Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 12 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed overall fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region both on 11 and 12 June as compared to 10 June, although the level of violence remained high, in particular in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. The SMM recorded a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations in Svitlodarsk and Horlivka on the night of 10 June. In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a similar number of ceasefire violations on the night of 10 June – compared to the previous night and fewer during the remainder of the reporting period – compared to 10 June. On both sides of the contact line, the Mission conducted crater analysis and observed damages to civilian houses caused by shelling. The SMM noted a newly-constructed “LPR” position north of the Siverskyi Donets river at Stadnytsia Luhansk bridge and a newly-constructed Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Maiorsk. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire, and facilitated the transportation of a patient at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge for medical care. In Kyiv, it monitored the “Equality march”, which passed off peacefully. Armed “DPR” members kept the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected and the SMM faced one additional restriction on its freedom of movement, in a border area not controlled by the Government.*

The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region both on 11 and 12 June as compared to 10 June, although the level of violence remained high with more than 450 explosions recorded on 11 June and more than 300 explosions recorded on 12 June. 

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, during the night hours of 10 June, the SMM heard 59 undetermined explosions 5-7km north-west of its position. The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km north-west and 5-6km south-west of its position. On the night of 11 June, whilst in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 61 undetermined explosions 5-7km north-west of its position. On 12 June, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station, the SMM recorded 81 undetermined explosions, mostly 2-3km north of its position.

On 11 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 34 explosions assessed as caused by artillery fire 3-6km north-west and 22 explosions (two outgoing and 20 undetermined explosions) 2-10km west-south-west and west of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 119 explosions (eight of which were assessed as caused by mortar impacts) at locations ranging from east to south 2-5km of its position. On 12 June, positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 169 undetermined explosions 1-6km west and west-north-west of its position. On the same day, whilst in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 15 explosions at locations ranging from east to south 3-10km of its position.

During the night of 10 June, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 157 explosions (seven of which were assessed as caused by mortar impacts) 2-4km south of its position.

During the night of 10 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 63 explosions (nine of which were assessed as caused by outgoing 152mm artillery rounds and 28 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds - 14 impacts and four outgoing rounds) mostly 0.5-8km west of its position.

On 11 June, at the south-western entrance to “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that he had received orders to implement a ceasefire regime starting from 19:00 on 10 June. Subsequently, “DPR” members in Kominternove stated that they had received the same instructions. The following day, whilst in Kominternove, the SMM heard seven single shots of small-arms fire 1-2km west-north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a similarly high number of ceasefire violations during the night of 10 June compared to the previous night and fewer during the remainder of the reporting period – compared to the daytime of 10 June. During the night of 10 June, whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 3.5-4km south-west of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In south-western parts of “DPR”-controlled Horlivka, the SMM analysed four fresh craters in residential areas and assessed them as caused by 120mm mortar or 122mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that they had heard shelling around 01:30 on 11 June. The SMM observed a completely destroyed western side of a roof of a house.

In residential areas of “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk), the SMM observed damage to a wooden shed behind a house – a destroyed north-west-facing wall and a collapsed main pillar.  SMM crater analysis indicated that a 73mm recoilless gun (SPG-9) round – assessed as fired from a direction between north-west to north-north-west – had caused the damage. At another site in the area, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the tarmac and assessed it as caused by 82mm mortar round fired from a north-north-westerly direction. The SMM also saw fresh traces of a tracked vehicle at the spot and a resident told the SMM that he had seen a military-type vehicle with a “barrel pointing up” during the time of the shelling which, according to him, occurred on the night of 10 June.

In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM conducted crater analysis on two fresh craters – one in the garden of a house and another in a field 10-15m from a house and concluded that both had been caused by 125mm tank rounds fired from an easterly direction.

On the western outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), close to an “LPR” forward positions, the SMM saw at least two fresh craters and assessed that 82mm mortar rounds – fired from a westerly direction– had caused the craters. A local shop keeper (woman aged 60) in the village and five armed “LPR” members present separately told the SMM that in the early afternoon of 12 June, they had heard heavy explosions west of the village.

The SMM followed up on reports that that an 11 year-old boy had been wounded in Avdiivka on 11 June. Medical staff in Avdiivka hospital and the head of police in Avdiivka separately confirmed to the SMM the information, adding he had a bullet wound in his leg (7.62mm calibre bullet). The military doctor in Avdiivka hospital told the SMM that during the night of 11 June, 11 wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been admitted to the hospital and one had died during treatment. A surgeon in Volnovakha district hospital (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk) informed the SMM that 12 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been brought to the hospital with shrapnel wounds on 11 June.

The SMM continued to follow up on the loss of an SMM long-range UAV on 2 June over “DPR”-controlled Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report, 3 June 2016). On 11 June in Korsun, a civilian man told the SMM that shortly after what he described as the crash of the UAV he had seen several armed “DPR” members approaching the area on foot with large black bags and collecting the remnants. On 12 June, in the vicinity of Korsun, 12 residents separately told the SMM that on the day the UAV was lost they had seen two missile traces, the second of which had hit something and exploded. On 12 June, the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions the technical means to identify affiliation of UAVs was lacking.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM observed, beyond the respective withdrawal lines and outside storage sites, 13 tanks (T-64) at a training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) on 11 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM continued to observe a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 May) on 11 June. Also in violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile system (SA-13 Strela-10, 120mm) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) on 12 June.

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such a location and observed: 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm). The SMM also noted as missing 11 anti-tank guns (two T-12 Rapira, 100mm, first observed missing on 20 March; and three MT-12 Rapira, 100mm and six T-12 Rapira, 100mm, observed missing for the first time) and three Addendum-regulated mortars (two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, first observed missing on 20 March; and one 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, observed missing for the first time).

