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Daily report
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 4 October 2015
- Source:
- OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (closed)
- Our work:
- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Regions:
- Eastern Europe
This report is for the media and general public.
The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The situation in Donetsk and Luhansk remained generally calm. The SMM heard some explosions and small-arms fire. SMM monitored the withdrawal of weapons as required under the Addendum to the Package of measures. In Donetsk region, the SMM observed long civilian vehicle queues at several checkpoints.
At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), on 3 October the SMM heard 13 explosions approximately 5‑6km north-west of its position and one explosion 3.5km, north-easterly direction (likely at the Donetsk airport).[1] According to the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC, these were demining operations.
In Oleksandrivske, Bulavynske, and Olkhovatka (all “DPR”‑controlled, 47, 49 and 52km north-east of Donetsk respectively) the SMM observed a military-type truck marked “Demining Team” passing through the villages.
The SMM observed long vehicle queues at a number of checkpoints in Donetsk region. On 3 October, at the Zaitseve Government check point, the SMM observed approximately 200 civilian vehicles queuing to cross into "DPR"-controlled areas, while some 300 vehicles were waiting to cross into government-controlled areas. At the Maiorsk Ukraine Armed Forces checkpoint, the SMM saw some 150 vehicles queuing to proceed in the direction of Artemivsk (government-controlled, 66km N of Donetsk), while about 70 vehicles were queuing in the opposite direction. At the Government checkpoint in Buhas (46km south west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a queue of approximately 60 vehicles waiting to pass towards Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk) and a queue of approximately 120 vehicles waiting to pass towards Donetsk.
On 4 October, at the Marynivka (“DPR”-controlled 78km east of Donetsk) crossing point at the Ukraine-Russian Federation border, the SMM observed 57 vehicles, including two gas-cistern trucks, and two buses marked “Donetsk-Rostov” and with Ukrainian license plates waiting in queue. Some civilians complained to the SMM of the lengthy waiting time, which according to them was some 5 hours. At the Uspenka crossing point (“DPR”-controlled 73km south-east of Donetsk) at the Ukraine-Russian Federation border, the SMM saw 50 cars (eight with Russian Federation license plates) and 22 heavy trucks (all of them with Ukrainian license plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. SMM spoke to some travellers who also expressed their discontent with the waiting time, which according to them often exceeded 10 hours.
On a secondary road leading north from the E-58, towards government-controlled Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed mine warning signs on the side of an unpaved road.
On 4 October, in “Lugansk People’s Republic” (LPR)-controlled areas in Luhansk region, the SMM monitored the process of withdrawal of tanks in accordance with the Addendum to the Package of measures. The SMM observed the removal of 30 main battle tanks (MBTs, T-64 and T-72) from three areas, along three routes, to two storage sites, as previously announced to the SMM.
On 4 October the Ukrainian Armed Forces provided the SMM with details of the routes for the withdrawal of MBTs in addition to the previously provided details of weapons storage sites and of the weapons to be withdrawn in conformity with the provision of the Addendum to the Package of measures.
On 4 October, at a combat training area in "LPR"-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM counted 12 pieces of self-propelled howitzers (2S1 122mm Gvozdika), which conformed to the respective withdrawal lines. At a combat training area in "LPR"-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) where no live-fire exercises were taking place, the SMM observed on the same day 17 MBTs (T-64). Also on 4 October, the SMM observed one military support vehicle and one truck loaded with one tank (T-72) moving from the direction of “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) to the direction of "LPR"-controlled Uspenka (23 south-west of Luhansk).
On 3 October, in the area of government-controlled Krymske (43km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed three anti-tank cannons (MT-12, 100mm). On 4 October, in the area of government-controlled Popasna (59km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed four stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S3, Gvozdivka, 152mm).
On 4 October, the SMM re-visited two "DPR" heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. In both areas, the number and types of weapons present matched SMM records. However, the SMM discovered that one of the self-propelled artillery pieces (S21, Gvozdika) was replaced by a different item, the chassis numbers of which did not match SMM records. Also on 4 October the SMM revisited two “DPR”-controlled heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. Personnel denied the SMM access to one area. At the other, the SMM found five mortars (PM-38, 120mm) absent (first recorded as absent on 1 September).
The SMM revisited three Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas whose location corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. The SMM observed all previously recorded weapons to be present at one of the areas, but noted some weapons were absent at the other two areas. At one, 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm,) were found to be absent. The four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), four towed guns (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), and eight anti-tank guided missile systems (9K114, Sthurm) first absent on 12 July, were again absent. At the second area, five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) were again absent – as they have been since 24 July.
On 4 October the SMM revisited one Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area in a location corresponding with the respective withdrawal lines. The SMM recorded six anti-tank guns (2A29 MT-12, Rapira, 100mm). The serial numbers and the quantity of systems did not match the twelve weapons observed on the SMM’s first visit on 05 May, but they are identical to what was observed during the last six visits.
Through aerial surveillance, on 3 October the SMM also observed six main battle tanks (MBTs) and other military equipment in the “DPR”-controlled area of Komsomolske (74km north-east of Mariupol). On 4 October, the SMM UAV spotted 21 MBTs in “DPR”-controlled area of Sontseve (58km north-east of Mariupol), two towed artillery pieces in the area of Oktyabr (29km north-east of Mariupol) and in the area of Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) - one self-propelled howitzer (Gvozdika, 122 mm) and one MBT.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Lviv, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation. Armed individuals continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.
Denied access:
- On 3 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM at a checkpoint inside government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). The soldier informed the SMM that he has orders to restrict all movements trough the checkpoint. The SMM used an alternative route to proceed towards Severodonetsk.
- On 4 October, “DPR” members at a heavy weapons holding area denied access to the SMM. They stated that they have an order from their “commander”.
Other impediments:
- On 4 October the SMM UAV global positioning system (GPS) was jammed while flying over “DPR”-controlled areas north-east of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) as well as while flying over a government-controlled area west of Mariupol.
[1] For a complete breakdown of incidents, please see the annexed table.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.