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**STATEMENT BY
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY
SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL, AT THE 1099th PLENARY MEETING OF
THE OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

26 February 2025

**Agenda item: Security Dialogue
Subject: Responsible military use of new and emerging technologies**

Mr. Chairperson,

We note the efforts of the Spanish Chairmanship in organizing a Security Dialogue on new and emerging technologies in the military domain. We are grateful to the keynote speakers for their presentations.

In our view, the prospect of considering the very complex issue of new military technologies within the politico-military dimension of the OSCE's activities has absolutely no relevance for the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). It is already being discussed in the relevant inclusive international platforms – in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) established by the States Parties to the Inhumane Weapons Convention (CCW), and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). Given the lack of appropriate expertise, discussion within the OSCE is counterproductive. It would not contribute to the achievement of the stated objectives in the GGE on LAWS and the UNDC, but would rather undermine their activities.

Taking into account the title of the topic submitted for consideration, we see a danger that the launching of this discussion at the FSC would be used by certain European countries solely to impose their initiative to develop some kind of principles for the responsible military use of new technologies and thus attempt to predetermine the direction of the work in Geneva. We therefore believe that a one-off consideration by the FSC of this topic for “enlightenment” purposes is sufficient, and further discussion is unnecessary. Possible attempts at putting it back on the FSC agenda will have no chance of gaining consensus. We should therefore focus here on the urgent core issues that the Heads of State or Government in the OSCE area have tasked us to deal with in the Forum.

At the same time, we should like to take this opportunity to set out the Russian Federation's principled approach to the topic of this meeting.

We are forced to state that the issue of weapons systems using artificial intelligence (AI) technology, in particular LAWS, is still unresolved and extremely controversial. This is evidenced by the absence of working models for LAWS, the uncertainty about the basic characteristics and conceptual framework, and the significant difference in the positions of States, as clearly demonstrated by the discussion at the session of the GGE on LAWS in March 2024.

The Russian Federation is against the fixing of any so-called “concept of the responsible use of AI technologies” as the only approach to the future possible regulation of the military use of AI. We also consider it inappropriate to try to predetermine the outcome of the discussion of AI issues, which in the future could include the development of relevant international treaties or soft-law instruments based on concepts other than the famous “responsible behaviour”. In that context, we take a negative view of the Declaration on Maintaining Human Control in AI-Enabled Weapon Systems announced at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit (Paris, 10 and 11 February this year), which, given its content, extremely limited composition and one-sided geographical representation of participants, is divisive and does not contribute to uniting efforts in this area, and also creates a negative basis for the forthcoming session of the GGE on LAWS in March this year.

It is our belief that special attention at this stage should be paid to the development of a unified definition of AI weapons systems to ensure a common understanding of their nature and a clearer idea of future work perspectives. Suitable weapons systems can offer far greater efficiency than human operators in accomplishing tasks and can reduce the likelihood of errors and miscalculations. Consequently, any discussion should be balanced and take into account both the possible disadvantages and advantages of this category of weapons.

We assume that the norms of international law, including international humanitarian law, apply in full to all weapons systems, including autonomous ones, and do not need to be adapted to take into account the specificities of such weapons systems. We see no compelling reasons at present for imposing any new restrictions and prohibitions on autonomous weapons systems, for updating or adapting international humanitarian law in relation to such means, or for strengthening the human rights component in this context. The main thing is to guarantee that human control over AI weapons systems is maintained so as to ensure the observance of the norms and principles of international law. Specific forms and methods of control should be left to the discretion of States.

For our part, we are ready to continue our active participation in the consideration of modalities for applying existing norms of international humanitarian law to LAWS within the framework of the relevant GGE on the CCW platform. We believe that concerns about LAWS can best be allayed by ensuring the faithful and full implementation of existing international law. We note that the new mandate of the GGE was endorsed by the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW (Geneva, 15–17 November 2023) until 2026. We trust that the Group will be able to achieve substantive results and agree on conclusions and recommendations to be presented at the Seventh CCW Review Conference next year, with account taken of the views of all High Contracting Parties.

Mr. Chairperson,

I should like to make some comments on the statements by a number of participating States regarding the use of the latest weapons systems during the conduct of the special military operation. The accusations made regarding Russia’s “irresponsible” use of advanced military technologies are either completely unfounded or based on fabricated pseudo-evidence inconsistent with elementary laws of logic and physics. They have been exposed on numerous occasions, including in this room. The Russian

Federation uses the relevant weapons systems in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, and with the understandings established at the international level.

The Kyiv regime, with the collective West's support, uses them systematically against the civilian population and civilian infrastructure. It is not possible to pass off drone strikes that kill civilians as unintentional incidents or collateral damage. The operators of such unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can see the targets clearly on high-resolution monitors and understand perfectly well who is being killed. In the first half of 2024 alone, 98 civilians, including seven children, were killed in such attacks. At least 500 civilians were injured. This statistic is regrettably continuing to increase.

Numerous UAV strikes on the Zaporizhzhia and Kursk nuclear power plants also provide irrefutable evidence of the terrorist warfare conducted by the Ukrainian armed forces. We would not be surprised if all this were happening at the instigation of Western countries, which provide the Kyiv regime with satellite data.

International energy infrastructure facilities are also subject to strikes by Ukrainian UAVs. Thus, on 17 February, the Ukrainian armed forces carried out an air raid on the Kropotkinskaya oil-pumping station, part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, whose largest shareholders, apart from Kazakh companies, are oil and gas corporations from the United States of America and Western Europe. Obviously, the major suppliers of energy resources, mainly our Kazakh friends, but also their counterparts in the West, will suffer losses as a result of the damage. In that regard, we call upon the authorities in Washington and the European States concerned to exert the necessary influence on the Kyiv regime, which poses a real threat to the uninterrupted operation of the international transport and energy infrastructure.

The only possible conclusion that can be drawn from this situation is that the Kyiv regime's terrorist use of UAVs is a deliberate policy on the part of the Ukrainian State. What else can you call targeting civilians, including children, or UAV strikes against sensitive and internationally important targets with full understanding of one's actions and their consequences? It is obvious that the Ukrainian authorities have unleashed a large-scale terrorist war, which is actively supported by many NATO and EU member States. The use of terrorist methods is absolutely unacceptable, and we shall continue to vigorously oppose them.

Thank you for your attention.