FSC.MDS/14/06
14 February 2006

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Secretariat

ENGLISH only

Conference Services

Please find attached the **introductory remarks** by **Amb. Pierre Champenois**, Belgian Chairmanship, Chairperson of the Military Doctrine Seminar, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, delivered at the Opening Session of the OSCE Seminar on Military Doctrine, Vienna, 14 - 15 February 2006.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AT THE SEMINAR ON MILITARY DOCTRINE VIENNA 14-15 JANUARY

It is an honour and a great pleasure for me to welcome you here in Vienna in the name of the Belgian CIO, at the start of this OSCE Seminar on Military Doctrine. It is indeed an important event, if only because the last such seminar dates back to five years ago and in view of the fact that, during this long interlude, there was practically no follow-up on the subject. To say the least, doctrinal issues did not figure prominently on the agenda of OSCE in general and of the FSC in particular. This inaction was due, I think, less to a lack of interest on the part of the military establishment than to a growing political dissatisfaction at the manner in which security issues were being handled or even neglected in the OSCE in general. Moreover, the ongoing controversy around the still pending entry into force of the revised CFE Treaty casts a shadow on the entire security dialogue. Indeed this situation cannot go on much longer without undermining an instrument that is rightly considered as the bedrock of military stability in the OSCE area. Arms control and confidence building, whose heydays seem sometime to be behind us, are still very much part of the good things in European security that we take for granted but also of the answers to the extraordinary challenges we all still face.

As you know, revitalizing the work of the security basket stands high on the CiO's agenda. It is in this perspective that we put great hope in this seminar. The very

fact that it is being held, after all these years, is in itself a clear indication that there is a renewed awareness on the part of all of us that (1) irrespective of the great achievements of the last fifteen years, security is still very much an issue in, and around the OSCE area, and (2) that the pervasive and ill-defined nature of emerging threats – one can rightly speak of multiple vulnerabilities - calls for a new doctrinal approach based on the need for a flexible, multidimensional, cooperative, transparent as well as integrated approach.

The once clear distinction between civilian and military aspects of security has long been blurred. The question is not any more to define generic threats - we are now in broad agreement on that - but to devise the most appropriate and most effective response or, more accurately, combination of responses. The paradox is that the European environment is now safer from a strictly military point of view, but less predictable, and therefore potentially less stable from a security point of view. This said, our objective today should not be to define and even less to agree on a set of doctrinal postures as we used to do, in former days, that is each of us within our respective alliances, nor should we think of a kind of "one size fit all" doctrine. The world, and the OSCE for that matter, is much too complex. Nor is it sufficient to say that we should prepare for all contingencies, from high intensity conflict, to police operation or to purely civilian or humanitarian actions, with, of course, due attention paid to prevention of conflicts and peace keeping which do already put a heavy burden on our armed forces today and will do so for the foreseeable future. Scattering our resources over every conceivable goal would probably be the best way to waste scarce money for a doubtful result.

What we usefully could do is to identify a number of relevant parameters whose adoption for planning purposes would facilitate the launching of cooperative and timely responses when and where necessary, irrespective of the modalities of a possible intervention or of the institutional framework in which such an action could be undertaken. The framework is, according to me, rather secondary. By such parameters, I mean the need for intelligence sharing, for multiple and multidisciplinary response, for interoperability and transparency, for police as well as judicial cooperation, for combining civilian and military instruments, all of which are key conditions for tailoring national capabilities, not just military forces, according to the requirements of international cooperation in an OSCE framework, or elsewhere.

I don't think that, in view of the inherently global nature of the strategic environment, one can speak of a doctrine designed specifically for or applicable in the OSCE area. Moreover OSCE is not a defense organisation. But there is merit in adopting a conceptual framework to guide participating states, be they members of an alliance or not, as they adapt their security policies and defense postures to the challenges of modern times. What we need is a set of references.

Technological change and its impact on doctrine is also an important topic. Doctrines are indeed, to a growing extent, technology driven, and technologies themselves are now, more than often, dual-use. This does not mean that technology is the answer to all problems. It is at best part of the solution when it

does not become itself part of the problem especially when critical technologies are readily available on a commercial basis. Here again the main points seem to be access, both from the contradictory point of view of availability and non-proliferation, transparency and interoperability, not to mention cost which, in practical terms, also means technology sharing.

All of theses questions are on your agenda for the next two days. I hope that the debate will be productive and that it will open the way for a better mutual understanding of what we are together facing up to and of how we could jointly meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.