Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 25 October 2016
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, with many concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with 24 October. The Mission observed the aftermath of ceasefire violations at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, and in Zaitseve and Raivka. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas. The Ukrainian and Russian Federation officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) failed to assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines. The Mission noted long queues of pedestrians at entry-exit checkpoints in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living on both sides of the contact line in Zaitseve and repairs to railway lines. It monitored two border areas not under government control. The SMM monitored the situation along the administration boundary line between the mainland and Crimea.
The SMM observed slightly fewer ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region, including 193 explosions compared with 231 explosions in the previous reporting period. The violence concentrated in the Avdiivka/Yasynuvata area, where more than 160 explosions were recorded.
During the night of 24-25 October the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions and 53 undetermined projectiles fired from north to east-south-east 4-8km east-south-east. The following day, positioned in Avdiivka the SMM heard 141 explosions, 15 of which were assessed as caused by the impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, all 2-5km east and south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 4-6km south-west. The SMM also saw and heard two airbursts 300m south-west of its position.
On the night of 24 October, positioned in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 24 explosions including 19 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) mounted cannon (73mm), all 2km east.
During the night of 24-25 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), facing north-north-east, recorded three undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as the impact of a round from an unknown weapon. The camera also recorded a ten-minute-long exchange of fire starting with seven bursts of direct tracers fired from east to west followed by a total of three rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west-south-west to east-north-east, 23 bursts of direct tracers (13 from east to west and ten from west-south-west to east-north-east).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded relatively fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions compared with 11 explosions on 24 October. Positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), at 08:52, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2-4km east (outside the disengagement area). Positioned at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, at 14:25 the SMM heard one undetermined explosions 3km north-east (outside the disengagement area). Positioned in the north-eastern part of “LPR”-controlled Kruta Hora (16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 12 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 1-2km north-east.
The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw a large hole in the roof of an inhabited house and three bullets embedded in the north-facing wall of the house. The “head” of “village council” told the SMM that the damage had been caused by shelling on 22 October. The SMM also observed three armed personnel carriers (APC; MT-LB) less than 50m from the location (see below). In “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a large and deep hole in the west-facing side of the bunker of an “LPR” position and parts of anti-tank guided missile tail at the location. The SMM assessed the impact as caused by anti-tank guide missile fired from a westerly direction. The “LPR” “commander” told the SMM that shelling had occurred at 12:30, resulting in two armed men injured. The SMM saw one armed “LPR” member wearing a head bandage stained with blood.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, during the reporting period was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.
On government-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM observed a fresh impact on the asphalt road next to the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the bridge and assessed it as caused by automatic-grenade launcher round (AGS) possibly fired from a southerly direction. The SMM noted a fresh impact on the south-facing concrete wall of the bunker and assessed it as caused by a bullet from a heavy machine-gun fired from a southerly direction. On the asphalt road of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge between the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position and the “LPR” forward position the SMM saw four new impacts and assessed them as caused by automatic-grenade launcher round (AGS) possibly fired from northerly and north-westerly directions. Further to the south, the SMM observed a fresh impact on the north-facing metal structure of the “LPR” forward position. The SMM assessed that the fire had come from a northerly direction. The SMM also observed seven impacts assessed as caused by IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) rounds on the north-facing concrete wall of a bunker of the forward position. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members separately told the SMM that shelling had occurred the previous night. During the observation on Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM heard two separate explosions (outside the disengagement area) (see above).
At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM monitored both sides of the disengagement area and noted a relatively calm situation. The SMM could not proceed through the potential Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from either side as the crossing route has not been demined yet.*
The SMM was not able to proceed from the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske towards the disengagement area as “DPR” members did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* Although a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC was present in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), he did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel towards the east to Petrivske via the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) along the north side of the disengagement area. The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road (see SMM Daily Report 25 October 2016) had not been removed.* The SMM noted a calm situation in areas of Petrivske and Bohdanivka, where it did not observe any ceasefire violation or movement of forces or hardware.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by a military truck heading south near government-controlled Yahidne (72km north of Donetsk) on 24 October. At the railway station in government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) the SMM also saw nine towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) in the morning, and 15 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), which were all loaded on loaded on railway flatbed carts in the early afternoon.
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed: two tanks (T-64) loaded on flatbed trailers heading east near government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk) on 24 October; two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in government-controlled Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk); and one surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) and one tank (T-64) heading south-east near Sievierodonetsk.
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad 122mm); ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), four of which were observed for the first time; and 12 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), one of which was observed for the first time. The SMM also noted as missing: one MLRS (BM-21 Grad 122mm); five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), which were recorded as missing for the first time; and 18 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm).
