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Daily report
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 24 June 2015
- Source:
- OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (closed)
- Our work:
- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Regions:
- Eastern Europe
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. The SMM, based on its monitoring – which was restricted by third parties and by security considerations* – observed continued violence in a number of places in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in particular, at and around the Donetsk airport.
Violence continued in a number of locations in the Donetsk region, in particular at and around the destroyed “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk airport (12km north-west of Donetsk). Positioned in a “DPR”-controlled area 8km north-west of the city-centre, the SMM heard, and in some cases also saw, 106 incoming and outgoing mortar and artillery rounds. Violence was also noted in the south-western suburbs of the city, where the SMM noted 48 mortar rounds being fired.[1]
Positioned in two separate locations around government-controlled Sopyne (3.5km west of Shyrokyne; 16km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 16 tank, four mortar and 15 or 16 other rounds of indeterminate nature being fired from locations 2-7km to the east-north-east, and impacting in or around Shyrokyne. An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a burning house and substantial shelling marks in the Shyrokyne area.
In government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (36km north-north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard six outgoing artillery rounds at a location 5km to the north.
Despite claims that withdrawal of heavy weapons was complete, the SMM observed the following weapons’ movements and presence in areas non-compliant with the withdrawal lines. In government-controlled areas in the north of the Donetsk region, the SMM observed four main battle tanks (MBT) (one T-64 and three T-72s), one being repaired and three moving north. In government-controlled areas to the north-north-west of Donetsk city, the SMM noted a significant Ukrainian Armed Forces presence, and lines of defensive trenches being developed and strengthened. In government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (36km north-north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed three military flatbed trucks carrying 120mm mortars, moving north. In areas in and around “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (39km east of Mariupol), an SMM UAV spotted four MBTs, 50 armoured personnel carriers, five artillery pieces and 69 military trucks.
In government-controlled Krasnoarmiisk (55km north-west of Donetsk), the acting commander of a Ukrainian Armed Forces field hospital – which cares for military personnel deployed along the contact line around Donetsk city – told the SMM that there had been an increase in the number of admittances the previous week. He said 50 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had been admitted, mostly having sustained injuries from artillery and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rounds, and anti-personnel mines. He added that the number of soldiers suffering from psychological illnesses had also increased.
The chief judge of the Krasnoarmiisk District Court told the SMM that although his court had jurisdiction over certain “DPR”-controlled areas, in practice it was impossible to follow up on cases in such areas. The head of the District Prosecutor’s Office in government-controlled Artemivsk (67km north-north-east of Donetsk) expressed similar views. He said that while residents in “DPR”-controlled areas could bring complaints to the Artemivsk Prosecutor’s Office, it was difficult if not impossible to proceed with such cases. As government officials, the prosecutors would be targeted in “DPR”-controlled areas, he explained.
Immediately north of government-controlled Volnovakha (55km north of Mariupol), the SMM observed a stationary Swiss humanitarian aid convoy consisting of 10 heavy trucks. After 15 minutes, it moved north through the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Buhas (60km north of Mariupol), and proceeded into “DPR”-controlled territory.
Between 17.05 and 17.20hrs on 23 June, the SMM – positioned at the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) – heard approximately 40 rounds of outgoing heavy-machine gun fire 500m to the east; outgoing small-arms fire approximately 500-1,000m to the north-east; and, seven to eight outgoing mortar rounds 1km to the north.
Between 10:45 and 11:25hrs – in government-controlled Putylyne (44km north-west of Luhansk) – the SMM heard intense artillery shelling, eight to 12 rounds a minute, and SALW, including heavy-machinegun, fire, 1-10km to the south-east.
In government-controlled Komyshuvakha (66km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two incoming artillery rounds 10km to the east.
At a water supply facility in government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM noted that one of the water-pump stations and a transformer were damaged, caused – according to plant employees – by MLRS Grad rockets on 23 June. The SMM noted a large crater impact outside the damaged pump station. The employees said the presence of mines was preventing the replacement of the transformer. In “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Vesniane (45km west of Luhansk), and in the government-controlled villages of Hrechyshkyne, Kapitanove, Muratove and Bobrove (45, 50, 50 and 56km north-west of Luhansk, respectively), various interlocutors told the SMM that there was no mains water.
The SMM observed a civil society organization in Luhansk city provide 36 people with soup, porridge and tea. The head of the organization told the SMM that her organization provides food three times a week to approximately 5,000 people, of whom 2,000 are pensioners and 500 children. She said the “LPR” “authorities” – although requested to do so – provide no support.
An advisor to the newly-appointed governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region told the SMM on 23 June that the new regional administration hoped to place an emphasis on socio-economic reform rather than the conflict, which, he said, had previously been used to limit political debate.
On 22 June, the SMM visited two border crossing points – Tymkove (253km north-west of Odessa) and Slobidka (245km north-west of Odessa) – on the Transdniestria section of the Ukraine-Moldova international border. Members of the State Border Guard Service (SGBS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) told the SMM that there was no significant or unusual activity in their sectors. The SGBS personnel added that the current alert and readiness level was normal. The SMM noted nothing untoward, in keeping with the situation in August and September 2014, when the SMM last visited the area. The SMM observed almost no one crossing. The following day, the SMM patrolled approximately 200km along the Transdniestria section of the border, noting no unusual security or military arrangements in place.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv and Kyiv.
* Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by third parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM by both the “DPR” and “LPR”. SMM UAVs cannot operate in the Luhansk region as it is beyond their range.
Delay:
- On 23 and 24 June Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel searched SMM vehicles in the government-controlled towns of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and Bilovodsk (74km north-east of Luhansk), respectively. In Stanytsia Luhanska, the soldiers said they were looking for “contraband”.
Interference with SMM UAVs:
- The UAV suffered intermittent jamming over a number of “DPR”-controlled areas.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions on SMM access and freedom of
movement” for further information.
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.