Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 May 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations. The Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including, however, more explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons and observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere.* 'The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination shared part of an instruction to “DPR” members to restrict the mission's freedom of movement.* The Mission visited a border area currently not under government control. The SMM monitored public gatherings in Ivano-Frankivsk and Poltava.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 300), compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions).

On the evening and night of 11-12 May the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, nine undetermined explosions, one projectile in flight from west to east and 24 projectiles in flight from north to south, mostly 3-4km east-south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka for about five hours, in two minutes in the afternoon, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 11-12 May the SMM camera at the “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded 16 projectiles in flight from east to west, followed by one projectile in flight from west to east, one undetermined explosion and one projectile east to west, and then aggregated totals of two undetermined explosion, 40 projectiles in flight (12 from east to west, 25 projectiles from west to east, two north to south and one south to north), five illumination flares in vertical flight and one airburst, all 3-4km north-north-east. On 12 May, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions, mostly 2-5km west as well as bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire predominantly at unknown distances south-west and west-south-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening and night of 11-12 May, the SMM heard 134 undetermined explosions at locations ranging between 3-10km west-south-west and south-east, and three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of unknown weapons 2-6km north-west. The SMM also heard several hundred bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, mostly at locations ranging from 3km to 6km south-east. The following day, at the same location, within 20 minutes in the late afternoon, the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions 2-4km south-south-west and two undetermined explosions 3-6km south-south-east

On the evening and night of 11-12 May the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, three tracer rounds of unknown weapons in flight from east to west, four undetermined explosions and four tracer rounds in flight from west to east followed by aggregated totals of 232 tracer rounds (210 from east to west and 22 from west to east) and two explosions assessed as outgoing rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west to east, all at unknown distances north-north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 40). Positioned in government-controlled Pobieda (55km north of Luhansk) the SMM heard 35 explosions assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds, 21 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) and 500 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 8-10km south, assessed as live-fire exercise outside the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 11 May the SMM camera in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska recorded, in sequence, two heavy-machine-gun tracer rounds in flight from south-south-east to north-north-east 2.2km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area and four bursts of small-arms fire at the same distance and direction, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned 3km north of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) at the “LPR”-controlled checkpoint on the edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-5km south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

While the SMM attempted to reach the camera site in Petrivske, an armed “DPR” member at a checkpoint demanded to know the gender of the patrol members. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw three multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near “LPR”-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

In violation of respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted on 8 May five towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm) and one mortar (PM-38, 120mm) (as well as about 40 fired shell casings and another 14 unfired rounds of 85mm ammunition) near Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites the SMM saw two (tanks T-64) on flatbed trailers stationary on the H20 highway near Anadol (39km north of Mariupol), facing south.

The SMM revisited “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage sites and continued to observe that one MLRS (BM-21) and 13 towed howitzers (seven D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw one stationary armoured artillery reconnaissance vehicle (SNAR-10) based on armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) chassis on 11 May in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk). On 12 May, the SMM saw at least nine covered military-type trucks (with door markings painted over and thus obscured) moving west on the M04 highway, near Vesela Tarasivka (17km west from Luhansk).

In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one IFV (BMP-1) stationary on the H20 highway near Anadol, facing south; a military convoy of three vehicles, two cargo trucks and one truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a cargo platform, heading west near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). Positioned 2.8km south-west of Artema (26km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw three APC (MT-LB) moving east. On 8 May an SMM mini UAV spotted one APC (MT-LB), and two unknown tracked vehicles under camouflage netting near Lebedynske.

The SMM saw five fresh tracks on road H-21 assessed as from IFV (BMP-1) 3km south of “LPR”-controlled Stukalova Balka (9km north of Luhansk). Some 600m south of the village the SMM noted that three IFV (BMP-1) tracks left the road onto a dirt track heading east. Two such tracks continued north on the H-21 road.

On 11 May, the SMM saw for the first time a checkpoint made of concrete blocks on the H15 road, around 3km north-west from the Marinka entry-exit checkpoint (23km south-west of Donetsk). At the new checkpoint, a man in camouflage attire with an assault rifle, who introduced himself as a police officer from Marinka Police stopped the SMM and asked to see the patrol leader’s identification document, after which the SMM was able to proceed unhindered. The Mission saw two more men in such attire and wearing balaclavas, armed with assault rifles. On 12 May, the SMM noted that a checkpoint next to the road leading from Marinka roundabout towards Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk) had been removed.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the security zone. The SMM saw again the tail fin of one 120mm mortar protruding from the pavement at the eastern edge of the road (covered by a piece of metal) 100m south-west of the Prince Ihor Monument, outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. (See SMM Daily Report 8 May 2017.)

The SMM visited a border area currently not under government control. At the Novoazovsk border crossing point (101km south-east of Donetsk), in about half an hour, the SMM observed two pedestrians (women) and two civilian vehicles (with Ukrainian licence plates) enter Ukraine. The SMM also saw 40 large cargo trucks (with trailers full of grain, all with Russian Federation licence plates), stationary on both sides of the road, parked in the direction of exiting Ukraine.

On 11 May, the SMM noted that six central streets in Donetsk city had been blocked and cordoned off by about 700 unarmed men and women in black attire. People (some in apparently organized groups) were walking around with small black--blue-and-red flags and balloons. The SMM also saw many children and youth in organized groups, led by adults in civilian clothes. The SMM heard music at several places in the city and noted the event apparently ended around 23:00.

In its headquarters in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk) the JCCC provided the SMM with a copy of part of an instruction that the representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation said had been issued by the senior “DPR” members to those staffing checkpoints in parts of Donetsk region outside government control. According to this document, “DPR” members are instructed: to stop SMM patrols; to deny the SMM passage unless they are on “planned routes”; and to avoid any discussion with the SMM and to any enquiry from the SMM with the words “I am not authorized to explain”.* 

On 11 May, the SMM monitored public gatherings in Ivano-Frankivsk, Poltava and Kharkiv. In Poltava and Ivano-Frankivsk, the SMM monitored events involving the raising of the flags of Ukraine and the European Union (EU). In Poltava (150km west of Kharkiv), the SMM saw about 500 people (mostly young and middle aged, men and women), 15 Ukrainian and six EU flags together with the flags of four universities based in Poltava. Ten police officers were present. In Ivano-Frankivsk city the SMM saw about 2,000 people (predominantly young men and women) at the event, as well as Ukrainian and EU flags. The SMM noted four police officers present. Public officials made addresses in support of the adoption by the Council of the European Union of a regulation on visa liberalisation for Ukrainian citizens. Both gatherings were peaceful. (See SMM Daily Report 12 May 2017.) On 12 May, the SMM monitored a peaceful event dedicated to the same theme in Kharkiv city.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Lviv, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• Armed “LPR” members told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said no demining had taken place and that the road south of the bridge remained mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from moving west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional:

• On 11 May, an armed man at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk) demanded that the SMM open the trunks. He noted down the SMM registration plates and the patrol leader’s name and SMM ID number, visually inspected the trunks (as the Mission refused to allow them to open the boxes being transported) and then allowed the SMM to pass, delaying the SMM for 20 minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.