



Permanent Delegation of
Belgium to the OSCE

Wohllebengasse 6/3
A-1040 Vienna
Tel. 00-43-1-5056364
Fax 00-43-1-5050388
Email: viennaosce@diplomel.be
Web: <http://www.osce2006.be>

CIO.GAL/225/06
18 December 2006

Original: as delivered

Vienna, 18 December 2006

Upon request of the Personal Representative on Combating anti-Semitism, Mr. Gert Weisskirchen, please find in annex the first version of the Conference Documentation concerning the Expert Meeting on Best Practices in Combating anti-Semitism which took place in Berlin on 20 and 21 November 2006.



**German Delegation of the OSCE-PA &
Gert Weisskirchen, Personal Representative of the Chairman-
in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism**

BEST PRACTICES IN COMBATING ANTISEMITISM

- EXPERT MEETING -

Berlin, 20 November – 21 November, 2006

Conference Documentation



Contacts

Deutscher Bundestag

Delegation der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE

Leiterin: Britta Hanke-Giesers

Address: Platz der Republik 1, 11011 Berlin, Germany

Tel.: +49 (30) 227-33733; +49 (30) 227-32949

Fax: +49 (30) 227-36414

E-Mail: osze@bundestag.de

Internet: http://www.bundestag.de/internet/interparl_orga/osze/index.html

Prof. Gert Weisskirchen, MdB

Außenpolitischer Sprecher der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion;

Abgeordneter des Wahlkreises Rhein-Neckar (278)

Persönlicher Beauftragter des OSZE-Vorsitzenden zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus

Address: Platz der Republik 1, 11011 Berlin, Germany

Tel.: +49 (30) 227-73503

Fax: +49 (30) 227-76503

E-Mail: gert.weisskirchen@bundestag.de

Internet: <http://www.gert-weisskirchen.de>

Dr. Kathrin Meyer

Advisor on Antisemitism Issues

Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Programme

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Address: Al. Ujazdowskie 19, 00-557 Warsaw, Poland

Tel.: +48 (22) 5200600 ext.1284

Mob.: +48 (695) 808 810

Fax: +48 (22) 5200605

E-mail: kathrin.meyer@odihr.pl

Internet: www.osce.org/odihr

Remark:

This is the **first version** of the Conference Documentation of the Expert Meeting “BEST PRACTICES IN COMBATING ANTISEMITISM” from 20 – 21 November 2006 in Berlin. The complete documentation with more articles and all texts translated in English will be distributed in January 2007.

Sehr geehrte Mitglieder der parlamentarischen
Versammlung der OSZE,
sehr geehrte Teilnehmer der Konferenz,
sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

zwei Jahre Arbeit als Persönlicher Beauftragter des Vorsitzenden der OSZE zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus haben mir deutlich gemacht, dass die Anstrengungen verstärkt werden müssen. Immer noch vergiftet der Antisemitismus das Vertrauen zwischen den Menschen, die in unserem gemeinsamen Raum leben. In manchen Regionen ist unglücklicherweise ein Ansteigen dieses Übels festzustellen. Wenn auch erhebliche Lücken durch umfassende empirische Untersuchungen zu schließen sind: das Bild ist erschreckend genug, das sie zeigen.



Die OSZE-Konferenzen in Wien, Berlin, Paris, Brüssel und Cordoba haben die Basis für ein hinreichendes Maß von Entscheidungen geschaffen, die die Mitgliedsstaaten im Konsens gefällt haben. 2006 sollte das Jahr werden, das zeigen sollte, in welcher Weise die eingegangenen Verpflichtungen nationalstaatlich umgesetzt werden.

Deshalb lautet die Leitfrage unserer Konferenz: welche Probleme sind bei der Implementierung entstanden? Und: was muss getan werden, diese Probleme zu beseitigen?


Der Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus durch die OSZE und mit den Mitteln der OSZE ist entstanden in der Parlamentarierversammlung der OSZE. Sie hat entschieden, die Außenminister der OSZE-Staaten für diesen Kampf zu gewinnen. Schließlich hat die staatliche Ebene diese Aufgabe angenommen. Nach den Erfahrungen von zwei Jahren macht es Sinn, dass Parlamentarier eine Zwischenbilanz ziehen. Dankbar bin ich dafür, dass die nationale Delegation des Deutschen Bundestages Experten, Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen und Parlamentarier eingeladen hat, um mit einer vorläufigen, gewiss nicht vollständigen, Evaluation zu prüfen, welche Schritte erfolgreich waren, welche nicht und in welche Richtung weitere Schritte unternommen werden müssen, um die verabredeten Ziele zu erreichen.

Dabei sind wir angewiesen auf das Engagement der zivilen Gesellschaften, seien sie nationalstaatlich oder transnational organisiert. Wir Parlamentarier haben eine unvergleichbar gute Chance, tektonische Verschiebungen, die sich in unseren Bevölkerungen vollziehen, rasch aufzuspüren. Das können wir aber nur wenn und solange die Akteure aus den Zivilgesellschaften mit uns eng zusammenarbeiten. Ihre Stärke wiederum ist die Autonomie, die ihnen der Staat garantieren muss. Verstehen wir uns gemeinsam vereint im Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus, gegen Islamfeindschaft und gegen andere Formen von Diskriminierung, dann können wir effizient die Ressourcen nutzen, die uns national und international zur Verfügung stehen.

Sie haben die Einladung des Deutschen Bundestages angenommen. Ich bin sicher: unser Treffen wird erheblich dazu beitragen, uns zu helfen auf der Suche nach den besten Praxisformen im Kampf gegen die Intoleranz.

Ich freue mich auf offene und kritische Diskussionen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen



Gert Weisskirchen
*Persönlicher Beauftragter des OSZE-Vorsitzenden
zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus*

Table of Contents

1. Zusammenfassung der Konferenz (Deutsch)	6
Britta Hanke-Giesers, Inga Immel, Anna Weiland, Philip Wüst	6
2. Program of the Conference	20
3. Opening Statement: The fight against Antisemitism in the OSCE ...	22
Pierre Chevalier	22
4. Trends in Antisemitism: France	25
Jean-Yves Camus	25
5. PANEL 1: Data Collection	28
5.1. European Efforts to Combat Antisemitism from the Arab Perspective	28
Dr. Esther Webman	28
5.2. Hate Crime Data Collection and the Implementation of OSCE Commitments ..	32
Dr. Kathrin Meyer	32
6. PANEL 2: Hate Crimes	36
6.1. Statement	36
David C. Friedman	36
6.2. OSCE/ODIHR Law Enforcement Officers Programme for Combating Hate Crime.....	39
Paul Goldenberg	39
6.3. Statement	41
Daniela Petkovic	41
6.4. Outcomes of LEOP-CHC Delivery in Spain.....	43
Antonio Arrabal Villalobos	43
6.5. Policing Hate Crimes	47
Michael Whine	47
6.6. Recommendations from the Hate Crimes Session.....	49
Michael Whine	49
7. Further Presentations on Antisemitism	50
7.1. Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts / Antisemitism in Europe	50
Edward H. Kaplan, Charles A. Small	50
7.2. The Situation on Hate on the Internet.....	62
Mark Weitzman	62
8. OSCE initiatives to combat Antisemitism.....	65
Thomas von Winter and Christoff Soltau	65
9. Concluding Statement	69
Andrew Baker	69
10. Abschlussstatement: Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus in 2007	72
Gert Weisskirchen	72
11. Participants	75

1. Zusammenfassung der Konferenz (Deutsch)

Britta Hanke-Giesers, Inga Immel, Anna Weiland, Philip Wüst

Eröffnungsansprache

Wolfgang Thierse, Vizepräsident des Deutschen Bundestages, eröffnete die Konferenz „Best practices on Combating Antisemitism“. Er erklärte, in Deutschland sei die Überwindung des Antisemitismus ein Teil der Raison d'être unseres Staatswesens geworden. Aber trotz der Anstrengungen zur Auseinandersetzung sei der Antisemitismus nicht überwunden. Die Aufgabe bestehe trotz Aufklärungsmaßnahmen, trotz Pflege von Gedenkstätten und anderen Maßnahmen unverändert fort.

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland habe in Berlin das Holocaust-Denkmal zur Erinnerung an die Verbrechen der Vergangenheit errichtet. Diese Entscheidung des Bundestages zeige, dass das Parlament sich zur Verantwortung bekenne. Dramatische Veränderungen wie Globalisierung, Demographischer Wandel, technologische und wirtschaftliche Veränderung hätten dazu beigetragen, dass die Empfänglichkeit für scheinbar einfache Antworten zunehme. Manche benutzten auch den Konflikt in Nahen Osten, um antisemitischen Hass zu pflegen.

Ein Generationenwechsel stehe an und es sei unsicher, wie nachfolgende Generationen mit der Erinnerung umgehen. Auch wenn diese andere Formen der Erinnerung findet, müsse man ihnen eine Chance geben, sich überhaupt zu erinnern. Die Weitergabe der Erinnerung sei deshalb eine wichtige Aufgabe, eine pädagogische und politische Herausforderung, der sich die OSZE annehme.

Der Sondergesandte des OSZE-Vorsitzenden Senator **Pierre Chevalier**, dankte für die Einladung. Wenn man die Stätte der bisherigen Antisemitismus-Konferenzen – Wien, Berlin, Cordoba, Paris etc. – besuche, sehe man dort den jüdischen Beitrag zur Gesellschaft in diesen Ländern. Gleichzeitig seien dies Orte, wo Juden gelitten haben. Es sei bedenklich, dass man solche Treffen wie das jetzige überhaupt brauche. Die OSZE habe Antisemitismus als eine maßgebliche Bedrohung für Freiheit und Sicherheit erkannt. Deshalb habe ODIHR entsprechende Strukturen aufgebaut und ein Toleranz und Nicht-Diskriminierungsprogramm geschaffen. Zusammen mit dem Anne-Frank-Haus werde Lehrmaterial erarbeitet. Die OSZE habe Sonderbeauftragte eingesetzt, um die Themen voranzubringen, ferner wurde eine Task Force zum Thema Antisemitismus und andere Formen der Intoleranz eingesetzt. Der Vorsitz habe sich für mehr Kooperation zwischen den Sonderbeauftragten und mit ODIHR ausgesprochen. Chevalier unterstrich die Rolle der Erziehung und des Aufbaus von Fähigkeiten sowie die Bedeutung des gesetzlichen Rahmens und der Partnerschaft mit der Zivilgesellschaft. 2007 werde eine weitere Konferenz gegen Antisemitismus stattfinden.

Jean-Yves Camus, Institut für internationale und strategische Beziehungen in Frankreich, sprach zum Thema „Tendenzen im Antisemitismus“. Nach Camus gibt eine neue Dimension des Antisemitismus: die Negierung des Holocaust. Dies präge die öffentliche Meinung in anderer Weise als in den achtziger Jahren. Wenn der Holocaust nicht stattgefunden hätte, wären Entschädigungen unberechtigt. Alles würde damit in Frage gestellt. Der Libanon-Krieg in den achtziger Jahren sei der zweite Aspekt, der zu der jetzigen Situation führe. Israel wurde als nazistischer Staat definiert und die Juden vom Opfer zum Täter gemacht. Im Anschluss seien die Anzahl der antisemitischen Presseartikel gestiegen, aber es habe zunächst noch keine antisemitischen Taten gegeben. Später habe es Antisemitismus auch in der extremen Linken gegeben, was alles zusammen den Rahmen für das heutige Klima bilde. Neu sei nun, dass Antisemitismus nicht mehr nur theoretisch bleibe, sondern Anschläge und Übergriffe sich häufen. Israel werde als Staat anders als andere Staaten behandelt, indem sein

Existenzrecht in Frage gestellt werde. Seit dem Jahr 2000 gebe es extrem viele Übergriffe. Antizionismus und Antisemitismus verbänden sich zu unheilvollen neuen politischen Allianzen; die extreme Linke und Islamisten hätten auf einmal gemeinsame Ziele. Er machte darauf aufmerksam, dass häufig mit zweierlei Maß gemessen werde: so werde in den Nachrichten die Hisbollah häufig als Angegriffene gezeigt. Junge Leute auch mit arabischem Hintergrund in Europa wachsen mit dieser Wahrnehmung auf. Gleichzeitig sei die extreme Rechte in Parteien und Parlamenten vertreten und die Zivilgesellschaft habe nicht reagiert.

In der **folgenden Debatte** wurde darauf eingegangen, dass der neue Antisemitismus den alten Bildern folge (so Juliane Wetzel, TU Berlin); und die Frage gestellt, wie man die Situation de-eskalieren könne. Dennis McShane (Vereinigtes Königreich, MP) verwies auf die Banalisierung des Holocaust durch relativierende Vergleiche mit anderen Taten. Professorin Hart unterstrich, die Unkenntnis von jüdischem Leben und jüdischer Geschichte, Kultur etc. trage ebenfalls zum Antisemitismus bei.

Diskussionsrunde über Gesetzliche Aspekte

PANEL 1: Datenerhebung

Nach der Begrüßung der Teilnehmer durch **Prof. Weisskirchen** ergriff als erster Gastredner der britische Abgeordnete **Dr. Denis MacShane** das Wort. In einem ausführlichen Bericht schilderte er die im britischen Parlament unternommenen Aktivitäten, um sich mit dem Phänomen Antisemitismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit auseinanderzusetzen. Dabei ging es im Besonderen um die Datenerfassung und Informationszusammenstellung im Hinblick auf antisemitische Übergriffe und Straftaten. MacShane bezeichnete es als besonders besorgniserregend, dass wissenschaftliche Daten nicht in dem Maße verfügbar seien wie es notwendig sei. Zum Beispiel würde durch die Polizeikräfte keine Erfassung der Übergriffe mit antisemitischem Hintergrund erfolgen. Der britische Staat gebe sehr viel Geld für Sicherheits- und andere Maßnahmen zum Schutze jüdischer Gemeinden aus. Aber nicht nur gegen jüdische Gemeinden, sondern auch gegen moslemische Gemeinden habe sich Hass und verstärkte Islamophobie entwickelt, die auch immer mehr Ausdruck in der Presse und den Medien finde. Er bezeichnete den in den letzten Jahren festzustellenden wachsenden Antisemitismus als ein wieder entflammtes Phänomen, in dem sich viele unterschiedliche ideologische Ansichten vereinten, wie z. B. eine antiwestliche Haltung, die Ablehnung des Rechtsstaates, die Verachtung der westlichen Werte sowie der Widerstand gegen monotheistische Religionen, wie er von einigen religiösen fundamentalistischen Kreisen ausgehe. Festzustellen sei auch, dass es einen breiteren Rahmen für antisemitistische Einstellungen gebe, der über die ursprünglich primitiven Beschuldigungen hinausgehe und nun eine gehobenere Ebene erreicht habe. Auf alle diese Entwicklungen habe die britische Regierung gut und rasch reagiert und sich auch mit dem im britischen Parlament eingebrachten Bericht zu diesem Thema eingehend auseinandergesetzt. Eine der Schlussfolgerungen des Berichtes sei es gewesen, Polizeikräfte stärker für Übergriffe mit antisemitischem Hintergrund zu sensibilisieren und zum Anderen, dem im Internet und anderen Medien verbreiteten Hassmaterial, das insbesondere von Personen und Gruppierungen arabischer und anderer Staaten ausgehe, Grenzen zu setzen. Das Internet sei der größte Verbreiter von Antisemitismus. Leider hätten es die USA bislang abgelehnt zu akzeptieren, dass dies eine Tatsache sei und dass man gemeinsam etwas dagegen unternehmen müsse. Er betonte, dass der vom britischen Parlament verfasste Bericht jedermann zugänglich sei.

Als zweiter Redner am Vormittag war **Botschafter Jacques Huntzinger** vom französischen Außenministerium eingeladen worden, einen Bericht über Datenerfassung und Informationsvermittlung über Vorfälle mit antisemitischem Hintergrund in Frankreich vorzulegen. Als erster Punkt sei festzuhalten, dass die Datenerfassung alles erfassen müsse,

was mit Antisemitismus zu tun habe. Zweitens sei wichtig festzustellen, dass eine Bekämpfung dieses Phänomens nur erfolgreich sein könne, wenn die Gesellschaft und die Regierung über ein gutes Überwachungssystem und eine gute Datenerfassung über sämtliche antisemitistische Vorfälle verfügten. Dies sei der Ansatzpunkt für jede weitere Aktivität. In Frankreich habe man im Jahr 2001/2002 akzeptieren müssen, dass das Phänomen des Antisemitismus erneut aufflackerte. Damit hätte eine gesamtgesellschaftliche Debatte eingesetzt, in deren Folge im Jahre 2002 beschlossen worden sei, ein System in Gang zu setzen, das exemplarischen Charakter habe. Viele Länder hätten die französische Vorgehensweise als Modell für eigene Einrichtungen genommen. Ausgangssituation im Jahre 2002 sei gewesen, dass jüdische Verbände wie CRIF und andere sich mit lautem Protest beim Innenministerium gemeldet hätten. Dem vorausgegangen war, dass ein kontinuierlicher Anstieg antisemitistischer Vorfälle zu verzeichnen gewesen sei - vom Jahre 2002, in dem es 150 bis 200 Vorfälle gegeben habe - seien diese zum Jahr 2003 sprunghaft auf 500 angestiegen mit einem Höhepunkt im Jahre 2004 von 1000. Im Jahre 2005 habe man 600 bis 700 Vorfälle erfasst. Die explosionsartige Zunahme der Vorfälle vom Jahr 2002 zum Jahr 2003 und 2004 seien zurückzuführen auf eine neue Art von Antisemitismus. Dieser gehe überwiegend von Bevölkerungsteilen aus, die aus nordafrikanischen und maghrebinischen Staaten stammten und sich stark mit dem israelisch/palästinensischen Konflikt identifizierten. Dieser Konflikt habe eine große Polemik ausgelöst. Viele jüdische Einrichtungen hätten Überwachungssysteme gefordert oder selbst eingerichtet. Das Innenministerium habe zunächst die von den jüdischen Gemeinschaften vorgelegten Zahlen abgelehnt und sich in ersten Auseinandersetzungen nur mit der Zahl der Vorfälle befasst. 2003 habe man jedoch gezielt damit begonnen, ein Überwachungs- und Datenerfassungssystem einzurichten. Dessen erstes Prinzip sei eine Koordinierung zwischen verschiedenen Akteuren wie den jüdischen Gemeinden, jüdischen Einrichtungen und den staatlichen Ministerien gewesen. Das zweite wichtige Prinzip sei die Informationsweitergabe unter diesen Akteuren. Dies erfolge in Form einer Ständigen Kommission, die sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf regionaler Ebene arbeite. Zwischen dem Innen-, Bildungs- und Justizministerium sei eine interministerielle Koordinierungsstelle eingerichtet worden, weil Übergriffe mit antisemitischem Hintergrund zunächst in die Zuständigkeit dieser Ministerien fielen - das Innenministerium, wenn es sich um Vorfälle im öffentlichen Leben z. B. Straßen, Gebäuden handle, das Bildungsministerium, wenn es sich um Vorfälle in Schulen und Bildungseinrichtungen handle und das Justizministerium, wenn es sich um angezeigte Straftaten handle. In Bezug auf die Informationsweitergabe sei es wichtig, eine Beobachtungsstelle zu haben, die die Gesamtzahl der Übergriffe möglichst noch vor Ort erfasse und anschließend rasch an die übergeordneten Stellen weitergebe. Diese Stellen entschieden gemeinsam, wo Schwerpunkte für Prävention und Bekämpfung zu setzen seien. Zu diesem Zweck sei in den Ministerien eine spezielle Software entwickelt worden, die sehr gut funktioniere. Die Daten der Opfer würden von der Polizei erfasst und an das Innenministerium weitergegeben. Das Bildungsministerium sei gehalten, in Form der Schulaufsicht auf Vorkommnisse in allen sensiblen Schulbereichen und Akademien zu achten. Natürlich sei auch das französische System kein perfektes System, doch man sei bemüht, dieses System ständig weiter zu verbessern. Wichtige Fragen, um die es dabei gehe, seien zum einen die Identifizierung der Tatsachen, zum zweiten verschärfte Sensibilisierung im Hinblick auf Banalisierung/Trivialisierung von verbalen Diffamierungen, zum dritten Übergriffe in Presse und audiovisuellen Medien zu beobachten und zu verfolgen und zum vierten eine Strafmaßerhöhung für Gewaltakte und Übergriffe, denen antisemitistische Motive zugrunde lägen. Dieser letzte Punkt sei jedoch der schwierigste, denn es gebe keine eindeutige Definition von Antisemitismus, und letztlich sei bei Straftaten die jeweilige Auslegung des einzelnen Richters maßgeblich. Frankreich habe mit dem Lellouche-Gesetz u. a. ein verschärftes Strafmaß für antisemitistische Übergriffe und Straftaten festgelegt. Jedoch zögerte eine Reihe von Richtern bei der Frage, ob es sich im

Einzelnen um Antisemitismus oder noch um Meinungsfreiheit handele, und die Grenze zwischen Antizionismus und Antisemitismus werde immer diffuser, wobei Antizionismus kein Straftatbestand sei. Es habe Gerichtsverfahren gegeben, bei denen sich Richter geweigert hätten, ein antisemitistisches Motiv zu erkennen. Mittlerweile gebe es Anweisungen des Innenministeriums an die Generalstaatsanwaltschaft, auf verschärfte Anwendung des Lellouche-Gesetzes zu achten. Bedauernswerterweise entwickle sich auch der verbale Antisemitismus immer weiter, er werde zunehmend banalisiert und deshalb käme es auch zu weniger Verurteilungen. Das Pressegesetz in Frankreich über die Meinungsfreiheit aus den 30iger Jahren musste auf die neue Situation, die z. B. Hassverbrechen und Straftaten mit antisemitistischem Hintergrund mit einschließe, angepasst werden. Außerdem sei es schwierig, ein Beobachtungssystem im Hinblick auf die Medien festzulegen.

Dr. Esther Webman vom Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism der Universität Tel Aviv, Israel stellte einen Kurzbericht vor, den sie zum Thema „Europäische Anstrengungen zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus aus der arabischen Perspektive“ zusammengestellt hatte. Sie beschrieb die Arbeit des Stephen Roth Instituts in Tel Aviv, das ein akademisches Institut der Universität von Tel Aviv sei und weltweit antisemitistische Vorfälle beobachte, eine große ständig weiterentwickelte Datenbank unterhalte und jährliche Veröffentlichungen publiziere, die länderspezifische Aufstellungen enthalte ebenso wie Analysen von Presseartikeln und Buchbesprechungen. Ihre Arbeit bestehe in erster Linie darin, Tages- und Wochenzeitschriften und andere Publikationen auszuwerten und auch Nutzen zu ziehen aus den in den letzten Jahren von israelischen und jüdischen Organisationen geleisteten Arbeit in Bezug auf die Erfassung von Vorfällen mit antisemitischem Hintergrund. Frau Dr. Webman ging ausführlich auf die Reaktion der arabischen Welt auf die Aktivitäten der OSZE sowie auf das amerikanische Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus und antiisraelischer Stimmung in Europa ein. Dies sei nicht nur wichtig für ein Verständnis der arabisch/muslimischen Position, sondern auch für einen zukünftigen Erfolg internationaler Bemühungen zur Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus und Holocaustleugnung. Die internationale Konferenz zur Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus, die im April 2004 in Berlin unter der Schirmherrschaft der OSZE stattgefunden habe, habe in der arabischen Welt eine Reaktion des Misstrauens und der Kritik hervorgerufen. Unter Reaktion sei die Debatte zu verstehen, die in der Öffentlichkeit, in Zeitschriften und Fernsehprogrammen entstanden und nicht eine offizielle Reaktion der Staaten gewesen sei. Von palästinensischer Seite sei diese Konferenz als eine gemeine Ablenkung von dem Verhalten Israels gegenüber den Palästinensern bezeichnet worden. Dabei seien unverhältnismäßige Vorfälle einander gegenüber gestellt worden. So z. B. die Schändung eines jüdischen Grabs in einer französischen Stadt im Verhältnis zu der Zerstörung eines ganzen Stadtviertels in Rafah. Frau Dr. Webman zitierte im Einzelnen verschiedene Zeitschriften und Fernsehauftritte insbesondere des jordanischen Wissenschaftlers George Haddad, Reaktionen ägyptischer Journalisten, die aus Berlin berichteten und der Konferenz vorwarfen, eine negative Haltung gegenüber der arabischen und muslimischen Gemeinschaft in Europa einzunehmen. Auch das in Stockholm im Jahre 2000 veranstaltete internationale Forum über den Holocaust sei als geschichtsverzerrend dargestellt worden. Die Verabschiedung des amerikanischen Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus im Oktober 2004 habe starke Opposition von arabischen Kommentatoren und Journalisten hervorgerufen. Der gemeinsame Tenor habe darin gegipfelt, dass die Juden Legislative und Exekutive übernommen und diese dazu gebracht hätten, Kritik an Israel zu verbieten. Obwohl einige Kommentatoren eingeräumt hätten, dass Antisemitismus gefährlich sei, seien generell aber in erster Linie die Araber bedauert worden. Der zunehmende Antisemitismus und die Übergriffe würden eher als ein Trend wahrgenommen, der sich gegen die Juden richte, und es sei angedeutet worden, dass die europäische Straße darauf warte, ein Zeichen zu erhalten. Wenige Stimmen habe es dabei gegeben, die sich für die Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus

und gegen die Leugnung des Holocaust ausgesprochen hätten. Eine dieser Stimmen gehöre Abdal-Rahman Rashid, dem Generaldirektor des Arabischen Satellitenfernsehens al-Arabiya und früherem Herausgeber einer in London ansässigen arabischen Zeitung. Er hätte in seinen Leitartikeln die Araber immer wieder davor gewarnt, sich mit Antisemitismus und Holocaustleugnern zu verbünden. Seiner Meinung nach sollte das amerikanische Gesetz genau als das verstanden werden, was es bezwecke – ein Gesetz zur Überwachung von Antisemitismus, und anstatt es zu verurteilen, sollten die Araber seine Umsetzung ermutigen und sich darum bemühen, es so auszuweiten, dass es Anstiftung zu jedwedem Rassismus gegen Muslime, Farbige und anderen Minderheiten mit umfasse. Der Schutz der Juden sollte der erste Schritt zum Schutze für jedermann sein, fügte ein amerikanischer Journalist arabischer Abstammung hinzu. Ein weiterer Journalist unterstrich, dass Konferenzen und Beschlüsse den Antisemitismus nicht ausrotten würden. Die einzige Möglichkeit, dies zu tun, bestünde darin, sich mit seinen Hintergründen auseinanderzusetzen, und die lägen in der israelischen Politik. Frau Dr. Webman erklärte, dass sie der Ansicht widerspreche, dass der israelisch/palästinensische Konflikt die Ursache allen Übels sei. Sie bezweifle die Wirksamkeit von Gesetzen zur Ausrottung antisemitischer Denkweisen und Stereotypen und halte es für extrem wichtig, Wege und Mittel zu finden, sich auf die arabische Welt und die Gesellschaften der dritten Welt zuzubewegen, denn Eines sei sicher, man wolle die Welt nicht in zwei Achsen teilen, eine die des Antisemitismus beschuldigt werde und die muslimische Welt, Europa, Lateinamerika und China umfasse und die andere, die sich dagegen stelle und aus Israel und den USA bestehe.

