Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 22 September 2016

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 63 explosions compared with 126 in the previous reporting period. Most of the recorded ceasefire violations occurred in the area of Yasynuvata-Avdiivka. The Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region (29 explosions compared with six). The SMM continued to observe the presence of weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines, including four multiple-launch rocket systems, and followed up on the presence of mines near populated areas. The SMM observed damages caused to houses and infrastructure in Nyzhnoteple. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to essential infrastructure in Luhansk region. The SMM encountered restrictions to its freedom of movement including in disengagement areas near Petrivske and Zolote, and noted a calm situation in the wider Petrivske area.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including half the number of explosions ofreporting period (63 compared with 126). Most of the ceasefire violations were recorded in the area of Yasynuvata-Avdiivka.

On the night of 21-22 September, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 20 shots of heavy-machine-gun 10km north of its location, as well as, within two minutes, 54 shots of small-arms-fire 6km west of its location. Later that night, while in “DPR” controlled Donetsk city centre, between 22:45 and 23:01, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 10-11km north-north-west of its location.

On 22 September, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), between 13:25 and 14:35, the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as outgoing round, as well as hundreds of shots of small-arms fire 2-5km west of its position. The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), between 14:06 and 18:40, recorded 24 explosions assessed as impacts 3-6km east-south-east of its location.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region (29 explosions compared with six explosions) than in the previous reporting period. All the explosions were recorded during daytime before midday.

Positioned 2km north-west of government-controlled Mykolaivka (77km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions assessed as live-fire exercise 2km south-west of its position, outside of the security zone.

Positioned at an “LPR” checkpoint 4km south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), within 15 minutes, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km south-west of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an unknown distance west of its position. While in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 10km north-east of its location.

Positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM, accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), assessed the security situation in the nearby Petrivske disengagement area as calm.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, on 21 September the SMM observed four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) stored along with ammunition in a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound near government-controlled Ivanivka (59km south-west of Donetsk). On 22 September, the SMM observed an anti-tank guided missile system (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) mounted on an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near the bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, on 21 September, the SMM observed nine towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), attached to Kraz military trucks, stationary in a forest near government-controlled Lisne (20km north-west of Mariupol). On 22 September, at a known training site near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw ten tanks (T-64). On 22 September, the SMM observed at least 20 tanks (T-64s) loaded and stationary on a train together in government-controlled Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk)

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. On 21 September, the SMM observed three IFVs (BMP-2) in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). On 21 September, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed two IFVs (BMP-2). On 22 September, the SMM saw three IFVs (BMP-2) near the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the military presence near civilian infrastructure. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, at the last Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position on the bridge, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a crane truck unloading concrete blocks. In government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk) the SMM followed up on allegations that a Ukrainian Armed Forces IFV had damaged various houses in the village, an electricity pylon and a gas pipeline. In the area, the SMM saw gas and electricity repair crews as well as members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Military Police who were registering the damages and about 12 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel doing repair works. The owners of the three damaged houses independently told the SMM that the incident had occurred between 05:48 and 06:00 that day. At all three properties the SMM saw damage to walls, gates and fences, while an outhouse was completely destroyed. The SMM spoke with a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who said that the damages had been caused by a BMP-1. In government-controlled Myroliubivka (46km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound located in a residential area. A representative of the village council informed the SMM that the military presence in the area was not a concern, adding that there was a good working relationship with them.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mine hazard signs. In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM observed that at least three streets of the village, one of them going west towards the Petrivske disengagement area*, each had one mine hazard sign (factory made with a white skull on red background, placed on wooden and/or metal sticks). The SMM saw at least 20 “DPR” members (armed and unarmed) were walking around those streets and entering a building assessed as the village administration.

The SMM followed up on the presence of mines near populated areas. At the eastern edge of government-controlled Pionerske (14km east of Mariupol) the SMM again  noted the presence of approximately 200 sea mines stacked and guarded by a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit (see SMM Daily Report 22 September). At the location, the SMM observed increased Ukrainian Armed Forces presence (including 15 soldiers and various military trucks), compared with the previous day. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer-in-charge told the SMM that his unit had informed local residents about their planned exercise and added that they have no intention to plant any mine in the sea. After a press conference, where a civil-military co-operation unit (CIMIC) representative stated that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were carrying out “engineering works” to reinforce the defence of the coastline, the CIMIC representative told the SMM that he could neither confirm nor deny whether any sea mines were or would be placed in the area.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repair works to essential infrastructure. The SMM monitored the cleaning of the water canal in the area of the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), as well as the repair works on water pipes in government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk) and on water wells in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM also monitored the repair works to the railway lines from “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (60km west of Luhansk) to government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and to government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 08:12 on 21 September, at the main “DPR” checkpoint on the H20 road near “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 330 vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas, and 55 vehicles waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At 13:11, the traffic flow was of 109 vehicles and six buses queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas, as well as 118 vehicles and eight buses waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At 08:35 at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 85 vehicles and approximately 400 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas, and 100 vehicles and approximately 500 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. At 12:55, the SMM counted 110 vehicles, 14 buses and 25 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas, as well as 70 cars, six buses and 50 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. In the afternoon of 22 September, at the two government checkpoints on the H15 road near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a total of 370 vehicles and 200 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas, and 250 vehicles and 150 pedestrians waiting in the opposite direction. In the morning, at the government checkpoint in government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 250 vehicles queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 50 vehicles waiting to travel in the opposite direction.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians travelling across the contact line at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Between 07:15 and 08:30, at the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 500 pedestrians queuing to exit government-controlled areas. At 07:30, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,000 pedestrians waiting to walk towards government-controlled area. The SMM spoke with five of them independently (two female and three male, approximately 35-55 years old) who had come from government-controlled areas and stated that it had taken them three hours to pass the government checkpoint.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 22 September, the SMM could not reach the disengagement area near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) from either side of the contact line because its access was blocked. At the closed crossing route connecting government-controlled parts of Zolote with “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM had to turn around after Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel refused passage, citing the presence of possible mines and booby traps beyond the government checkpoint. On the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed crossing route the SMM was also forced to turn around and continue in another direction, due to the presence of concrete blocks in the middle of the road near the “LPR” checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.

• On 22 September, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM was prevented from entering the disengagement area due to the presence of mine hazard signs (factory-made with a white skull on red background, placed on wooden and/or metal sticks) on the westerly road connecting the village with the disengagement area. The SMM observed that at least 20 “DPR” members (armed and unarmed) were walking around this and other mine-signalled streets.

Other impediments:

• On 22 September, at a “DPR” checkpoint in Yasne (“DPR”-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) an armed “DPR” member at a checkpoint told the SMM that the road between “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk and Olenivka (30 and 23km south-west of Donetsk, respectively) was closed.  The SMM observed multiple rows of downed trees and concrete barriers. The SMM took a different route.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.