Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 20 August 2015

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM monitored the situation on the administrative boundary line with Crimea at Chonhar crossing point.

The overall security situation at and around “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled airport (9km north-west of Donetsk) remained tense. From the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at Donetsk railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM recorded a total of 66 explosions in the morning, occurring at locations three to eight kilometres north, north-east, west and north- west of its position. Between 13:00 and 14:30hrs the SMM saw and heard exchange of heavy-machine-gun, mortar and automatic-grenade-launcher fire. Between 14:30 and 16:20hrs, the situation deteriorated; mortar (82 and 120mm), automatic-grenade-launcher (30mm), heavy machine-gun (14.5mm) fire were exchanged. The SMM heard and saw 202 explosions during the afternoon at locations three to six kilometres north, north-east, west and north-west of its position.

The SMM was approached by a “DPR” member at a checkpoint in the vicinity of Olenivka (“DPR”-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) carrying a projectile of a 122mm artillery grenade. The “DPR” member was intoxicated.

In Makiivka (“DPR”-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed a convoy consisting of 49 trucks, with “Russian Federation humanitarian aid” labels. The convoy was accompanied by representatives of the Russian Federation Ministry for Emergency Situation to whom the SMM spoke. According to the interlocutors all trucks had been emptied in a depot close by but they did not give further details.

In Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), residents told the SMM about recent shelling of the village. The SMM observed eight craters in the village. The SMM performed crater analysis and according to the impact angle it assessed that 152mm illuminating shells were fired from an approximate distance of 10 to 12 km from an easterly direction.

At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed a queue of approximately 30 civilian vehicles heading towards government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) and approximately 70 civilian vehicles heading towards Mariupol. The SMM talked with several passengers who told the SMM that approximate time of waiting at the checkpoint was three to six hours.

While in government-controlled Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed at 12:35hrs three large brown smoke plumes approximately three to five kilometres west of its position.

The SMM visited for the first time two Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas whose locations comply with the respective withdrawal line. At one site, Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives to the JCCC were also present during the announced visit.  The SMM saw 11 self-propelled howitzer systems (2S3-“Akatsiya”, 152mm). However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC refused to permit to the SMM to record the weapons’ serial numbers stating that this activity was not part of the February Minsk package of measures.* At the other Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area, the SMM was allowed to freely access the area and note the serial numbers of the weapons.

The SMM revisited one “DPR” heavy weapons holding area whose location complies with the respective withdrawal lines. Two of the previously recorded nine multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) BM-21 were absent.

The SMM observed the following weapons’ movements in areas that are in violation of respective withdrawal lines. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed four military Ural-type trucks and four main battle tanks (MBT T-72), and two towed 120mm artillery pieces (D30).

In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) stationary, with no ammunition loaded. 

In addition, the SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observed in “DPR”-controlled areas, which are in violation of respective withdrawal lines, the following military equipment: seven MBTs and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) west of Starolaspa (59km north-east of Mariupol), four heavy artillery pieces and four APCs north-east of Bila Kamyanka (58km north-east of Mariupol), six MBTs and 24 APCs in Komsomolske (75km north-east of Mariupol), two 2S1 self-propelled howitzers “Gvozdika” east of Petrivske (78km north-east of Mariupol) and two MBTs as well as two APCs in the area of Donetsk airport.

In government-controlled areas, which are in violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM UAV spotted three MBTs, two APCs and one military truck with antenna system under camouflaged net (possible jamming station). In Novohnativka (62km east of Mariupol) it observed six self-propelled howitzers “Gvozdika” (2S1) and a command vehicle in Pryovrazhne (19km north-east of Mariupol) and two howitzers east of Aslanove (15km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM monitored the situation on the administrative boundary line (ABL) with Crimea at Chonhar (170km south-east of Kherson) crossing point. The SMM observed six civilian trucks with Ukrainian number plates and several dozen passenger vehicles waiting, also with Ukrainian number plates. The number of people crossing into Crimea during the two hours when the SMM was monitoring was around 20-30.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Chernivtsi, Dnepropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv and Odessa.

*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the “LPR”, have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM.

Denied access:

• At an “LPR” checkpoint just south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk)“LPR” members stated that they were not informed of SMM patrols in their area that day. They said that for future patrols, SMM would require a Russian translation of the patrol plan duly signed by SMM and approved by “LPR”. In addition, they said, the SMM patrol plan required an original signature and each patrol plan copy should also have an “LPR” stamp. According to them in case of an “LPR” escort, the mentioned documents would not be needed.
• At one Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC refused to permit to the SMM to record the weapons’ serial numbers stating that this activity was not part of the February Minsk Package of measures.  

Delay:

• At a “'DPR” checkpoint between "”LPR"--controlled Luhansk and “DPR”-controlled Konstantinovka (68km north of Donetsk), “DPR” members stopped the SMM . They said that they had not received prior notification of SMM’s arrival and did not know the purpose of its patrol. When shown the patrol plan, “DPR” members requested a version in Russian language of it. After checking ID cards and national passports as well as looking into the car trunks, the SMM was allowed to proceed after 15 minutes.
• At a “DPR”-controlled checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Shirokyi village (6.5km south-west of Donetsk city) the SMM MEDEVAC patrol had to wait for 30 minutes. The SMM had informed the “DPR” about the purpose of its movement.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.