Die Moderatorin der Diskussionsrunde, **Dr. Kathrin Meyer**, Beraterin für Antisemitismusfragen, Toleranz und Nichtdiskriminierungsprogramme von ODIHR, dem Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte in Warschau, ergänzte die Vorträge der Gastredner durch einen Überblick über den Stand der Dinge in Bezug auf Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von Antisemitismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in den OSZE-Staaten. Sie führte aus, dass die OSZE ODIHR mit der Implementierung der Überwachung antisemitischer Vorkommnisse beauftragt habe. Die Aufgabe, verlässliche Informationen zusammentragen, stamme aus der Erklärung der Konferenz in Berlin im Jahre 2004. 56 Staaten der OSZE wirkten bei dieser Aufgabe mit. Von 2004 bis 2005 habe ODIHR fünf Verbalnoten an alle Staaten gesandt, um Daten zu erhalten und diese zu erfassen. 46 Länder hätten nationale Stellen als Kontaktstellen und Ansprechpartner und Institutionen genannt. 38 Länder hätten statistische Angaben übermittelt. Das Bild werde jedoch differenzierter, wenn man die zugesandten Informationen genauer betrachte. Vor zwei Wochen habe es eine Implementierungssitzung gegeben, auf der auf das Datendefizit hingewiesen worden sei. Mittlerweile hätten 43 OSZE-Staaten ein Ministerium benannt, einige sogar spezielle Abteilungen, die sich gezielt um diese Fragen kümmerten. Nur wenige Länder hätten konkrete Namen mitgeteilt, und nur sieben Länder hätten Staatsanwälte und Polizeistellen benannt, die als Anlaufstellen dienten. Insgesamt hätten nur acht Staaten ganz spezielle Stellen benannt, die ausreichend Informationen lieferten. Drei Staaten hätten mitgeteilt, dass es keine Übergriffe in ihrem Land gebe. Aus Italien und der Tschechischen Republik habe es besonders detaillierte Daten und Informationen gegeben. Sie unterstrich, dass es aber generell gesehen in manchen Bereichen noch ein großes Datendefizit gebe, obwohl Gesetzesvorschriften in Bezug auf die Datenerhebung existierten, die aber nicht umgesetzt würden, vielleicht wegen fehlender Ressourcen oder mangelnder Schulung von Mitarbeitern. Schwierig sei aber auch die Definition von Hassverbrechen und antisemitistischen Übergriffen. Es sei darauf hinzuweisen, dass über viele Vorkommnisse gar kein Bericht erstattet würde, denn vieles laufe unter dem Aspekt Hooligan-Straftaten. Sie fügte hinzu, dass es am richtigen Verständnis und auch an der Schulung der Mitarbeiter der Strafverfolgungsorgane fehle.

In der anschließenden Diskussion wurde von **Herrn Heuberger** (Jewish Claims Conference, JCC) die Frage an Botschafter Huntzinger gestellt, warum nur dann etwas getan werde, wenn sich eine Krise oder eine dramatische Situation entwickle, und warum nicht kontinuierlich vorher etwas unternommen werde. Er stellte auch die Frage, warum es immer Aufgabe der jüdischen Organisationen sei, sich um Hilfe an den Staat zu wenden. Er ging auf die Grenze zwischen Meinungsfreiheit und Straftatbeständen ein und wies darauf hin, dass oft erst nach der Feststellung eines Richters, dass es sich um eine Straftat handle, etwas unternommen werde. In seiner Antwort verwies **Botschafter Huntzinger** darauf, dass sich der Antisemitismus entwickelt und in einer abrupten Form verändert habe. Seien es in den Jahren 2001 und 2002 noch Straftaten gewesen, die sich gegen herkömmliche Orte wie Friedhöfe oder jüdische Einrichtungen richteten - deren Zahl sei mittlerweile in Frankreich rückläufig - so habe es im Jahre 2003 ein Aufflammen eines Antisemitismus in eine andere Richtung gegeben. Dies habe Staat und Öffentlichkeit gleichermaßen irritiert. Junge Leute aus den Vororten hätten - oft in Nachahmung der Intifada oder nur aus Lust an Gewaltausübung - für große Unruhe gesorgt. Nach den Präsidentschaftswahlen in Frankreich sei die Regierung fest entschlossen gewesen, eine Politik in Richtung Prävention und Repression umzusetzen. Auf die Frage, warum sich jüdische Organisationen zuerst äußerten, stellte Huntzinger fest, dass diese Einrichtungen unmittelbar und als erste betroffen seien und sie über Vorfälle berichteten, die zunächst möglicherweise zunächst gar nicht bekannt seien. In Frankreich gebe es nach Israel und den USA die größte jüdische Gemeinde mit etwa 700 000 Mitgliedern, aber auch die drittgrößte muslimische Gemeinde. Überwiegend Juden aus osteuropäischen Staaten lebten in den gleichen Vierteln wie Araber und Einwanderer maghrebischer Herkunft, oft in ärmlichen Verhältnissen. Dort komme es zu Spannungen und zu ersten Übergriffen. Nachdem in Frankreich die Alarmglocken bei den staatlichen Stellen geläutet hätten, sei der Prozess der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Gerichtsbarkeit und den politischen Stellen sehr positiv verlaufen. Die Datenerhebung erfolge auch durch Polizeistellen, Schuldirektoren und andere Stellen, wobei viele dieser Vorfälle keine Straftatbestände im eigentlichen Sinne darstellten. Die Grenze zwischen Antisemitismus und Antizionismus liege nicht auf der Hand. Man dürfe diese Begriffe auch nicht vermischen, sondern müsse beide genau definieren.

Der Teilnehmer **David Hirsh** (Universität London, Gründer „Engage World Jewish Congress“) beklagte, dass in Großbritannien der so genannte „common sense“ für Übergriffe und unzulässiges Verhalten nachlasse und stattdessen ein bestimmtes Ambiente und bestimmte Diskussionen salonfähig geworden seien und von der Gesellschaft akzeptiert würden. So werde Israel der Apartheid und des rassistischen Verhaltens beschuldigt. Diese Situation lasse sich gesetzlich nicht ändern. Man müsse die Menschen überzeugen, damit sie erkennen würden, welche Motive hinter diesen Denkweisen stünden.

Als letzter Redner in der Debatte äußerte sich **Roman Spektor** (Präsident der jüdischen Dachorganisation in Russland) und stellte die Frage, warum auf dem 2. Berliner Treffen keine russischen Teilnehmer und nur sehr wenig OSZE-Vertreter seien. Er wies darauf hin, dass man sich in Russland zwar häufiger mit dem Antisemitismus auseinandersetze, dieser aber weiter zunehme und es immer mehr einschlägige Straftaten gebe. Um solchen deutlichen Erscheinungsformen entgegenzutreten, sei es eine bewährte Praxis, die OSZE-Teilnehmerländer an die auf der 1. Berliner Konferenz gemachten Zusagen zu erinnern.

Juliane Wetzel vom Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung der TU Berlin stellte fest, dass in Frankreich und Großbritannien die Datenerhebung und Informationsbeschaffung sehr gut in allen Formen und auf allen Ebenen funktioniere. Sie beklagte, dass dies in Deutschland allerdings nicht der Fall sei. Daten würden in erster Linie über Straftaten gesammelt, die der Verfassungsschutz von den Landes- und Bundeskriminalämtern erhalte. Auch von Verfassungsschützern werde kritisiert, dass verschiedene Spektren nicht abgedeckt würden.

Abg. Weisskirchen schloss die erste Diskussionsrunde und bedauerte, dass die drei Persönlichen Beauftragten des OSZE-Vorsitzenden bislang trotz intensiver Bemühungen keine Einladung von Russland erhalten hätten. Auch er bezeichnete die Entwicklung in Russland in Bezug auf antisemitistische Vorfälle als besorgniserregend. Er fügte hinzu, dass auch alte Formen des Antijudaismus sehr ausgeprägt seien. Russland sei quasi zweigeteilt, wobei auf der einen Seite Präsident Putin eine klare und überzeugende Position bezogen habe, zum anderen aber weite Teile der russischen Gesellschaft mit antisemitistischen Vorurteilen stark durchsetzt seien. Daneben sei auch festzuhalten, dass es eine zunehmende Islamophobie und andere Formen von Vorurteilen z. B. gegenüber Sinti und Roma gebe.

PANEL 2: Hassgeprägte Verbrechen

Unter der Leitung von **Michael Whine**, Direktor des britischen Community Security Trusts (CST) und Mitglied des Polizeiforums für hassgeprägte Verbrechen, stellten vier weitere Experten jeweils verschiedene Konzepte vor, die versuchen, hassgeprägten Verbrechen vorzubeugen, aber vor allem anstreben, deren Aufklärung und Ahndung zu verbessern.

Der erste Redner war der US-Amerikaner **Paul Goldenberg**, der als leitender Direktor der National Public Safety Strategy sowie als Berater für OSZE/ODIHR und des Law Enforcement Officer Programmes (LEOP) tätig ist. Er betonte ausdrücklich, dass Datensammlungen über den „Horror des Antisemitismus“ unerlässlich sei, jedoch Polizisten, die direkt auf diesen Hass reagieren, eine spezielle Ausbildung durchlaufen müssten. Daher müsse Zeit, Geld und Ressourcen in die polizeiliche Aus- und Weiterbildung investiert werden, damit die Beamten den Unterschied zwischen Vandalismus und jenen Verbrechen, die durch Hass ausgelöst werden, erkennen.

Die zielgerichtete Ausbildung im Bereich der Strafverfolgung sei bereits in einigen OSZE-Staaten eingeführt. Obwohl es eigentlich die Aufgabe des Staates sei, seine Bürger zu beschützen, sei die Beteiligung von NROs unverzichtbar, insbesondere um eine Brücke zwischen staatlichen Strafverfolgungsinstitutionen und der Zivilgesellschaft zu bilden.

Die polizeiliche Ausbildung stand auch bei **Danijela Petkovic**, Dozentin für Strafrecht an der Polizeiakademie in Zagreb und Polizeipräsidentin und nationale Ausbilderin für das LEOP zur Bekämpfung von hassgeprägten Verbrechen in Kroatien im Vordergrund. Mit Hilfe der engen Zusammenarbeit mit dem Innenministerium und dem ODIHR haben im Juni dieses Jahres neun kroatische Polizeibeamte als erste in ihrer Region ihre Ausbildung erfolgreich abgeschlossen. Die weitere Umsetzung des LEOP werde in den kommenden Jahren durch die Aufnahme der Ausbildung in den allgemeinen Lehrplan, sowie einige Spezialschulungen und durch die Kooperationen mit Ministerien und NROs erreicht, sodass in Kürze mindestens ein fortgebildeter Polizeibeamter in jedem Bezirk arbeitet. Darüber hinaus wurden im letzten Monat einige Zusatzartikel in das Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen, die eine Definition von hassgeprägten Verbrechen liefern und den Strafenkatalog verschärfen. Ebenso seien alle Einheiten dazu verpflichtet, eine Datensammlung über Gewaltverbrechen, aber auch verdächtiges Musik- oder Filmmaterial, Graffiti u.ä. zu erstellen und Informationen untereinander auszutauschen. Dies solle zu einer verbesserten Verbrechensverhinderung und -verfolgung führen.

Antonio Arrabal Villalobos von der Abteilung für Internationale polizeiliche Zusammenarbeit im Staatssekretariat für Sicherheitsfragen des spanischen Innenministeriums stellte die seit März 2005 existierende enge Zusammenarbeit von Spanien mit der OSZE in der Aus- und Weiterbildung von Polizisten sowie die derzeitige Lage im Land vor. Hauptaugenmerk jedoch liegt auf dem Konzept des „good policing“ das eine Mischung aus der Stärkung von Demokratie und dem Schutz der Menschenrechte sowie Toleranz ist. Die Polizei habe dabei die wichtige Aufgabe, das Gesetz effektiv umzusetzen und vorbeugende

Maßnahmen im Kampf gegen Rassismus und Diskriminierung zu ergreifen. In Reaktion auf die stetige und schnelle Veränderung der Bevölkerungen weltweit, müsse die Polizei handlungsfähig sein. Das Ziel dabei bleibe, in den OSZE-Staaten eine Region der Toleranz zu schaffen.

David Friedman, amerikanischer Regionaldirektor und Koordinator der Anti-Defamation League (ADL) und Direktor der National Law Enforcement Initiative meinte, dass es von höchster Bedeutung sei, dass beispielsweise Polizisten in der Lage seien, antisemitische Verbrechen auch als solche zu erkennen. Schnelligkeit sei der entscheidende Faktor bei der Strafverfolgung. Je länger eine effektive Handlung der Polizei oder Staatsanwaltschaft dauere, desto größer würde der Schmerz der Opfer und parallel dazu würde das Vertrauen in Justiz und Polizei sinken. Daher sei eine wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen Gesellschaft und Strafverfolgungsorganen sehr wichtig; die Polizei müsse jüdische Gemeinden ebenso sehr verstehen und begreifen, wie jüdische Gemeinden die polizeiliche Arbeit. Da hassgeprägte Verbrechen von Natur aus unterschiedlich seien, gebe es auch kein universal wirkendes Modell.

Moderator **Michael Whine** stellte in knappen Worten die Sicherheitsberatung für jüdische Gemeinden seines britischen CST vor. Dabei werde stets eng mit der Regierung und Strafverfolgungsorganen gearbeitet. Die von dem CST entwickelte Datenbank über antisemitische Verbrechen sei zuverlässiger als die der Polizei, so dass diese nun um eine Mithilfe bei der Erstellung einer eigenen Datensammlung gebeten habe. Darüber hinaus würden Opfer von hassgeprägten Verbrechen betreut und unterstützt. Seit kurzem sei die britische Regierung auch offener in Bezug auf eine Zusammenarbeit und einen Dialog mit NROs geworden, sodass der CST bereits heutzutage in die Formulierung von Gesetzen mit Bezug auf Religionen eingebunden ist. Mitglieder des Trusts seien unabhängige Berater in Gerichten, im Polizeiforum über hassgeprägte Verbrechen. Aufgrund des erstaunlichen Erfolges in der Durchsetzung seiner Ziele, habe die Polizei den CST gebeten, auch andere Gemeinden wie beispielsweise Hindus oder Moslems in Bezug auf Sicherheitsaspekte zu schulen.

In der offenen Diskussionsrunde beklagte ein NRO-Mitglied aus der Ukraine, dass NROs zwar großes Interesse an einer engen Zusammenarbeit mit staatlichen Strafverfolgungsinstitutionen haben, letztere jedoch leider nicht. Auch der Versuch, ein adäquates Datennetz aufzubauen und effektiv gegen Antisemitismus entgegenzuwirken sei bisher gescheitert, da dies Aufgabe des Staates und seiner Organe sei. Er fragte daher, wie man die von den Referenten beschriebene Zusammenarbeit von staatlichen und zivilen Organisationen praktisch umsetzen könne.

Paul Goldenberg antwortete, dass in den vergangenen sechs Monaten Treffen mit NROs und der Polizei auf hoher Ebene stattgefunden haben und im Rahmen des LEOP vier Leute im hohen Staatsdienst bereits ausgebildet wurden und weitere geplant seien. Dennoch sei die Situation sicherlich verbesserungswürdig, aber ein erster Schritt sei gemacht.

Sonja Biserko vom *Helsinki Committee* beschrieb kurz die Situation des Antisemitismus in Serbien. Aufgrund der Radikalisierung der Politik in den 1980er Jahren sei Serbien ein Sonderfall, der im Ausland wenig bemerkt wird, welches aber gefährliche Ausmaße annehmen könne. Antisemitismus sei ein Teil des Nationalstolzes, was sich auf die Unfähigkeit der Gesellschaft, die Vergangenheit und insbesondere den Zweiten Weltkrieg zu bewältigen und auf eine recht radikale Auslegung der Kirche und einiger politischer Parteien zurückzuführen sei. Rassistische sowie antisemitische Vorfälle seien gerade auch in der Jugend verbreitet, doch auf offizieller Ebene wurde durch die Regierung wenig gehandelt und Programme, die seit 2003 hin und wieder veranstaltet werden zeigen lediglich geringen Erfolg. So lange der Oberste Gerichtshof nicht auch als moralische Instanz von der

Gesellschaft anerkannt werde, so lange werde sich auch wenig ändern. **Paul Goldenberg** wies kurz darauf hin, dass bei einer kommenden Konferenz in Paris über polizeiliche Ausbildung gesprochen werde, woran auch serbische Vertreter teilnehmen und zugesagt haben, im ganzen Land Polizisten dementsprechend auszubilden.

Azay Quliyev, Delegierter der OSZE-PV aus Aserbaidschan, stellte zwei direkte Fragen an die Panelmitglieder. Erstens, wie könnten andere Staaten und ausländische Organisationen besser in den nationalen Aufbau eines solchen Ausbildungssystems eingebunden werden und zweitens, wie könne man die Rolle der zivilen Organisationen und der Zivilgesellschaft allgemein verstärken?

Michael Whine bemerkte, dass solche Schulungen bereits von der ODIHR geplant seien und **David Friedman** fuhr fort, dass der Erfolg der Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus vom politischen Willen der Regierung abhängig sei. Vor 25 Jahren haben in den USA auch noch Gesetze über den Umgang und die Ahndung von hassgeprägten Verbrechen gefehlt. Doch es sei wichtig, dass lokale NROs durchhielten und ständig für eine Verbesserung der Situation kämpften.

Rafal Pankowski von der Never Again Association aus Polen warf ein, wie man der Internationalisierung von Hass-Netzwerken entgegenwirken könne. **Paul Goldenberg** bestätigte, dass Hass keine Grenzen habe und befürwortet daher eine neue und umfassende Datenbank für viele Organisationen, die beispielsweise auch Informationen über Musik und sog. Hass-Konzerte enthalte. Musik sei seiner Ansicht nach ein nicht zu unterschätzendes Medium um Hass zu verbreiten und zu akzeptieren. Daher solle auch in diesem Bezug der Kontakt zur Strafverfolgung verbessert werden.

Auch **Prof. Gert Weisskirchen** bemerkte, dass Neonazis und Antisemiten sich weltweit vernetzen. Deutschland versuche, Schritt für Schritt nationale Gesetze an die Regelungen der OSZE anzugleichen und fordere transnational eine bessere Abstimmung. Das Problem sei erkannt, nun müsse noch adäquat gehandelt werden.

Michael Whine nannte darüber hinaus noch Programme der EU und Europol zur Bekämpfung von grenzüberschreitenden Verbrechen. Ein Muster-Beispiel für eher bi- als multilaterale Zusammenarbeit sei der Informationsaustausch über Fußball-Hooligans. Das Hauptmedium für die Verbreitung von Hass sei aber seit einigen Jahren das Internet, worauf NROs sowie Polizei noch effektiver reagieren müssen. Hierbei fehle es leider in einigen Ländern an politischem Willen.

Arbeitsessen mit Ansprache von Dr. Small zum Thema

“Antisemitismus in Europa: vorhersehbar aufgrund israelfeindlicher Stimmungen“

Dr. Charles Asher Small, Direktor der Yale Initiative für Interdisziplinäre Studien über Antisemitismus der Yale Universität in den USA, stellte die Ergebnisse seiner Studie „Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Antisemitism in Europe“ vor. Darin wird insbesondere die Korrelation zwischen Anti-Israel Sentiments und Antisemitismus betont. Small argumentiert, dass die Globalisierung ein Prozess sei der auf der einen Seite Leute verbinde, auf der anderen Seite, Bevölkerungsgruppen jedoch auch voneinander trenne. Die einsetzende Schwächung der Staatlichkeit in vielen Ländern schreite immer weiter voran und das sog. „politische Vakuum“, das früher vom Staat besetzt wurde, werde nun von zivilen Organisationen gefüllt. Dies gelte insbesondere im Zusammenhang der sozialen Absicherung eines sich immer mehr zurückziehenden Wohlfahrtsstaates.

Im Zuge dieser „social movements“ und postmoderner Demokratie sei der Begriff der Toleranz von höchster Wichtigkeit. Toleranz bedeute im klassischen Sinne, sich selbst als Spiegelbild des Anderen zu betrachten. Radikaler Islamismus und die fortschreitende

Islamisierung, die beide nicht mit der Religion der Muslime verwechselt werden dürfe, sei eine Bedrohung, nicht nur für Juden, sondern ebenso sehr für die Werte der modernen Welt. Als Beispiele für diese Bedrohung führt Small die Hamas sowie den iranischen Präsidenten Ahmadinejad auf und liefert Zitate, die diese Bedrohung auslösen. Beide, die palästinensische Organisation ebenso sehr wie der iranische Präsident, riefen wiederholt öffentlich zur Zerstörung des Staates Israel und der Tötung von Juden auf. Daher dürfe man nicht wegsehen oder diese Bedrohung als nicht existent oder nicht umsetzbar einschätzen, sondern sich vielmehr informieren, welche Ziele die Hamas und ähnliche Gruppen verfolgen.

Antisemitismus sei jedoch kein neues Phänomen. Die Juden wurden in der (europäischen) Geschichte schon lange aufgrund ihrer religiösen Überzeugung und ethnischer Herkunft benachteiligt, diskriminiert oder verfolgt. „Die Juden“ wurden von verschiedenen Bereichen der Wissenschaft, wie beispielsweise Religion, Biologie, Philosophie und anderen, generell als eine unterlegene und problematische Rasse eingestuft. Als Außenseiter im eigenen Heimatland entwickelten die Juden schließlich eine vergleichsweise starke Verbundenheit mit dem Staat Israel, die mittlerweile einen Teil der Identität eines Juden ausmache. Die Antisemitismus-Studie in Europa habe gezeigt, dass eine Dämonisierung des Staates Israel eine neue Art des Antisemitismus hervorbringe. Wenn Leute nun eine überzeugte anti-israelische Haltung eingenommen haben, so sei die Wahrscheinlichkeit um 56% größer, dass sie auch antisemitisch eingestellt seien. Erstaunlicherweise sei jedoch der Antisemitismus in Europa relativ wenig verbreitet. Ebenso paradox sei es, dass Anhänger der extremen Linken, die eigentlich Demokratie und Menschenrechte fördern sollten, bei Israel eine eher autokratische Einstellung einnehmen.

Wie zuvor schon erwähnt, sei das jüdische Identitätsgefühl eng mit dem Staat Israel verbunden. Die größte momentane Bedrohung gehe von Iran und der „Koalition der nuklearen Waffen“ aus. Die Zitate des iranischen Präsidenten Ahmadinejad seien keine Aussagen eines verrückten Mannes, sondern lägen der Überzeugung der Imane und anderen zugrunde. Dies sei kein Feind mit einer klaren politischen Agenda. Die Geschichte habe aber gezeigt, dass es fatale Auswirkung habe, wenn man die Zeichen nicht richtig deute und rechtzeitig handeln würde. Die Zeichen seien offensichtlich, daher bestünde nun auch Handlungsbedarf. Eine Möglichkeit wäre beispielsweise eine Resolution der Versammlung über Völkermordsverbrechen und Empfehlungen für Länder und deren Regierungen.

