Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 25 September 2016

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region both on 24 and 25 September, including 154 and 21 explosions, respectively, with almost all concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, compared with 209 in the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a relatively calm situation, with one explosion recorded compared with ten in the previous reporting period. The SMM observed heavy weapons in violation of withdrawal lines and armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian injured in Avdiivka and occupation of civilian buildings by armed formations in Yasynuvata. The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line and of civilians at checkpoints. The Mission monitored three border areas currently not under government control. The Mission was restricted in its freedom of movement, including in disengagement areas near Petrivske and Zolote and noted a calm situation in the wider Petrivske, Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote areas. The SMM monitored commemoration events along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea.  

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region both on 24 and 25 September, with 154 and 21 explosions recorded respectively, compared with 209 in the previous reporting period. Most of ceasefire violations were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area.

On 24 September, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and a continuous exchange of small-arms fire 2-5km south-east of its position. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded, throughout the day, 79 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons and 19 airbursts of rounds from unknown weapons, all 3-6km south-east of its location. The following day, the camera recorded 20 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons 3-6km east-south-east and south-east of its location.

In “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), on 24 September, the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions and hundreds of overlapping bursts and single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-6km west-north-west and north-west of its position. In “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM recorded on 24 September, three undetermined explosions and 60 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 6-12km north and west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, with one explosion recorded compared with ten in the previous reporting period. Positioned in Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), on 24 September, the SMM observed three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 15-80m of its position, from the direction of a nearby Ukrainian Armed Forces position, as well as one flare and two single shots of small-arms fire 100-300m south-east of its position. Positioned in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), on 25 September, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 1km west of its position.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in the general areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. On 24 September the SMM received baseline information on disengagement of forces and hardware from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In all three areas, the SMM noted a calm situation, but could not reach the disengagement area of Petrivske.* On 23 September, at the government checkpoint at the northern end of the closed crossing route near Zolote, the SMM observed a newly constructed underground shelter with a capacity of 20 people. The SMM also noted a smaller shelter used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel.

In Petrivske the SMM could not proceed west of the village, both on 24 and 25 September, due to the likely mine contamination, with the presence of a new mine hazard sign in the middle of the road.* A “DPR” member told the SMM he could not guarantee its safety from the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the area. The SMM observed a civilian vehicle drive, as well as “DPR” members and two civilians walk down that road. Some “DPR” members were walking on a gravel track where the SMM saw a new mine hazard sign. The SMM also noted the presence of armoured combat vehicles. On 25 September, the SMM asked for security guarantees for an SMM team coming from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). An armed “DPR” member told the SMM that his men would not fire, but he could not guarantee SMM safety from the danger of mines.*

The SMM followed up on reports of an injured civilian and damaged houses. On 25 September, medical staff at the hospital in Avdiivka confirmed to the SMM reports of a 42-year-old man injured by small-arms fire in his garden in the industrial zone of Avdiivka, near the contact line. On 24 September, the SMM followed up on an incident in government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (25km north of Luhansk) where on 22 September a Ukrainian Armed Forces infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) had damaged houses, an electricity pylon and a gas pipeline (See SMM Daily Report 23 September). The SMM observed that the electricity pylon had been replaced, the gas pipeline had been repaired, and the damages to the houses were being repaired by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel or by the owners. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 11 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk) and an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, on 24 September, as well as three stationary tanks (unknown type) near “DPR”-controlled Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk) on 25 September.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM noted ten stationary tanks (T-64) at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with criteria set forth in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted 24 self-propelled howitzers (12 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm; and 12 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), and 29 tanks (T-64). The SMM noted as missing five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), as first noted on 3 March 2016, and a tank (T-64). The SMM observed one site to be abandoned in addition to two other sites that continued to be abandoned, as first noted on 23 March, with a total of 25 towed howitzers (13 2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm; and 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) missing. The SMM also noted nine towed howitzers (2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm) present for the first time. In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM noted six multiple-launch rockets systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 15 towed howitzers (seven 2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm; and eight D-30, 122mm), four anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm), 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and two mortars (120mm).

