



AUSTRIAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

## **P R O C E E D I N G S**

### **CONFERENCE**

**To commemorate the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the  
Helsinki Final Act**

## **DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY**

**and the**

## **EVOLVING ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

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**Austrian Center for International Studies**

**in cooperation with the**

**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**



## FOREWORD

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, the Austrian Center for International Studies, in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held a conference on “Democracy and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and the Evolving Role of Regional Organizations” on 21-22 April 2005 in the Vienna Hofburg.

ACIS wishes to express its gratitude to the OSCE for the cooperation and support which made this conference, the inaugural event of ACIS, possible.

For their valuable contributions to this conference, ACIS and the OSCE wish to thank both the speakers and other participants, who included Heads of the Permanent Delegations to the OSCE, of the OSCE Partners for Cooperation, and of the EU Delegation to the International Organizations in Vienna, as well as widely recognized experts from Europe and the U.S.A. It was thought important and appropriate on the occasion of this 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary to look at, among other things, the key role played by the Helsinki Final Act in ushering in the post-cold war era, and the important achievements and challenges of the OSCE since then.

The conference presentations in these proceedings provide an in-depth assessment of, *inter alia*: the strengths of and challenges to democratic systems, including the historical implications and impacts of ‘overstretch’; the essential role and potential of regional multilateral organizations such as the OSCE and EU in providing security and stability as well as in fostering democratization and democratic processes; challenges now facing the OSCE; and understanding and managing regional organizations, democratic and security systems as evolving complex systems. The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect those of ACIS or the OSCE.

This is a period of transition for many regional and international organizations and the OSCE is no exception. The new environment in which they must function presents new issues to be dealt with - and also new opportunities. While maintaining the agreed principles upon which it was founded, the OSCE has to deal with criticisms which could affect its mission and direction. Its future effectiveness and success will depend critically on the political will of its participating states as well as on increased resources.

A key question for any multilateral organization is: what can and does the organization do which individual countries or another grouping of countries could not do, or do effectively? The OSCE has developed, on a cooperative basis, capabilities focussing on enhancing security, democracy and human rights in and for its participating states, which include not only countries in Europe and North America but also in Central Asia. This, and its activities on the ground, have given it a unique range of institutional capabilities and experience which no other organization now has. These should be strengthened and made more transparent and objective, while seeking a balance among its mandated activities to promote democracy, security and development.

Regional organizations, as well as democratic and security systems, are complex evolving systems, which are characterized *inter alia* by unpredictability and surprise, and which must continuously respond to new challenges arising both from within these systems and from their environments. This requires enhancing capabilities for cooperation, adaptation, innovation, communication, risk anticipation/assessment, and managing change, which, at a time when there can be no certainty of outcomes, nevertheless provides a spectrum of options and

readiness for a 'certainty of response' needed to deal with actual and potential threats and instabilities on a timely basis. The OSCE and EU have been and are on the forefront of developing and supporting such capabilities. Further, in dealing with crises, conflicts and instabilities, options can be developed on a cooperative basis, within these organizations, which would not be available unilaterally. All of this places new requirements on the leadership and management of such organizations and systems.

The experience of the OSCE could be relevant and adapted to other regions, taking into account their own specific conditions and requirements concerning multilateral cooperation and arrangements.

Important ideas, issues and directions have been identified and discussed during this conference. ACIS projects will be addressing, in cooperation with other organizations, these and related topics dealing with challenges to political, security and economic systems and regional organizations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Its projects also aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice, ideas and action, *inter alia* through development and discussion of innovative approaches for analysis, policies and practices.

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# **MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN A TIME OF TRANSITION**

**Jan Kubis**

**Secretary General<sup>1</sup>  
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**

It is a pleasure for me to take part in this inaugural meeting of the Austrian Center for International Studies. The topic of this meeting is both important and timely.

## **DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY IN AN EVOLVING EUROPE**

Lately, there has been a great deal of focus on the OSCE budget, scales and other rather technical issues. But what lies behind this is a question of democracy and security in an evolving Europe. I am glad that we have an opportunity here to discuss these critical issues in an informal way, with the benefit of outside experts.

This is the first in a series of meetings that will take place this year on the occasion of the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Through such discussions, we will be able to take some time out from our busy schedules, to reflect on the important contribution of the OSCE to fostering security and cooperation in Europe, and look ahead to where the organization is going at a time of change.