In der anschließenden Diskussionsrunde griff **Prof. Dr. Micha Brumlik** von der Universität Frankfurt das Problem und den Ursprung des europäischen Antisemitismus auf. Zuerst einmal sei dies natürlich ein sehr komplexes Phänomen. Eine vor kurzem in Deutschland durchgeführte Umfrage ergab, dass 60% der Befragten der Äußerung zustimmten, „das was die Juden mit den Palästinenser machten, sei das Gleiche, wie die Nazis mit den Juden“. Dies sei eine neue, eine kalte und passive Art des Antisemitismus, da die Bevölkerung seine Solidarität mit Israel langsam jedoch stetig entziehe; er nennt dies auch „die Gleichgültigkeit der Mitte“. Er glaube nicht daran, dass die viel diskutierte Schuldfrage bei den Medien liege. Es gebe nun einmal ein übermäßiges Interesse an Israel in Deutschland aufgrund der jüngeren Vergangenheit. Vielmehr müsse darauf geachtet werden Antisemitismus nicht nur einzelnen Gesellschaftsschichten oder politischen Gruppierungen zu suchen, sondern die gesamte Bevölkerung anzusprechen.

Doris Barnett, MdB, äußerte sich betroffen von den von Small vorgestellten Ergebnissen und sah ebenfalls aktuell eine konkrete Gefahr für den Staat Israel. Das Problem sei, dass nur wenige in Europa Arabisch verstünden. Durch die Übersetzungen ginge wahrscheinlich viel Inhalt verloren. Darüber hinaus empfinde sie es als wichtig, ein richtiges Bild von dem Islam als Religion sowie den Fundamentalisten zu haben. Sie widerspräche allerdings Prof. Dr. Brumlik und denke, dass Medien aufgrund der Auswahl der gezeigten Bilder und deren

Kommentare durchaus eine Macht der Manipulation haben. Dabei denke sie mit Grauen an einen möglichen europäischen Fernsehsender der Al Qaida.

Maciej Kozłowski aus Polen fragte, warum keine Studien in Mitteleuropa durchgeführt wurden. Der moderne Antisemitismus in Polen sei vielmehr gegen Israel und der gesamten Lage im Nahen Osten gerichtet, es bestünde daher keine Korrelation zwischen traditionellem und modernem Antisemitismus. Auf politischer Ebene habe Polen sehr gute Beziehungen mit Israel und setze sich regelmäßig für den Staat ein. Das Problem sei jedoch bereits im internationalen Diskurs zu finden, bei dem bereits eine Sprache benutzt werde, derer sich Extremisten bedienen; Beispiel: Israel übt Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit aus.

Andrew Baker vom American Jewish Committee (AJC) warf ein, dass es keine Überraschung sei, dass Anti-Israelismus in Antisemitismus umschlage. Darüber hinaus fügte er hinzu, dass die Bedrohung für den Staat Israel und die Juden von allen anerkannt werde.

Dr. Charles Asher Small betonte noch einmal, dass eine Umwandlung momentan stattfinde. Das Vakuum der schwachen Staatlichkeit werde nun durch Islamismus gefüllt und führe zu dieser modernen Form des Antisemitismus.

Der Abgeordnete des britischen Unterhauses **Dr. Denis MacShane** bemerkte, man müsse trotz allem das Recht verteidigen, Israel auch kritisieren zu dürfen. Der Glaube sei ein sehr mächtiges Instrument, worauf es zu achten gelte und man müsse zu allen religiösen Fundamentalisten sagen „zurück in deine Kiste“. Der Iran von heute sei jedoch keineswegs Nazi-Deutschland, solche Vergleiche seien gefährlich. Natürlich sei Präsident Ahmadinejad verrückt, jedoch sollte man niemanden dämonisieren. Er plädiere für eine politische Lösung des Konflikts.

Dr. Charles Asher Small entgegnete, er würde keineswegs den Iran dämonisieren und vielmehr die Geschichte, Kultur und Bevölkerung bewundern, aber er würde jene verurteilen, die vom Völkermord sprächen.

Henrik Bachner aus Schweden beklagte die irrationale Auffassung über Juden. Antisemitische Ideen und Gedankengut würden mehr und mehr akzeptiert, jedoch nicht verstanden. So würden die Juden auch verbreitet als Ursprung des Terrorismus und der Spaltung des Nahen Ostens von dem Westen gesehen. Es gebe jedoch auch hier keine universell anwendbare Lösung, da in jedem Land die Verhältnisse unterschiedlich seien.

Prof. Dr. Micha Brumlik griff Dr. MacShanes Aussage auf und meint, niemand würde den Iran mit Nazi-Deutschland gleichsetzen. Jedoch sei höchste Aufmerksamkeit geboten, da Ahmadinejad der erste Staatsmann seit Hitler sei, der öffentlich plant, Juden töten zu lassen. Solche Aussagen müssten ernst genommen und die Probleme gelöst werden.

Als Vertreterin der Nachkriegsgeneration hat sich **MdB Marieluise Beck** intensiv mit den Taten der Vater-Generation auseinandergesetzt. In irgendeiner Form müsse man die Aussagen des iranischen Präsidenten bewerten; dieses könne jedoch zwischen „kann man nicht ernst nehmen“ und „wird ernst genommen, aber man weiß nicht, was zu tun sei“ liegen. Wirtschaftliche und politische Sanktionen haben am Beispiel des Irak gezeigt, dass diese von autoritären Führern zu ihrem Nutzen verwendet werden und die Bevölkerung gegen jene, die die Sanktionen durchführen, aufhetzen. Ein Angriff sei noch weniger möglich und politische Diplomatie habe bisher keinen nennenswerten Erfolg gebracht.

Prof. Gert Weisskirchen, MdB, betonte, dass sich alle auf eine gemeinsame politische Linie einigen müssten. Man müsste herausfinden, wie sich die Staatenwelt verhalten solle. Ein wichtiger Punkt sei die Förderung von zivilem Engagement. Er bedankte sich bei Small für die „schnörkellose und brutale“ Schilderung des Problems und nannte die neueste Studie der

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, die die Bedrohung bestätigt, dass der Antisemitismus in der Mitte der Gesellschaft Fuß fasst.

PANEL 3: Erziehung

In diesem Panel wurden die unterschiedlichen Herangehensweisen an das Thema Antisemitismus in Schulen diskutiert und analysiert. Dabei ging es sowohl um die eingesetzten Lehrmaterialien als auch um die Rolle der Lehrenden und deren Ausbildung.

Dr. Kathrin Meyer vom ODIHR und **Karen Polak** (Anne-Frank-Haus) stellten ein gemeinsames Programm für Unterrichtsmaterialien vor. Antisemitismus werde zunächst als Sicherheitsrisiko in der OSZE-Region wahrgenommen. Daher hätten die Teilnehmerstaaten Programme gegen Antisemitismus und zur Holocaust-Erinnerung beschlossen. Diese Erziehung sei wichtig, aber nicht ausreichend. Nach Erkenntnissen des Europäischen Jüdischen Kongresses (EJC) ist es daraus zu folgern, dass innerhalb der EU antisemitische Taten zunehmen, obwohl alle Länder Holocaust-Erziehungsprogramme haben. Die von ODIHR und dem Anne-Frank-Haus vorbereiteten Lehrmaterialien stehen allen OSZE-Teilnehmerstaaten zur Verfügung. Entscheidend sei die Umsetzung und Anwendung der zur Verfügung stehenden Möglichkeiten. Diese sei deshalb noch nicht zufrieden stellend, auch weil das Bewusstsein über die Notwendigkeit von Antisemitismus-Unterricht in vielen Ländern wenig ausgeprägt sei. Außerdem fehle es an nachhaltiger Lehrer-Ausbildung zu diesem Thema.

Karen Polak verwies auf die vielfältigen Strategien, die zum Thema Antisemitismus-Bildung existieren und unterstrich, dass es bei solch einem Thema sicherlich keine perfekte Lösung gebe. Deshalb müsse diese Vielfältigkeit auch erhalten bleiben. Bei der Auswahl der Lehrmittel müsse man sich auf die gesellschaftliche Mitte der Schüler konzentrieren, um möglichst viele Menschen zu erreichen.

Viele Menschen würden mit dem Begriff „Juden“ oder „Antisemitismus“ hauptsächlich den Holocaust verbinden, hier müsse angesetzt werden in dem beispielsweise die vielfältige jüdische Geschichte in Europa in den Unterricht integriert wird. Dass Antisemitismus-Aufklärung in den Schulen eher ein Schatten-Dasein friste, hänge auch damit zusammen, dass viele Lehrer solch einen Unterricht – durch die dadurch verbundenen notwendigen Fortbildungen – als zusätzliche Belastung empfinden würden. Hier müssten die Rahmenbedingungen verbessert werden, in dem zum Beispiel der Antisemitismus nicht nur im Fach Geschichte auf dem Lehrplan stehe, sondern darüber hinaus auch in Fächern wie Sozialwissenschaften, Politik, u.ä. thematisiert wird. Hilfreich wäre es außerdem, prominente Fürsprecher für dieses Thema zu finden. Auf diese Weise könnte man in der Lehrerschaft mehr Personen dazu bewegen, sich freiwillig mit dieser Materie zu beschäftigen. Abschließend müsse im Unterricht nicht nur erklärt werden, *was* Antisemitismus sei, sondern auch *wie* man darauf reagiere. Insgesamt habe das Anne-Frank-Haus positive Erfahrungen gesammelt, diese gelte es nun auszuweiten und zu vertiefen.

Andras Kovacs verwies in seinem Beitrag auf eine soziologische Erhebung in Ungarn, nach der der Bildungsstand einer Person in keinem direkten Zusammenhang mit möglichen antisemitischen Tendenzen stehe. Vielmehr seien oft die Leute mit viel Wissen über Antisemitismus und den Holocaust eher antisemitisch eingestellt. Dieses Problem hänge auch mit einem falschen Lehrplan zusammen. Darüber hinaus habe die Studie ergeben, dass in der Bevölkerung Ungarns zwei Grundtendenzen im Denken über Juden existieren würden. Erstens fände es die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung wichtig, Gedenktage an den Holocaust aufrecht zu erhalten. Zweitens würde aber ebenfalls eine Mehrheit empfinden, dass die Juden ihre „Opferrolle“ unverhältnismäßig ausnutzen würden. Diese Tendenzen müssten genauer untersucht werden.

Im Anschluss benannte er Grundprobleme beim Kampf gegen Antisemitismus:

- der Antisemitismus ist der älteste Haß auf eine bestimmte Gruppe der Menschheit, es gibt dadurch ein Kontinuitätsproblem
- Antisemitismus existiert weltweit, sogar in Ländern, in denen gar keine Juden leben
- Die Rolle der Juden in der europäischen Geschichte, da sich dargestellte jüdische Geschichte zu sehr auf die Zeit von 1933-1945 konzentriert
- die aktuelle Generation, die über keine eigenen Erfahrungen mit Judenverfolgung verfügt und deshalb dem Problem keine große Relevanz einräumt.

Karen Polak griff Beispiele aus der aktuellen Generation auf und unterstrich, dass hier auch erste Erfolge bei der Vermittlung des neuen Lehrstoffes ausgemacht werden könnten, da junge Menschen mit dem Begriff Juden inzwischen vermehrt Israel und weniger Holocaust assoziieren würden.

Juliane Wetzel betonte, dass die Unterrichtung der jüdischen Geschichte nicht ausreichend sei, um vor Antisemitismus zu schützen. Außerdem sei Antisemitismus eine Erscheinung, die sich nicht gegen den einzelnen Juden, sondern gegen das ganze Kollektiv richten würde.

In der anschließenden Diskussion erinnerte **Georg Heuberger** von der Claims Conference an die Eröffnungsrede von Wolfgang Thierse, in der dieser betonte, dass es wichtig sei, die Erinnerungen des Holocaust konsequent an die nachfolgenden Generationen weiter zu geben. Dabei seien zwei Aspekte wichtig, erstens müsse klar gemacht werden, dass es sich im Dritten Reich um einen Zivilisationsbruch gehandelt habe und zweitens müsse auch darüber nachgedacht werden, *wie* Erinnerung transportiert werde und die didaktischen Mittel müssten dementsprechend angepasst werden. In den Schulbüchern würden die Juden grundsätzlich in einer Opferrolle präsentiert, ihre wichtigen Beiträge zu Kultur, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft würden nicht erwähnt. Hier läge auch eine wichtige Aufgabe bei den Lehrern, die eben diese Wahrnehmung verändern müssten.

Shani Rozanes vom World Jewish Congress (WJC) betonte die Wichtigkeit von anderen Medien bei der Bildungsarbeit. Zu viele junge Menschen würden nichts mehr mit dem Begriff Holocaust verbinden. **Josef Zissels** vom Congress of National Communities of Ukraine bemängelte, dass es bei vielen Antisemitismuskonferenzen zu wenige zählbare Ergebnisse gäbe. Deshalb fände er den Beitrag von Andras Kovacs auch sehr gut, da dieser auch einmal kritische Töne habe verlauten lassen. Er regte an, dass bei einem nächsten Meeting auch Sozialpsychologen eingeladen werden könnten, die über die Entstehung des Antisemitismus in der Gesellschaft berichten könnten. In der Ukraine nähmen antisemitische Veröffentlichungen in Fachblättern wie auch Gewalttaten gegen Juden beständig zu. Bei der Bekämpfung dieses Phänomens müsste aber auch mehr Aufmerksamkeit auf die unterschiedlichen Mentalitäten in Russland und der EU geachtet werden.

Andras Kovacs antwortete, dass in Tschechien ähnliche Erfahrungen mit dem Antisemitismus und seiner Bekämpfung gemacht worden seien wie in Deutschland. Problematisch sei die Umstellung des Unterrichts in den ehemaligen Sowjetstaaten, da sei man jetzt in einer Übergangsphase. Auf seine Frage, wer die verschiedenen Lehrmethoden umsetzt, antwortete **Kathrin Meyer**, dass es hierfür in jedem Land ein OSZE-Büro gäbe und darüber hinaus eng mit den jeweiligen Bildungsministerien zusammengearbeitet werden würde.

Vortrag von Mark Weitzman, Simon-Wiesental-Center zum Thema:

„Hate on the Internet: the situation based on the Simon Wiesenthal’s recent electronic report“, Digital Hate and Terrorism 2006

Mark Weitzman ging auf den Antisemitismus in digitaler Form ein. Als Beispiel nannte er eine Reihe von Websites. Die digitale Technik stelle dabei einen neuen Faktor in Hinblick auf die technologischen Möglichkeiten, wie auch die Verbreitung dar. Als Grundfaktor sei festzustellen, dass nun ein größeres Publikum grenzüberschreitend und so schnell und kostengünstig erreicht werde, wie es bislang es nicht möglich war. Das alles zeige sich in einer wachsenden Zahl von Hass-Seiten. Er nannte Spiele, die unter den Namen „Selbstmordbomber“, „Ethnische Säuberung“ oder „KZ-Manager“ verbreitet werden. Die Technologie finde auch leichter den Weg zu einer jungen Zielgruppe. Gewalt werde als Lösung propagiert und die Ziele werden entmenslicht. Durch die Entmenslichung des Opfers in solchen Spielen werde eine Generation von Nutzern herangezogen, die dieses modellhaft verinnerliche. Man müsse sich über diese Aspekte des Internet bewusst werden und auch selbst agieren.

Abschlussitzung

Ergebnisse aus den Diskussionsrunden

Andrew Baker vom American Jewish Committee (AJC) erinnerte, dass der Ministerrat der OSZE vor vier Jahren die erste Antisemitismuskonferenz in Wien beschlossen habe. Ein enormer Anstieg der Taten sei zu verzeichnen gewesen. Wichtig sei dabei auch die Anerkennung solcher Taten als antisemitische Straftaten gewesen und nicht lediglich als Sachbeschädigung oder Körperverletzung.

Ein Kernaspekt im Zusammenhang mit dem Antisemitismus sei der Umgang mit dem Nahost-Konflikt. Die Berliner Erklärung von 2004 habe ODIHR ein neues Mandat gegeben. Man habe sich um Sonderbeauftragte bemüht, was im Fall des Antisemitismus nun von Gert Weisskirchen erfolgreich wahrgenommen werde und der Thematik höhere Aufmerksamkeit gebe. Auch dies sei aber nicht unumstritten, manche sehen hierin eine Hierarchie der Diskriminierungen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Konferenz sollten dem Vorsitz zugeleitet werden, damit sie 2007 berücksichtigt werden könne.

Gert Weisskirchen, MdB, nannte die OSZE ein schweres Schiff, das im Konsens agieren müsse. Aber das Schiff einmal Fahrt aufgenommen hätte, produziere es gute Ergebnisse. ODIHR habe erfolgreiche Arbeit geleistet im Bereich Erziehung und Polizeitraining. Der Antisemitismus sei nicht überwunden, sondern komme in neuer Gestalt. Er wünsche sich mehr Handlungsspielraum für Aktivitäten. Im Bereich Gesetzesvollzug und Erziehung sei man auf gutem Wege, nun sei die Umsetzung wichtig. 2006 habe unvollkommene Ergebnisse gebracht; manche Länder hätten gut, viele zurückhaltend und einige gar nicht reagiert. Die Probleme lägen nicht auf der politischen Führungsebene, sondern auf zwei anderen Ebenen. Die Umsetzung des politischen Willens bis hin in die Behördenstrukturen sei wichtig, noch wichtiger sei aber die erfolgreiche Einbeziehung der Zivilgesellschaft. Leider gäbe es ein Wiedererstarken von antisemitischen Äußerungen, so dass der Kampf verstärkt werden müsse. Er wolle im kommenden Jahr Akzente setzen, sowohl sektoral, als auch regional. Zum Beispiel sollte ein Blick auf die Akademische Welt und auf Medien gerichtet werden. Ein selbstverpflichtender Kodex könnte von und für Journalisten entwickelt werden. Ferner sollten bestimmte Länder, insbesondere Russland, in den Fokus genommen werden. Weisskirchen verwies nochmals auf die Studie der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, die bestätigte, dass in Deutschland knapp zehn Prozent der Bevölkerung ein geschlossenes rechtsextremes Weltbild haben. Er begrüßte den Vorschlag des künftigen OSZE-Vorsitzenden, dem spanischen Außenminister Moratinos, eine Konferenz zum Thema Islamophobie durchzuführen. Zusätzlich sollte in einem der Maghreb-Staaten aber auch eine Konferenz zur Problematik des Antisemitismus in dieser Region in 2007 stattfinden.

2. Program of the Conference

November 20, 2006

Opening remarks by **Wolfgang Thierse**

Vice President of the Bundestag

Head of the German Delegation to the OSCE PA

Senator Pierre Chevalier

Special Envoy of the Belgian OSCE-Chairmanship

TRENDS IN ANTISEMITISM

(media, academia and the cultural sphere, immigrant communities)

Jean-Yves Camus

France Institute for International and Strategic Relations

November 21, 2006

ROUND TABLE ON LEGAL ASPECTS:

PANEL 1: Data Collection

Ambassador Jacques Huntzinger

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Rt. Hon. Dr. Denis Mac Shane

Member of Parliament GB

Dr. Esther Webman

Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism;

Tel Aviv University

Moderator

Dr. Kathrin Meyer (Advisor on Antisemitism Issues Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Programme, OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights)

PANEL 2: Hate Crimes

David Friedman

ADL's DC Regional Director – Director of National Law Enforcement Initiatives

Paul Goldenberg

Chief Executive Director, National Public Safety Strategy Group, OSCE/ODIHR

Consultant for ODIHR Law Enforcement Officer Programme

Danijela Petkovic

Police Academy Instructor of Criminal Law Police Academy, Republic of Croatia

Antonio Arrabal Villalobos

*Department of International Police co-operation, Secretariat of State of Security,
Ministry of Interior, Spain*

Moderator

Michael Whine

*Community Security Trust, Director; Member of the UK police forum
on hate crimes*

Working Lunch

"Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Antisemitism in Europe"

Dr. Charles Asher Small,

*Director, Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism,
Yale University*

**ROUND TABLE
PANEL 3: Education****Dr. Kathrin Meyer**

ODIHR/Anne Frank House – teaching material on Antisemitism

Andras Kovacs

Central European University and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Karen Polak

Anne Frank House Amsterdam

Moderator

Dr. Juliane Wetzel

*Center for Research on Antisemitism,
Technical University Berlin*

Presentation

"Hate on the Internet: the situation based on the Simon Wiesenthal's recent electronic report", Digital Hate and Terrorism 2006

Mark Weitzman

Simon Wiesenthal Center

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

"Where do we go from here?"

Results from the panels

Andrew Baker

American Jewish Committee

Prof. Gert Weisskirchen,

Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman on Combating Antisemitism

3. Opening Statement: **The fight against Antisemitism in the OSCE**

Pierre Chevalier¹

Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to start my speech by thanking you very much for having invited me to deliver some remarks on “The fight against Antisemitism in the OSCE” at this expert meeting organized by the German Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE. My gratitude goes to the head of the German delegation, Mr. Wolfgang Thierse, and the Bundestag.

A special word is certainly also due to Mr Gert Weisskirchen, the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for combating Antisemitism and also a member of the Bundestag. While he has invited us as a Member of Parliament, I greet him as a fellow parliamentarian. As the Special Envoy of Karel De Gucht, Chairman in Office, I greet and salute the Personal Representative, but more importantly I thank him for his hard work and dynamic approach in fulfilling his mandate.

Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen

At one point, the working title “From Vienna to Cordoba via Berlin, Paris and Brussels” was suggested for my intervention, with a reference of course to the high-level conferences on intolerance, racism and xenophobia organised by the OSCE these past few years. In fact, if one wanted to study Jewish history in Europe, traveling to the cities mentioned in this title – Vienna, Cordoba, Berlin, Paris and Brussels – would be a very good start indeed. These cities, and – as I should emphasize - many other cities all over Europe, bear witness to the major contribution of Jewish culture to European civilization. European cities are also places, however, where Jewish people have suffered tremendously. Before we look back at the OSCE experience in recent years, it is important to reflect upon the tragic events in these cities and indeed throughout Europe, in particular the Holocaust. As Elie Wiesel has said, “Not to transmit an experience is to betray it”. It is of the utmost importance that we continue to remember.

On that note, the fact that, in 2006, it is still necessary to organize a meeting on Antisemitism, is something we should reflect about. It is, however, more than necessary to hold such meetings, in order to confront the persistence of various forms of Antisemitism throughout the OSCE-area at this day and age. For, as we all know, more than 60 years after the liberation of Auschwitz, Antisemitism did not come to an end. During recent years we have seen a resurgence in many parts of the OSCE region.

The OSCE has acted on this, recognizing Antisemitism as a major threat to freedom and human dignity throughout history. The high level conferences from Vienna to Cordoba have acted as catalysts for increasing the level of activity of the participating States on combating Antisemitism.

As part of the OSCE’s response, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has created a Tolerance and Non-Discrimination programme that this year, among other projects,

¹ Special Envoy of the 2006 Belgian OSCE Chairmanship

produced Guidelines for educators when preparing Holocaust memorial days, a joint project with Yad Vashem, as well as teaching materials on Antisemitism, developed with the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam. The Guidelines were launched at the Holocaust Commemoration ceremony in Brussels on 27 January, whereas the teaching material was presented during the “Tolerance Implementation Meeting on Education to promote Mutual respect and understanding and to teach about the Holocaust”, that was held in Dubrovnik a month ago. The ODIHR law enforcement and police training programme, implemented in several OSCE countries into the national police education curricula, is also worthwhile mentioning. This programme does not only aim to help to combat hate crimes, but also to provide the affected communities with support from the law enforcement agencies. The increased capacity of law enforcement agencies to identify hate crimes when they occur will help the participating States to collect data and report on it in the future.

These examples indicate that, after the high-level conferences that started in Vienna, the OSCE has this year given priority to concrete implementation of commitments. There are three important points here:

- first of all, in doing so, the Organization has followed up on the mandate given by Ministers at the Ministerial Council in Ljubljana in December 2005 to focus on implementation.
- secondly, combating intolerance and discrimination within the OSCE, and promoting mutual respect and understanding, has to take place at a level ensuring the highest possible impact on the ground, and
- finally, although ODIHR and the three Personal Representatives are there to assist them, it is very clear that it is the final responsibility of participating States themselves to implement the commitments they have made.

In addition to the concrete projects I already referred to, the focus on implementation has materialized in three implementation meetings on tolerance this year. The first, in June in Almaty, dealt with interreligious, intercultural and interethnic dialogue. The second one, in Dubrovnik, focused in particular on education as the most effective long term instrument to promote tolerance and mutual understanding. The third one, which was held in Vienna two weeks ago, addressed the hate crime data deficit. I am certain that several of the recommendations and conclusions from those meetings will be referred to in the course of the proceedings of this meeting today and tomorrow.

