Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 October 2016
This report is for the general public and the media.
The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region on 1 October followed by a decrease on 2 October. In Luhansk region the number of ceasefire violations recorded dropped on 1 October but increased on 2 October. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The SMM was able to patrol on a road between Zolote and Pervomaisk through a section of the disengagement area. The SMM did not have full access in all disengagement areas and was restricted in its freedom of movement in the area of Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske. The SMM monitored three border areas not controlled by the Government.
The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region on 1 October, followed by a decrease on 2 October.[1] On 1 October the SMM recorded 473 explosions in Donetsk region compared with 255 the previous day. On 2 October the SMM recorded 280 explosions.
Whilst in “DPR” controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 30 September-1 October, the SMM heard 94 undetermined explosions 6-8km south and north-north-east.
On the night of 30 September-1 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 16 explosions assessed as impacts and five bursts of gunfire 2-4km south-east. On 1 October, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 40 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km west and west-south-west. On 1 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka recorded 217 explosions assessed as impacts 4-7km south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka on 1 October, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun-fire 3km east.
Positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk) on 1 October, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 3-8km north, north-north-west, and north-north-east.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km east of Mariupol) on 1 October the SMM heard 41 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire north-east, and two undetermined explosions 2km south-east.
On the night of 1-2 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 37 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (15 as 82mm mortar, six as 122mm artillery and 16 as 73mm recoilless gun rounds), at least 72 shots of automatic grenade launcher, and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south-east.
During the evening of 1 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 30 explosions (ten undetermined and 20 impacts) and saw five muzzle flashes, all assessed as caused by artillery fire (calibre unknown); heard 80 explosions (60 assessed as outgoing and 20 as incoming 120mm mortar rounds); at least 70 explosions of infantry-fighting-vehicle (IFV) cannon fire (30 of which were assessed as caused by IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm), and 40 by IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), at least 15 bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), ten bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher, and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations ranging from 6-16km north-west and west.
On 2 October the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and bursts of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 1-6km south-west to north-north-west in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata. The SMM also recorded three periods of short and intense overlapping bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-4km west and west-south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-5km south and south-east.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded three explosions on 1 October compared with 91 the previous day. On 2 October the SMM noted an increase with 99 explosions recorded. On 1 October, while on the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Zolote/Pervomaisk (60km north-west of Luhansk) crossing route (disengagement area) the SMM heard two undetermined explosions (possibly artillery) followed by three shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, approximately 5km south-west of its position (assessed as outside of the disengagement area). Later, at the same position, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions approximately 5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 1 October, while stationary south of the bridge to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion, 1km north-east (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).
On 2 October, while at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion, approximately 10km south-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).
On 2 October, while in government-controlled Orikhove Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 75 explosions assessed as incoming 82mm and 120mm mortar rounds, approximately 20 explosions assessed as IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, two bursts assessed as IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, ten bursts assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS) and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-4km south-east. The SMM also heard approximately four bursts, assessed as IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire 2-4km south-west.
The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in some areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September.
At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route on 1 October the SMM saw an IFV (BRDM) that it had not seen there before. The SMM saw that the IFV proceeded further into the disengagement area and picked up a group of ten personnel before returning and passing through the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint. Later the SMM observed four armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel walking along a dirt road inside the disengagement area, and separately, five Ukrainian border guards and one military truck within the disengagement area. The SMM was able to cross from the government-controlled side to the “LPR”-controlled side of the Zolote-Pervomaisk closed crossing route but did not have access to all of the disengagement area.
At the same time, at the checkpoint on the “LPR”-controlled side of the disengagement area, the SMM observed two Kamaz trucks, 20 armed “LPR” members and six Russian Federation Armed Forces officers from the JCCC. At the checkpoint the SMM observed as one truck was loaded with several boxes of ammunition and left the disengagement area. It returned to the checkpoint to pick up six “LPR” members and their weapons, before withdrawing from the disengagement area. A heavy machine-gun (12.7mm) and 200 rounds were later moved by armed “LPR” members. The SMM observed that two positions were empty of armed “LPR” members and weapons. At the checkpoint the SMM observed a further six armed “LPR” members get on a Kamaz truck.