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and observed that all weapons previously recorded as withdrawn to that site were present. One armed and two unarmed “DPR” members denied the SMM access to one part of a permanent storage site.*  

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone and armed formations in residential areas. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw, on 24 September: one stationary IFV (BMP-2) at the checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge; one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); one stationary IFV (BMP-2) at the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position just north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, where on 22 September the SMM had also seen a truck unloading concrete blocks (See SMM Daily Report 23 September); and a convoy of six armoured personnel carriers (APC; four BTR-3 and two unknown), at several locations, including Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk), heading towards Shchastia. 

In “DPR”-controlled areas on 23 September the SMM saw: two IFVs (BMP) stationary on the main road and one APC (BRM-1K) stationary behind a house in Petrivske, where the SMM also saw at least ten armed “DPR” members walking up and down the road; two APCs (MTLB), and one APC (BTR-60) between Makiivka and Khartsyzk (12 and 26km north-east of Donetsk, respectively), heading east; one IFV (BMP-1) stationary between two houses in a main street in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk), where the SMM noted several severely damaged buildings; on 25 September, the SMM saw three IFVs (two BMP-1 and one BMD-2) 10km south-east of Donetsk, and five IFVs (BMP) in Boikivske. In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed, on 24 September: two APCs (MTLB) parked behind a school in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), which was occupied by armed “LPR” members.

The SMM observed a new Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint and newly dug trenches 3.5km north-west of government-controlled Staryi Aidar (21km north-west of Luhansk). In the south-eastern edge of Yasynuvata, the SMM observed, for the first time, a two-storey house on the Kokkinaki Street flying a Russian and a “DPR” flag, while the veranda of the upper floor had been reinforced with sandbags. In the parking lot in front of the building, the SMM saw military-type trucks with “DPR” military-type plates.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In government-controlled Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk) residents (12 women of different age groups and two men in their fifties) said that their village lacked basic infrastructure such as shops, a post office, school, and healthcare service. In “DPR”-controlled Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed armed formations present in the village and armed men going in and out of two former administrative buildings. In “LPR”-controlled Obozne (18km north of Luhansk), on two separate days, residents (women, different age groups) complained about lack of water supply in the last three days in most parts of the village, and no information as to when it would be restored. An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint in Obozne told the SMM that there was running water at the checkpoint facilities.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and UXO near populated areas. On 23 September, in “DPR”-controlled Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw a trailer parked in the middle of the road, with two improvised mine hazard signs on it. Armed “DPR” members had denied the SMM access to the village on 2 September (See SMM Daily Report 3 September).* The SMM observed a civilian car driving off the tarmac and passing the obstacle, beyond which, some 300 meters towards the village centre, the SMM observed a “DPR” checkpoint. The SMM saw UXO (120mm mortar and RPG-7) at the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge both on 24 and 25 September, as reported previously. In Novooleksandrivka the SMM observed the tail of an 82mm mortar in the backyard of a house, as previously noted on 22 September.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 23 September, at a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka, an armed “DPR” member prevented the SMM from talking to the people queuing at the checkpoint.* Several people, however, separately told the SMM that they had started queuing at 3:00. The SMM assessed that, in four hours, about 70 passenger vehicles had crossed the checkpoint to travel towards government-controlled areas. The next day, within 90 minutes before the closure, the SMM saw 55 passenger vehicles returning from the area between the government and “DPR” checkpoints, towards non-government-controlled areas. Many told the SMM that they had been waiting since early morning and still had not entered government-controlled areas.