In the work this year relating to Antisemitism more in particular, we have been fortunate to be able to rely on the cooperation with partner organizations such as Yad Vashem, the Anne Frank House and the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research. As you are aware, Belgium joined the Task Force in 2005.

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Mutual respect and understanding, integration with respect for diversity and intercultural and inter-religious dialogue remain core issues within the OSCE’s Human Dimension. Obviously, our efforts in combating each and every form of intolerance should be equal. That being said, we do, of course recognize that the distinctiveness of different forms of intolerance sometimes may require appropriate distinctive approaches.

The mechanism of the three Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE – Professor Weisskirchen on combating Antisemitism, Ambassador Orhun on combating Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims and Mrs Crickley on Racism, Xenophobia

and Discrimination also focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions - exemplifies this approach. While they strive to coordinate their activities - and the Chairmanship has encouraged such coordination and close cooperation among themselves and with the ODIHR - their respective mandates and positions ensure the visibility but also the distinctive approaches in response to specific forms of intolerance.

A Ministerial Decision on combating intolerance and discrimination and promoting mutual respect and understanding is currently being negotiated in Vienna for adoption at the upcoming Brussels Ministerial Council. It emphasizes, perhaps not surprisingly in view of the experience gained during past years, the role of education, youth, capacity-building for law enforcement authorities, awareness-raising on the value of cultural and religious diversity as a source of mutual enrichment of societies, a sound legal framework and effective partnerships with civil society.

While recalling the need to continue to implement commitments, the draft decision also, importantly I think, provides the basis for convening, during the first half of 2007, a new High-Level Conference on Combating Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding, following up on the 2005 Cordoba Conference on Antisemitism and Other Forms of Intolerance.

Finally, in the wake of the “cartoon crisis”, the current draft also emphasizes the role of public figures in political discourse, as well as the role of the media.

Politicians of course being such public figures, and parliamentarians being politicians, this text therefore calls on us to take our responsibilities and strongly condemn acts of any form of intolerance, including anti-Semitism, while promoting and supporting initiatives that allow for progress towards mutual respect and understanding.

I can assure you that both the Chairman-in-Office and myself have taken on that commitment with firm resolve, and will continue to do so in the future. We are fortunate to have personalities such as Professor Weisskirchen to remind us of this commitment, and to be able to call on experts who can provide us with sound advice and best practices on the way forward. This meeting is a welcome contribution to that end.

Thank you.

4. Trends in Antisemitism: France

Jean-Yves Camus²

What is commonly referred to as the wave of Antisemitism in France began immediately after the start of the Second Intifada in autumn 2000, and peaked in 2004. That year, according to the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior, 950 anti-Semitic acts were recorded, against 601 in 2003. However, the rise of Antisemitism is only part of a more global phenomenon, that of an increase in the numbers of racist and anti-Semitic acts: once again, 2004 was a peak, with 1513 recorded incidents, against 833 in 2003 and 1313 in 2002. This phenomenon, which is not linear in progression, seems to have changed in nature in the last months of 2004, which witnessed a sharp decrease in the number of anti-Semitic incidents, while the number of racist, that is, mostly anti-Arab or anti-Black incidents, remained steady. It is documented by the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior that 41, 97% of those racist and anti-Semitic incidents recorded in 2004 took place in the Paris and suburbs area, closely followed by the Rhône- Alpes and Provence Côte d'Azur regions. When it came to anti-Arab incidents however, including what can be named Islamophobic incidents such as the daubing of mosques or attacks on imams and veiled women, the Alsace region came second. Eastern France in general, including Alsace, is also where most desecrations of Jewish cemeteries took place, and the area is a hotbed of skinhead/ neo-nazi activity. The island of Corsica was characterized by an unusual number of racist attacks against Moroccan immigrants and citizens of Moroccan descent. In 2005, the decrease in anti-Semitic incidents and racist actions continued: 504 antisemitic incidents and 470 racist actions were recorded. However, this does not mean that anti-Semitic violence has stopped. First of all, the level of Antisemitism is higher than it was at the worst moments before 2000 (including 1967 and 1973, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982). Then, the worst anti-Semitic act took place in Paris, in February 2006, when a 23 years-old cell phones retailer, Ilan Halimi, was abducted and killed by a gang of youth of West African, North African and West Indian origin, who were obviously motivated by the hatred of the Jews.

Other figures one needs to keep in mind are that in 2004, 307 individuals were questioned by the police because of their alleged involvement in a racist or anti-Semitic act, 182 being specifically questioned regarding an anti-Semitic action. The increase in repression as well as the first convictions in courts in cases of Antisemitism, were certainly pivotal in slowing down this wave of Antisemitism. Most of the controversy around those events had to do with the alleged higher than average implication of Muslims. While figures on this matter cannot be exact (for under French law it is forbidden to mention an individual's ethnic origin in the police or judiciary statistics), it has been estimated by the police that, out of 209 of those questioned in 2004, following an anti-Semitic incident, 104 were Muslims, which does not say much about those people's religious practice). However, a survey conducted by CEVIPOF, a scholarly research centre in political science, concluded that 39% of practising Muslims showed anti-Semitic stereotypes, as against 18% in the overall French population. But this can only be properly interpreted in the context of a low rate of religious practice within the Muslim community, generally estimated at around 15-17%. Therefore, while Islamism and even radical Islam have made significant progresses in the last decade, especially among the youth, it is totally impossible to conclude, as many proponents of the "clash of civilizations" theory have, with regard to the case of France (Pipes; Horowitz; Goldnadel), that "the Muslim community" is intrinsically anti-Semitic, or that it adheres to radical or political Islam. And the anti-Semitic prejudice shown by part of the immigrant population, far from being grounded in the Muslim faith, is often of a cultural or political

² Associate Researcher, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Paris

nature, as Antisemitism is also used as a weapon against Israel and what is described as the “Zionist lobby” worldwide, by the Arab nationalist movement and the State-controlled media in Arab secular countries.

Why has this “wave of Antisemitism” caused such a trauma within the Jewish community? I see three reasons. The first one is that there is a wide belief, among the Jews and among the French population at large, that Antisemitism was dead after 1945 and the Shoah. The horrors of the Second World War were such that it was assumed the antisemites were shameful and were silenced once and for all after Auschwitz. Therefore, any upsurge of Antisemitism was denied in the first instance, then was interpreted as a “resurgence” of the Nazi past, with the only difference that the antisemites of today are not the neo-nazis, but “the Muslims”. The second reason is that many Jews feel betrayed by the French Government, which at first took the rise of Antisemitism lightly, dismissing it as a mere consequence of the Middle-East conflict and avoided, until 2002, taking the necessary measures to fight it.

The third reason is that Antisemitism has changed in nature, moving from a classical racial or theological (Christian) prejudice to the more subtle form of radical anti-Zionism, which can be defined as the position which denies the Israeli State the right to exist, or/and which denies the Jews the right to live in this State or emigrate to it. Because the overwhelming majority of the Jews which are active in communal life are strongly pro-Israel, and even consider that the Jewish State is at the centre of their Jewish identity, they see radical anti-Zionism as the ultimate enemy. Another, but secondary, reason is that the French Jewish community of today, being predominantly Sephardi, sees the situation through its past experience of fleeing the newly independent countries of North Africa. The rationale behind their fear is that “they” (the Muslims) have driven us out of our country (Algeria; Morocco or Tunisia) in the past, and “they” will try to drive us out of France. There is clearly a fear of being outnumbered by the Muslims, thus of being worth less attention from the authorities, and a significant part of the French population today, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, even shares Bat Ye’or’s theory that Europe, having cut from its Judeo-Christian roots, has become “Eurabia”, that is, a continent colonized by Islam and thus, a territory where the Jews will not be safe anymore. As a consequence of this position, the number of Jews who emigrate to Israel rose to an all-time high figure of 2980 in 2005. However, immigration to Israel is an option chosen mostly by those who already have family there and who are observant and besides, the number of those who later come back to France, although not accounted for in the Israeli statistics, seem to be high.

As a consequence of this new situation, a significant segment of the Jewish community, shifted from the Left to the Right of the political spectrum, a move that is common to all Western countries. In the case of France, two factors are responsible for this. First, the Socialist Government of the former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, did not immediately tackle the issue of Antisemitism after September 2000 and in the months following 9/11, which were also those preceeding the April 2002 presidential election. Then, the anti-Israel bias which was traditional within the Communist Party; the Green Party and the Far-Left parties (especially the Trotskyite groups which represented 7,22% of the vote in the last presidential election) came at the forefront of the political agenda with the rise of the anti-globalization movement and the close ties between part of this movement and some Muslim personalities who are perceived here as being Islamic fundamentalists (e.g, Tariq Ramadan). This caused a widespread rejection of the Left, and even allegations that “the Left” had become hostile to the Jewish community and to Israel. A conservative, non-Jewish columnist from the daily *Le Figaro*, Alexis Lacroix, went as far as writing, in a recent essay³, that “The Left is not

³ *Le Socialisme des imbéciles*, Editions La Table Ronde, 2005

becoming anti-Semitic. It goes back to its anti-Semitic roots. Today, antisemitism is at the margins of the Left, tomorrow may be, it will be at its core". In the meantime, the shift in the French foreign policy to a more pro-Israeli stand under the conservative governments of Raffarin and Villepin, the efforts of the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, to fight Antisemitism, coupled with his tough law and order and immigration policies, have convinced a significant part of French Jewry that the Right is its natural ally. What is clear is that the Jewish community does not perceive the problem of anti-Semitic violence as merely a law and order issue. They see it as a part of a much wider crisis of the French national identity, in which the "clash of civilizations" theory becomes a reality. It is also noteworthy, for example, that the Autumn 2005 riots in the Paris suburbs were frequently described in the Jewish and non-Jewish media alike, as an "Intifada of the suburbs", thus suggesting that the revolt was caused by radical Muslims, that it was an ethnic uprising in essence, and that it targeted a Jewish enemy, in short, that it was the revolt of an intrinsically anti-Semitic population⁴.

In conclusion, I would like to say that one cannot understand the current wave of Antisemitism without mentioning that: (1) although anti-Semitic violence begins in 2000 at the time of the Second Intifada, the big change in the anti-Semitic discourse occurred in 1982, at the time of the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, when even the mainstream media used stereotypes that equated the Israeli armed forces to the Nazis. (2) the so-called "new Antisemitism" which is rampant among a minority of the Muslim-born (but not necessarily observant) population emerged in a country where an extreme right political party, the Front National, receives more than 15% of the vote since the 1990s, and where its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has repeatedly trivialized the Holocaust, as have done many of the party's top and middle level executives. Finally, it should also be said that, while Antisemitism reaches unprecedented level, there is a continuous decrease in anti-Semitic prejudices among the French population.

⁴ It is to be reminded that the level of antisemitic attacks during the riots was much lower than in the otherwise quite year 2004. The riots did not specifically target the Jewish communities. Besides, it was neither masterminded by Muslim fundamentalists, nor organized as a guerrilla movement such as it is the case with the Palestinian Intifada.

5. PANEL 1: Data Collection

5.1. *European Efforts to Combat Antisemitism from the Arab Perspective*

Dr. Esther Webman⁵

Good morning to you all.

As you've heard I'm representing the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Antisemitism and Racism – an academic institute at Tel Aviv University which monitors antisemitic manifestations worldwide, maintains a large ongoing database and publishes an annual journal consisting of country-by-country surveys, analytical historical articles and a book review section. In this framework my responsibility is the Arab world. We go over daily papers, weekly magazines and other publications, and of course we benefit from the work done in recent years by Israeli and Jewish organizations engaged in monitoring antisemitism. But, I'm not going to talk about collecting data or about legal aspects. I would like to present the Arab response to OSCE activities as well as to the American Act against antisemitism and the anti-Israel mood in Europe, which I think is not only important to an understanding of the Arab/Muslim position but to the future success of international efforts to combat antisemitism and Holocaust denial.

Suspicion and criticism characterized the Arab reaction to the international conference on antisemitism held in Berlin in April 2004 under the auspices of the OSCE. By Arab reaction, I mean the discourse that emerged in public debates in newspapers and in television programs and not official reactions, which were, for instance, well demonstrated at the Durban conference. The OSCE conference was described by Palestinians as a "red herring" and a "sly distraction" aimed at diverting attention from Israel's behavior toward them. "Which crime is more serious: the desecration of a Jewish grave in some French town, or destroying an entire neighborhood in Rafah? Scrawling a swastika on the wall of a Jewish synagogue in Italy or turning Palestinian towns and villages into virtual concentration camps?," wondered a Palestinian writer in an interview to al-Jazira. Comparing Jews to Nazis, he claimed, is not a "sweeping condemnation of Jews, but rather a rejection of evil actions, behavior and dogmas." This kind of conference, contended Jordanian scholar George Haddad, is taking place according to a plan set up by "International Zionism" in view of the European opinion poll which considered Israel and the US the states most endangering world stability and peace. "It aims at fighting by law and punishment whoever criticizes or denounces an Israeli crime or a Jewish movement." It would have been more proper, added an Egyptian journalist reporting from Berlin, if the conference would have dealt with the negative attitude toward the Arab and Muslim communities in Europe or at least with Israeli violations against the Palestinian people. The Jewish feeling of victimhood is "a political game" for exploiting others and deepening the feeling of guilt in the West, which was responsible in the past for the persecution of Jews, the concentration camps and the crematoria.

Likewise, the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust held in January 2000 was presented as being aimed "at forging history by hiding the truth about the so-called Holocaust." The Zionist entity was accused by a Hamas statement of using "psychological and ideological terrorism" through the conference and the "Nazi Holocaust story," and participant states were called upon to revise their positions and renounce their "sympathetic understanding of Zionist arrogance and continuing blackmail." An *al-Hayat* editor 'Abd al-

⁵ Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism; Tel Aviv University

Wahhab Badrakhan considered the conference a rebirth of the "Holocaust business," and depicted Holocaust studies "as an injection in the blood or the head" of the student.

The adoption in the US of the Global Antisemitism Review Act as law in October 2004 also triggered strong opposition of Arab writers and commentators. As in previous debates on antisemitism, they concurred that the Jews who have taken over the legislative and executive authorities in the US promoted it to prevent criticism of Israel. It was also perceived as an attempt by Republicans to curry favor with traditionally pro-Democratic US voters.

The major arguments against the Act accused it of being:

- Interference in the domestic affairs of states and a violation of freedom of expression;
- A racist law, hostile to Arabs and Muslims, that ignores the fact that the Arabs who are also Semites are victims of discrimination and persecution;
- A form of "intellectual terrorism," through which the US is trying to force its hegemony and values on the world;
- A political and not a humanitarian act, which blurs the line between Judaism and Zionism, in order to protect Israel from legitimate criticism, providing it with a license to continue its terrorist policies against the Arabs. Moreover, it allows the Israeli security apparatus to instigate acts of antisemitism in countries with Jewish communities, such as France, in order to force immigration to Israel.

A three-day conference on the repercussions of the act was held in Cairo University in March 2005 in collaboration with Arabs Against Discrimination (AAD), an organization founded in December 2003 to monitor racist activities and statements of Israeli and Zionist organizations, and the Egyptian Society of International Law. Several questions were raised for discussion: Will the act muzzle freedom of expression in the Arab and Muslim world? What is the law's exact definition of antisemitism, and why does it not include criticism of Israel and Zionism? And how can Arab countries stand up to it? There was reportedly a general consensus among the experts that it was designed "to gag critics of Israeli crimes, and underline US global hegemony" as well as target Muslims and Arabs. The act was seen as "a blatant violation of international law," according to which "no country has the right to enact punishment on another country for violating human rights, or committing antisemitic acts." The act's requirement to remove antisemitic statements from Arab school and university textbooks "was meant to distort history, brainwash youths and alienate them from their culture," explained comparative international law professor, 'Ali al-Ghatit, who participated in the Arab team for the defense of Garaudy in 2002. The conferees agreed to take action to resist the law's application, and to start by raising public awareness of its perils, especially in the West. The first step in this direction was the opening of an AAD branch office in Washington with the aim of reaching out to the American public and joining forces with experts, intellectuals and human rights activists "to find ways to stop this clampdown on freedom."

Some of the writers conceded that antisemitism is a dangerous, deplorable phenomenon, but considered the Arabs also its victims, because they paid and are still paying compensation for antisemitic crimes perpetrated in Europe. "It is not Jews who are being murdered by the thousands by Arab antisemitism," wrote Joseph Massad, a Palestinian professor of modern Arab politics and intellectual history at Columbia University, who argued that the term antisemitism is "anachronistic and ahistorical," "but rather Arabs and Muslims who are being murdered by the tens of thousands by Euro-American Christian antisemitism and by Israeli Jewish antisemitism."

In contrast to this criticism of the OSCE and the American Act, the rise of antisemitic manifestations in Europe, the attacks on Jews and Jewish institutions, statements against Jews in Germany, and the results of the EU opinion poll in 2003 were perceived jubilantly as part of a new European trend and "a political revolution against the Jews." It seems as if "the European street was waiting for a sign to express latent feelings toward the Jews," against their excessive influence and political exploitation, wrote one commentator who predicted that in the near future the traditional parties, which represented the ruling power since the end of WWII, will be replaced by new parties representing new generations, whose foremost issue on their agenda would be the defeat of Jewish influence. For these younger generations, the European antisemitic past would be less compelling. Shi'I scholar Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah also assessed that "something has really begun to change in the West in general, and in some European states in particular," urging Arabs and Muslims to devote serious attention to it, and exploit the new mood in Europe for enhancing awareness to their cause and to Israel's deeds. The new antisemitism today, opined columnist Jihad al-Khazin, is not comparable to that which prevailed in the 1930s. The old antisemitism was perpetrated by governments and led to the Holocaust, whereas present-day antisemitism is carried out by individuals mainly from the margins of society. Nevertheless, it should be denounced but should not be used as an excuse for Israeli crimes.

Amidst this array of opinions, voices expressing support for combating antisemitism and Holocaust denial were rare. One of these was 'Abd al-Rahman Rashid, the director general of al-'Arabiya satellite TV and former editor of the London-based *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, who has persistently pursued in his editorials an anti-fascist line, warning the Arabs against aligning themselves with antisemites and Holocaust deniers. The law should be understood for what it is – a law for monitoring antisemitism, he explained, and instead of condemning it, Arabs should encourage it and seek to expand it to include any incitement to racism against Muslims, blacks and other minorities. Protecting Jews should be the first step to protecting everyone, added an American writer of Arab descent.

Lebanese columnists Joseph Samaha and Jihad al-Khazin, Egyptian liberal scholar and activist Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, Egyptian writer 'Ali Salim, and Egyptian academic scholar in Leipzig 'Umar Kamil were among those who criticized antisemitic manifestations in the Arab discourse, including Holocaust denial. These were detrimental to the Arabs' demand for their legitimate rights and their relations with the world, and could not be justified even in light of Israel's deplorable "crimes" against the Palestinians. Kamil called upon Arab intellectuals to free themselves from their abortive discourse and devise a new one more agreeable to "the other," whereas Salim expected the Arab League to play a role in changing the Arab attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace in the Middle East.

This was the Arab discourse on antisemitism in a nutshell.

In a study that I conducted with a colleague on representations of the Holocaust in the Arab world since the end of WWII, we established that there was a strong correlation between the growing role of the Holocaust in Israeli and Jewish identity and the frequency of Arab reference to it. With its assumption of further significance for Jewish and western culture, it has aroused increased antagonism among Arabs and Muslims. Thus, it seems that the intensified international preoccupation with antisemitism and the Holocaust – the establishment of the international task force on Holocaust education, the UN commemoration of 60 years to the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps, and its decision to designate 27 January as Holocaust Remembrance Day – has elicited an adverse reaction in the Arab world.

Conferences and decisions will not eliminate antisemitism, stated Jihad al-Khazin. The only way is to deal with its causes, he said, and those are embedded in Israeli policies. Although I reject the view that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the cause of all evil, I doubt the efficiency of legislation to uproot antisemitic thinking and stereotypes and consider it extremely important to find ways to reach out to Arab and third world societies. After all we don't want, as wrote another Arab critic, to divide the world into two axes – one that is accused of antisemitism and includes the Muslim world, Europe, Latin America, China, and one that opposes it consisting only of Israel and the US - and bring about the escalation of hatred.

Thank you.

5.2. *Hate Crime Data Collection and the Implementation of OSCE Commitments*

Dr. Kathrin Meyer⁶

1. Summary of Commitments

OSCE Participating States have committed to:

- Combat hate crimes, including on the internet;⁷
- Strengthen efforts to provide public officials, and in particular law enforcement officers with appropriate training on responding to and preventing hate crimes;⁸
- Collect reliable information and statistics on hate crime, including on anti-Semitic crimes and make this information available to the public;⁹
- Submit existing legislation, statistics and reliable information on hate crime to the ODIHR;¹⁰
- Consider nominating national points of contact on hate crimes and examine the possibility of establishing within countries appropriate bodies to promote tolerance and combat racism.¹¹

The Office for Democratic Institution and Human Rights (ODIHR) was mandated to:

- Follow closely anti-Semitic incidents;¹²
- Systematically collect and disseminate information (legislation, statistics, best practices) pertaining to anti-Semitic incidents and hate crimes;¹³
- Provide assistance to OSCE participating States in the areas of education, law enforcement training, legislation, civil society capacity building and hate;
- Support the ability of civil society and the development of partnerships to address racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, including Antisemitism.¹⁴

2. ODIHR Working Definition of Hate Crime

Part A) Any criminal offence, including offences against persons or property, where the victim, premises or target of the offence are selected because of their real or perceived connection, attachment, affiliation, support or membership with a group as defined in part B

Part B) A group may be based upon their real or perceived race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or other similar factor.

⁶ Advisor on Antisemitism Issues, OSCE-ODIHR

⁷ Annex to Decision No. 12/04; Permanent Council Decision No. 607 on Combating Antisemitism

⁸ Ljubljana MC Decision No. 10: Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding.

⁹ Maastricht MC Decision No. 4/03; Annex to Decision No. 12/04, Permanent Council Decision No. 607 on Combating Antisemitism.

¹⁰ Maastricht MC Decision No. 4/03.

¹¹ Annex to Sofia MC Decision No. 12/04, Permanent Council Decision No. 607 on Combating Antisemitism.

¹² Annex to Sofia MC Decision No. 12/04, Permanent Council Decision No. 607 on Combating Antisemitism.

¹³ Ljubljana MC Decision No. 10: Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding.

¹⁴ Annex to Sofia MC Decision No. 12/04, Permanent Council Decision No. 621 on Tolerance and The Fight against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination.

3. Implementing OSCE Commitments

a) Responses to ODIHR activities

Tolerance Implementation Meeting, Vienna 2006: Addressing the Hate Crimes Data Deficit:

- 36 participating States were represented at the meeting
 - 17 of the 46 nominated National Points of Contact on Hate Crimes were represented: USA, Andorra, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Spain, Finland, France, Kazakhstan, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Holy See, Sweden, Czech Republic.

ODIHR Report on Hate-Motivated Incidents

- 18 participating States provided the ODIHR with information and feedback on the report

Response to the Notes Verbales

- In the period 2004-2006, 50 (80%) participating States have submitted information on: legislation, statistics, practical initiatives and national points of contact on combating hate crime to the ODIHR.
- 46 participating States have nominated national points of contact on hate crime.
- 46 participating States have submitted information about legislation
- 38 participating States have submitted information about practical initiatives
- 38 participating States have submitted information about statistics

b) Overview of the information collected by the ODIHR: Some results

The National Points of Contact on Hate Crimes

In total, 46 participating States have nominated a national point of contact, some of them more than one.

- 3 participating States have – partly inter alia - nominated their delegations to the OSCE as point of contact.
- 33 participating States have nominated a Ministry as point of contact: for example *Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Security, Ministry of Heritage, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Human and Minority Rights* etc.
- 7 participating States have nominated Prosecutors and Police as national points of contact on hate crime.
- 22 participating States have informed the ODIHR of the existence of specialised bodies to monitor or respond to incidents motivated by intolerance. 10 participating States have nominated specialised bodies and working groups as national point of contact on hate crimes. Some of them deal with racism and hate crime, others with human rights, minority and discrimination issues.
 - *Belgium*: Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR)
 - *Bulgaria*: Commission for the Protection against Discrimination
 - *Czech Republic*: Interministerial Commission for Combating Extremism, Racism and Xenophobia.
 - *Ireland*: National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism
 - *Latvia*: Latvian National Human Rights Office
 - *Liechtenstein*: Office of Foreign Affairs, Working Group against Racism, Antisemitism and Xenophobia.

- *Luxembourg*: Government's Commissioner for Foreigners
- *Portugal*: High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME)
- *Sweden*: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention
- *Switzerland*: Federal Commission against Racism

In addition to that, there are special envoys dealing with Antisemitism issues in the following participating States:

- *Germany*: Ambassador Benedikt Haller, Special Envoy for Relations with the Jewish Communities, Federal Foreign Office
- *United States of America*: Dr. Greg Rickman, U.S. Special Envoy for Monitoring and Combating Antisemitism, U.S. State Department
- *France*: Ambassador Jacques Huntzinger, International Dimension of the Shoa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- *Poland*: Ambassador Maciej Kozłowski, Ambassador at Large for Polish-Jewish Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Statistics

- 6 participating States did not respond to the Note Verbale and thus failed to provide statistics.
- 6 participating States did not submit statistics on hate crime claiming that there are no reported hate crimes in their countries.
- 5 participating States submitted other information, but did not provide statistics.
- 10 participating States have provided the ODIHR with qualitative and/or quantitative data and information on anti-Semitic incidents and/or discourse.