Since Helsinki, there has been an inseparable link between security and democracy. The famous Decalogue includes principles concerning sovereignty, non-use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention in internal affairs as well as principles on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no hierarchy of principles, and they are all inter-linked. As the Act says, “All the principles. . . are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted, taking into account the others”.

The Helsinki Final Act was the result of a compromise between different priorities – between those who wanted to put a strong emphasis on security, and those who sought a stronger emphasis on democracy. A compromise was found – one which was instrumental in uniting a divided continent during the Cold War.

The link between security and democracy was strongly forged after the collapse of communism. Through the Copenhagen Document, the Moscow Document and the Charter of Paris, OSCE leaders pledged that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy, and the rule of law are prerequisites for setting up a lasting order of peace, security, justice and cooperation in Europe. As heads of state and government said in the Charter of Paris, “friendly relations among us will benefit from the consolidation of democracy and improved security”.

## **HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY**

The CSCE and then the OSCE in the 1990s was instrumental in helping states to consolidate their democratic processes, particularly those states in post-Communist transition. This included a high degree of intrusiveness. This was legitimate. It was based on the declaration made by CSCE Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1991 that – and I quote – “commitments undertaken in

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<sup>1</sup> Delivered by Mr. Didier Fau, Director, Office of the Secretary General

the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States, and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned”.

The idea was that human rights and security are inseparable. How a state treats its people is of collective concern. It has implications on that state’s standing as a member of a community based on respecting common commitments.

The human dimension is one of three dimensions of the organization, together with the political-military and economic and environmental areas. Commitments in all three areas are treated jointly based on the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security.

The OSCE’s approach enabled the establishment of OSCE missions, election monitoring, and institutions with strong mandates such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities. But this intrusiveness was not to be abused. The OSCE is a cooperative security organization.

## **CHALLENGES FOR THE OSCE**

Nevertheless, we have heard views which suggest that the relationship between security and democracy has become too one-sided.

So do we all still share the same principles? I believe so. But there is – as there was at Helsinki and at other times in the OSCE’s thirty year history – a significant divergence of views among some major states about how those principles should be seen in relation to each other. The asymmetrical balance of priorities among states – which has been there since the beginning – is now more evident than it has been for a while.

I think that nobody would refute the pledge made at the Paris Summit in 1990 to – and I quote – “undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations”. In other words, all states have signed up to democratization. The question is how to get there, and how quickly.

If we accept that there can be no lasting security without democracy, states need to help each other democratize through peer review. Here, organizations such as the OSCE – with its standards, political bodies, institutions and field missions – can be helpful.

But help should come in digestible doses and, ideally, with the understanding of the state concerned. While the OSCE creates the environment for legitimate intrusiveness in terms of promoting democracy, it will lose credibility if it is seen as a vehicle for promoting other interests. It must, therefore, carefully guard its transparent and cooperative approach.

One could also ask: is too much democracy, all at once, a potential catalyst for insecurity? In states with weak civic structures and civil society, with grave problems, such as weak governance or tensions based on lack of economic and social security, can the rapid onset of democratic change lead to chaos? The lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are instructive. It is no accident that one of the current UN’s highest priorities is to improve its capacity in peace-building.

## **MANAGING CHANGE**

Where I believe that the international community can play a more active role is in the process of managing change. As in 1989/90, change is happening at such a pace that we – and particularly the parties involved – find hard to handle.

Democracy is irrepressible. If any proof were needed, one has to only consider recent developments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

But the process of change can generate instability. We all have seen first hand that an abrupt process of transition – as euphoric as it may be – can also be rather fragile.

Bearing that in mind, the international community should encourage governments with weak democracies to realize their self-interest in living up to their commitments – before resistance to democratic change leads to dramatic developments. If that fails and there is rapid change, the international community should assist in the process of transition to ensure that the process is legitimate, representative, sustainable and based on the rule of law and good governance. The decisions are up to the people. But in order for these decisions to bear fruit, the advice and assistance of the international community may be required. And here, as we are doing in Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE should be prepared to help.

But let us not look at this through rose-colored glasses. Democracy – even through the change of regimes – does not take root overnight. In Western Europe we had centuries to develop our democratic systems, which still remain imperfect.

