Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 9 December 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a number of ceasefire violations, mostly near Donetsk airport. It experienced a number of freedom-of-movement restrictions but it did reach border areas not controlled by the Government*. It noted a Right Sector protest in Kirovohrad and the election of a Svoboda party member as chairman of the Ivano-Frankivsk regional council.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in several areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Positioned 6km north-west of Donetsk, the SMM heard 39 undetermined explosions, and several bursts and single shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all approximately 3km to the north-north-west, in an area at and around Donetsk airport. A number of other explosions were recorded elsewhere, with all those in Luhansk region assessed as training-related[1].

In the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM revisited a school, approximately 1.5km south-west of the point where a woman died from gunshot wounds on 4 December (see Daily Reports, 7 December and 8 December 2015). The SMM noted the presence of well-armed “DPR” members inside the school – and indications that they were billeted there – as well as ammunition of various calibre and small arms and light weapons stored there. A 1.5m-deep trench connected the school with a nearby “DPR” checkpoint. There were no teachers or pupils at the school. The SMM observed no textbooks, visual aids or any other indications that the school was being used for educational purposes. Residents told the SMM that the school was not functioning.

The SMM continued to observe a Ukrainian Armed Forces presence in government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Reports 8 December and 9 December 2015), where it noted a number of military personnel and hardware. Further south in government-controlled Pyshchevik (25km north-east of Mariupol) – at a T-junction leading to “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol) – the SMM observed several houses occupied by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. At a “DPR” checkpoint west of Oktiabr, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions to the north-north-west.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site, where all previously-recorded weapons were missing. Outside the site, the SMM noted a column of seven tanks (T-72). At a “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) permanent weapons storage site, the SMM noted that all previously-recorded weapons were present.

In areas beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside storage sites – the SMM observed the following Addendum-related weapons: eight tanks near “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. “DPR” members have yet to provide the requested inventory of heavy weapons and locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons, as requested by the SMM on 16 October. Members of the “LPR” had provided the SMM with an inventory of heavy weapons, their serial numbers and the locations at which they are said to be stored, as requested by the SMM. The Ukrainian military authorities had earlier provided an inventory list of military equipment featuring weapons systems as well as their serial numbers, but not the locations to which the weapons are to be permanently withdrawn.

The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

At such Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed: 45 towed anti-tank guns (MT-12, 100mm); 17 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm); nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm); eight towed howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika); six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm); 12 towed howitzers (2A65, 152mm); 24 towed howitzers (2A36, 152mm); and, 21 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm).

The SMM also noted the presence of Addendum-related weapons at Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, namely 20 tanks (T-64) and 34 mortars (2B11, 120mm).

In areas beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside heavy weapons holding areas – the SMM observed the following heavy weapons: ten towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint, 152mm) near government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).  

The SMM monitored the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Sievernyi (51km south-east of Luhansk), noting a calm situation.

In a government-controlled village in Donetsk region, residents told the SMM that deliveries of coal to the village were more commonly made from areas not controlled by the Government than from government-controlled areas. The SMM observed a large pile of coal directly across the contact line in a “DPR”-controlled area, where residents were loading wheel-barrows and taking the coal back to the government-controlled area.

On 8 December in Komsomolske (59km south-east of Kharkiv), the chief engineer of the local electric power plant told the SMM that the plant – which uses 1,500 tons of coal a day – had reserves of 105,000 tons. He said the reserves had been recently filled by coal sourced from Rostov-on-Don in the Russian Federation. He added that the plant had been built in accordance with the specifications of Donbas anthracite coal, which is found on both sides of the border.

Outside the Roshen Chocolate Store in Kharkiv – owned by President Poroshenko – the SMM observed damage to the glass exterior of the shop and a small crater on the adjacent footpath. The SMM assessed that a concussion-type device had caused the damage. A Ministry of Internal Affairs official present at the scene told the SMM that an RGD-5 hand-grenade had been thrown at the shop in the early hours of the morning. Later, another Ministry of Internal Affairs official told the SMM that an RGD-5 hand-grenade had been discovered in the parking lot outside a district court in Kharkiv, where a high-profile case was in progress. The court hearing concerned an accused charged with crimes against national security and public order, under Articles 109 and 294, respectively, of the Criminal Code. The courtroom had been evacuated as the police dealt with the device, the official said.

In Kirovohrad (205km west of Dnepropetrovsk), outside the Appeal Court, the SMM observed approximately 100 people, mostly in military-style fatigues, wearing balaclavas and waving Right Sector flags. Twenty-four police officers in full riot gear, alongside 100-150 patrol police officers, were present. The town’s deputy chief of police told the SMM that members of the Right Sector were protesting outside the Appeal Court, demanding the court overrule a decision of a lower court to direct the arrest and detention of three Right Sector members on suspicion of involvement in a recent robbery. He said that unspecified members of Right Sector had allegedly threatened to use violence against members of the Appeal Court, if they failed to overturn the decision. 

On 7 December in Ivano-Frankivsk, the SMM monitored the first session of the seventh convocation of Ivano-Frankivsk regional council. The members elected a Svoboda party member as chairman of the council, 53 votes in favour and 31 against. Two days later in Ivano-Frankivsk, the city’s chief of police told the SMM that there had been a series of bomb threats made against various public buildings and institutions in the city, timed he said to coincide with the first session of the regional council.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas adjacent to the international border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• In a “DPR”-controlled north-western suburb of Donetsk city, armed men prevented the SMM from entering a compound, which another armed man, described as “shift commander”, subsequently said was a “military barracks”. Fifty metres from the facility’s main gate, the SMM noted traces on the asphalt which appeared to be created by an armoured tracked vehicle.   
• An “LPR” checkpoint “commander” prevented the SMM from passing through the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk).

Delay:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel initially refused the SMM entry to a military compound in government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) – citing the need to receive permission from their superiors – but allowed the SMM entry when they returned two hours later.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.