Implications: Data Deficit = Information Deficit

- Without data, it is difficult to combat such crimes
- Without data, it is difficult to assess on what exactly policies dealing with issues of tolerance and non-discrimination should focus

c) ODIHR Recommendations

With respect to data collection, the ODIHR recommends that participating States should

- Enact legislation requiring the relevant national criminal justice authorities to record and report on incidents motivated by hate or bias at the local and national level;
- Strengthen existing methodologies for identifying and monitoring hate crimes and incidents and for the collection of data on the types of crime or incident, perpetrators and victims, as well as the legal or other follow-up to the crime, including prosecution and length of sentences,
- Strengthen their efforts to establish specific mechanisms for registering, recording, and publicly reporting on hate crimes, including official databases and annual reports;
- Continue nominating national contact points to gather and send to the ODIHR updated and regular information on hate crime statistics and legislation and relevant national initiatives to combat hate crime.

In addition to that, the ODIHR recommends that participating States should

- Enact legislation requiring the relevant national criminal justice authorities to record and report on incidents motivated by hate or bias at the local and national level.

d) Tools provided by the ODIHR

In accordance with its mandate, the ODIHR

- Systematically collects and disseminates information (legislation, statistics, best practices) on tolerance and non-discrimination in the OSCE area and has made this information available to the public:
 - The Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System:
<http://tnd.odihr.pl/>
 - OSCE-ODIHR Report on “Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Incidents in the OSCE Region”, published in October 2006
- Provides assistance to OSCE participating States in the areas of education, law enforcement training, legislation, and civil society capacity building.

ODIHR Law Enforcement Officer Training Programme for Combating Hate Crime

It focuses on:

- Building on existing skills and strengths in law enforcement
- Building partnership capacity among police and NGOs to deal with hate crimes
- Increasing capacity for hate crimes detection, investigation, and prosecution
- Increasing intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities
- Building the means to measure
- Becoming more effective in dealing with hate crime at the community, state and OSCE level.

The following participating States have implemented the training: *Spain, Hungary, and Croatia*, with *Poland* being in the process of doing so.

6. PANEL 2: Hate Crimes

6.1. *Statement*

David C. Friedman

I am David C. Friedman, the regional director of the Anti-Defamation League's Washington, DC regional office and the director of ADL's national law enforcement initiatives.

I want to thank our hosts, the Germany Parliamentary Delegation to the OSCE, and Professor Gert Weisskirchen in particular, who serves as the Personal Representative of the Chair in Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for the leadership role they have played in combating Antisemitism and hate crimes in this vast region.

Today's panel discussion on hate crimes brings together three critical issues in which ADL is a recognized leader—Antisemitism, hate crimes and working with law enforcement. ADL is a non-profit, human relations organization created in 1913 to fight Antisemitism and all forms of hate. As a direct outgrowth of this mandate, ADL has evolved into the leading non-government organization in the area of combating hate crimes. It was ADL that first created model hate crimes legislation twenty five years ago in the United States. Today, almost every state in the nation has laws based directly or indirectly on the ADL model. ADL has provided assistance to thousands of victims of anti-Semitic incidents and hate crimes through its network of 27 regional offices. And the League is recognized by law enforcement, the media, governmental agencies and the education community as the most authoritative private resource on hate groups and extremism.

ADL's relationship with law enforcement is unique. Law enforcement turns to ADL for information, expertise and training. During the course of a year, thousands of law enforcement personnel access the League's online database on extremism and hate groups. Over the past eighteen months, ADL has trained more than 40,000 law enforcement personnel in the areas of hate crimes, extremism, counter-terrorism, ethics and diversity. ADL training is required for every New Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. ADL's counter-terrorism training program—the Advanced Training School—has trained more than 350 senior federal, state and local police commanders and receives eight applications for every place [seat?] at the training. Under contract from the Austrian government, ADL is currently providing diversity training for the Austrian [exact title] Police.

I want to share with you some of the lessons ADL has learned from almost a century fighting Antisemitism, and a quarter century leading the efforts to combat hate crimes targeting the Jewish community and other hate crime victim groups.

These crimes demand priority attention because of their special impact. Hate crimes are designed to intimidate the victim and members of the victim's community, leaving them feeling isolated, vulnerable, and unprotected by the law. Failure to address this unique type of crime could cause an isolated incident to explode into widespread community tension. The damage done by hate crimes, therefore, cannot be measured solely in terms of physical injury or dollars and cents. By making members of minority communities fearful, angry, and suspicious of other groups—and of the power structure that is supposed to protect them—these incidents can damage the fabric of our society and fragment communities.

The impact of a hate crime on the victim, targeted group and the community is often determined by how the victim and his or her community perceived themselves to have been treated by the responding and investigating officers. These perceptions can be affected by how law enforcement professionals related to the victim, the speed of their response, whether

or not they appeared to dismiss the victim's perception that an attack was motivated by hate. There are a great many cases in which the anger of a victim and his community quickly turns from the perpetrator of a hate crime to the law enforcement community. Victims who believe that they have not been treated with sufficient respect or sensitivity by police—whether or not that assessment is fair—often consider their experience with law enforcement to be a “second victimization.”

Negative perceptions about police handling of hate crimes undermine the trust and partnership that are essential to a police department's performance, and increase the risk of violence directed at law enforcement personnel. Most importantly [you're not adding to the previous statement, you're taking it in a different direction, so 'moreover' is confusing], such negative perceptions can often be avoided. Through its years of providing assistance to victims of anti-Semitic incidents and hate crimes and its work with law enforcement, ADL has identified a number of operational issues that can be addressed by police to ensure the quality of law enforcement's interaction with hate crimes victims.

1. Speed of response. Hate crimes resonate exponentially. Word of an attack spreads extremely quickly across a community, and is often picked up by the media shortly after it has transpired. Rumors within a community and media reports may have already been circulating before the responding officers have finished taking their reports, and well before police superiors and spokespersons have been alerted to a particular incident. All of these factors may contribute to a perception that police have been slow to respond to an anti-Semitic incident or hate crime and some in the community may conclude, often without justification, that police “don't care” about attacks on members of their particular racial, religious or ethnic group. For that reason, rapid and forceful law enforcement response to possible hate crimes and hate incidents is essential.
2. Recognizing anti-Semitic incidents and hate crimes. In order for police to respond quickly, build trust with the victim and his/her community, and bring the perpetrators of hate crimes to justice, it is imperative that law enforcement professionals at all level have the ability to recognize hate crimes and anti-Semitic incidents. Hate motivated attacks on Jews and the Jewish community present a special challenge in this regard because Jews are targeted because of their religion, race and identity with the State of Israel. Training for responding officers, supervisors and commanders will increase law enforcement's ability to quickly recognize hate crimes directed at members of the Jewish community and will assist them in their investigations and apprehension of those responsible.
3. Relationships with the Jewish community. One of the most effective techniques to prevent hate crimes and anti-Semitic incidents and to respond effectively when crimes occur is to establish relationships with key Jewish community leaders in advance. There are numerous and far-reaching benefits for this proactive strategy. In Washington, DC, many of the communities that were the frequent targets of hate crimes were hostile to, and distrustful of, police and prosecutors, whom they did not believe were committed to enforcing the city's hate crimes law. To address this issue, ADL and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia (the city's chief prosecutor) created a task force composed of prosecutors, police and community based NGOs to meet monthly to share information about hate crimes. Within two years, this task force had built an exceptional level of trust and partnership between community groups and law enforcement. The task force was so successful, that it became the model for similar task forces in all 94 U.S. Attorneys Offices in the United States.

Formal task forces and individual relationships between community and law enforcement leaders increase understanding on both sides. By interacting with community leaders, law enforcement professionals gain a level of knowledge about specific communities that they could not find in training sessions or classroom presentations. Many law enforcement community outreach efforts focus on police learning about specific racial, religious and ethnic groups. It is equally important for community leaders to learn about law enforcement. One of the causes of distrust and conflict between victim communities and police in the wake of a hate crime is the public's lack of knowledge about hate crime laws and police procedures. Relationships increase understanding on both sides.

In the immediate aftermath of a hate crime, communication between the police and the targeted community is critically important. For law enforcement, the information they may gain from community members can assist in the apprehension of perpetrators and reduce the chances of retaliatory violence. Having open channels of communication into the community will allow police to share important information related to the investigation and to communicate with the community directly regarding their handling of a case. Effective communication requires that relationships between law enforcement and community leaders exist in advance. Such relationships can seldom be established during a crisis.

Combating anti-Semitic incidents and hate crimes provide law enforcement with a unique opportunity to build trust with communities within diverse societies. When ADL crafted the first model hate crimes statutes in the United States more than 25 years ago, our goal was to provide police and prosecutors with a tool to bring hate crime perpetrators to justice and deter and prevent such criminal acts. In many jurisdictions within the U.S. police were unconvinced of the need for such laws. Over the past two and a half decades, however, police across the United States have recognized the value and importance of hate crime laws, not simply as a means of enforcing laws and protecting the community, but as a vehicle to build trust and partnership with the public.

The tools of the ODIHR and the networking that the OSCE process fosters among NGOs should be used to build networks and connections among advocates and officials of good will across the OSCE region. NGOs can and should play a significant role in assisting Participating States and their law enforcement agencies in addressing the problem of hate crimes. There are certainly many differences in the legal frameworks, as well as the social and political contexts in each of the OSCE Participating States, but there are also critical similarities. As a result, the precise role played by NGOs will differ from country to country, but their value as a bridge between communities and law enforcement and governmental institutions is vitally important. Alliances between representatives of NGOs, community organizations, police and prosecutors build trust and send a forceful message to racial, ethnic and religious communities that those sworn to protect them are truly committed to fighting hate crimes. The role that trained representatives of NGOs can play in providing training to law enforcement in both hate crimes and in community relations should not be underestimated. Civilians training police is one of the most effective means of increasing understanding between law enforcement and the public. Moreover, the use of highly skilled civilians for police training represents a concrete and very powerful expression of law enforcement's core values and of a nation's democratic principles and ideals.

In the 1980's, when ADL began its campaign to combat hate crimes in the United States, there were few laws on the books, little police training on the issue and no political will to address the problem of hate crimes. Hate crimes remain a serious problem in America, but we have made very significant progress. This twenty-five year struggle to protect people from the scourge of hate crimes might not have taken so long had ADL been able to work with the support of a government agency with the commitment, understanding and vision of OSCE.

6.2. OSCE/ODIHR Law Enforcement Officers Programme for Combating Hate Crime

Paul Goldenberg¹⁵

International training programme for law enforcement agencies and their community partners

Emphasis on four main components:

4. Training for police officers on all aspects of hate crime: response, investigation, gathering intelligence, sharing information, and working with prosecutors
5. Developing strategies to combat hate crime that are based on proactive police leadership and community-based partnerships
6. Training prosecutors on how to use evidence to establish that a crime has been committed
7. Developing an effective process for collecting and disseminating data on hate crime

Promotes peaceful communities through an *education* process

Supports healthy communities through:

1. Police:
 - Problem awareness
 - Effective Police-Community relationships and partnerships
 - Informed police intervention
2. Communities
 - Community engagement and police-community leadership in community safety and security
 - Community incident management
 - Community mediation
 - Community conflict prevention and resolution techniques

Delivery of the programme through the Human Rights Office of the OSCE:

- Promotes peace, order and good governance through the support of human rights, civil society and the advancement of democratic institutions
- Strengthens and promotes Community Capacity Building

Community Capacity Building is a cornerstone of the programme design

This unique program has successfully facilitated positive police-community relationships among:

- Grassroots community organizations
- Police officials
- NGOs
- Community and religious leaders
- Everyday citizens

¹⁵ Chief Executive Director, National Public Safety Strategy Group, OSCE/ODIHR

Focus on safety and basic human rights issues. This provides opportunities for:

- Expanded discussions on the impact of hate crimes and ways to combat them
- Improved mutual Police-Community understanding and support
- Implementation of new strategies for resolving differences among communities and their police agencies
- Addressing the strong and direct correlation between public support for police services and affected communities' perception regarding police responses to hate crimes and hate incidents

Implementation of the law enforcement programme results in:

- Training-facilitated and post-training education sessions between the police and minority communities
- Often the first time NGO and police leaders collaborate on policing around community issues
- Each educating the other

Participation of NGO leaders allows an opportunity to:

- Learn about police procedure
- Open new lines of communication
- Create new pathways to long-term relationships that would not otherwise be available
- Facilitate an on-going dialogue between the minority and NGO community and law enforcement officials
- Articulate State commitment to developing and sustaining peaceful communities
- Yield significant benefits using educational means
- Assignment of resources each may provide to the other for building peaceful solutions to conflict

6.3. **Statement**

Daniela Petkovic¹⁶

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen!

It's my honour to participate in such an expert meeting dealing with Antisemitism and intolerance. My name is Daniela Petkovic, I'm lawyer by profession and I work with the Ministry of interior as the teacher of criminal law at the Police School/Police Academy in Zagreb. I'm also chief police inspector and national trainer in Law Enforcement Officer Programme on Combating Hate Crime in Croatia.

Croatia entered LEOP in 2005 and the first training was held between June, 28/ 30 2006 at the Police Academy in Zagreb. With the support of the experts who work for the ODIHR, especially Paul Goldenberg, Tim Parsons and John Howley, we have successfully finished education course of nine police officers to become future trainers. Training was very interactive and included representatives from the Governmental Office for Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Deputy General Attorney as well representatives from the NGO Step out and Contra.

Further implementation of LEOP will be proceeded in the following way:

- LEOP will be integrated in National Police Curriculum through all teaching programmes, especially at the basic police training
- through the special courses in duration of more than one week which are carried out through the Department for Advanced and Specialized Training
- through additional specialized training carried out by the Police Districts (that means we need to execute one more training for the multipliers so we'll have at least one educated police trainer for hate crimes in each Police District)
- through the cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Governmental Office for Human Rights, district attorneys and the police, especially in collecting, processing and disseminating data
- through NGO – police partnership at all levels (state and local) which has been already accepted as our policy

With the latest amendments to the Criminal Code which entered into force October 1, 2006, in a way that Article 89 Paragraph 36 clearly defines hate crime as “any criminal act according to the Criminal Code, committed by reasons of hatred towards a person on the basis of his/her race, skin colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other belief, national or social background, property, birth, education, social status, age, medical status or any other attribute”.

Article 91 Paragraph 6 was amended in a way that hate crime murder is now considered as Aggravated Murder with the punishment by imprisonment not less ten years or by long term imprisonment.

In the Article 174 – Racial and Other Discrimination, Paragraph 3, fine punishment was erased and imprisonment was increased from six months to three year.

On October 23, Memorandum of Agreement between Ministry of Interior of Croatia and ODIHR was signed in Dubrovnik. Croatia became first country in the region to offer training in combating hate – motivated crimes to its police officers.

¹⁶ Police Academy Instructor of Criminal Law, Republic of Croatia

Police Director General brought a guideline to order executing of measures for systematic monitoring and synchronisation of activities concerning hate crimes in October. The line of work dealing with terrorism and extreme violence in each Police District are obliged to monitor, collect, and analyze systematically all kinds of dealings with problems concerning hate crimes, and will be directly involved in processing criminal offences in its jurisdiction according to the criminal acts current nomenclature. All organizational units are obliged to monitor and document by photos or VCR records or in any other way appearing of graffiti and other inscriptions which publicly insult and call to hatred and non – tolerance, and take measures in identifying the perpetrators and their processing.

It is also necessary to collect information about music bands concerts, especially those who in their performances and through their lyrics spread hatred and non – tolerance, and take measures in identifying the perpetrators and their processing.

If the number of hate crime cases starts to increase, it is necessary to take urgent and more severe measures and activities focused on prevention of further incidents, identifying and processing of perpetrators as well as protecting the threatened population or the specific group.

Together with the stated amendments to the Criminal Code, this represents quality framework for police efficiency in hate crime prevention.

Thank you for your attention!

6.4. Outcomes of LEOP-CHC¹⁷ Delivery in Spain

Antonio Arrabal Villalobos¹⁸

At the beginning 2005 of March the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) asked the Spanish Ministry of Interior for cooperation to developing a program of police experts in hate crimes to be delivered in good number of countries belonging to the International Organization addressed to having Police officers more sensitive to hate crime and with better instruction to deal with hate crime.

In may 2005 took place in Madrid the delivery of first Law Enforcement Officers on Combating Hate Crimes session. The purpose of the course, addressed to teachers and trainers of National Police and Civil Guard academies and teaching centres, was reinforce the contents of curricula of teaching programs of police academies centres.

Spain (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) expressed from the very beginning the determination of collaborating with OSCE participating in the project because,

- it agree with the efforts of the space OSCE to create cultures of tolerance and coexistence,
- it responds to the objectives of defending of the multilateral mechanisms and promotion of the human rights.
- It assess very positively to increase the awareness of Police bodies in as delicate field for democratic coexistence as is the racism, intolerance, xenophobia, and discrimination incidence

The Spain's Ministry of Interior decided its active collaboration with OSCE from the very beginning.

- National Police and Civil Guard activity is inside higher standards on respect to human rights. The youth of our democracy has allowed in this, like in other scopes, renovate the whole penal law and procedure rules adapted to best practices patterns on individual freedoms respect for Law Enforcement Agencies.
- Particularly in what refers to police education in the scope on the prevention and fighting against racism, xenophobia, Antisemitism and other forms of intolerance, educational curricula includes those kind of topics, from ethics subjects to prevention and investigation measures and treatment of offenders and victims ones.
- Nevertheless the Ministry of Interior appreciates the benefits of developing of the programme in Spain and contributing to develop it in many others countries. So, Spain is part of the team in this issue.

The outcomes of the delivery of the programme in Spain has been,

- Inclusion in educational curricula of National Police and Civil Guard academies at all levels: first access, specialization, promotion which currently are in effect.
- Inclusion on lessons and topics related with police dealing with racism, Antisemitism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance in internal web sites (intranet)

As a consequence the Ministry of Interior is going to follow up and keep the level of integration and collaboration with ODIHR-OSCE proposals in this scope.

¹⁷ LEOP-CHG (Law Enforcement Officers Programme on Combating Hate Crimes) - OSCE

¹⁸ State Department for Security, Spain

SITUATION ON RACISM IN SPAIN

A Spanish advocacy group, Movement against Intolerance, has demanded that the parliament pass a Hate Crimes law to deal with what it describes as an increasing occurrence of hate crimes, especially due to the growth of neo-Nazi groups in Spain.

Media reported Ministry of the Interior figures of 70 operative neo-Nazi groups with a membership of 11,000 operating in the country. The Nazi website “The Censure of the Democracy” claims membership of over 16,000 people committed to an ideology of hate. Among the crime statistics cited in the media were at least 60 people killed and hundreds injured by hate-motivated crimes over the past 13 years in Spain.

The RAXEN report warned about 94 music bands, self-described ‘patriots’, playing concerts in relative secrecy and publishing CDs containing a hate ideology of racism, Antisemitism and intolerance.

Roma situation

Reliable estimates of the Romani population in Spain range among 600,000 to 700,000 out of a total general population of around 44 million. Nearly half of the Roma in Spain live in the southern region of Andalusia, the autonomous community with the largest Romani population (approximately 3% of the total population). Large Romani communities are also found in Madrid, Valencia and Catalonia.

The Romani population is young in comparison with the population at large; around half of the Spanish Roma people are less than 16 years old and the birth rate of Roma is much higher than among the general population. Spanish Roma are also, however, very diverse and heterogeneous. Cultural differences among Spanish Romani peoples are in part related to regional differences and in part due to various historical and cultural factors.

Moreover, Spanish Roma people are currently going through a period of important change. Several generations ago, for example, the majority of Roma lived in rural areas and small towns, but in recent decades many Roma have moved to urban areas. There has also been a gradual decrease in the birth rate and the number of children per family. The average age of marriage is also increasing, although it is still lower than the general population.

The social situation of the Spanish Roma has improved considerably during the last 30 years. This is fundamentally due to the fact that the Roma have gained from the universalization of welfare state benefits as well as the rest of the citizens, and also due to the action of positive measures specifically addressed to this group. Despite this improvement of their living conditions, in comparison with the rest of society, the income level of the Roma is still under the average and a part of them still live in conditions of poverty and exclusion (30% according to the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2001-2003).

The Spanish Roma community has suffered a historical racism and discrimination shown during centuries in legal providences and legal provisions such as the Social Dangerousness Law, or certain articles of the Guardia Civil regulation. In this sense, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 improved considerably the situation of the Roma community, although it does not mention the ethnic minorities living in Spain, as the right of equal treatment for all persons is recognised under article 14.

Nowadays, although remarkable advances have been achieved, racism and discrimination are still one of the main obstacles for the Roma people’s incorporation to society as full-fledged citizens. Roma people, according to all opinion studies, always appear as one of the worst valued groups, and such social rejection produces discriminatory practices in the daily life.

Regarding hate crimes, Roma people still suffers racist attacks mainly committed individually, although are also one of the target groups of extremist organisations. It is also relatively frequent the commitment of racist attacks in the framework of public demonstrations against Roma people, especially in small villages and rural areas where stereotypes and prejudices link them with crime.

Source: Fundacion Secretariado Gitano

Spain's Police sources

- About 10.000 people are integrated in right wing groups in Spain (1/3 Civil Guard territory). But there are much more sympathizers (soccer ultras, or attendants to a RAC concert).
- Common denominator, being against immigration. Nothing more common to joint these groups.
- Right wing organizations must be divided into two groups: about 20 mini legal political parties, and neo-nazi groups and among which stand up Hammerskin, Blood an Honour an Volksfront.
- The illegal groups are weakly organized and they have not a clear leader. The clearest manifestation of their existence is when they attend sporadic and occasional musical concerts. And also through internet.
- In 2005 Law Enforcemnt in Spain detained 142 people member of that groups because use of street fights using knives and sharp weapons, bats, sticks and, mostly fists and kicks
- Legal wing right parties has insignificant implantation in political scenario and constitute a very atomized constellation of acronyms.

POLICE ROLE ON HATE CRIMES

I'd like to speak about the role of Police on hate crimes, taking a sentence which is at the very beginning of the OSCE Law Enforcement Officer's on Combating Hate Crimes Facilitator's Guide. The sentence is

"Policing is an ideal issue for the OSCE. It combines security and human rights. Good policing has a vital role to play in the prevention of conflicts, the preservation of Social Stability during political crises, and the post-conflict rehabilitation of societies.

Without an effective law enforcement, respect for the rule of law and the operation of institutions responsible for upholding it, there can be little likelihood of social, political or economic development"

It was pronounced by a former OSCE Chairman-in Office not very long time ago.

And borrowing to Paul Goldenberg a saying:

"Law Enforcement agencies, particularly foron-line officers have an important role to play in leading the fight against hate crimes. Police are often at the forefront of social change. They are in an unique an vital position in maintaining civil society and protecting the safety and security of nation's citizenzy".

One of the key issues on prevention of conflicts is the promotion of human rights, the democracy, tolerance, non-discrimination, including hate crimes an violent manifestations of racism, xenophobia, Antisemitism an other forms of intolerance.

Although the police are certainly not the only public organisation with a responsibility in these matters, they can be considered the gatekeepers of equality, integration and cohesion in our rapidly changing societies. It is necessary that the police are active and reliable in carrying

out their role as guardians of the anti-discrimination legislation. In other words, the police have an important responsibility in enforcing the law as well as taking preventive measures to combat racism and discrimination.

The composition of population in Europe and all over the world has changed radically and is changing more and more. Now we have in many countries multi-ethnic communities which places special demands on the police organisation. As a result, the police must accept the need to adapt their professionalism, quality of service and their legal and wider responsibilities to the needs of a continually changing population. The goal is to provide services that are applicable and accessible to all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin and background.

To combat the destructive and socially damaging impact of hate crime, law enforcement must be in the foreground of social change. States and communities, in responding to hate crimes (such as in the form of action, policy, legislation and justice), are most often heavily dependent on effective law enforcement to create positive change and reduce criminality. The responding police officers' behaviour and approach to a hate crime are indicative to the community how the issue is perceived by the State, and how the community may be affected positively or negatively.

6.5. *Policing Hate Crimes*

Michael Whine¹⁹

A series of reports on hate crimes in general, and on antisemitism in particular, have been published during the past two years.

They reflect mounting concern that Europe may once again provide the arena for a new wave of anti – Jewish violence. Some Jewish voices express their fear that this new antisemitism, which frequently comes from new and different directions, has the potential to be as genocidal as were the Nazis. These fears may be regarded as exaggerated and misplaced but our experience teaches us to recognise the symptoms of hate. We understand better than most the symbiotic relationship between hateful discourse and the violence that inevitably ensues. We also know that when we are the first in line for victimisation, other minorities are not far behind and that what is at ultimately at stake is the wellbeing of democracy itself.