For example, democracy in Western Europe is currently being challenged in its attempt to cope with new threats to security. How does one accommodate minority rights and the desire for self-government without undermining states? How should increasing challenges of intolerance be dealt with? Here, striking the balance between democracy and security is very delicate.

So too is the challenge of defending civil liberties and human rights while trying to combat terrorism. This is an issue that the OSCE is engaged in, and is a major challenge for all OSCE states today.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

To conclude, the relationship between security, democracy and good governance has defined the OSCE for the past thirty years. It remains the basis of the constructive tension that drives its work. There is a strong bond between the two, but one will never find a perfect balance.

We must simply be resolute in defending common standards, in understanding the challenges of democratization, in sensitivity to different perceptions of security threats, and be prepared to assist to states when possible. In this way, the OSCE can continue to play an important role in promoting democracy, stability and security.

Thank you for your attention. I wish you a stimulating discussion and to you, Dr. Mautner-Markhof, all the best in the further development of the Austrian Center for International Studies.



# **RUSSIA AND THE OSCE IN THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT**

**N. Narochnitskaia<sup>1</sup>**

**Vice Chairman, Committee on International Affairs  
State Duma of the Russian Federation**

## **THE “GREAT GAME” IN THE 21st CENTURY**

A meaningful analysis of the geopolitical, legal-international and ideological aspects of the new political age can be obtained solely outside the clichés of globalization doctrine. Demagogic deliberations about the final removal of the remaining vestiges of totalitarianism, replaced by victorious democracy, smack too much of the overused Marxist thesis about "transfer from capitalism to communism being the main content of our age." The world is being divided once more before our eyes. The pressure against noncommunist Russia tripled compared to the one exercised against the communist USSR

The whole of Eurasia is being restructured in tune with the painfully familiar geopolitical and spiritual ideas of the Old World's imperial past. By joining NATO, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are parting from alien Russia and coming back to Latin Europe, not to the "post-Habsburg" expanse, however, but to the Atlantic aegis whose purpose is to control not only Russia but Europe's future. It is not at all amazing that Catholic Poland sympathizes with the Chechen bandits, cutting Christian heads. The Polish idol, Adam Mickiewicz, perished somewhere in Constantinople, where he went "to knock together a Polish Cossack legion" to join "civilized" Turkey against "barbarian" Russia in the Crimean War.

In fact, the Baltic-Black Sea salient (a project dating back to the 16th century) is again designed to block Russia from the Baltic and the Black Seas. Kosovo today, as 100 years ago, is the only land military route to Thessalonica, connecting Western Europe with the Straits area. When the late Pope John Paul II called the Ukrainians the only descendants of St. Vladimir and persistently set up Catholic dioceses in Russia, he seemed to act as an heir to Pope Urban VII, who responded to the Union of Brest of 1596 with: "Oh, my Rusins! I hope to reach out to the East through you!"

Finally, the triumphant Anglo-Saxons entering Kabul and Mesopotamia as “peacemakers” have just realized the boldest dreams of Lord Disraeli and Lord Palmerston. And Lord Judd, a comic imitator of the latter, is setting up so-called Chechen committees at the Council of Europe to emulate his idol who set up Circassian committees at the Paris Congress of 1856.

Control over natural resources and geostrategic and naval routes continues to be the main reason why the world is carved up and wars are waged. Russia is being gradually pushed to the Eurasian northeast, away from the major accesses (the Mediterranean-Black Sea-Caspian region) to major natural resources. This area is the north boundary of the World Energy Ellipse that includes the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran, the Persian Gulf, northern Iran, the Russian Northern Caucasus, and Afghanistan.

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The southern salient begins in the Mediterranean and the Straits. It is designed to link together the Anglo-Saxon positions in Turkey through the Persian Gulf and Pakistan and reach Afghanistan. For a while the latter remained outside Anglo-Saxon control while Iraq was a stumbling block. Both were destroyed. Time is running out for Iran.

The northern boundary of the energy ellipse runs close to Ukraine, Moldova, the Northern and Southern Caucasus. This explains why the territories between the Baltic and the Black Sea are actively drawn into the Atlantic orbit, while Byelorussia, so far a missing part of the puzzle, is being cruelly persecuted. We are watching how Russia is squeezed out of the Crimea, how the riot in Chechnya is being presented as a national liberation movement and how Georgia is pulled into the American orbit.