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: nine multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and two Addendum-regulated mortars (PM-38, 120mm).

Beyond the respective withdrawal line and outside storage sites, in government-controlled Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile system (SA-8 Osa, 120mm) moving, south towards security zone.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 50mm heavy machine-gun near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-70) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), on 10 June; two APCs (BTR-70) near Shchastia, two APCs (BTR-60) near  Nyzhnie, two APCs (BRDM-2) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), three APCs (BRDM-2) and two infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near Zolote, four APCs (one BTR-60, one BTR-4 and two BTR of undetermined model) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), one APC (BRDM-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) on 11 June; four APCs (three BTR-60 and one BTR-4) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Popasna, one APC (BRDM-2) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk),  one APC (BRDM-2) near Troitske on 12 June.

On 11 June, in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 12 empty cardboard cases of 82mm mortar ammunition and several plastic tubes which it assessed to contain explosive charges in an abandoned farm building located 300m away from the nearest inhabited civilian houses. In an open area adjacent to the building, the SMM also noted what it assessed as recently used mortar firing position facing east. 

The SMM continued to observe the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 12 June in “DPR”-controlled Nikishyne (60km north-east of Donetsk), at approximately 150m north of a “DPR” checkpoint, the SMM observed for the first time a mortar tail (which it assessed as unexploded) stuck in the asphalt road.  On the same day, in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve, the SMM saw for the first time a tail of an unexploded MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) missile stuck in the asphalt near both the entrance to a “DPR” compound and the entrance to the railway station.

The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. During the morning hours of 12 June, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 40 people waiting to cross the bridge towards government-controlled areas. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM observed 300 people waiting to proceed towards government-controlled areas and 30 people waiting in the opposite direction. In “LPR”-controlled parts of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed a new “LPR” forward position constructed from tires and sand, located north of the Siverskyi Donets river – approximately 250m north of an “LPR”-controlled checkpoint.

At the government checkpoint in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the officer in charge informed the SMM that the checkpoint had been closed in the early morning of 12 June due to shelling, and reopened at 09:00 after security check and demining procedures were completed. Shortly after noon, at a checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 505 civilian cars queuing to cross into government-controlled areas and 280 cars queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM noted a newly-constructed Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, which is located 500m south-east of the last government checkpoint in Maiorsk and 1,500m north-west of a new “DPR” checkpoint on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka, which had been recently constructed 900m further north-west of the last “DPR” checkpoint (see SMM Daily Report on 6 June).

On the north-eastern outskirts of Troitske, the SMM observed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers constructing two new positions. The SMM also saw a flag with two horizontal stripes, one red and one black, being stuck in the ground 100m from those positions. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) near Kominternove on 11 June.

The SMM facilitated co-ordination between employees of the State Emergency Service and “LPR” members at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge to transport a patient for medical care. Following up on information received from a man crossing from government-controlled area to “LPR”-controlled areas about a person having fainted between the government checkpoint and an “LPR” checkpoint, 150m north of the wooden makeshift ramp, the SMM saw an old man (aged 70) sitting on the ground. The SMM contacted representatives of checkpoints on both sides of the contact line in order to facilitate the transportation of the patient to an ambulance. At his own request, representatives of State Emergency Service carried him on a stretcher to the nearest “LPR”-controlled checkpoint, from where “LPR” members brought him into an ambulance.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable the handover of a DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) sample from a missing man for identification purposes, repairs to infrastructure, and demining works. On 11 June in government-controlled Shchastia, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire and facilitated the handover of DNA samples from the missing man. On the bridge between a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Shchastia and an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line, the SMM observed as the sample was transferred from “LPR” members to representatives of the Ministry of Defence. On the same day, in Shchastia, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable engineers of a power company to repair water pipelines in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable employees of the State Emergency Service to remove unexploded ordnance from water canals next to a coal power plant. The following day, in areas of an “LPR” checkpoint south of Shchastia and Vesela Hora, the SMM observed a crew of 12-15 electrical workers working on the electricity infrastructure accompanied by a demining team. 

The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government, at “DPR-controlled Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) on 10 June, at “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (53km north-east of Mariupol), at “DPR”-controlled Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), at “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) on 11 June, and at “LPR”-controlled Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), and encountered freedom-of-movement restriction on one occasion. At the border crossing point in Marynivka, the SMM observed 21 civilian cars and one bus (18 with Ukrainian licence plates, two with “DPR” licence plates, two with Russian Federation licence plates) waiting to cross into the Russian Federation while one commercial cargo truck (Ukrainian licence plates) was observed crossing into Ukraine. The SMM spoke to 10-15 people waiting in a queue, all told that they would use Ukrainian passports to pass the border crossing point. In the vicinity of the pedestrian border crossing point Sievernyi, during a 25-minute period, the SMM observed 18 pedestrians crossing into the Russian Federation and 11 crossing into Ukraine. An “LPR” member did not allow the SMM to proceed further to the border crossing point*.

On 12 June in Kyiv, the SMM monitored a march organized by activists of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. The SMM observed 1,300 people (men and women aged between 20 and 40) marching from Taras Shevchenko Park to Lev Tolstoy Square. It also noted several thousand police officers and two-metre-high steel fences and gates blocking all streets leading to the venue. On four different occasions, the SMM observed several people holding banners containing messages against the march. The event passed off peacefully.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In the vicinity of the “LPR”-controlled border crossing point Sievernyi, an “LPR” member did not allow the SMM to proceed further to the border crossing point.
• Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected as they have been doing since 20 May. As a result, SMM remote monitoring equipment at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine and in Avdiivka are disabled (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2016).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.