The reports also reflect the concern of international governmental and non-governmental organisations within the OSCE region, who recognise that violence and violent speech directed to a particular community or communities provide a tension indicator and that democratic rights are threatened and international agreements and undertakings are contravened.

A short list of recent reports by international bodies which inter alia examine the rise in antisemitism would include;

- the May 2006 EUMC Summary Overview on Antisemitism;
- the October 2006 OSCE ODIHR report on Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Incidents in the OSCE Region
- the October 2006 AGIS European Union Social Fund Report on Reducing Hate Crime in Europe
- the 2005 Survey of Violent Hate Crimes in Europe and North America published by Human Rights First, formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights;
- the 2005 Annual Report by the International Network Against Cyberhate.

Among the recent national reports we have had:

- The September 2006 Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism;
- The US Government Uniform Crime Report on Hate Crime Statistics 2005.

Jewish communities have also published their own reports and at the beginning of November 2006, the European Jewish Congress issued a report on Anti-Semitic Incidents and Discourse in Europe During the Israel-Hizbollah War, which reflected the concerns of some Jewish communities within the OSCE region that, once again, Middle East tension was overspilling on to the streets of Europe.

The OSCE is foremost among international governmental organisations in initiating training so that law enforcement agencies can better address one of the failings highlighted by nearly all the reports mentioned. That is that there is a data deficit; ie governments, despite their commitments, are failing to monitor and record hate crimes in general, and antisemitic crimes in particular.

¹⁹ Community Security Trust, Director; Member of the UK police forum on hate crimes

It is apparent that many states have yet to realise the threat that hate crimes pose to the fabric of their societies, and having no experience of monitoring such crimes are incapable of designing policies to counter them.

The OSCE/ODIHR has also established the Law Enforcement Officer Training Programme so that police forces, which previously served often to enforce the will of governments, can now learn to protect their citizens' human rights, on the one hand and monitor and record hate crimes, on the other.

These concerns were the theme of the OSCE Meeting in Vienna two weeks ago. Here, states were reminded of the Ministerial Council Decisions of 2003 and 2005 that they should keep reliable information and statistics on hate crimes, including forms of violent manifestations of racism, xenophobia, discrimination and antisemitism, and that this information should be made public.

To assist states, ODIHR has offered a working definition of hate crime, which sits alongside that provided by the EUMC on antisemitism.

It has also published an Overview of Statistics, Legislation and National Initiatives on Combating Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region, intended for practitioners and civil society which serves as a useful handbook.

Thematic sessions at the Vienna meeting focussed on the importance of data collection, the importance of data collection in police – community relations, and the importance of data for formulating policy.

The meeting was preceded by a Forum attended by representatives of 25 Non Governmental Organisations, which recalled OSCE commitments and urged support for civil society projects aimed at monitoring and reducing hate crimes and the development of networks and coalitions focussed on the issue.

What has also become apparent is that states do not necessarily have all the information, or best answers, in combating hate crime, and antisemitism. Civil society organisations sometimes lead the way in both the provision of information and in its analytical use.

The organisations for which I work, particularly the Community Security Trust, are among the best in this arena, in part because we are focussed on the problem and because we are capable of mobilising resources to address them. Our experience is now increasingly sought by other communities and by government agencies, and we are happy to share our experiences. We know that antisemitism cannot be fought just by Jews. It needs others as well, but most importantly it needs states to address the problem through its criminal justice and other agencies.

6.6. *Recommendations from the Hate Crimes Session*

Michael Whine

1. The ODIHR Law Enforcement Officer Programme recognises that the police are the first responders to a hate crime, and that their response will determine the course and outcome of any investigation.
It therefore deserves continued prioritisation by OSCE states if they are to reduce the level of hate crime in the region.
2. We recognise the hate crimes increasingly have an international dimension and OSCE and state law enforcement agencies need to recognise this, and to substantially increase their cooperation and exchange of information.
3. We recognise that NGO's and civil society can add value to the work of law enforcement agencies in combating hate crimes and antisemitism, and urge them to avail themselves of the assistance they can offer.
4. We recognise that those states that have demonstrated the political will to tackle antisemitic and other hate crimes have made significant progress in enacting legislation, training law enforcement officers, and thereby reducing such crimes. Their example should be followed by those states which have so far failed to implement their OSCE and other undertakings.
5. We recognise that some former Soviet states have no history of government working with NGO's on combating antisemitic and other hate crimes, and urge them to do so. Likewise, we urge NGO's to continue to press their governments, with a view to including them in their counter-actions against antisemitic and other hate crimes.

7. Further Presentations on Antisemitism

7.1. *Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts / Antisemitism in Europe*²⁰

Edward H. Kaplan²¹, Charles A. Small²²

published as well in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50 No. 4, August 2006, p. 548-561

Abstract:

In the discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, extreme criticisms of Israel (e.g., Israel is an apartheid state, the Israel Defense Forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians), coupled with extreme policy proposals (e.g., boycott of Israeli academics and institutions, divest from companies doing business with Israel), have sparked counterclaims that such criticisms are anti-Semitic (for only Israel is singled out). The research in this article shines a different, statistical light on this question: based on a survey of 500 citizens in each of 10 European countries, the authors ask whether those individuals with extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to be anti-Semitic. Even after controlling for numerous potentially confounding factors, they find that anti-Israel sentiment consistently predicts the probability that an individual is anti-Semitic, with the likelihood of measured anti-Semitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed.

On April 22, 2005, the Executive Council of Britain's Association of University Teachers (AUT) voted to boycott two Israeli universities (Bar Ilan and Haifa). The boycott was advocated "as a contribution to the struggle to end Israel's occupation, colonization and system of apartheid" (<http://www.zionismontheweb.org/AUT/autres.htm>), while the boycott's main proponent stated that this action would increase pressure on the "illegitimate state of Israel" (<http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/0,9959,1466250,00.html>). Similarly spirited statements include London Mayor Ken Livingstone's assertion that Israeli Prime Minister "Sharon continues to organise terror. More than three times as many Palestinians as Israelis have been killed in the present conflict" (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1430132,00.html>). Addressing suicide bombings in Israel, philosopher Ted Honderich wrote that "those Palestinians who have resorted to necessary killing have been right to try to free their people, and those who have killed themselves in the cause of their people have indeed sanctified themselves" (<http://chronicle.com/free/v50/i09/09b01201.htm>).

Many Israeli and Jewish individuals and organizations have characterized statements such as these as anti-Semitic in effect if not intent, given that Israel is singled out in the face of silence over human rights violations committed elsewhere. There is indeed a long and sad history of anti-Semitism in Europe and elsewhere (Almog 1988; Martire and Clark 1982; Selznick and Steinberg 1969). Dating back to the study of Adorno et al. (1950), several scholars have conducted empirical (i.e., survey-based) studies to determine those factors that

²⁰ AUTHORS' NOTE: The raw data with explanatory notes and additional technical material are available in an Excel file available at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/>. The data for this study were provided by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and while we thank the ADL for sharing their data with us, the views expressed in this article are ours and do not represent the official positions or policies of the ADL. EHK was supported by the Yale School of Management research fund.

²¹ School of Management, Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, School of Medicine Department of Chemical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Yale University

²² Institute for Social and Policy Studies and Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, Yale University

characterize persons who exhibit more (or less) prejudice against Jews (Anti-Defamation League 1998, 2002; Frindte, Wettig, and Wammetsberger 2005; Konig, Eisinga, and Scheepers 2000; Konig, Scheepers, and Falling 2001; Lutterman and Middleton 1970; Weil 1985). In reviewing this literature, Konig, Scheepers, and Falling (2001) identify religious (e.g., Christian worldview, fundamentalism), social-psychological (e.g., anomie, authoritarianism), and sociostructural (e.g., age, education, gender) variables as key correlates of anti-Semitism at the individual level. More recently, scholars have addressed the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism (Frindte, Wettig, and Wammetsberger 2005; Wistrich 1990, 2004), but whether extreme criticism of Israel, as exemplified in the recent AUT boycott debate, is de facto anti-Semitic remains bitterly contested (<http://www.engageonline.org.uk>). Although motivated by strong anti-Israel sentiment such as that earlier described, our research question is not whether anti-Israel statements are anti-Semitic in either effect or intent. Rather, we ask whether individuals with strong anti-Israel views are more likely to harbor anti-Semitic attitudes than others. Certainly, Bayes's rule would suggest this to be true. Let p be the proportion of the population with anti-Semitic leanings, q be the fraction of those with anti-Semitic leanings who are anti-Israel, and r be the fraction of those not anti-Semitic who are anti-Israel. Then, the fraction of those with anti-Israel views who are also anti-Semitic, f , is given by

$$f = \frac{pq}{pq + (1 - p)r} . \quad (1)$$

Presumably, those with anti-Semitic leanings would be more likely to espouse anti-Israel viewpoints than those who are not anti-Semitic (given that Israel presents itself as a Jewish state), implying that $q > r$, which in turn implies that the fraction of those with anti-Israel leanings who are anti-Semitic (f) exceeds the unconditional proportion of the population that is anti-Semitic (p).

Following the logic of equation (1), one can ask not only whether those with anti-Israel leanings are more likely to be anti-Semitic but also whether the *degree* of anti-Israel feeling differentially predicts the likelihood that one harbors anti-Semitic views. This framework does *not* require any assumption regarding causality, that is, whether anti-Semitism “causes” anti-Israel sentiment (or vice versa). Rather, our analysis focuses on information updating (as is common in Bayesian analyses). Worded differently, our research addresses the following scenario: when confronted by an individual espousing anti-Israel statements such as those cited in the opening of this article, what is the probability that the person issuing such statements is anti-Semitic? Working from a baseline assessment of the fraction of individuals in the relevant population who are anti-Semitic, the presentation of strong anti-Israel statements constitutes new information, which forces attention on the fraction of such individuals who are anti-Semitic. More generally, we seek the fractions of those with anti-Israel views of differing severity who also harbor anti-Semitic views (as opposed to arguing whether such anti-Israel views themselves are or are not inherently anti-Semitic).

The contribution of this article is that for ten European countries, we are able to answer our research questions empirically. We next describe our data source and method of analysis, after which we present our statistical findings. Not only do we find that the extent of anti-Israel sentiment differentially predicts the likelihood of anti-Semitism among survey respondents, but the predictions are sharp. Those with extreme anti-Israel sentiment are roughly six times more likely to harbor anti-Semitic views than those who do not fault Israel on the measures studied, and among those respondents deeply critical of Israel, the fraction that harbors anti-Semitic views exceeds 50 percent. Furthermore, these results are robust even after controlling for numerous additional (and potentially confounding) factors both singularly and simultaneously.

DATA

The Anti-Defamation League (henceforth ADL, <http://www.adl.org/>) commissioned First International Resources (<http://www.first-intl.com/default.htm>) to develop a study of attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and the Palestinians (Anti-Defamation League 2004). In addition to survey items probing such attitudes, questions addressed the degree of respondents' social contacts with Jews and respondents' attitudes toward others (e.g., different religion, immigrants). Respondents were also asked to provide standard demographic information (e.g., age, gender, income etc.). The resulting survey was administered by Taylor Nelson Sofres (<http://www.tns-global.com>) via telephone, resulting in interviews with 500 citizens in each of ten countries for a total sample of 5,000 (actually 5,004). No information is available regarding those contacted who refused to participate in the study, which raises an obvious statistical question regarding nonresponse bias. However, given that the goal of our analysis is to examine the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment rather than to estimate the true prevalence of either, nonresponse becomes less of an issue. The situation is somewhat akin to epidemiological studies relating, say, the incidence of cancer to smoking behavior: there is no need for the proportion of smokers in such studies to mimic the true percentage in the population. As will be detailed below, the consistency of the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment across many different analyses makes it difficult to believe that the results obtained are somehow artifactual due to nonresponse bias.

TABLE 1
Statements Comprising the Anti-Semitic Index with Corresponding Response
Frequency in Agreement (of n = 5,004)

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Response Frequency</i>
Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind.	1,052
Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want.	784
Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country.	2,200
Jews have too much power in the business world.	1,309
Jews have lots of irritating faults.	545
Jews stick together more than other (CITIZENS OF RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE).	2,942
Jews always like to be at the head of things.	1,150
Jews have too much power in international financial markets.	1,460
Jews have too much power in our country today.	500
Jewish business people are so shrewd that others do not have a fair chance to compete.	884
Jews are just as honest as other business people.	485 ^a

a. Frequency of respondents that disagreed with this statement.

THE ANTI-SEMITIC INDEX

Table 1 reports the eleven statements used in this study to measure anti-Semitism along with the number of respondents who agreed with each proposition. As in prior ADL surveys (Anti-Defamation League 1998, 2002), an anti-Semitic index was defined by counting the number of statements with which a respondent agreed.²³ Figure 1A reports the survivor distribution for this index, which is the fraction of all respondents with index scores exceeding x for x ranging from 0 through 11. Consistent with the prior ADL surveys, we say that a respondent harbors anti-Semitic views if he or she agrees with more than five of the eleven statements in Table 1, although we will show that our results are not particularly sensitive to this cutoff.

²³ See the online companion to this article for interitem correlations, reliability, and other diagnostics for the anti-Semitic and anti-Israel indices.

From Figure 1A, the overall fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views equals 14 percent.




Figure 1: Survivor Distributions Reporting the Fraction of Survey Respondents with Index Scores Exceeding x for (A) the Anti-Semitic Index (x Ranges from 0-11) and (B) the Anti-Israel Index (x Ranges from 0-4)

TABLE 2
Statements Comprising the Anti-Israel Index with Corresponding Response
Frequency in Agreement (of n = 5,004)

<i>Statement/Question</i>	<i>Response Frequency</i>
The Israeli treatment of the Palestinians is similar to South Africa's treatment of blacks during apartheid.	705 ^a
Who do you think is more responsible for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israelis, or the Palestinians?	1,254 ^b
In your opinion, during military activities inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, do the Israeli Defense Forces intentionally target Palestinian civilians, or are civilian casualties an accidental outcome of Israel's military response? ^c	1,765 ^c
In your opinion, is there any justification for Palestinian suicide bombers that target Israeli civilians?	426 ^d

a. Frequency of respondents that agree a lot with this statement.

b. Frequency of respondents stating Israelis.

c. Frequency of respondents stating that the Israeli Defense Forces intentionally target civilians.

d. Frequency of respondents stating yes.

THE ANTI-ISRAEL INDEX

Table 2 reports the four statements used in this study to ascertain anti-Israel sentiment and the number of respondents who agreed with each. Similar to the anti-Semitic index, we used the number of these statements agreed to by a respondent to define an anti-Israel index. The higher the value of this index, the stronger the anti-Israel sentiment expressed. Figure 1B reports the survivor distribution for the anti-Israel index. Just under half of all respondents report anti-Israel index scores of 0, indicating no measured anti-Israel sentiment, while only 1 percent of respondents agreed with all four of the anti-Israel statements considered.

PREDICTING ANTI-SEMITISM FROM ANTI-ISRAEL SENTIMENT

To see whether anti-Israel sentiment is generally predictive of anti-Semitic views among the 5,000 respondents to our survey, we examined the survivor distribution of the anti-Semitic index for each of the five levels of the anti-Israel index. The results are shown in Figure 2A. The five curves are significantly different (log-rank $\chi^2 = 286$, $df = 4$, $p \sim 0$), confirming that measured anti-Semitism differs by the extent of anti-Israel sentiment. It is noteworthy that these five survivor curves never cross: for any value x of the anti-Semitic index, the fraction of respondents who agree with more than x anti-Semitic statements strictly increases with the value of the anti-Israel index. Figure 2B reports the fraction of respondents who agree with more than five of the eleven anti-Semitic statements for the different levels of the anti-Israel index. Recall that of all respondents, 14 percent harbor anti-Semitic views. Only 9 percent of those with anti-Israel index scores of 0 report harboring anti-Semitic views, but the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views grows to 12, 22, 35, and 56 percent for anti-Israel index values of 1 through 4, respectively.




Figure 2: (A) Survivor Distributions Reporting the Fraction of Survey Respondents with Index Scores Exceeding x for the Anti-Semitic Index (x Ranges from 0-11), Conditional on the Anti-Israel Index Equaling, from Bottom to Top, 0 (Solid Bottom Line), 1 (Long-Dashed Line), 2 (Short-Dashed Line), 3 (Broken Line), or 4 (Solid Top Line); and (B) Fraction of Respondents Defined as Harboring Anti-Semitic Views (Anti-Semitic Index Scores Exceeding 5) as a Function of the Anti-Israel Index

THIRD-FACTOR INTERACTIONS

As discussed earlier, presumably those with anti-Semitic views are more likely to oppose a Jewish state than others; therefore, the greater the extent of anti-Israel sentiment revealed, the higher the likelihood of associated anti-Semitism via Bayes's rule. However, it is also possible that the relationship observed between anti-Israel and anti-Semitic attitudes is the result of third-factor interactions. For example, those who are intolerant of others (e.g., different religion, different country of origin) might be more likely to express both anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment as a result. Does the relationship displayed in Figure 2B survive when one controls for possible confounding factors?

Figure 3 explores such interactions by reporting the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views as a function of anti-Israel index levels while controlling for the levels of third factors. The most important observation from this graphical exploration is that the panels of Figure 3 repeat the basic pattern shown in Figure 2B for essentially all levels of all factors. Figure 3A shows that within each of the ten countries surveyed, the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views increases with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment measured. While there is considerable variation among these countries in measured anti-Semitism overall—ranging from 8 percent in Denmark and the Netherlands to 22 percent in Spain—the association between anti-Israel and anti-Semitic leanings appears in each country. Figure 3B shows that for each of several different income levels (and including those who refused to divulge their income), the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views increases with the anti-Israel index. Figure 3C considers the interaction between anti-Semitism, anti-Israel sentiment, and religion. For Christian respondents and those who profess no religion, the fraction reporting anti-Semitic index values in excess of 5 strongly increases with reported anti-Israel sentiment. This is also true of those reporting “other” as their religious affiliation. Among Muslims, the reported level of anti-Semitism jumps past 60 percent for those with anti-Israel index values of 2 or more; a similar rapid rise is seen among those refusing to state their religion. Even among Jewish respondents, one sees an increase in anti-Semitic responses as the anti-Israel index increases, but note that there are only 25 Jewish respondents (compared to 2,970 Christians, 1,547 reporting no religion, 92 Muslims, 295 reporting “other,” and 75 who refused to state their religion). Among these 25 Jewish respondents, 13 scored 0 on the anti-Israel index (with one of these scoring over 5 on the anti-Semitic index), 10 scored 1 on the anti-Israel index (with 2 reporting anti-Semitic leanings), and 2 scored 2 on the anti-Israel index (with 1 reporting anti-Semitic leanings). When considering the statement “Illegal immigrants today are a burden on our economy because they take our jobs, housing and health care,” Figure 3D repeats the same relation between anti-Semitism and the anti-Israel index for all attitudes toward illegal immigrants. Does the extent of contact respondents have with Jews matter? The survey asked respondents, “Approximately how often would you say that you come into contact with Jews either at work or in social occasions?” Figure 3E reports the by now familiar relationship between anti-Semitism and the anti-Israel index for different levels of contact. Finally, Figure 3F reports the fraction of respondents who agree with specific anti-Semitic canards (Table 1) as a function of the anti-Israel index. Whether the accusation is that “Jews have too much power in our country,” “Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want,” or “Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind,” the fraction of respondents agreeing with these (and the rest of the) anti-Semitic stereotypes consistently increases as a function of the anti-Israel index.




Figure 3 Fraction of Respondents Harboring Anti-Semitic Views (Anti-Semitic Index Scores Exceeding 5) as a Function of the Anti-Israel Index Equaling 0 (Solid Black), 1 (Forward Slash), 2 (Back Slash), 3 (Cross-Hatch), and 4 (Horizontal Bar) Controlling for (A) Country of Residence, (B) Income, (C) Religion, (D) Attitudes toward Illegal Immigrants (See Text), (E) Frequency of Contact with Jews (See Text), and (F) Fraction of Respondents Agreeing with Specific Anti-Semitic Attitudes (See Table 1), as a Function of the Anti-Israel Index Equaling 0 (Solid Black), 1 (Forward Slash), 2 (Back Slash), 3 (Cross-Hatch), and 4 (Horizontal Bar)

MULTIFACTOR MODEL

To further explore the association between the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views and the anti-Israel index, we fit a multiple logistic regression model to the survey data. Such a model enables estimation of the level of anti-Semitism as a function of the anti-Israel index while simultaneously controlling for possible confounding factors. The model also enables estimation of the independent effects (if any) of these same factors on the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views.

Several findings emerge from the results shown in Table 3.²⁴ First, even after controlling for respondents' country of residence, age, religion, income, gender, extent of contact with Jews, attitudes toward people of other races/religions, and attitudes toward illegal immigrants, the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel attitudes remains intact. The odds ratios of the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views for anti-Israel index scores greater than 0 (relative to those with an anti-Israel index of 0) equal 1.59, 3.28, 6.51, and 10.94 for anti-Israel index scores of 1 through 4, respectively. All of these scores are significantly different from unity (which would occur if anti-Israel index levels carried no information about anti-Semitism). The mitigating effects of the possible confounds considered are minor, as the equivalent odds ratios associated with the uncontrolled results of Figure 2B equal 1.43, 2.92, 5.45, and 12.94 for anti-Israel index scores of 1 through 4, a similar set of ratios with the

²⁴ A more complete table reporting estimated coefficients, standard errors, coefficient z-statistics and p-values, and overall goodness-of-fit tests appears in the online companion to this article.

same qualitative implications as the figures derived from the logistic model. Furthermore, of all the factors considered in this model, the anti-Israel index is by far the most important, as indicated by its chi-square of 196 at 4 degrees of freedom.

While simultaneously considering the factors shown in Table 3 did not meaningfully alter the relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Israel attitudes in the data, these other factors all tested significant in their own right, as can be seen from their associated chi-square statistics in Table 3. The important relationships between these factors and anti-Semitism will now be summarized. First, the fraction of respondents harboring anti-Semitic views tends to increase with age. Second, relative to Christians, Muslim respondents are much more likely to harbor anti-Semitic views (odds ratio = 7.8). There was no statistically significant difference between the fraction of anti-Semitic responses obtained from Jews, other religions, or those reporting no religion as compared to Christians, although those who refused to identify their religion were more likely to harbor anti-Semitic views. Third, the fraction of anti-Semitic responses tended to decline as income increased. Fourth, women were much less likely than men to report anti-Semitic results. Fifth, the level of contact with Jews had no statistically significant relation to anti-Semitism, except that those who did not know how much contact they had with Jews were much less likely to harbor anti-Semitic views (odds ratio = 0.34 relative to those who reported no contact with Jews). Sixth, the less one feels in common with other races/religions, the more likely one is to exhibit anti-Semitism. Seventh, the less tolerant respondents were of illegal immigrants, the more likely they expressed anti-Semitism.

TABLE 3
Multifactor Logistic Model Predicting the Probability a Respondent Reports an Anti-Semitic Index Exceeding 5 from the Anti-Israel Index, Controlling for Country of Residence, Age, Religion, Income, Gender, Contact with Jews, Commonality with Other Races/Religions, and Attitudes toward Immigrants

<i>Predictor</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>	<i>95% Confidence Interval</i>	
		<i>Lower</i>	<i>Upper</i>
Anti-Israel Index (Relative to 0)			
1	1.59	1.28	1.99
2	3.28	2.56	4.19
3	6.51	4.68	9.04
4	10.94	5.93	20.17
Country (Relative to NL)			
AUS	2.82	1.79	4.44
BEL	2.37	1.51	3.72
DEN	1.21	0.73	2.01
FR	2.30	1.43	3.70
GER	2.58	1.63	4.08
IT	2.11	1.31	3.38
SP	4.56	2.91	7.15
SWI	3.20	2.05	5.02
UK	1.45	0.90	2.34
Age (Relative to 18-24)			
25-34	1.10	0.73	1.66
35-44	1.25	0.85	1.84
45-54	1.62	1.10	2.39
55-64	2.03	1.37	3.01
Refuse	0.98	0.29	3.36
Unknown	2.62	1.77	3.87

Religion (Relative to Christianity)			
Islam	7.80	4.69	12.98
Judaism	1.84	0.58	5.84
None	0.97	0.79	1.20
Other	1.39	0.94	2.05
Refuse	2.88	1.52	5.47
Income (Relative to < 11K Euros)			
11-33	0.75	0.58	0.98
33-66	0.56	0.41	0.77
66-99	0.43	0.26	0.69
99-132	0.65	0.30	1.40
Over 132	0.48	0.19	1.19
Refuse	0.72	0.56	0.94
Gender (Relative to Male)			
Female	0.62	0.52	0.75
Contact with Jews (Relative to Never Any Contact)			
Hardly ever	0.79	0.61	1.01
Once in while	0.77	0.59	1.00
Fairly often	0.76	0.52	1.12
Very often	0.97	0.62	1.51
v Refuse	0.31	0.04	2.49
Unknown	0.34	0.21	0.54
Not Much in Common Other Races/Religions? (Relative to Disagree a Lot)			
Disagree	1.20	0.92	1.56
Neither	1.25	0.92	1.72
Agree	2.33	1.80	3.02
Agree a lot	2.23	1.62	3.06
Refuse	2.00	0.68	5.94
Unknown	0.75	0.34	1.65
Immigrants Drain on Economy? (Relative to Disagree a Lot)			
Disagree	1.45	1.07	1.97
Neither	1.37	0.92	2.05
Agree	2.12	1.60	2.82
Agree a lot	3.82	2.85	5.12
Refuse	1.21	0.34	4.31
Unknown	1.15	0.55	2.40

Tests for Terms with > 1 Degree of Freedom

<i>Term</i>	<i>Chi-Square</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Anti-Israel	195.67	4	0.00
Country	75.22	9	0.00
Age	48.62	6	0.00
Religion	76.73	5	0.00
Income	19.73	6	0.00
Contact Jews	23.90	6	0.00
Common	60.41	6	0.00
Immigrants	97.50	6	0.00

An important potential explanatory factor that is not included in the model shown is education. Unfortunately, the ADL survey did not provide a useful measure of the extent of respondents' education, asking instead, "At what age did you complete your full-time education?" There are two problems with this question. First, the respondents are asked for their age at completion of formal studies rather than the actual level of education attained. Second, the response options for this question are as follows: sixteen or younger, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty and older, don't know/not sure, and refused to answer. This range of ages is too narrow to assess meaningfully the amount of education received.