Washington's Eurasian strategy aims at a total control over the energy ellipse; the United States is working towards depriving all potential as well as already existing centers of power located much closer to the natural riches of any role in regulating their use.

The Chechen conflict serves both aims - for this reason an ordinary criminal riot was transformed into an instrument of the world project. But at all times the Islamic expansionist impulse was guided by a non-Islamic mind that channeled it in the desirable geopolitical directions.

Back in 1835, a British vessel "Vixen" was caught off the Caucasian shores unloading weapons for the Circassians.

Some of today's developments can remind one of the 1950s. One can expect an attempt to revive the CENTO Pact under a fashionable name, like a Stability Pact for Central Asia. The CENTO developed from the Baghdad Pact and sought to tie together all the strategically important points along the Mediterranean-Asia Minor-Persian Gulf-Pakistan line. But Iraq and Kuwait - the Mesopotamia - were the cherished prize Britain was seeking in World War I (the Sykes-Picot agreement).

Against this background, any preaching about the end of the Cold War causes nothing but skepticism. International relations of the 20th century, including the present era of democracy, differ from the imperial past only in two ways: unprecedented ideologization and lack of aristocratic elegance.

During the era of global rivalry between the *liberté* of the Third Estate and *égalité* of the proletarians, the American presidents and the Soviet Party General Secretaries brought up on mass culture rather than Mozart were far removed from the ethics of Prince Metternich and Prince Gorchakov. So instead of the latter's "*la Russie se recueille*" we saw the ways of N.Khrushchev and of a Rambo.

While the Korean War, the American invasion of Cuba and Soviet invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia offered nothing new to international relations, they were accompanied by an unprecedented effort to identify national interests with the moral and ethical canons of the universe. This turned an opponent into the worst enemy of mankind. Communism and liberalism - both creations of the philosophy of progress - claim a universalistic goal of self-globalization and refer to "proletarian internationalism", "happiness of mankind" and "democracy" as the main foreign policy aims rather than national interests. As a result, in the 20th century, the continuing geopolitical projects are contemplated within the Manichean dichotomy of good and evil.

The present "one and only correct and therefore omnipotent" liberal teaching continues theologizing its historical project. The global super-community, something that Marxism

preached and liberalism is still preaching, seems a secular parody of an idea of a metaphysical Rome (*translatio imperii*) wandering from the West to the East and back. Interestingly enough, Marxism and liberalism even condemn the 'aliens' in a similar way: "While history is forging ahead to the triumph of market and democracy, certain countries remain on the side of the highway" - this is not Nikita Khrushchev - it is Condoleezza Rice!

Here once more I am forced to offer a politically incorrect remark: today we see that all the constants of the centuries-long rivalry over access to ports and raw materials are still present, together with those traits of the Cold War that made it very close to religious wars.

## **PRE- AND POST-WESTPHALIA: THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY**

Those Cold War characteristics which resembled religious wars are manifested by a return to the pre-Westphalian thinking in which sovereignty and classical international law had no force.

The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 ended religious wars, that is, wars waged for ideological reasons. From that time on it was the nation-state that was the subject of international law, regardless of type of government, which was left as prerogative of domestic choice.

The Enlightenment and West European liberal democracy made the idea of the "sovereignty of people" their basic postulate. International law relies on the principle of absolute sovereignty of a nation-state that cannot be rated first- or second class depending on the state's "degree of civilization".

Chapter I of the UN Charter, "Purposes and Principles", betrays no preference for any religious-philosophical or social-political system and does not mention democracy at all as a goal. It insists on "sovereign equality" of all various actors of international relations, that is, of republics and monarchies, religious communities (Christian, Islamic or Hindu alike), and liberal-democratic societies of the Western type. From the point of view of classical international law and the UN Charter they are absolutely equal and none of them can be described as progressive or backward.

Kant in his time said that a "war of punishment" (*bellum punitivum*) among states was unacceptable precisely because their relations were not those between a superior and inferior.