On 24 September, at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed some 300 people (men and women of different age groups) queuing to exit government-controlled areas and 50 people queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that 67 people (men and women of different age groups, including eight children) entered government-controlled areas within 15 minutes. On two occasions the SMM observed State Emergency Services staff assisting disabled elderly people with a wheelchair. At 07:50, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw some 500 people (men and women of different age groups, including children) queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas, and around 100 queuing in the opposite direction. People in the beginning of the former queue told the SMM that they had arrived at around 06:00 and had waited in the cold. At 10:15, the SMM observed similar numbers queuing in both directions. At 15:30 the line had reduced to 200 people (men and women of different age groups) queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas while 600 were queuing in the opposite direction. Medical personnel told the SMM that during the afternoon, they had assisted five persons with high blood pressure and a woman who had fallen down the wooden structure connecting the pieces of the destroyed bridge, injuring her left shoulder. On 25 September, the SMM continued to observe long queues of 700 people (men and women of different age groups) at this checkpoint. Several people complained that it had taken them four to five hours to cross in either direction.

The SMM monitored three border areas currently not under government control. On 24 September, at the border crossing point in Dovzhanskyi (85km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 47 passenger vehicles (12 with Russian Federation and the rest with Ukrainian licence plates), four buses and four closed cargo trucks queuing to leave Ukraine. The SMM also noted 22 vehicles (most with Ukrainian licence plates) parked nearby. The SMM assessed that the waiting time for passenger vehicles was about three hours due to a high number of travellers. At the Izvaryne border crossing point (53km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed, within two hours, 120 pedestrians, 77 passenger cars (50 with Ukrainian, 24 with Russian Federation and three with Belarusian licence plates), five busses, three fuel trucks and two closed trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) leaving Ukraine. The SMM also observed 50-60 pedestrians, 15 passenger cars, four closed cargo trucks, and four buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. On 25 September, at the Novoazovsk border crossing point (102km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM noted a calm situation.

In the area of the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea the SMM monitored two separate events commemorating the one-year anniversary of the economic blockade of Crimea, one at the crossing point near Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson), which was closed during the event, and one near Novooleksiivka (162km east of Kherson). The SMM noted around 250 people at each of the events, and police officers. The events ended peacefully.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate                                                                               

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 24 September Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers firmly denied SMM access to a compound in Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), also blocking its entrance with a vehicle. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).
• At the government checkpoint at the northern end of the closed crossing route near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), on both 24 and 25 September, the SMM could not proceed further to cross the contact line due to a likely presence of mines and booby traps. The SMM saw mine hazard signs along the road. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that he could remove an anti-tank obstacle to allow SMM access, but could not guarantee its security from a likely danger of mines and UXO. The SMM flew a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from that location and spotted two roadblocks in “LPR”-controlled areas, at the closed crossing route between Pervomaisk and a government-controlled part of Zolote. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On both 24 and 25 September, the SMM could not proceed further along the closed crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk and government-controlled Zolote due to the presence of concrete blocks on the road. Three armed “LPR” members informed the SMM that they had received instructions from their superiors to move all their belongings from a checkpoint there, as a truck would remove the concrete blocks. The SMM observed the “LPR” members load everything onto a vehicle. On 25 September, the SMM noted that some concrete blocks along the route had been removed, but the route continued to be blocked by other concrete blocks. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 24 September, one armed and two unarmed “DPR” members denied the SMM access to one part of a permanent storage site, which prevented the SMM from verifying weapons. The SMM noted fresh tank tracks coming from that respective area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area of Petrivske from government-controlled Bohdanivka as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not facilitate security guarantees for the SMM.
• On 25 September, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM was prevented from entering the disengagement area due to the presence of mine hazard signs on the westerly road connecting the village with the disengagement area.

Conditional access:

• On 24 September, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel allowed the SMM to visit a heavy weapons holding area only on foot. The site is far from the entrance and the SMM had previously been allowed to drive there.

Other impediments:

• On 23 September, at a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka, an armed “DPR” member prevented the SMM from talking to the people queuing at the checkpoint.
• On 24 September, the SMM heard small-arms fire in the area where it was flying a mini UAV near government controlled Bohorodychne (115km north of Donetsk). The SMM flew the UAV back immediately and informed the JCCC. (See SMM Spot Report 25 September.)

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.