The SMM revisited a “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM continued to note that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft weapon [2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: two armoured personnel carriers (APC; one BTR and one BRDM) and one IFV (BMP) near Avdiivka; one APC (BTR) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) loaded on a truck near Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk); one IFV (BMP-1) near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area). In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw three stationary APCs (MT-LB) near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk).
At Oktiabr mine (“DPR”-controlled, 9km north-east of Donetsk city centre) the SMM observed a rusted unexploded ordnance lying on the ground 30m away from the entrance to a mineshaft tower, where the SMM camera is installed. The SMM assessed it as a 122mm artillery or 120mm mortar round.
The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the early afternoon on 24 October at a “DPR” checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 53 civilian cars, all with Ukrainian licence plates, queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. The SMM counted ten cars proceeding in a period of 30 minutes. Several travellers in a queue independently told the SMM that it was impossible for cars with “DPR” plates to enter government-controlled areas, and therefore they would try to keep their Ukrainian licence plates as long as possible. In the morning of 25 October at a checkpoint in government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw a dead body of a man lying on the road. A police officer present told the SMM that a resident of Shakhtarsk (“DPR”-controlled, 50km east of Donetsk) had arrived at the checkpoint by bus at around 07:50, and when walking towards the checkpoint he had suffered a heart stroke and had died after some time at the spot. At 12:00 at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed approximately 2,000 pedestrians queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and approximately ten pedestrians in the opposite direction. At 12:45 at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 900 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 1,200 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction.
The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In a government-controlled part of Zaitseve, known as Zhovanka, the head of the village told the SMM that there were currently 238 people living in the village compared with 800 before the conflict. According to him, the village had had no electricity supply since 25 June, as the transmission lines had been damaged by shelling. He added that the residents used wood and coal for heating, but both commodities were in short supply. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve the “head” of “village council” said that 300 inhabited houses had no electricity supply and the village relied on coal for heating. On 24 October, at a psychiatric hospital in government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that a Ukrainian Armed Forces battalion has been located there since April 2016 and his unit occupied one third of the hospital building. Medical staff confirmed the information to the SMM, adding that the part of the hospital being used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces for accommodation and as headquarters had been previously empty. The commander said the area had been demined, although the SMM saw mine hazard signs on adjacent roads and footpaths, which he said patients could still use. The SMM also saw the presence of military hardware in the premises (see above).
The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure. Near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) the SMM monitored repairs to railway tracks. The SMM observed one train consisting of two locomotives and 39 cargo wagons (loaded with gravel, wood material and others) traveling from government-controlled area towards “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi.
The SMM observed a calm situation in two border areas currently not under government control in Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk) and Novoborovytsi (79 km south of Luhansk).
The SMM monitored the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM noted a calm situation at the crossing points near Kalanchak and Chaplynka (67 and 77 km south-east of Kherson, respectively) and in adjacent areas. On 24 October in areas between Kherson and Kakhovka (70km east of Kherson) the SMM noted the existence of protective measures (military checkpoints) having been taken at main intersections and bridges. At one location the SMM saw mines linked by cordage for a potential road block.
The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
- On two separate occasions on the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska (inside the disengagement area) the SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge) as it observed a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska the presence of anti-tank obstacle (“Czech hedgehog”) on the road leading west from the Prince Ihor monument prevented the SMM from proceeding further to west. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On three separate occasions (one in government-controlled areas and two in “LPR”-controlled areas) the SMM could not proceed further from each side of the contact line on the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present told the SMM that demining had not yet been conducted in the area. At a checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, an “LPR” member told the SMM that fields and areas other than roads located in the disengagement area had not been cleared of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM was not able to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present on the spot did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road had not been removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was not able to proceed toward the disengagement area from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place and the road was not safe. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was unable to travel on the road from government-controlled Katerynivka to government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) due to the presence of anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”). The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not proceed across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia from “LPR”-controlled side. Armed “LPR” members at the checkpoint south of the bridge warned the SMM of the presence of mines at the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel again denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area (see SMM Daily Report 25 October 2016). The SMM informed the JCCC.
- At an “LPR” checkpoint north-eastern outskirt of Luhansk city “LPR” members did not allow the SMM to proceed further to the settlement of Veselenke (within Luhansk city), citing security concerns. The SMM informed the JCCC.
Conditional access:
- At the north-eastern edge of “DPR”-controlled Naberezhne (33km north-east of Mariupol) two armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM and allowed to proceed further to the village on condition of accepting an escort. The SMM informed the JCCC.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.