On 2 October in Zolote, the SMM observed that where once the road was completely blocked, it had been cleared and vehicles are able to pass. The SMM was able to cross the contact line without impediment only on this road. At an “LPR” checkpoint inside the southern part of the disengagement area the SMM observed armed “LPR” members moving construction material from positions in the disengagement area to new positions. During the time the SMM monitored in the area, five civilian vehicles and two motorbikes approached the checkpoint and people asked when the crossing route would be reopened. “LPR” members did not allow anyone to pass. The SMM was not able to access all areas mentioned in the baseline information.
In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska on 1 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that they were awaiting orders before starting to disengage. An “LPR” member on the south side of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska told the SMM that disengagement was unlikely to happen on 1 October. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers from the JCCC told the SMM that they had demined an area adjacent to the crossing route on 30 September. The SMM observed three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel scanning the ground with metal detectors. A Ukrainian officer from the JCCC said that mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) would be marked and then transported out only after the entry-exit checkpoint’s working hours. On both 1 and 2 October, the SMM observed an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV (BMP-2) near a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area and in violation of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons. (See SMM Daily Report 30 September.) An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an IFV (BMP) with an anti-tank guided missile (130mm) north of the bridge (and outside of the disengagement area) in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska on 1 October.
On 2 October at Stanytsia Luhanska, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officers from the JCCC told the SMM that they had no information on the status of disengagement. The SMM observed that Russian Federation Armed Forces officers from the JCCC were not present in “LPR”-controlled areas. On the government-controlled side of the bridge, 10m east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position, the SMM saw one fresh crater assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher (AGS) fire. Close to the crater, the SMM saw a used smoke grenade. In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed four fresh impacts: one south of the bridge assessed as caused by a rocket-propelled grenade; two near the “LPR” forward position on the bridge assessed as caused by under-barrel grenade launchers and another in a grassy area close to the bridge.
The SMM was positioned at a temporary observation post in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske throughout 1 October. Between 12:43 and 14:53 the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 2-5km south, but could not confirm whether they took place inside the disengagement area. An SMM mini UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (possibly a BMP) near Petrivske, inside the disengagement area. The SMM observed that four armoured combat vehicles (BMP) were no longer present in the village (outside of the disengagement area) and that fresh traces from a tracked vehicle were visible on the road through the town. A sign warning of mines on the road running south from the village, observed on 29 September, had been removed. The SMM was denied access to the road running east to west (to the north of the disengagement area) from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske to government-controlled Bohdanivka due to the warnings from “DPR” members of the presence of mines.*
Armed “DPR” members and Russian Federation Armed Forces officers from the JCCC arrived in the area at approximately 10:00 but left by 11:20 stating to the waiting media that no disengagement would take place on 1 October. In the afternoon a “DPR” member told the SMM that the road (running north of the disengagement area) towards the contact line and another road running south from the village had been cleared of all mines and UXO. The SMM was unable to travel west on the former road and south into the disengagement area as no JCCC representatives were present to co-ordinate, despite SMM requests.* While at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint approximately 1.9km east of Bohdanivka the SMM heard and saw a controlled detonation of an unexploded guided anti-tank missile approximately 300m south-east. The SMM could not travel east due to the risk of mines and unexploded ordnance and the sides’ failure to demine the area.
In Petrivske on 2 October, the SMM observed two IFVs (BMP-1) concealed in different locations along a road that runs through the centre of the village. As the SMM approached a large barn located in the village and outside of the disengagement area, a number of men started to run and one man wearing military-style clothes tried to close the exterior gate. The SMM observed at least two IFVs (BMP) and one military-type truck with five “DPR” members inside the barn. While closing the barn door, one of the “DPR” members put a balaclava on. An SMM mini UAV observed, on numerous occasions, “DPR” members (armed and not armed) walking in the village, alone or in small groups. Three mine signs were observed in the village, outside of the disengagement area. A “DPR” member told the SMM that there were no mines and no mine signs on the road between Petrivske and Bohdanivka. The SMM observed no mine signs on the road; however, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers from the JCCC failed to assist to ensure the security of the SMM. The SMM sought their assistance to ensure the security of the SMM but attempts to reach them were unsuccessful. Due to the lack of security guarantees and the possible presence of mines the SMM was prevented from travelling in both directions on the road between Petrivske and Bohdanivka and south into the disengagement area on 2 October.*
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a forest near government-controlled Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk) on 2 October. The SMM also observed an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area on 1 and 2 October (see above).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM observed 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) at one site. For the first time the SMM observed six multiple-launch rocket systems (9A53, Uragan-1M, 220mm) in a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines; Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from recording the serial numbers of the weapons.*. The SMM observed that two Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas continued to be abandoned with a total of 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 152mm) and six towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) missing, as they have been since 3 July 2016.
