Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3 January 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

Note: This report covers the period from 19:30hrs on 30 December, the cut-off point for the last daily report.

The SMM observed a relative calm with only a small number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region and in Luhansk region. The SMM was able to reach Kominternove and observed craters that residents said had been caused on 31 December. “LPR” members in an area north of Troitske threatened to shoot the SMM if they did not leave the area. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling towards the Izvaryne and Dolzhanskyi border crossing points. “DPR” members refused the SMM access to the village of Oktiabr on three successive days. The SMM observed that a pylon on the Kakhovka–Titan power line that had been felled on 30 December had been replaced by 3 January. Marches commemorating the birthday of Stepan Bandera were observed by the SMM throughout the country.

The SMM observed a relative calm with only a small number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region between 31 December and 3 January[1]. From a position at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM observed no ceasefire violations on 31 December and on 3 January; one undetermined explosion on 1 January 4-5km north-east of its position and one undetermined explosion and three bursts of small-arms fire on 2 January. In southern parts of Donetsk region on 31 December, whilst in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 12 explosions (likely mortars) in an area 5km north-east of its position and, whilst in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard six explosions, most likely mortars, in an area to the east.

The overall situation in the Luhansk region was relatively calm between 31 December and 3 January, with two explosions heard by the SMM on 2 January in “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk).

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited “DPR” permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and found that all weapons, previously verified as withdrawn to the sites, were present. At one site, the SMM observed, in violation of the respective withdrawal line, 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) which are not regulated under the Addendum, but the Package of measures.

Beyond the withdrawal lines and outside storage sites, the SMM observed the following Addendum-regulated weapons: 25 tanks (T-64 and T-72), stationary in a training area near “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. The SMM is yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October notification.

On 2 January, the SMM revisited “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage sites. All weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the sites were present. 

The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such holding areas and observed: 35 howitzers (18 2A36/Giatsint-B, 152mm; and 17 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm). At one area, one howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) was observed as absent for the first time. Two areas were abandoned, as they have been since July and September.

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited one such holding area and observed six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm). “DPR” members prevented the SMM from accessing one site on 2 January.*

On 3 January the SMM observed two stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika 122mm) in an area north of “LPR”-controlled Troitske (31km south-west of Luhansk), in violation of respective withdrawal lines. The SMM was subsequently told by armed “LPR” members to leave the area, who threatened to open fire on the SMM if it did not comply*.

On 31 December, the SMM observed eight military-type trucks (Ural), two of which towed 120mm mortars near “DPR”-controlled Obilne (21km south-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

The SMM observed the presence of other hardware: seven tanks near “DPR”-controlled Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) beyond withdrawal lines; an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) on a Ukrainian Armed Forces truck travelling south-west in the direction of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol).

SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were subject to jamming on two occasions – on 2 January when flying near the landing site in government-controlled territory and also on 3 January near government-controlled Marinka (22km west of Donetsk city centre) and Maksymilyanivka (30km west of Donetsk city centre).*

On 3 January, the SMM visited Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) and observed approximately ten armed “DPR” members. The SMM was approached by a number of residents (male and female, elderly and middle aged) who said that the village was shelled on 31 December 2015. The SMM observed three craters, and assessed them to be have been caused by 82mm mortar impacts. At a nearby uninhabited house the SMM observed damage to gates, a fence and a tree in the vicinity assessed to have been caused by shrapnel and indirect fire, with the marks on the tree assessed as having been caused recently. A resident showed the SMM a tail fin from an 82mm mortar which, it was claimed, had been removed from one of the craters. Two “DPR” members appeared and prevented the SMM from visiting an area located east of the village*.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical infrastructure. A representative of the Luhansk water company in “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that since the water pump was repaired on 30 December, water is now supplied to four out of the five “LPR”-controlled villages planned, namely Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk), Lyman (11km north of Luhansk), Metalist (6km north of Luhansk), Svitle (10km north of Luhansk), although Shyshkove (10km north-east of Luhansk) is without water due to damaged water pipes. The SMM spoke with residents in these villages who said that they now have water, gas and electricity. Two residents in Metalist said that water is not supplied to all houses. They also said that water does not reach some apartments situated on higher floors.

