’s Republic” ("LPR")-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion east-north-east of its position. On the outskirts of government-controlled Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two large explosions south-south-west of its position, which it assessed to have been most likely related to “LPR” training activities in the area of Oleksandrivsk (“LPR”-controlled, 8km west of Luhansk). In government-controlled Orikhove Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six explosions 10-15km south-east of its position. The SMM heard one explosion 10-15km south of its position while in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM assessed that both incidents were most likely related to training activities in the area of “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km west of Luhansk). Additionally, in government-controlled Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two single shots fired from small arms approximately 6-8km south-east of its position.
In government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a queue of about 200 people (men and women, approximately 50-70). Interlocutors from the queue informed the SMM that they were waiting to receive humanitarian aid (food supplies) provided by a non-governmental organization.
The SMM revisited five “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. At three of the holding areas, the SMM found all previously recorded weapons present. At the fourth area, the SMM found that two howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were absent, as has been noted also on 5 October (see SMM Daily Report 6 October 2015). “DPR” members at the fifth “DPR” area did not allow the SMM to enter the area*.
The SMM revisited three Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. At the first area, the SMM noted that nine previously registered heavy mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) were absent. In the second area, six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were absent, as the SMM first noted on 18 July (see SMM Daily Report 18 July 2015). At the third holding area the SMM observed that nine previously registered anti-tank guns (2A29, MT-12, Rapira, 100mm) and one previously registered anti-tank gun (2A19 T-12, 100mm) were absent. Four of the anti-tank guns (2A29, MT-12, Rapira, 100mm) were first recorded absent in late May. In two of the areas, the SMM registered the serial numbers of additional weapons.
The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces weapons storage site and confirmed the presence of all weapons previously withdrawn to this site as stipulated in the Addendum to the Package of measures.
The SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) continued to observe concentrations of heavy weapons in areas in violation of the respective withdrawal lines: in “DPR”-controlled areas eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were observed at a training site in the area of Ternove (59km east of Donetsk), one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in the area of Petrivske (40km south-south-east of Donetsk) and eight main battle tanks (MBTs) at a training area in the area “DPR”-controlled Sontseve (57km south of Donetsk). In the area of government-controlled Bohdanivka (44km S of Donetsk), one MBT was observed.
The UAV also noted a concentration of more than 60 MBTs in the area of Ternove (59km east of Donetsk). Additionally, according to aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM, a concentration of military hardware was observed in the area of Chervonyi Zhovten (38km north of Luhansk), including 96 military trucks, 22 armoured vehicles, three heavy equipment transporter trucks, and 33 unidentified vehicles. The SMM also spotted outside the declared storage sites seven MBTs in the area of Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. Armed individuals continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.
Denied access:
- Armed men stopped the SMM from passing a checkpoint outside “DPR”-controlled Stavky (29km north-east of Donetsk), citing security concerns.
- “DPR” members at a heavy weapons holding area prevented the SMM from entering the area.
Conditional access:
- At a checkpoint in government-controlled Bohdanivka (42km south of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander refused to allow the SMM to proceed without escort. He explained that there is a minefield in the area. The SMM was escorted to the contact line and then back to Bohdanivka.
Delayed access:
- At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the exit of Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was delayed for 34 minutes. A soldier stated that he had to obtain permission from his superiors.
[1] For a complete breakdown of incidents, please see the annexed table.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.