Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 31 March 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed a further increase in the number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a low number of ceasefire violations. It monitored and facilitated repairs of essential infrastructure. The SMM observed the marking of mined areas in the security zone. It followed up on reports of shelling. The SMM facilitated the safe passage of civilians stranded between Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” checkpoints in Luhansk region. The Mission reached a border crossing point in an area not controlled by the Government. The SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement mostly in areas not controlled by the Government*.  

The number of ceasefire violations observed in Donetsk region continued to increase compared with the previous day.[1] Whilst positioned 3km west of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) between 10:00 and 15:30hrs the SMM heard 445 undetermined explosions, saw seven impacts from an unknown weapon, and heard 61 bursts and 269 single shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-5km north, north-north-west, west-north-west, west, west-south-west, south-west, and south-south-west of its position. These constituted over 50 per cent of all ceasefire violations registered in the region. In government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 mortar impacts (five assessed as caused by 82mm mortars, six – by 120mm), 30 undetermined explosions from an automatic grenade launcher and recoilless gun (SPG-9), and numerous intermittent bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 7-8km south of its position.

During the evening and night of 30-31 March, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 5-11km north-west, north, and north-north-east of its position in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city. Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”- controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), from 08:35 to 13:00hrs the SMM noted a significantly calmer situation compared to the previous day, registering one undetermined explosion.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), between 16:43hrs on 30 March and 07:30hrs on 31 March, the SMM heard 116 impacts (assessed as caused by 82 and 120mm mortar rounds), two impacts from an automatic grenade launcher, and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-5km south-west and north-east of its position. Whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk),  between 18:22hrs on 30 March and 07:30hrs on 31 March, the SMM heard 86 explosions assessed as caused by mortar and artillery rounds and 35 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 6-12km south-south-west, west-north-west, and north of its position.

In southern Donetsk region, the SMM also noted an increase in ceasefire violations. In the evening hours of 30 March the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 12 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance north-east of the camera’s position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM continued to record a low number of ceasefire violations, most of which were assessed as part of a training exercise at a range outside the security zone, near government-controlled Dmytrivka (41km north of Luhansk).

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In government-controlled areas of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM visited a site near Ukrainian Armed Forces positions in a residential area close to the contact line. The SMM saw and analysed three craters and assessed that the first was caused by a 122mm artillery round, while the second and third were caused by 152 mm artillery rounds. All three craters were assessed as caused by rounds fired from the south-south-east. In government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM conducted analysis of two fresh craters in a field 150 north-west and 200m south-west of a Ukrainian Armed Forces position. It assessed that both were caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from the east. The SMM noted that the soldiers were digging trenches near their compound. Near “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk), the SMM analysed two fresh craters in the vicinity of an “LPR” position and assessed that both had been caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from the south-west.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations correspond with the withdrawal lines and noted that a number of weapons previously verified as withdrawn to those sites were absent, namely: 10 tanks (T-72) and three mortars (2B9, 82mm), for the first time; six tanks (T-64) and one mortar (2B9, 82mm) since 4 March; two mortars (2B9, 82mm) since 1 February.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one tank stationary among civilian trucks in a cement factory compound, approximately 2km south of “DPR”-controlled Komsomolske (42km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM observed four loaded towed howitzers (152mm) attached to trucks at a Ukrainian Armed Forces military compound near government-controlled Pryvilne (31km north of Mariupol).

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100 mm); 11 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS, 9K51/BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and 12 MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm).

The SMM observed the presence of other hardware within the security zone: seven armoured combat vehicles (ACVs, six BTR 70 one BTR 60) and two military trucks driving in convoy near government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk); three stationary IFVs (BTR and BMP) near government-controlled Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk); 15 ACVs (three BTR60 and 12 BRDM-2) and two military trucks driving in convoy at the southern outskirts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the marking of mined areas within the security zone. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoints near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw six mine hazard signs on the northern side of the road. All signs were square, approximately 30x30cm and either red/white (with skull and cross-bones) or yellow/red, reading “Attention Mines” in Russian and Ukrainian languages.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In “DPR”-controlled Vuhlehirsk (48km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw an unexploded MLRS rocket (probably from a BM-27 Uragan, 220mm), sticking out of the ground close to a civilian building, about 20m from the road. In “LPR”-controlled Shovkova Protoka (30km south of Luhansk) the SMM observed what was assessed as an unexploded MLRS rocket (possibly from a BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in the ground outside populated areas.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of essential infrastructure. The SMM monitored – on both sides of the contact line - repairs to a gas pipeline near government-controlled Marinka. Ukrainian Armed Forces civil-military co-operation officers at the site told the SMM that 370 metres of pipeline and trench remained to be completed in the area closest to the contact line. Whilst at the site, the SMM heard an engine noise consistent with a small aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicle and saw a flying object circling directly above the gas pipeline repair worksite. Works were suspended twice due to ceasefire violations in the area. The technical manager supervising the works told the SMM that even though some of the small-arms shots had impacted very close to the workers, they had been able to place 72 metres of gas pipe and dig 15 metres of new trench.

The SMM monitored the situation affecting civilians at checkpoints in Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). In government-controlled areas of Zolote the Ukrainian Armed Forces had announced the opening of a new checkpoint enabling civilians to cross the contact line and by noon Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel informed the SMM that several hundred people had crossed on foot in the direction of “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote. Armed “LPR” members at the first “LPR” checkpoint located some 2km south-east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, however, citing security concerns, denied them passage, and the SMM saw over 300 civilians on foot stranded on the road between the checkpoints. As the situation showed no signs of improvement throughout the day, in the late afternoon the SMM liaised with Ukrainian authorities to facilitate transport for those civilians, many of them elderly, to return to government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government and noted a calm situation at the pedestrian crossing point at Ulianivske (“DPR”-controlled, 62km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored the activities of the civil formation Asker at crossing points at the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea. At the Kalanchak crossing point (96km south-east of Kherson) the SMM observed a dispute between a man – known to the SMM as an Asker member – and customs and border guard officers, who told the SMM they had been irritated by the Asker member’s attempts to interfere with their work by being present at the passport control and customs checking area. The member claimed that the statute of the organization entitled the Asker to unrestricted access within the crossing point area, but the customs and border guards officers disagreed with this interpretation of the text of the statute.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint east of government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol) on the road to Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) citing security concerns.
• Armed men denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (21km south-west of Donetsk) and demanded to see monitors’ national passports.
• Three armed men approached the SMM whilst it was in the village “administration” building in border area “LPR”-controlled village of Diakove (70km south of Luhansk) and insisted on seeing the SMM patrol plan and claimed the SMM had to have stamped by their superiors. The armed men then told the SMM to leave the area.  
• An armed man approached the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Smile (32 north-west of Luhansk), aggressively requested the SMM to leave the area and threatened to destroy its audio-visual equipment (e.g. cameras, binoculars, SMM phones).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.