On 31 December, the SMM observed that a pylon on the Kakhovka–Titan power line had been felled in an area 3km west of the village of Bohdanivka (93km east of Kherson). At the site, the SMM observed explosive damage to the pylon assessed as having been caused by a 120mm mortar or an improvised explosive device. The duty police officer in nearby Kakhovka told the SMM that the pylon had been intentionally felled when a 120mm mortar shell was placed at the pylon and detonated the previous night. According to him, a criminal case has been opened against unknown persons for intentional damage to electric power facilities (Article 194 (2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). On 2 January, the SMM revisited the location and observed a new pylon in place, replacing the one that had been felled. The technical director of the power grid in Kherson region told the SMM that all technical repairs had been completed by UkrEnergo but that the line has yet to be re-energized.

On 1 January, the SMM observed marches commemorating the birthday of Stepan Bandera throughout the country. In Kyiv, approximately 1,000 people (men and women, all ages) took part in a procession through the city. Some carried flags of the Svoboda party, Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor) and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. Approximately 1,000 police and National Guard officers monitored the procession. In Odessa, the SMM saw 300 participants (70% male, 30% female, with an average age of 30 years), some carrying flags of the Svoboda party and Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor). About 25 participants wore full or partial camouflage uniforms; some wore balaclavas. Thirty-five police officers were present. In Ivano-Frankivsk, the SMM observed approximately 200 participants (both men and women), including 40 soldiers, at a procession that was monitored by 12 police officers. Some participants carried flags of the Svoboda party. In Lviv, the SMM observed 300 participants (of all ages, 70% men), including members of the Svoboda party, the “Sich” volunteer battalion under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the non-governmental organization “Sokil”, in a procession escorted by 20 police officers. In Kherson, the SMM observed a march organized by approximately 20 members of the Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor), Azov volunteer battalion under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Svoboda party with the participation of approximately 80 persons (of all ages, 75% men). A small police presence was observed. All events passed off peacefully.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas alongside the border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• On 31 December, four armed “LPR” members at a training area near “LPR”-controlled Yurivka (26km south-west of Luhansk) told the SMM it was not permitted to be in the area and to leave immediately. The SMM subsequently contacted an “LPR” “commander”, who allowed the SMM to proceed a short distance further, from where the SMM observed an “LPR” camp. The “commander” did not allow the SMM to travel any further.
• On 1 January, armed “LPR” members near Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk) stopped the SMM and told them to leave the area immediately. The SMM left the area and was followed by “LPR” members in a military-type vehicle. When the SMM stopped to speak with the occupants of the vehicle, they said that the SMM was prohibited from leaving their vehicles while in the area of Pervomaisk.
• On 1 January, armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint near Uralo Kavkaz (45km south-east of Luhansk) stopped the SMM and prevented it from travelling towards the Izvaryne border crossing point. According to them, an anti-smuggling operation was ongoing. The SMM observed that all other vehicles were allowed to pass the checkpoint.
• On 1 January, armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint in Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol) and refused further travel. After waiting for an hour, the SMM left the location.
• On 2 January, armed “DPR” members denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area.
• On 2 January, armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (88km south of Donetsk, 4km east of Kominternove), and refused further travel. The SMM subsequently left the area.
• On 2 January, armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint in Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol) and refused further travel.
• On 2 January, armed “LPR” members refused the SMM access to a factory complex near Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk). The SMM had visited the site to follow-up on allegations that artillery systems were at the location.
• On 3 January, armed “LPR” members in an area north of Troitske (31km south-west of Luhansk), told the SMM to leave the area and threatened to open fire on the SMM if they did not comply.
• On 3 January, an armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM at a temporary checkpoint in Sverdlovsk (61km south-east of Luhansk) and prevented the SMM from proceeding further, ostensibly due to a demining operation in the town. The SMM explained that its intention was to visit the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Dolzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk) and not the town. Despite this, the SMM was denied passage. The “LPR” escorted the SMM away from this area to “LPR”-controlled Komsomolskyi (56km south-east of Luhansk).
• On 3 January, armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint in Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol) and refused further travel.
• On 3 January, armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from visiting an area located east of the village of Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol).

Delayed access:

• On 31 December, two armed “LPR” members in Alchevsk (40km south-west of Luhansk) asked to see the SMM's patrol plan. They told the SMM the plan was invalid because it lacked a signature from “LPR”. The armed men said they would escort the SMM to Luhansk city to resolve the situation, and that if the SMM did not obey, the patrol team would be arrested. After the SMM called the “headquarters” of the armed men, the SMM were allowed to continue its patrol after a 20 minute delay.

Other impediments:

• SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were subject to jamming on two occasions – on 2 January when flying near the landing site in government-controlled territory and also on 3 January near government-controlled Marinka (22km west of Donetsk city centre) and Maksymilyanivka (30km west of Donetsk city centre).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.