Near Bohoiavlenka, the SMM observed what was assessed to be a former firing position in a wooded area and saw an 122mm shell without an initiator and ten empty 122mm ammunition boxes.
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone.[2] The SMM saw a stationary IFV (BMP-2) in the yard of a house in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska on 1 and 2 October; two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-3) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) on 1 and 2 October; one IFV (BMP-2) moving east from government-controlled Orikhove-Donetske towards Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk); four IFVs (BMP) in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske on 2 October; an ACV (BRDM-2) near “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) on 1 October.
The SMM monitored three border areas not controlled by the Government. At around noon on 1 October the SMM monitored at the pedestrian Ulianivske border crossing point (61km south-east of Donetsk). Over 50 minutes of monitoring the SMM saw one man exiting and another entering Ukraine. At the Uspenka border crossing point (90km south-east of Donetsk) several truck drivers (men, aged between 20 and 50 years) said they normally waited up to 12 hours to cross out of Ukraine, and could wait up to 24 hours on their return. They added that the time it took to cross had increased over the past 18 months because the number of “DPR” members at the crossing point had dropped from seven to three. At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM, over a forty-minute period, observed 11 civilian vehicles (seven with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates) and three covered trucks (with Ukrainian license plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. Three truck drivers (males, approximately, 40-60 years old) told the SMM that it usually took 30 minutes to cross. Two women told the SMM that they crossed twice per month to buy medicines which they said were cheaper on the other side.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
- On two occasions on 1 October, the absence of JCCC officers to assist in ensuring security of the SMM and of the sides to demine the area in order to ensure full access for the SMM to monitor near and Petrivske, hindered SMM access.
- On 1 October, the risk of mines and unexploded ordnance and the sides’ failure to demine the area prevented the SMM from travelling on the road running east to west (to the north of the disengagement area) from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske to government-controlled Bohdanivka. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 1 October, the risk of mines and unexploded ordnance and the sides’ failure to demine the area prevented the SMM from travelling on the road east from government-controlled Bohdanivka to “DPR”-controlled Petrivske. The SMM requested that Ukrainian Armed Forces and JCCC representatives assist to ensure the security of the SMM. The Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that they could not take responsibility for security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines on the road and did not co-ordinate demining.
- On 1 and 2 October, anti-tank mines on the road near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) prevented the SMM from travelling further. The SMM told “LPR” members that it needed to cross and informed the JCCC.
- On 1 and 2 October, two lines of anti-tank mines on the government-controlled side of the bridge near government-controlled Shchastia prevented the SMM from travelling further. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 2 October, the risk of mines and unexploded ordnance and the sides’ failure to demine the area prevented the SMM from travelling on the road running east to west (to the north of the disengagement area) from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske to government-controlled Bohdanivka. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 2 October, the risk of mines and unexploded ordnance prevented the SMM from travelling east from government-controlled Bohdanivka to “DPR”-controlled Petrivske on the road north of the disengagement area. The SMM requested that Ukrainian Armed Forces and JCCC representatives assist to ensure the security of the SMM. The Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that they cannot take responsibility for the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines on the road and did not co-ordinate demining of the area.
- On 2 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a compound in government-controlled Aslanove (16km north of Mariupol). The SMM informed the relevant JCCC officer who subsequently did not answer further telephone calls from the SMM.
- On 2 October, “DPR” armed members at a checkpoint east of Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk), prevented the SMM from proceeding into the village.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from recording the serial numbers of the weapons in a weapons holding area.
Delay:
- Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM access to an area thought to contain weapons near government-controlled Bohorodychne (114km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC. After a two-hour delay the SMM was allowed to enter.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.