Finally, as a check on the sensitivity of our results to the specific cutoff employed in operationalizing anti-Semitism (anti-Semitic index values in excess of 5), we also explored ordered logistic models that estimate the probability a respondent reports *any* particular level of the anti-Semitic index (rather than only index values in excess of 5 or not). These more complex models did not lead to any important differences from the results described earlier, which is perhaps not surprising given what was shown earlier: conditional on the values of the anti-Israel index, the survivor distributions of the anti-Semitic index *never cross* (see Figure 2A), indicating strong explanatory power at *any* anti-Semitic index threshold and not just the ADL-inspired cutoff of 5.

CONCLUSIONS

We began this article by noting that extreme anti-Israel sentiment has been interpreted by some as anti-Semitic in effect if not intent. It is therefore important to consider the competing motivations behind such sentiment. There are certainly critics of Israel on specific policy grounds, but there are also anti-Semitic individuals for whom attacks on Israel are manifestations of prejudice. Given this mix, what is one to think when presented with accusations such as "Israel is just like apartheid South Africa," "Israel is responsible for the violence in the Middle East," or "Israel deliberately targets Palestinian civilians"?

Our research directly addresses this issue. From a large survey of 5,000 citizens of ten European countries, we showed that the prevalence of those harboring (self-reported) anti-Semitic views consistently increases with respondents' degree of anti-Israel sentiment (see Figures 2 and 3 and Table 3), even after controlling for other factors. It is noteworthy that fewer than one-quarter of those with anti-Israel index scores of only 1 or 2 harbor anti-Semitic views (as defined by anti-Semitic index scores exceeding 5), which supports the contention that one certainly can be critical of Israeli policies without being anti-Semitic. However, among those with the most extreme anti-Israel sentiments in our survey (anti-Israel index scores of 4), 56 percent report anti-Semitic leanings. Based on this analysis, when an individual's criticism of Israel becomes sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying anti-Semitism.

REFERENCES

- Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. *The authoritarian personality*. New York: John Wiley.
- Almog, Shmuel. 1988. *Antisemitism through the ages*. Oxford, UK: Pergamon.
- Anti-Defamation League. 1998. *Anti-Semitism and prejudice in America*. New York: Anti-Defamation League. http://www.adl.org/antisemitism_survey/survey_main.asp.
- . 2002. *European attitudes toward Jews: A five country survey*. New York: Anti-Defamation League. http://www.adl.org/anti_semitism/EuropeanAttitudesPoll-10-02.pdf.
- . 2004. *Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in ten European countries*. New York: Anti-Defamation League. http://www.adl.org/antisemitism_survey/survey_main.asp.
- Frindte, Wolfgang, Susan Wettig, and Dorit Wammetsberger. 2005. Old and new anti-Semitic attitudes in the context of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Two studies in Germany. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 11 (3): 239-66.
- Konig, Ruben, Rob Eisinga, and Peer Scheepers. 2000. Explaining the relationship between Christian religion and anti-Semitism in the Netherlands. *Review of Religious Research* 41 (3): 373-93.
- Konig, Ruben, Peer Scheepers, and Albert Felling. 2001. Research on antisemitism: A review of previous findings and the case of the Netherlands in the 1990s. In *Ethnic minorities and inter-ethnic relations in context: A Dutch Hungarian comparison*, edited by Karen Phaet and Antal Örkény, 179-99. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Luterman, Kenneth G., and Russell Middleton. 1970. Authoritarianism, anomia, and prejudice. *Social Forces* 48 (4): 485-92.
- Martire, Gregory, and Ruth Clark. 1982. *Anti-Semitism in the United States: A study of prejudice in the 1980s*. New York: Praeger.
- Selznick, Gertrude J., and Stephen Steinberg. 1969. *The tenacity of prejudice: Anti-Semitism in contemporary America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Weil, Frederick D. 1985. The variable effects of education on liberal attitudes: A comparative-historical analysis of anti-Semitism using public opinion survey data. *American Sociological Review* 50 (4): 458-74.
- Wistrich, Robert S., ed. 1990. *Anti-Zionism and antisemitism in the contemporary world*. London: Macmillan.
- . 2004. Anti-Zionism and antisemitism. *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16 (3-4): 27-31.

7.2. *The Situation on Hate on the Internet*

Mark Weitzman²⁵

Recent years saw a debate over whether the wave of antisemitism in Europe and the rest of the world was a resurgence of traditional antisemitism, or whether it was a manifestation of a new antisemitism. As in so many other debates of this nature, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Antisemitism has always reflected the realities of its time, whether the theological traditional antisemitism of the medieval period, the pseudo-scientific antisemitism of the late 19th and early 20th century, or the conspiratorial antisemitism reflected in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion stemming from the political and social upheavals of the early 20th century.

In our time the new factors involve an ideology and a technology. The ideology is anti-Zionism stemming from the birth and existence of the State of Israel. The method is, of course, the Internet. The Internet has radically changed the way antisemitism (and other forms of extremism) can impact upon society. To quickly sum up a few basic points, it can reach a wider audience than ever before, (over 1 billion people, or 16.7% of the world's population - <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>), it crosses borders, empowers by lessening personal risk and so on. This is all reflected in the growth of hate sites, from 1 in 1995 to almost 6,000 today.

However, the best way to illustrate this growth, including the growth in the technical value and sophistication of these sites, is by seeing for ourselves. I would like to now show you exactly what we are talking about, by using examples drawn from our database. Some of these can be found on our annual compilation of Digital Hate and Terrorism (the 2006 edition), and others are more recent updates.

I will begin with some drawn from the category of games. These are doubly dangerous on that they not only encourage the worst types of stereotyping, dehumanization and violence, but they do so in a style that is aimed to appeal to youth (who are, after all, the most prominent gamers online).

1. Kaboom – a game that encourages would be suicide bombers to aim for the highest number of victims.
2. Ethnic Cleansing – based on a popular game, and encourages genocide as a goal
3. Nazi Moorhunjagd – Gerhard Lauck's revised approach, after his release from prison.
4. Way to Al-Quds – Middle Eastern based game
5. Hizbollah
6. NY Defender
7. KZ Manager
8. Oklahoma City
9. Border Patrol
10. Ass Bandits

²⁵ Simon Wiesenthal Center

Other websites try to manipulate the minds of the user in different ways. Some of these provide religious justifications for antisemitism and violence, such as the following:

1. Ask the Scholar
2. Mujahidat

Others try to use a distorted view of history to provide justification for their beliefs.

1. MLKing.org
2. Free Arab Voice
3. Pure Lies
4. Holocaust Class
5. Butz (Ahmadinejad)
6. Farsi
7. Al Queda in Iraq

The last few sites above show the beginning of what possibly may be a new trend – the meeting of Western neo-nazis, particularly Holocaust deniers, with Muslim antisemites who view attacks on the Holocaust as a way of delegitimizing Israel. The primary leader in that regard is of course, the noxious President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; but he is not operating in isolation. His country's recent contest for cartoons negating the Holocaust drew entries from all over the globe, including Europe and the US. And, the US neo-Nazi, David Duke, who now teaches and spends time in the Ukraine, has also made the rounds of Arab countries, where he is treated as an honored and welcome guest. (In 2006 there already existed a site from Iran devoted to this theme [Iran Cartoon], along with the Teheran Times, Iran's English newspaper [Teheran Times.com] and we can also visit David Duke's site as well – [David Duke.com]). A report from a British paper on Sunday describes how a prominent Anglo-Muslim leader (Asghar Bukhari, a founder of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee raised money "and urged Islamic websites to make donations to [David Irving's] fighting fund" –Observer.

Another area of concern is the growing use of the Internet as a training grounds for terrorism. The following sites are all in that category, and show how easy it is for violence, both on an individual and group level, to be taught and incited, with increasing sophistication.

1. Cyanide Bombs
2. Chemical Warfare
3. Cell Phone
4. GPS
5. Terrorism Manuals
6. Home Built Launchers
7. Jihad Encyclopedia

Lastly, just to show the geographical range of these sites here are some samples drawn from European countries that illustrate the varieties of extremism that currently exist online.

1. Coramix.com
2. Leeds Crow
3. Madrid SUR
4. Resistance Aria
5. Hizbut al-Tahrir

A report in last Wednesday's New York Times described how the Internet has even created a shift in radical Islam. Using online forums and chat rooms, some little known Muslim thinkers are replacing Osama Bin-Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and other Al-Queda thinkers as the leaders of the jihadist movement. Leaving aside the ramifications of such a change, for our purposes let me point out that if this is indeed true, it illustrates once again the power of the Internet in the radical Islamist world. For, if it did not serve as the communications center for radical Islam, conversations and tracts posted online would not be able to induce such a shift.

If antisemitism is, as some have described it, a virus that attacks society, then it is a virus that mutates with the times. The remedies of the past are not necessarily the remedies that will work today. Any plan that does not factor in the influence of the new technology (including satellite TV) is simply not going to be effective. So what can we do? For one thing, I would suggest not getting bogged down in a useless debate over the US' First Amendment. That provides a convenient excuse for doing nothing.

1. We must be aware of the empowering effect of the Internet on extremists of all types. This also includes the ability to ratchet up the language and level of extremism.
2. We must have researchers who are fluent in the technology and languages of use online, and who can keep us informed.
3. We must make people aware of the misinformation and techniques used by extremists. This requires teaching critical reading skills from an early age to get away from the syndrome of if something is in print, then it must be true.
4. We must cooperate internationally, on the NGO, political and legal levels.
5. There must be political will to act legally when necessary. Even in the US there have been prosecutions of web sites; others have been closed down or had their assets frozen.
6. We must recognize the ability of the Internet to resuscitate themes and texts that were assumed to be irrelevant. Even the most obscure, discredited text takes on new life and force when it is posted online. Thus texts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion that now appear in many languages (the Protocols in about 20) have a new power and ability to influence.
7. We must be equally prepared to use the Internet for positive purposes, including the preparing and funding of positive sites.

The philosopher Avishai Margalit has recently written "We need morality not so much to counter evil as to counter indifference." And he added, "the combination of evil and indifference is lethal." This is an important reminder for us all. If we do not deal with the issue of antisemitism, if we do not recognize and confront it in all its manifestations, then we are essentially saying that we are willing to be complicit in the triumph of evil, with all its lethal implications. And that is a story whose ending, 62 years ago, we are all too familiar with.

8. OSCE initiatives to combat Antisemitism

Thomas von Winter and Christoff Soltau²⁶

Conferences and declarations

The first OSCE conference on Antisemitism was held in Vienna on 19/20 June 2003.

At the **11th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council** in Maastricht on 1/2 December 2003 delegates among other things adopted Ministerial Decision No. 4/03, in which the Ministerial Council expresses its concern about all the manifestations of aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia, Antisemitism and violent extremism in the participating States. It calls on the participating States to collect data on hate crimes, which include crimes motivated by Antisemitism.

The **second OSCE conference on Antisemitism** was held in Berlin on 28/29 April 2004. The Final Document has become known as the Berlin Declaration (see 2. below).

The **Meeting on the Relationship Between Racist, Xenophobic and Anti-Semitic Propaganda on the Internet and Hate Crimes** was held in Paris on 16/17 June 2004.

An **OSCE Conference on Tolerance and the Fight Against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination** was held in Brussels on 13/14 September 2004. In the Final Declaration the OSCE participating States condemn, without reserve, all forms of racism, xenophobia and Antisemitism and other acts of intolerance and discrimination.²⁷ The **Decision on Tolerance and the Fight Against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination**, which the Permanent Council adopted on 29 June 2004, is explicitly incorporated into the Declaration.

At its 12th Meeting, held in Sofia on 6/7 December 2004, the OSCE Ministerial Council adopted **Decision No. 12/04**, which recalls Decision No. 4/03. It also expressly endorses the Permanent Council's **Decision on Combating Antisemitism**. In Decision No. 12/04 the participating States declared their intention to ensure that their legal systems foster an environment free from anti-Semitic harassment, to promote national educationnal programmes for combating Antisemitism and to collect data on anti-Semitic crimes.

Following on from the conferences held in 2004, the OSCE Conference on Antisemitism and on Other Forms of Intolerance was held in Córdoba (Spain) on 8/9 June 2005. The **Cordoba Declaration**²⁸ was adopted at the end of this conference and recalls previous resolutions. The participating States are called on to fulfil their commitments to combat Antisemitism. The resolution also recalls the great importance of education on the Holocaust as a means for effectively preventing Antisemitism.

Decision No. 10/05 was adopted on the occasion of the **13th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council** in Ljubljana (Slovenia) on 5/6 December 2005.

At a meeting held from 3 to 7 July 2006, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted the **Brussels Declaration**,²⁹ in which the participating States are called on to work closely with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), particularly to collect and pass on the information the Office requires to accomplish its tasks and to forward the reports they agreed to compile on the status of implementation.

²⁶ Study of the Reference and Research Services of the German Bundestag

²⁷ http://osce.org/documents/cio/2004/09/3567_en.pdf.

²⁸ www.osce.org/documents/cio/2005/06/15109_en.pdf.

²⁹ www.osce.org/documents/pa/2006/07/19815_en.pdf.

The Berlin Declaration

On 28/29 April 2004, Germany hosted the OSCE Conference on Antisemitism. The conference was held in the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin on the invitation of the Federal government. The OSCE's and the Federal government's aim in holding the conference was to send a clear signal that they take very seriously the problem of Antisemitism in the OSCE participating States. The Berlin Declaration adopted at the conference sets out various measures initiated and commitments entered into by the OSCE participating States to combat Antisemitism.³⁰

The participating States, for example, commit to:

1. Examine their legal systems and, if necessary, to make improvements in order to be able to better prosecute Antisemitism;
2. Promote educational programmes for combating Antisemitism;
3. Promote remembrance of and education about the Holocaust;
4. Combat hate crimes with an anti-Semitic background as well as anti-Semitic propaganda on the Internet;
5. Support international organisations and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) which combat Antisemitism; and
6. Work with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to determine procedures to regularly review the problem of Antisemitism.

In the Berlin Declaration, the OSCE participating States also commit themselves to collect information and statistics on anti-Semitic and other hate crimes and to report this information to the ODIHR and to make it available to the public. The ODIHR is tasked with reporting its findings to the Permanent Council and to make them public. In addition, the ODIHR is to promote the exchange among experts of best practices regarding the work done to combat Antisemitism and experiences in the field of law enforcement and education.³¹

Data collection

According to the ODIHR (communication, 19 October 2006), the OSCE participating States have not yet submitted the reports to which they committed themselves in the Berlin Declaration. As soon as the participating States have passed the reports promised in the Berlin Declaration to the ODIHR, the Office will compile a summary report.

In accordance with the Berlin Declaration, the ODIHR is also to follow closely anti-Semitic incidents in the OSCE area "in full co-operation" with, among others, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), which was founded on 2 June 1997. The EUMC already collects and publishes reports from the EU Member States on racism, Antisemitism and xenophobia in its European Information Network on Racism and Xenophobia (RAXEN) database. The 2004 annual report on "Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002-2004" contains country reports from Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom, for example.³² The EUMC also publishes country reports from the EU Member States compiled by National Focal Points (NFPs). These NFPs put together regional reports on the aforementioned topics at NGO level in the EU Member States³³:

³⁰ The text of the Berlin Declaration is available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2004/04/2828_en.pdf. For further information on the conference go to: http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2004/07/3349_en.pdf.

³¹ In response to the conference the Berlin Senate Administration for the Interior in September 2004 published a brochure entitled "Antisemitismus im extremistischen Spektrum Berlins" (Antisemitism in the Extremist Spectrum in Berlin): <http://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/seninn/verfassungsschutz/antisemitismusberlin.pdf> (available only in German).

³² Report in the EUMC database: <http://www.raxen.eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.html>.

³³ http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp_cat_content&catid=3e4fca599fa38.

Austria	Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights + Department of Linguistics at the University of Vienna + Institute of Conflict Research
Belgium	Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism (CEOOR)
Bulgaria	Project 1 EEOD
Cyprus	Cyprus Labour Institute (INEK/PEO)
Czech Republic	People in Need
Denmark	Documentation and Advisory Centre on Racial Discrimination (DACoRD)
Estonia	Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHHR)
Finland	Finnish League for Human Rights
France	Centre d'Etudes des Discriminations, du Racisme et de l'Antisémitisme (CEDRA)
Germany	European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS)
Greece	ANTIGONE - Information & Documentation Centre on Racism, Ecology, Peace and Non Violence
Hungary	Centre of Migration and Refugee Studies, Institute of Ethnic and Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (CMRS)
Ireland	National Consultative Commission on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) + Equality Authority (EA)
Italy	Co-operation for the Development of Emerging Countries (COSPE)
Latvia	Latvian Centre for Human Rights (LCHR)
Lithuania	Institute for Social Research (ISR)
Luxembourg	Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-économiques / International Network for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development (CEPS/INSTEAD)
Malta	Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice (JCFJ)
Netherlands	Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (DUMC)
Poland	Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR)
Portugal	Númena - Research center on human and social sciences
Rumania	Center for Legal Resources (CLR)
Slovakia	People Against Racism (PAR) + Institute for Public Affairs
Slovenia	Peace Institute - Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies
Spain	Movement for Peace and Liberty (MPDL)
Sweden	Expo Foundation
United Kingdom	The University of Warwick

The ODIHR's **Annual Report 2005**³⁴ describes the collection and systematising of information on hate crimes as one of the most important tasks of the ODIHR in 2005. Since

³⁴ www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2006/04/18821_607_en.pdf.

most participating States do not, in the opinion of the ODIHR, have effective mechanisms for recording data on the background, perpetrators and victims of the hate crimes, the Office felt it necessary to take responsibility for collating the relevant data on such crimes, legislative measures on prevention and prosecution of such crimes and good practices, and began doing so in 2004. The results were published in a report entitled **Combating Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: An Overview of Statistics, Legislation and National Initiatives**.³⁵ As a result of that report the ODIHR was, by its own accounts, able to identify gaps and deficiencies in the participating States as regards the collection of data and was able to make suggestions on how to improve the work done in this area as well as for legislation in the area of hate crimes. The ODIHR published the report **Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Incidents in the OSCE Region** for the period January to June 2006.³⁶ The report contains an overview of hate crimes committed in the first half of 2006. It also describes what governments and civil society in the affected participating States have done in response to such crimes. Finally, the report contains the ODIHR's "Toolbox" of ideas for the OSCE participating States which is intended to support them in combating hate crimes. Both these reports on hate crimes indicate that many OSCE participating States have not yet collected any statistics on these types of crimes.

Implementation

The ODIHR's publication on **Education on the Holocaust and on Antisemitism: An Overview and Analysis of Educational Approaches**³⁷ deals with education in schools on Antisemitism. The publication aims to support participating States in implementing the commitments resulting from the Berlin Declaration. Part A of the report lists the applicable legal bases in each participating States regarding Antisemitism and Holocaust education in schools. Further, the report contains details on whether the respective country has official memorial days and activities to commemorate the Holocaust. Part B of the report contains the ODIHR's recommendations on what form Holocaust and Antisemitism education in schools is to take in future. Good practices from each participating State are also included. In order to give participating States concrete ideas and materials for implementing the recommendations contained in the study, the ODIHR has developed special materials in co-operation with international groups of experts. In co-operation with Yad Vashem (Israel) and experts from 12 OSCE participating States, the ODIHR drew up guidelines for educationalists concerning Holocaust memorial days. These guidelines are currently available online in nine languages. Translations were done by governments in the respective countries. Apart from the guidelines, the ODIHR, in co-operation with the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam and national experts from seven OSCE participating States, developed special teaching materials on combating Antisemitism. These materials are being adapted to match the respective historical, political and social background in each individual country. Some of the participating States have committed themselves to integrating these materials into their national curricula as a teaching unit and to push forward implementation by organising seminars for teachers.

The ODIHR's **Law enforcement officer programme on combating hate crime** was developed in co-operation with international police experts. It comprises a concept for actively combating violent crimes motivated by hate. Various participating States have already incorporated the programme into their national training curricula for police training and further training.

³⁵ www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/09/16251_452_en.pdf.

³⁶ www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2006/10/21496_en.pdf.

³⁷ www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2006/04/18712_586_en.pdf.

9. Concluding Statement

Andrew Baker³⁸

By way of concluding this day-long meeting on the problems of anti-Semitism it might be useful to review developments beginning four years ago when the OSCE at its Ministerial Meeting in Porto agreed to hold its first ever conference devoted to the problem of anti-Semitism. This decision did not come easily.

At the time we had already witnessed a dramatic increase in attacks on Jewish targets in parts of Europe, in France in particular. Nevertheless, there was an inability and perhaps even a refusal to recognize the problem as one of anti-Semitism on the part of many European leaders. This surge in attacks was certainly related to events in the Middle East, where the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process gave way to the Second Intifada. Because of this, some people claimed that as the “motivation” for these attacks was solidarity with the Palestinians in their struggle it meant they were somehow political rather than anti-Semitic in nature. This was despite the fact that the targets were not Israeli but Jewish—primarily synagogues, cemeteries, and schools. Others downplayed the fact that many of the attackers came from Muslim and Arab communities, and instead labeled the incidents as acts of vandalism that one might sadly expect from poor and unemployed youth.

Governments were notoriously lax at recording anti-Semitic incidents, as well as other incidents of hate crimes. Even in 2004, the EUMC conceded that half of its monitors in the then 15 member Union did not even have a definition of anti-Semitism to provide guidance. Thus, even if anti-Semitic incidents took place, government agencies often did not recognize them, did not report them, and did not record them. This only added to the difficulty of acknowledging the problem.

So it was that the initial push for an OSCE conference came from the United States. Jewish organizations and others in America were acutely aware of the growing problem. Congressional hearings brought the subject greater attention, and increasingly European diplomats and politicians were pressed on the subject by their American colleagues. Nevertheless, even the State Department was a reluctant advocate. It did not question the seriousness of the problem, but it was nervous about prevailing with the cumbersome OSCE consensus decision-making process.

The incoming Dutch Chair-in-Office was given the task of organizing the first conference, which took place at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna in June 2003. A second, parallel conference designed to address other forms of discrimination and intolerance was also scheduled for later that same year, and the Chair was scrupulous in insuring that its format, its schedule and even its expenses would be exactly equal.

The Vienna Conference was criticized by some for being “only speeches” although some excellent speeches were certainly delivered. Former New York City Mayor Rudi Giuliani emphasized the importance in identifying and monitoring anti-Semitic and other hate crimes so that police and government can see where the problems lie and address them. Canadian Parliamentarian Irwin Cotler was the first to take up the subject of the pariah treatment of the State of Israel as a new manifestation of anti-Semitism, describing it as, “the Jew among the nations.” In large measure the success of this conference was the agreement that there would be a follow-up conference in 2004, hosted by the German Government in Berlin. There were surely some OSCE members who had thought this Vienna conference would be a one-time only event.

³⁸ Rabbi, American Jewish Committee (AJC)

By now, European leaders no longer denied the problem; it had become self-evident to all even if NGOs still led in monitoring efforts. The Berlin Conference in April 2004 was notable both for the high level of participants—the presence of the German Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State insured that many other foreign ministers also attended—and the adoption of the “Berlin Declaration”—a description of the problem of anti-Semitism and a statement of commitment by the OSCE member states to deal with it.

