Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 28 June 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty in a residential area of Pivdenne.The Mission observed fresh damage caused from gunfire in a residential area of Zolote-5 (Mykhailivka). The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Molodizhne and Zaichenko. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and a water pipeline in Obozne. 

In Donetskregion, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1]including explosions (about 290), compared with the previous reporting period (about 550 explosions).

On the evening and night of 27-28 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from west-north-west to east-south-east and a projectile north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by totals of six undetermined explosions and 45 projectiles (12 from west to east, nine from north-north-west to south-south-east, seven from west-north-west to east-south-east, six from north-west to south-east, five from east to west, five from north to south, two from east-south-east to west-north-west and one in vertical flight), all 0.5-2.5km south. 

During the day on 28 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka(government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions and about 80 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-5km in directions ranging from east-south-east to south.

On the same day, positioned 1.6km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 4-6km south-east and south-west. 

During the evening and night of 27-28 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 53 explosions (50 undetermined and three assessed as impacts) and about 130 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 2-9km east-south-east and south-east. The next day, at the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-4km east-south-east. 

During the day on 28 June, positioned in Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions, 2-6km east and south.  

On the evening and night of 27-28 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 13 projectiles in flight from south-south-west to north-north-east, four projectiles from south to north and an explosion assessed as an outgoing round, followed by totals of 41 explosions (37 undetermined, three assessed as outgoing rounds and one as an impact) and 225 projectiles (the majority from south to north, north to south and south-south-west to north-north-east) all 0.75-4km east.

During the day on 28 June, positioned near Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard 120 undetermined explosions and about 25 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at undetermined distances east and south-east.   

In Luhanskregion, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 26 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (66 explosions). 

During the day on 28 June, positioned near Syrotyne (government-controlled, 71km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 24 explosions assessed as impacts 20-25km south-east.  

The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty in a residential area of Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). At the hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk,  government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (67 years old) with a bandage on his left forearm and a woman (55 years old), his wife, with a bandage on the right side of her back. They told the SMM that they had been in the yard of their house onKaspiiska Street in Pivdenne on 27 June when they heard two explosions. The man said that shrapnel pieces from the incident remained in his arm. Medical staff told the SMM that the couple were admitted to the hospital with shrapnel injuries on 27 June. The SMM could not reach Pivdenne due to security considerations. 

At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, the SMM saw the body of a man (80 years old) who had passed away at the checkpoint on 27 June while he was waiting to cross into non-government-controlled areas. A medic told the SMM that he had provided medical aid to the man for half an hour, however he was then announced dead of a heart attack. 

The SMM observed fresh damage from gunfire in a residential area of Zolote-5 (Mykhailivka) (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk). At a second-floor apartment of a four-storey residential building on Voikova Street, the SMM saw a broken north-north-east facing window and a hole assessed as from a bullet, two small burn marks on the windowsill, a 10cm by 8cm hole on the north-north-east facing wall of the living room, and a similarly sized shrapnel hole on a north-north-east-facing balcony with the bullet/shrapnel still embedded. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by an unknown weapon fired from a north-north-easterly direction. A resident of the apartment, woman (76 years old) told the SMM that on 23 June she was woken by a loud noise and a bullet or shrapnel then flew over her head and hit a wall. At another second floor apartment at a nearby four-storey residential building, the SMM saw that a north-west facing window had been broken. A resident of the second apartment, a woman (70-80 years old), told the SMM that on 24 June she was woken up by a loud clap or burst. The SMM noted positions of the armed formations 700m north-east of the damaged buildings.  

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareof 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

During the day on 28 June, positioned 3km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-1.5km north, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area. The same day, positioned 1.5km west of Zolote-4 (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing round 1-2km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

On 28 June, the SMM saw reinforced trenches inside the Zolote disengagement area, 750m from the south-eastern edge of the area, but was not able to approach the site due to security restrictions. The same day, a fire lasting about 30 minutes was recorded by the SMM camera in Zolote, assessed as inside the disengagement area.  

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 28 June, the SMM observed a calm situation. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 27 June, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) on road H20 south-east of Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk): one stationary and another loaded on a transporter driving south. On 28 June, the SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) north-east of Yurivka (127km south of Donetsk) and a tank (T-64) loaded on a transporter entering Mariupol. 

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 26 June, in storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that seven towed mortars (five PM-38, 120mm, and two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm),  five self-propelled howitzers  (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 18 mortars (12 2B11Sani, 120mm, and six M120-15 Molot, 120mm) were again missing. On 28 June, in storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and noted that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing.  

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 11 tanks (seven T-72 and four T-64) were again missing.  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[2]in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 27 June, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (ARV) (BRM-1K) near Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one undetermined), an ARV (BRM-1K) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk), and an APC (BTR-80A) east of Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) and an IFV (type undetermined) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) one ARV (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk) and an ACV (type undetermined) east of Talakivka. On 28 June, the SMM saw two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 27 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six IFVs (BMP-1) north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB) in Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk) and spotted again a TORN radio intelligence system at the same location where it had previously been reported near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 9 June 2018). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six probable IFVs (type undetermined) and three APCs (two BTR-variants and an MT-LB) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol). 

On 27 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four fresh impacts in a field north of Sentianivka, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a northerly direction.

The SMM continued to observe mines, unexploded ordnances (UXO)andmine hazard signs. On a road between Talakivka and Pikuzy about 750m north-west of Pikuzy, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted, for the first time, four anti-tank mines on 27 June. Near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Nelipivka, an SMM mid-range UAV on 27 June again spotted more than 300 anti-tank mines laid in two rows running from north to south (See SMM Daily Report 22 June 2018). On the same day, near positions of the armed formations near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted more than 150 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in two rows running from east to west. On 28 June, the SMM saw again mine hazard signs and a tree lying across the roadway restricting movement near Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk) (seeSMM Daily Report 25 June 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard about 145 ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. At a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) over about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 44 cars (15 with Ukrainian and 21 Russian Federation licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates), five covered trucks (three with Ukrainian, one Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates) and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine. 

In Luhansk city, the SMM saw a humanitarian aid convoy of five cargo trucks with “Humanitarian aid from Russian Federation” written on them in Cyrillic, parked inside a logistics base. While there, the SMM also observed 15 men in dark blue uniforms with logos “MChS of Russia” and 20 pallets with blue boxes unloaded from the trucks.Two members of the armed formations refused to share information about the convoy with the SMM and said to contact other members of the armed formations for information.

At a reservoir near a phenol factory in Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), close to the contact line, recent SMM UAV footage from 15 June did not reveal new indications of military presence compared with imagery from February 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 15 February 2018). 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 28 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access: 

• Two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and prevented it from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming it was not safe for the SMM to continue. (seeSMM Daily Report 28 June). The SMM has visited impact sites from shelling in Pikuzy on three occasions in the past week (see SMM Daily Report 26 June 2018, SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018, SMM Daily Report 23 June 2018).
• Five armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM 500m from a location that the SMM had visited on 11 June north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk). One of them told the SMM that they were carrying out fortification works in the area and the SMM could not proceed without permission from other members of the armed formations. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM on 28 June temporarily lost communication assessed as due to signal interference[4]with two UAVs; a mid-range UAV flying about 1.5km north of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Popasna and a mini-UAV flying 4.2km north-east of the same checkpoint. 
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with a long-range UAV flying near Sakhanka, assessed as due to jamming. 

[1]  For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]  This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]  The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4]The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.