Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 3 March 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM observed fresh damage to civilian properties from shelling in Pikuzy.
- The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Lysychansk.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas, near Izvaryne, at a border crossing point outside government control, in non-government-controlled Pikuzy and again at a checkpoint near government-controlled Popasna.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-west of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled) and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).
Between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (including about 30 undetermined and impact explosions at an assessed range of 0.2-1km south-south-east, south and south-south-west), at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and again at easterly directions of Hnutove.
In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).
Between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north and south of Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Fresh damage from shelling in Pikuzy
On 3 March, at 49 Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), about 15m east of an inhabited one-storey house, the Mission saw a crater in soft ground and shrapnel marks on a fence. It assessed the damage as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction.
On Vatutina Street, the SMM saw that three south-east-facing windows of a one-storey house were shattered and that there were numerus shrapnel marks on the house’s south-east-facing wall and front door. The Mission also saw one fresh crater 1m and another fresh crater 2m south-east of the house. It assessed the craters as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. A man (in his fifties) who introduced himself as a resident of Pikuzy told the SMM there had been shelling in the area on the morning of 2 March.
Members of the armed formations restricted the SMM’s access to certain areas of Pikuzy.*
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 1 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded eight projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as an undetermined explosion, ten projectiles and an illumination flare, all at an assessed range of 1-6km east-north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the following evening, the same camera recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as two undetermined explosions and a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
On 3 March, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed for the first time a piece of ammunition, assessed as a remnant of an exploded rocket-propelled grenade round, about 3-5m west of the main road (around 70m north of the wooden ramps at the bridge).
On 2 and 3 March, positioned north-east of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines[4]
Government-controlled areas
2 March
The SMM saw:
- four towed howitzers (2A65, Msta-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
3 March
The SMM saw:
- 24 tanks (T-64) at a train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
3 March
The SMM saw:
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR 70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and
- an APC (BTR-60) in Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
2 March
The SMM saw:
- two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).
3 March
The SMM saw:
- two trucks assessed as parts of a TORN electronic warfare system in Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk).
Fresh impact craters
On 1 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted at least 20 fresh impacts craters assessed as caused by 82mm or 120mm mortar rounds in a field about 1.5km east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).
Casings of multiple launch rocket system in Donetsk city
On Putylivska Roshcha Street in Donetsk city, about 3.5km north-east of Donetsk central railway station, the SMM spotted an object lying on the side of the street which it assessed as a casing of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (a Grad type) rocket.
On 2 March, on Ananchenka Street in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), about 10m from nearest inhabited residential houses, the Mission saw an object embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the street which it assessed as a casing of an MLRS rocket.
On 3 March, at the Oktiabr mine compound (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw that the 120mm mortar round it had seen on 25 December 2018 25-50cm south of a road (about 100m south of the SMM camera site) was no longer present. A member of the armed formations told the Mission that the piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) had been removed.
SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure
On 2 and 3 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
Border areas outside government control
On 3 March, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw four cars (two with Lithuanian, one with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates) and six pedestrians (four women and two men, mixed ages) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw six pedestrians (four men and two women, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.*
On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw three men (in their forties) entering Ukraine and a man and a woman (in their forties) exiting Ukraine.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- On 2 March, at a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.
- On two occasions on 3 March, members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to certain areas of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On the first occasion, one of them denied the Mission access to Kirova Street. On the second occasion, another member demanded that the Mission leave the area “within one minute” due to safety concerns.
- On 3 March, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- On 2 and 3 March, the sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. For example, on 3 March, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the Mission that anti-tank mines on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Petrivske were still in place.
Delay:
- On 3 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and requested to see the patrol plan which the Mission refused to show. After about 30 minutes, he allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at Oktiabr mine were not operational.
[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] In Withdrawal of weapons section in SMM Daily Report of 1 March 2019, the sentence “22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk)” should have read “22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).”
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.