Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 28 August 2015

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. Ceasefire violations were recorded in numerous locations. The SMM observed damage caused by shelling and conducted several crater analyses in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The overall security situation at and around “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk airport (9km north-west of Donetsk) remained tense. Between 08:55 and 17:30hrs, whilst at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at Donetsk railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM recorded a total of 73 explosions – both incoming and outgoing - mostly consistent with mortar (88mm and 120mm) and automatic grenade launchers (AGL) at distances ranging between 1.5 and 6km north-west, north and north-north-east of its position[1].

In government-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), between 12:32 and 13:10hrs, the SMM heard 12 explosions from undetermined distance southeast of its position and saw one impact at a location 3km south of its position. Whilst in Kominternove, local residents showed the SMM three craters which they said resulted from shelling on 26 August. The SMM analysed craters in a residential area. Analysis indicated that 120mm mortar rounds – two were fired from the east, another one was fired from a westerly direction – had caused the damage including blown-out windows and a pitted roof. The SMM also observed that a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in the west of the village was closed for any residents, preventing them from crossing from the village into the west. The checkpoint commander told the SMM that following the shelling on 26 August the checkpoint had been closed for all traffic.

In “DPR”-controlled Yasne (30km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM conducted crater analysis on one impact of alleged shelling on 26 August. The SMM assessed it to have been caused by 125mm high explosive fragmentation shells of a main battle tank (MBT) fired from a southerly direction.

In “DPR”-controlled Holmivskyi (49km north-north-east of Donetsk), the SMM was told by local residents that shelling had taken place during the previous night. The SMM analysed three of six craters observed in and around a residential area and assessed that they had been caused by 122mm artillery fired from a north-easterly direction.

In government-controlled Zaitseve (50km north-north-east of Donetsk), the SMM visited a humanitarian logistic centre south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint located near the Kurdiumivka junction close to the contact line. The SMM observed around 100 people - mainly representative of local authorities, media and shopkeepers – attending the opening ceremony. The centre includes 53 food shops, a pharmacy, a bank and a police station.

At a checkpoint in government-controlled Buhas (60km north of Mariupol), the SMM observed a queue of 212 civilian vehicles waiting to enter “DPR”-controlled area and 150 civilian vehicles waiting to enter government-controlled area. The SMM spoke to some passengers - four women and two men – who said that they had been waiting for over five hours, while sometimes it had taken them more than 10 hours to proceed to cross the checkpoint.

The overall situation in Luhansk remained relatively tense with the SMM observing ceasefire violations in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited the checkpoint near the government-controlled northern side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), where a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer informed them that shelling and fire exchange had occurred during the previous night. The SMM observed and carried out analysis on three craters around the checkpoint, who assessed that they had been caused by 82mm and 120mm mortars – fired from a southerly direction. The SMM also visited four sites of a residential area in the town and observed four damaged civilian houses including a house with a completely destroyed summer kitchen, and another house with its roof entirely burnt. The SMM analysed craters and assessed that the impacts had been caused by 82mm and 120mm mortar.

At the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, an “LPR” member told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the previous night. The SMM analysed 33 craters around the “LPR” checkpoint in the non-residential area 200m east from the bridge across the contact line and assessed that most of them had been caused by 82mm mortar while others were consistent with rounds from infantry fighting vehicles (BMP1), mortar, automatic grenade launcher (AGS 17) and tank – fired from a northerly direction. 

In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on information received from “LPR” members about shelling during the night of 26 August. The SMM observed 29 craters in a non-residential area and conducted analysis on 28. The SMM assessed that 20 craters had been caused by 120mm mortar, six by 82mm mortar and two by 152mm artillery – mostly fired from a north-westerly direction.

In government-controlled Orikhove (56km south-west of Luhansk), local residents informed the SMM about heavy shelling that occurred the previous evening. The SMM observed temporary military installation in a residential area, saw civilian houses damaged by shrapnel fragments and met with one injured civilian. It found the remnants of ammunition from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on the ground in several sites in the village. The SMM could not conduct crater analysis due to the risk of unexploded ordnance.

The SMM visited an “LPR” training ground in the vicinity of Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), where it observed 40 MBTs (T-64). Around five of them were positioned in the shooting range and engaged in live-fire exercises.

At the checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed a crew conducting repair works of electricity pylons. The supervisor of the repair crew told the SMM that the high-voltage electricity cables, originating from the power station in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), were damaged in several places as a result of shelling.

The SMM – through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – spotted in “DPR”-controlled areas five self-propelled artillery in Rozdolne (46km south-east of Donetsk, 67 north-east of Mariupol), two MBTs in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) and two towed artillery pieces in Zaichenko (27km north-east of Mariupol). In government-controlled areas, SMM UAVs spotted two MBTs east of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk, 51km north-east of Mariupol).

On 27 August, the SMM revisited eight Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At seven areas at total of 22 heavy weapons previously recorded were missing: three towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing at one site, missing since 9 July; five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing at the second site, since 9 July; six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing at the third site, since 12 July; two MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing at the fourth site, since 12 July; two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were missing at the fifth site, since 9 July; two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were freshly missing at the sixth site; and two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were missing at the seventh site, since 22 August. At the eighth area for the first time the SMM was allowed to register serial numbers of twelve pieces of heavy weapon (six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six multipurpose light-armoured towing vehicles (MT-LB)).

The SMM also revisited two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. In one area, all previously registered weapons were present and their serial numbers matched the SMM’s records. In the second holding area the SMM observed that two previously recorded MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing.

On 27 August, in front of the regional police headquarters in Odessa, the SMM monitored 250 people (men and women equally, different age groups) protesting against Right Sector activists, who had allegedly destroyed Opposition Block tents, and calling police to protect its supporters. Around 100 police officers were present.

On 27 August, the SMM followed up on media reports of an explosion during the previous night at a Kyiv Branch of the Sberbank of Russia on Peremohy Avenue in Kyiv. The SMM observed shattered glass of the windows, a small indentation on the ground adjacent to the main entrance (30cm wide) and damaged frame of the main entrance.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv.

*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the “LPR”, have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM.

Delayed access:

• At a checkpoint in government-controlled Mykolaivka (63km north of Mariupol), the SMM was not allowed to proceed further by Ukrainian Armed Forces officer who cited that one of the SMM vehicles was not registered on their list. The SMM turned back 2km away from the checkpoint. After 20 minutes, the SMM tried to pass again and was allowed to proceed.

Conditional access:

•  At two “DPR” checkpoints in the south of Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the “DPR” members insisted on checking the passports of SMM monitors.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.