The OSCE consensus process still presented serious challenges. The idea of a declaration to be issued in Berlin came from several NGOs, but was initially viewed only tepidly by both the State Department and the German Foreign Office, the two main champions of the conference. They were troubled by the difficulties of securing the necessary unanimous support. (One official suggested that a statement could be drafted by taking language exclusively from previously adopted decisions.) But we were insistent that something be done that would begin to define the problem and also take up the “new forms” of anti-Semitism that were related to Israel and to events in the Middle East. Once engaged, the US and Germany with support from France shepherded various texts through the OSCE missions in Vienna. In the end, an agreement was reached that accomplished a fair amount. For the first time in an official OSCE document anti-Semitism was defined, and it further asserted that in recent years it had assumed “new forms and expressions.” It did not prove politically possible to address the demonization of Israel—surely what we all recognized as one of those new forms—but it did state that, “international developments in Israel or the Middle East never justify anti-Semitism.”

Berlin was also the occasion for enumerating governmental commitments and for setting out new responsibilities for ODIHR to collect information and disseminate best practices for countering anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, it was far from certain whether the governments would meet even these first, modest commitments which centered largely on reporting. And it was also unclear how much initiative ODIHR would demonstrate in this field, when it already was fully occupied with other responsibilities. Partly for these reasons we also used the meeting to propose the designation of an OSCE “special envoy”—someone outside the bureaucratic structure with the prominence and ability to prod governments and the OSCE and ODIHR, if necessary, to keep focused on the problem of anti-Semitism. Following much discussion and negotiation that continued until the end of the year, a decision was reached to appoint three “personal representatives” of the Chair-in-Office, including one with the sole responsibility for combating anti-Semitism.

While our focus is the OSCE, it is important also to cite certain parallel efforts. Although established in 1997 to address problems such as anti-Semitism, the European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) had not yet undertaken any comprehensive examination of the issue until 2003. In that year it commissioned a report prepared for it by the Berlin Center for Research on Anti-Semitism, but later decided not to release it. Claiming that it had certain deficiencies—but widely accused of bowing to political pressures—it announced that it would instead prepare its own report. Published shortly after the Berlin Conference, it did provide a thorough account based on data that could be gleaned from official and NGO sources in the 15 member countries. This provided evidence that much of the recent anti-Semitic activity could be traced to Europe’s Arab and Muslim communities as well as (the more traditional) right wing extremists, neo-Nazis and skinheads. A parallel report, based on interviews conducted with Jewish representatives in various EU countries, provided a distressing picture of Jewish communities wrestling with the meaning of this new upsurge and the lack of a firm societal or governmental response. The EUMC report also highlighted the fact that most of its official monitors (“focal points”) had no definition of anti-Semitism and of those that did no two were the same. This would lead the way for an initiative of its executive director in consultation with key NGOs to develop a “working

definition” that was precise and detailed and that also offered clear examples of anti-Semitism as it related to the treatment of the State of Israel. ODIHR representatives also participated in the discussion and adopted the definition for their own—albeit primarily internal—use.

Even as there was considerable progress made at the Berlin Conference, it resulted in a certain backlash. Ironically, some country delegates saw the high level of participation not as a reflection of the seriousness of the problem but a result of the “Jewish lobby” in America. They began to speak about a “hierarchy of discriminations” in which the problem of anti-Semitism was given too prominent a place. In response, there was a call for taking a “holistic” approach to dealing with problems of intolerance, which was somehow a principled way for not singling out anti-Semitism or even uttering its name. At the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, the Spanish Foreign Minister proposed hosting a similar conference in Cordoba the following year. Many of his EU colleagues bristled at the idea of another conference on anti-Semitism, and in the end it was decided that the Cordoba event would encompass other forms of discrimination, as well. Reflecting the difficulties of securing support for this and other initiatives to address the problem during the year 2005 and the insistence of some ambassadors that it was the last time they would agree to do so, the US Ambassador to the OSCE privately joked that while we may not be able to predict anything else about the future, “we can say for certain that on December 31st the problem of anti-Semitism will be solved.”

This year was to be devoted to implementation, an opportunity for governments to address the commitments they have made. In keeping with the view of the current Chair-in-Office to pursue a “holistic approach” the scheduled meetings were grouped by theme—interreligious and interethnic dialogue, education, and monitoring and data collection. The fact that today’s meeting in Berlin is not an “official” OSCE meeting is partially a reflection of the difficulty in maintaining that OSCE special focus on anti-Semitism. We owe a debt of thanks to the Personal Representative Gert Weisskirchen and to the German Bundestag for organizing and hosting this meeting. The incoming Chair-in-Office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos has already expressed his openness to the suggestions that are offered today, and his representatives are here with us. Let me in closing offer several comments and suggestions:

- Since it was given the task two years ago, ODIHR’s Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Unit has made substantial progress. It should be commended and it should be given the support and the necessary resources to continue them. In particular I want to cite the Law Enforcement Officers Program, which involves police training police in identifying and responding to hate crimes.
- Both the reports that have been prepared by ODIHR and its NGO forum and the EUMC’s own more recent studies still reveal that many countries have no adequate system for collecting data. This must be given priority in the coming year.
- The Spanish Foreign Minister has already described his intention to engage the Mediterranean Partner Countries during his chairmanship with particular reference to the “Dialogue of Civilizations.” We cannot ignore the fact that several of these countries (Arab nations in North Africa) are today a new source for anti-Semitic media, disseminated within their own borders as well as “exported” to immigrant communities in Europe. Dialogue with these partner countries should also provide an opportunity to address this very serious problem.
- For those of us here it is obvious, and we hope it will prove so for the OSCE Member States: the continued mandate of the Personal Representative for Combating Anti-Semitism is critical for the success of these efforts.

10. Abschlussstatement: Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus in 2007

Gert Weisskirchen³⁹

Vielen Dank, Andy Baker, Sie haben eine gute Zusammenfassung dessen geliefert, woran wir zu arbeiten haben.

Die OSZE ist ein konsensorientierter Mechanismus, ein schweres Schiff das durch die Wellen geht und nur schwierig gelenkt werden kann. Es funktioniert nur dann, wenn alle zustimmen. Ansonsten passiert absolut nichts. Manche, die die OSZE-Welt nicht kennen, sind höchst zurückhaltend gegenüber ihren Instrumenten. Eine Chance, dass dieser Tanker sicher sein Ziel erreicht, besteht darin, dass, wenn er einmal Fahrt aufgenommen hat, er es selten verfehlen wird.

Eines der besten Instrumente über das die OSZE verfügt ist ODIHR. ODIHR macht eine hervorragende Arbeit und nicht zuletzt auch deshalb, weil Kathrin Meyer und viele andere dort arbeiten. Wie man am Beispiel Education und Police Training gut erkennen kann ist ihre Arbeit außergewöhnlich, notwendig und exzellent. Dafür möchte ich mich persönlich bei Ihnen, Frau Meyer, ganz herzlich bedanken.

Einer Reihe von Problemen müssen wir aber ins Auge sehen. Unsere Debatte gestern und heute hat gezeigt, dass das Problem des Antisemitismus nicht vorbei geht, sondern in immer neuen Formen erscheint und auch wieder neue bedrohliche Züge annimmt. Unabhängig davon ob und in welcher Form die OSZE den Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus fortzuführen bereit ist, bleibt dieser Kampf auf lange Zeit eine zivilisatorische Aufgabe. Ich kann nur hoffen, dass dieser Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus mit schärferen Instrumenten ausgestattet wird und auch mit der Möglichkeit, dass diejenigen die berufen werden für den Vorsitzenden der OSZE diese Arbeit zu machen, mehr Möglichkeiten bekommen freier zu agieren, als das in den vergangenen zwei Jahren der Fall gewesen ist. Ich glaube nicht, dass es dazu nötig wäre, den holistischen Ansatz zu verlassen. Geben sie einfach denen, die in diesen drei Feldern arbeiten, die Möglichkeiten zu agieren und unterstützen sie die drei Persönlichen Beauftragten in der Weise die sie brauchen, um ihre Arbeit besser und effektiver einsetzen zu können, als das bislang der Fall gewesen ist. Dies wünsche ich mir mit dem Blick auf den kommenden OSZE-Vorsitzenden.

Nun möchte ich einige praktische Probleme ansprechen. Ich glaube die Instrumente Law Enforcement und Education sind auf einem guten Weg. Das darf man so sagen, wobei wir alle wissen, dass das, was derzeit geschieht, noch längst nicht ausreicht. Aber der Rahmen ist recht gut entwickelt. Es kommt jetzt darauf an, dass die Verpflichtungen, die die Mitgliedsstaaten eingegangen sind und was jetzt, unter deutlicher Unterstützung und Mitarbeit von ODIHR erarbeitet worden ist, in den Mitgliedsstaaten adäquat umgesetzt werden muss. Unsere Aufgabe als Persönliche Beauftragte besteht darin mitzuhelfen, diesen Implementierungsprozess voran zu bringen. Das Jahr 2006 sollte das Jahr sein, dies voran zu treiben. Ich muss offen sagen, dass es nur Unvollkommenes zu berichten gibt. Es gibt manche Länder, die sehr gut arbeiten, es gibt eine große Anzahl an Ländern, die zurückhaltend sind und es gibt leider auch eine zu große Zahl von Ländern, die gar nichts tun. Da komme ich auf ein grundsätzliches Problem, welches gerade bei dem Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus wichtig ist. Dies wurde heute und gestern offensichtlich

³⁹ Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism; Member of the German Bundestag (MdB)

Nach meiner Meinung liegt das Problem nicht auf der Ebene der politischen Führer. Diese haben klar und überzeugend gesprochen. Das Problem liegt auf anderen Ebenen. Einerseits bei der Umsetzung und Durchsetzung des politischen Willens bis in die einzelnen Behördenstrukturen, soweit es die staatliche Ebene anbetrifft. Das Zweite ist eine Sorge die ich habe, wenn wir nämlich diese Form des Kampfes gegen den Antisemitismus verstaatlichen oder nur auf eine rhetorische Ebene heben. Was viel, viel wichtiger ist, und das ist heute und gestern mehrfach deutlich geworden, ist die Zivilgesellschaft. Wir müssen mit den aktiven Gruppen, die es in den Gesellschaften gibt, den Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus gemeinsam so führen, dass wir die Mitte der Gesellschaft gewinnen. Und ich sehe manche Tendenzen die deutlich machen, dass gerade Teile der Gesellschaft verloren gehen, ob das im Sport, in der Kultur oder an den Universitäten der Fall ist. Ich sehe leider Tendenzen zu einem wieder erstarken von antisemitischen Äußerungen und manchmal sogar mehr als nur Äußerungen. Das bedeutet, dass wir diesen Kampf deutlich stärker führen müssen.

Aus alldem ergibt sich ein neues Bild für die Aufgaben, die wir zu bewältigen haben. Ich möchte gerne auf folgenden Gebieten im nächsten Jahr Akzente setzen. Dies werde ich dann auch dem Vorsitzenden der OSZE vorschlagen.

Das Erste ist die akademische Welt. Ich könnte mir gut vorstellen, dass es möglich wäre einen regionalen mit einem sektoralen Aspekt zu verbinden. Ich möchte insbesondere die westeuropäische Entwicklung aufgreifen, unabhängig davon, dass in der Ukraine oder anderswo östlich von Wien Probleme ebenfalls klar auf der Hand liegen. Aber wir müssen im Westen Europas diese bestehenden Tendenzen jetzt bekämpfen, weil sie jetzt am besten bekämpft werden können. Momentan befinden sie sich in einem frühen Stadium. Jetzt ist die beste Zeit diesen Kampf voll aufzunehmen, sei es in Deutschland, in Frankreich, Großbritannien oder den Niederlanden. Das sind die Länder, in denen wir eine solche schlimme Entwicklung erkennen. Ich würde darum bitten, dass der OSZE-Vorsitzende akzeptiert, dass hier ein ganz deutlicher Akzent gesetzt werden sollte.

Ich möchte ein Zweites sagen. Erneut sollen regionale und sektorale Aspekte verknüpft werden. Das ist alles, was mit Medien zu tun hat. Wir sehen in manchen Ländern in Südeuropa, besonders in Griechenland, eine sehr deutlich ausgeprägte antisemitische Haltung. Ich könnte mir gut vorstellen, dass dieses Problem sektoral und zugleich regional aufgenommen wird. Dies wäre ein weiterer Punkt, den ich gerne versuchen möchte im nächsten Jahr voran zu bringen. Da hätte ich gleich auch einen praktischen Vorschlag. Miklos Haraszti ist der Beauftragte der OSZE für die Freiheit der Medien. Ich könnte mir gut vorstellen, dass wir so etwas wie einen ethischen Kodex entwickeln, den Journalisten erarbeiten, nicht wir von der staatlichen oder der parlamentarischen Ebene. Einen Eingriff in die journalistische Freiheit möchten wir natürlich nicht. Aber es gibt in manchen Ländern, ob das Großbritannien, Deutschland oder andere Länder sind, von Journalisten autonom entwickelte Grundsätze, wie sie ihre journalistische Freiheit nutzen und einsetzen. Ich könnte mir gut vorstellen, dass beispielsweise Anne Applebaum, Timothy Garton Ash, Jorge Semprún, André Glucksmann und Journalisten und Publizisten aus Osteuropa eingeladen werden, um im gemeinsamen Gespräch einen autonomen und von Journalisten selbst verantworteten Kodex erarbeiten, wie Konflikte in Medien dargestellt werden können. Denn wir haben heute auch sehr häufig gesehen, dass die Art und Weise wie Medien berichten einen erheblichen Einfluss auf Sentiments, Ressentiments, Wiederkehr und auf Verstärken von antisemitischen Vorurteilen haben können.

Ich möchte einen dritten Punkt nennen. Das hat etwas mit Ländern zu tun. Ich glaube, dass einige Länder etwas genauer in das Blickfeld genommen werden müssen. Ich muss mich wiederholen und fange mit dem Land an, in dem es am schwierigsten ist. Russland muss etwas genauer angeschaut werden und ich weiß nicht, ob Russland nach dem Ministerrat in Brüssel bereit ist, sich etwas stärker zu öffnen. Ich hoffe das sehr, da es dort in der Tat einige

Entwicklungslinien gibt, die beängstigend sind, und die genauer in den Blick genommen werden müssen. Ich rede nicht von Präsident Putin, im Gegenteil, er hat seine Meinung sehr klar und deutlich geäußert.

Auch um eine Balance herzustellen meine ich, dass es notwendig ist zum Beispiel den Fall Deutschland genau unter die Lupe zu nehmen. Ich verweise auf die Studie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, die jetzt gerade deutlich gemacht hat, dass hier ein wachsendes Problem zu erkennen ist. Und das ist gerade, was Deutschland anbetrifft, sehr erschreckend. Hier ist der Holocaust erfunden worden, hier wurde er industriell realisiert und sollte bis zum schrecklichen Ende der Vernichtung aller Juden weitergeführt werden.

Ich könnte mir vorstellen, dass wir uns dann noch zwei andere Regionen etwas genauer anschauen sollten, beispielsweise Belgien und die Niederlande oder Litauen und den baltischen Raum.

Den letzten Punkt den Andy Baker genannt hat, würde ich sehr gerne aufnehmen. Der spanische Außenminister Moratinos hat in Sharm-el-Sheik gesagt, dass es eine besondere Konferenz zum Thema „Kampf gegen Islamophobie“ geben soll. Ich unterstütze und unterstreiche das, das ist sinnvoll und notwendig. Ich würde dann darum bitten, dass Spanien ein Land Arabiens bittet, mit der OSZE eine Veranstaltung über unser Thema durchzuführen. Gerade weil Marokko ein positives Beispiel im Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus ist, könnte es zeigen, wie in der europäischen Nachbarregion Erfolge erzielt werden können. Viele Akteure unserer direkten Nachbarn blicken sehnsüchtig in die OSZE und engagieren sich dafür, die Lage der Menschenrechte zu verbessern.

So könnten wir im Jahre 2007 neue Akzente setzen und ich würde herzlich darum bitten, dass ich mich auf Ihre Unterstützung verlassen kann. Die Nichtregierungsorganisationen und die Zivilgesellschaften sind die entscheidenden Faktoren im Kampf gegen Intoleranz, Antisemitismus und andere Formen der Xenophobie. Sie sind es am Ende, die unterstützt von Regierungen und Parlamenten die Kraft aufbringen müssen, dass diese Übel aus den Gesellschaften verschwinden. Wenn die Zivilgesellschaften nicht diese Kraft aufbringen, dann könnten wir diesen Kampf verlieren und nur mit Ihnen gemeinsam werden wir diesen Kampf gewinnen!

Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit und für diese sehr gewinnbringende Konferenz.

11. Participants of the Conference

Aderhold, Eltje

German Bundestag, Germany

Ahlefeldt, Johannes

German Bundestag, Germany

Arrabal Villalobos, Antonio

Ministry of Interior, Department of International Police Cooperation, Spain

Azay, Quliyev

MP, Member of the OSCE-PA, Azerbaijan

Bachner, Henrik

Living History Forum, Sweden

Baker, Andrew

American Jewish Committee (AJC), Director, Florida/USA

Barnett, Doris

MP, Member of the OSCE-PA, Berlin/Germany

Beatrice, Gelsomina

German Bundestag, Germany

Beck, Marieluise

MP, Member of the OSCE-PA, Berlin/Germany

Beck, Volker

MP, Berlin/Germany

Behrensen, Arne

Alliance against Antisemitism

Benz, Angelika

Office of MP Weisskirchen, German Bundestag, Germany

Berger, Deidre

American Jewish Committee (AJC), Berlin/Germany

Biserko, Sonja

Helsinki Committee, Serbia

Brehmer, Jörg

Office of MP Link, German Bundestag, Germany

Bronkhorst, Suzette

Magenta Foundation, Netherlands

Brumlik, Micha

University Frankfurt, Frankfurt/Germany

Brüning, Monika

MP, Member of the OSCE-PA, Berlin/Germany

Brynolf, Hampus

Living History Forum, Sweden

Camus, Jean-Yves

France Institute for International and Strategic Relations
Assistant of the magazine Actualité juive, France

Chebli, Sawsan

Office of MP Jung, German Bundestag, Germany

Chevalier, Pierre

Senator; Special envoy of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE , Belgien

Chisholm, Barbara

Interpreter

Chlenov, Michael

Federation of Jewish Organizations, Russia

Corbi, Henar

Ministry of Justice, Department for Religious Affairs, Spain

de Kerchove, Francois

Belgian Embassy Berlin, Belgium

Dolinsky, Eduard

Jewish Community, Ukraine

Edathy, Sebastian

MP, Chairman of the Committee of Interior Affairs, Berlin/Germany

Eisens, Ronald

Magenta Foundation, Netherlands

Faber, Bernie M.

Canadian Jewish Congress, Canada

Ferguson, Helen

Interpreter

Flumenbaum, Claudia

Interpreter

Franklin, Shai A.

Word Jewish Congress, USA

Friedman, David

Anti-Defamation-League Regional Director, Washington DC/USA

Fusfield, Eric

B'nai B'rith International, USA

Gadirova, Ateshi

Cultural Institute, Azerbaijan

Geleyn, Mark

Ambassador Belgian Embassy Berlin, Belgium

Giebel, Anne

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Warsaw/Poland

Giesen, Christiane

Interpreter

Goldenberg, Paul

National Public Safety Strategy Group Chief Executive Director, Washington DC/USA

Grätz, Petra

Office of the German Delegation to the OSCE, German Bundestag, Germany

Gringuz, Michael

Congress of National Communities of Ukraine, Germany

Großruck, Wolfgang

MP; Member of the OSCE-PA, Austria

Haller, Benedikt

Ambassador, Special Envoy for Relations with the Jewish Communities and for Antisemitism Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany

Hanke-Giesers, Britta

Office of the German Delegation to the OSCE, German Bundestag, Germany

Hart, Prof. Sonat

World Jewish Congress, Humboldt University Berlin, Germany

Hartmann, Michael**Heiden, Lisa**

World Jewish Congress, USA

Heuberger, Georg

Claims Conference

Hildebrandt, Axel

Office of MP Pau, German Bundestag, Germany

Hirsh, David

University of London, Founder of “Engage”

Huntzinger, Jacques

Ambassador, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris/France

Immel, Inga

Office of the German Delegation to the OSCE, German Bundestag, Germany

Jung, Johannes

MP, Berlin/Germany

Kennedy, Christian

Department of State, USA

Knobloch, Charlotte

Central Council of the Jews, President, Germany

Koffler, Adam

World Jewish Congress, USA

Konstantinis, Mosis

MP; Member of the OSCE-PA, Central Board of Jewish Communities, Greece

Kovacs, Dr. Andras

Central European University and the Hungarian, Academy of Sciences, Hungary

Kozlowski, Maciej

Mission to the OSCE, Poland

Kramer, Stephan

Central Council of the Jews, General Secretary, Germany

Krings, Günter

MP, Berlin/Germany

LeGendre, Paul

Human Rights First, USA

Liepina, Aiga

Latvia

Likhachev, Vyacheslav

Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, Russia

Link, Michael

MP, Member of the OSCE-PA, Berlin/Germany

Lorek, Andreas

Office of MP Weisskirchen, German Bundestag, Germany

MacShane, Dr. Dennis

MP (Great Britain), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, London/United Kingdom

Makeiev, Oleksii

Ukrainian Embassy in Berlin, Ukraine

Mayer, Louise

Interpreter

Meyer, Dr. Kathrin

Advisor on Antisemitism Issues Tolerance and Non-Discrimination (ODIHR), Poland

Michalowski, Dr. Stanislaw

Councillor in the Political department of the Polish Embassy in Berlin, Poland

Miller, Jonathan

Israelian Embassy in Berlin, Israel

Mock, Karen

Hate Crimes Community Working Group, Canada

Mykhalehlik, Natalia

Counsellor of the Ukrainian Parliament, Ukraine

Nakian, Elizabeth

Department of State, USA

Offergeld, Philipp

Office of MP Pflug, German Bundestag, Germany

Pallade, Dr. Yves

American Jewish Committee (AJC), Berlin/Germany

Pankowski, Rafal

Never Again Association, Poland

Papiashvili, Lali

MP; Member of the OSCE-PA, Georgia

Parnigoni, Rudolf

MP, Chairman of the Committee of Interior Affairs, Austria

Pau, Petra

MP, Berlin/Germany

Peklushenko, Oleksandr

MP, Ukraine

Petkovic, Danijela

Police Academy Instructor of Criminal Law Police Academy, Zagreb/Croatia

Pfeiffer, Sibylle

MP, Member of the OSCE-PA, Berlin/Germany

Pflug, Johannes

MP, Berlin/Germany

Podolsky, Anatoly

Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, Ukraine

Polak, Karen

Anne Frank House, Amsterdam/Niederlande

Ptushko, Elisabeth

Interpreter

Qualmann, Maren

American Jewish Committee (AJC), Berlin/Germany

Raidel, Hans

MP, Member of the OSCE-PA, Berlin/Germany

Rakenius, Gerhard

German Bundestag, Germany

Repellin-Holzgreve, Annick

Interpreter

Rickman, Greg

Special Envoy for Monitoring and Combating Antisemitism, USA

Ripperger, Sabine

Deutsche Welle, Berlin/Germany

Rozanes, Shani

World Jewish Congress

Rusch, Ute

Office of MP Link, German Bundestag, Germany

Salberg, Michael

Anti Defamation League (ADL). USA

Sálonmon, Ana

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Special Ambassador, Spain

Schroer, Annette

Interpreter

Small, Dr. Charles A.

Director, Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism, New Heaven/USA

Spektor, Roman

Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, Russia

Staehelin, Philipp

MP; Member of the OSCE-PA, Switzerland

Stone, Danny

World Jewish Congress

Teichtal, Rabbiner

Chabad Lubawitsch, Berlin/Germany

Thaddeus, Kontek

Mission to the OSCE, USA

Thierse, Dr. Wolfgang

MP, Head of the German Delegation of the OSCE-PA
Vice-President of the German Bundestag, Berlin/Germany

Van Emden, Gidon

A Jewish Contribution to an incl. Europe, Brussels/Belgium

Versmessen, Bert

Belgian Embassy, Belgium

Way, Ingo

Jüdische Allgemeine Zeitung

Webman, Dr. Esther

Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv/Israel

Weiland, Anna

German Bundestag, Germany

Weisskirchen, Prof. Gert

Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism; MP; Member of the German OSCE-PA Delegation, Berlin/Germany

Weitemeyer, Sebastian

Interpreter

Weitzman, Mark

Simon Wiesenthal Center, Director Task Force against Hate and Terrorism, Los Angeles/USA

Weßnigk, Daniel

Office of MP Weisskirchen, German Bundestag, Germany

Wetzel, Dr. Juliane

Center for Antisemitism Research of the TU Berlin, Berlin/Germany

Whine, Michael

Community Security Trust, Director, London/UK

Wiegel, Gert

Office of MP Pau, German Bundestag, Germany

Wilpert, Czarina

Eine Welt der Vielfalt, Berlin/Germany

Würzburg, Martina

Interpreter

Wüst, Philip

Office of the German Delegation to the OSCE, German Bundestag, Germany

Yalcintas, Nevzat

MP; Member of the OSCE-PA, Turkey

Zemskova, Polina

Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, Russia

Zissels, Josef

Congress of National Communities, Ukraine