The present challenge to the principles of sovereignty has been in the process of preparation for a long time. The Council of Europe was set up as a structure parallel to the UN. Its Charter and other documents proceed from the standards of uniform civil society and totally ignore such concepts as sovereignty and non-interference. The Council of Europe is a purely ideological organization, a "IV Liberal International" issuing "diplomas" in Western Democracy and ostracizing the uncivilized. It was the first to replace international law as a legal system applied to nations by the "world law" in which an individual rather than a state is regarded as its subject. It is in this context that the human rights issue is discussed, while the philosophies of atheist libertarianism and a religious society treat them in different ways.

The theoretical quest in the field of "relative" or "functional" sovereignty has been exploited for a long time, to provide political justification for the use of force. The new conceptions have supplied the West with the right to humanitarian interventions, since the UN Charter bans "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state".

If preserved, this trend may completely destroy the system of international law and bring the era of nation-states to an end. So far, smaller countries that have no nuclear weapons are at

the mercy of the strong powers; treaties and agreements become protocols of intentions opened with "*rebus sic stantibus*."

The philosophy of international law was crippled as soon as the concept of first- and second-class states became gradually accepted. It is for the self-proclaimed arbiters of the first class to classify the rest; the "model" states are allowed to wield weapons to punish the second-rate states. In the past, Christian as well as liberal thinking condemned such "social Darwinism". The ethos of a warfare in which a "superior" nation removes the non-historical nations from the stage were formulated by the German historian von Treitschke in the Bismarck era and had a well-known development in the 20th century.

The very idea that the state that threatens nobody and attacks nobody should be made an outcast or, as in the case of Iraq, disarmed by force points to the crisis of legal consciousness and sovereign equality.

### **SOME ROOTS OF TERRORISM**

The non-Western world interprets the preaching about the right to bomb, in the name of universal democracy, states with different and only allegedly aggressive types of government as a failure of Western values. The communist-universalistic alternative of the past is no longer attractive. The non-Western world is free to choose - it has chosen "terrorism."

While the "struggle against international terrorism" developed into a political doctrine one should bear in mind, however, that the terrorists pursue different aims in relation to the USA and Russia or Europe. "Terrorism" wants from the United States only non-interference in the affairs of other regions.

Chechen criminal bands, or "terrorists", are pursuing aims against Russian geopolitical goals of the past: detaching the Caucasus, the Stavropol and Krasnodar Territory (with the latter marked on their maps as "the Islamic republic of Adyghea"). "Terrorism" is a method employed to seize by force the territories that Russia defended from the Ottoman Empire and Persia.

The United States is fighting for its imperial interests and "global governance" while Russia is fighting for its continued existence on its own territory.

Russia's allies fail to demonstrate due solidarity with Russia when it comes to its territorial integrity. Should not the "anti-terrorist solidarity" be of an honest nature? Europe surprisingly ignores that Chechnya terrorism - an instrument for geopolitical goals and changing borders - is the most dangerous type of terrorism threatening Europe itself while the Islamist scenario has two parts – one in Caucasus, one in Kosovo.

### **RUSSIA AND EUROPE IN A 'UNIPOLAR' WORLD**

The first decade of the "unipolar" world produced on the agenda a host of issues. The re-division of the world that is taking place before our eyes has a geopolitical scenario of its own and is reshuffling international political forces into new patterns. As soon as Russia finally loses all acquisitions of Peter the Great that have been troubling "Old Europe" since the 18th century; the decline of Europe will become a fact. It will lose its role as a center of historical events of world importance.

The repartition of the world that is apparently taking place today is obviously aimed, among other things, at forcing Russia away from both the Baltic and Black Seas. This was Germany's objective in both world wars, and the USA is successfully working towards this goal, too. Old Europe is recklessly and mechanically following its lead. Europe's significance

for the USA is decreasing in direct proportion to the reduction of Russia's influence, and Europe may in the long run turn into a backyard for Brzezinski's Eurasian strategy.

Is it not time to see that it was not the Russian great power's role that threatened Europe's destiny?

Wobbly "global governance" calls for additional efforts to reach stability. Any genuine system of international relations even if based on a single key element demonstrates an ability to regulate and reproduce itself. The war on Iraq; launched in disregard of German-French protests, has clearly shown that the one and only 'Global Governor' would rather control world resources and the military sea routes leading to them than remain loyal to its obsolete allied obligations. The trans-Atlantic Yalta platform of interests survived the Soviet Union's disintegration; it was not strengthened by the movement to Belgrade and it split in Baghdad.

