Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 21 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued to monitor the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (50), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations, including almost all explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations with a similar number of explosions (26), compared with the previous reporting period (about 30). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
Inside the disengagement area, about 250m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw at least 15 deminers of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, one of them carrying a metal detector, clearing and cutting vegetation on the western and eastern sides of the road.
The Mission also saw nine deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing and burning vegetation east of the broken section of the bridge, as well as a senior member of the armed formations, and a member of the armed formations wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it, next to the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge.[2]
Other disengagement areas[3]
On 20 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) on the southern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
20 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk);
- five multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk); and
- 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 30 July 2019).
21 August
The SMM saw six MLRS (BM-21) in the training area near Ternove (see above).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Non-government-controlled areas
20 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- 14 tanks (eight T-64 and six undetermined variants) in the training area near Ternove (see above);
- 12 towed howitzers (four 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm, four 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and four 2A36 or 2A65), a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) and three tanks (T-72) near Khrustalnyi; and
- 12 tanks (probable T-64) in a training area near Shymshynivka (see above).
21 August
The SMM saw three tanks (type undetermined) in the training area near Ternove (see above).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
20 August
The SMM noted that seven tanks (T-80B) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) were present and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) was present for the first time. The Mission also noted that 58 tanks (52 T-64 and six T-72), 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 11 self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) remained missing.
Weapons storage sites
At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
20 August
The SMM noted that 17 mortars (11 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, three 2B11 Sani, 120mm and three BM-37, 82mm) and 31 tanks (T-64) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
20 August
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:
- a probable infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near residential houses in Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk);
- an IFV (BMP-1) near Druzhba (45km north-east of Donetsk); and
- an ACV (type undetermined) on the southern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
20 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a fortified position made of logs and steel under construction next to an existing trench in a field about 1.7km north-east of Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery from 19 July 2019).
Mines near Novoselivka, unexploded ordnance near Shyrokyne
On 20 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 60 anti-tank mines in a field about 3.5km north-east of Novoselivka, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019).
On 21 August, the Mission saw for the first time an object, assessed as a 14.5mm armour-piercing incendiary tracer, lying on soft ground on the side of road M-14 about 1km west Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol).
The SMM saw that the 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in the asphalt surface on a road leading to the power substation in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) observed for the first time on 19 August 2019 had been removed.
Demining activities near Hranitne
In a field north of road T-0512, about 5.5km south-west of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 20 people wearing clothing with the logo of an international organization conducting demining activities (for previous observations from the area, see SMM Daily Report 8 August).
SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to enable maintenance works to a gas pipeline in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
Border areas not under government control
While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 13 cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians (ten women and four men) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 18 cars (three with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), four covered-cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians (four women and three men) exiting Ukraine.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, a member of the armed formations again asked the SMM to provide its patrol plan and “security and safety instructions”. When the Mission refused to present its patrol plan, its passage was denied.
- At a checkpoint in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “lack of orders from superiors”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delay:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, a member of the armed formations only allowed the SMM passage after a delay of about 30 minutes.
Other impediments:
- On the evening and night of 20-21 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying between Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Dyliivka (government-controlled, 49km north of Donetsk); between Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Samsonivka (non-government-controlled, 31km south-east of Luhansk); and between Khmelnytskyi (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Luhansk) and Snizhne (non-government-controlled, 72km east of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Dyliivka and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka.[6]
- An SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAVs’ positions.