This seems to open a Pandora's box of troubles since it might become the starting point of a new stage of the clash of civilizations that will offer new roles to old players.

There is a shared opinion in the expert community that Europe will look for new forms of opposing the Eurasian strategy of the US, as the latter steps up its expansionism. It depends mainly on Russia whether the first decade of the 21st century will produce a more or less equilateral triangle of the centers of force (America-Europe-Russia) as an indispensable element of the new geopolitical arrangement. A strong European role requires strong Asian politics.

It seems that Russia is gradually restoring its traditional multisided strategy - something that befits a great Eurasian power. In fact, this policy is part of Russia's natural historical mission of balancing the West and the East. As soon as Russia abandoned it, the world was set in motion; civilizations started competing among themselves in an effort to grasp its heritage and to gain footholds in the key regions. It was Pyetr Stolypin who said: "We inherited our double-headed eagle from Byzantium. One-headed eagles are equally powerful yet, if we cut off the East-looking head of our eagle, it will bleed to death."

Russia's balancing role, one that the world needs very much, can be restored: Russia has not lost its strategically central position in Eurasia. It is even much more important than the naive Sakharov-Gorbachev school believed it to be and much more resilient than Brzezinski imagined it to be. His "grand chess game" was meant to do away with this role.

Russia should not be late - it should find its place in each of the system-forming or large structures. It should not allow any of its partners to use it in an opposition between America and Islam, between China and America, between India and Pakistan, and between Europe and America. The unipolar world is a temporary phenomenon of the short period of transition from the bipolar to a multipolar system. Its outlines can be seen today. China has made spectacular progress in space research while the Islamic world will obviously continue developing and consolidating.

Russia should not choose between "together with America against Europe" and "together with Europe against America." There is no choice between confrontation and eternal friendship in international relations, either. While pursuing strategic aims of its own that do not coincide with those of the United States, Russia needs good working relations with Washington. George Kennan described the relations between the two countries in the following way: they should be "reasonably good but reasonably distant". Translated into present realities this means: shared interests and no ideology.

In its time Prince Gorchakov's *"la Russie se recueille"* (Russia is concentrating) produced a much greater impression than Nikita Khrushchev's antics. In this connection we should bear in mind that "strategic partnership" implies "strategic rivalry."

## THE OSCE

The time has come to decide whether the multilateral organizations, primarily the OSCE, serve a goal of security and cooperation which implies a consensus interpretation of problems of equal importance to all participants. The OSCE has to make a decision with regard to direction in which it wants to go.

In our supposedly civilized and uniting Europe, in its most central institutions such as the OSCE,, we are witnessing a recourse to the very "old thinking" in which glossy concepts of market economy and liberal democracy are grotesquely mutated with pre-Westphalian ideological reasoning, "Cold-War"-type coalition-building, imperial domination and neocolonial arrogant tutoring from the point of view of the "white man's burden" complex.

What is needed to change things, to turn a source of instability and conflict into a starting point for cooperation and dialogue? To end the cynicism and hypocrisy with which it has become associated in the minds of my countrymen and come back to the real legal norms and procedures elaborated by the OSCE over the past decades?

The answer is quite easy and predictable – a reform and a total overhaul of present practices, including its mission fieldwork and elections monitoring. The organization should turn from human rights issues to soft security topics in the whole of its geographical area. This requires a substantial restructuring.

Political continuation of the OSCE is impossible without the rejection of practices which use the OSCE as an instrument of interests of certain countries in the Balkans and in the post-Soviet area. We have to:

- Establish the organization on a solid rock of norms and procedures, giving every participating state a sense of ownership over the OSCE, and moving the organization towards consensus
- Reorient the main priorities from monitoring and criticism to cooperation on issues equally important and interpreted by all without politicizing
- Open up the mission and institutional activities for the whole world to observe
- Discontinue the shameful practice of politicized and prejudiced reports of election observation missions, and install real and specific standards and criteria of reporting on election processes
- Assist countries in advancing to stated goals
- Engage in settlement of regional conflicts and potential enmities resulting from the migration challenge, throughout the whole space "from Vancouver to Vladivostok"
- Breathe life into the forgotten economic, environmental and military-political dimensions, and focus on real and not imaginary threats to Pan-European security
- Act on mutual trust and respect, without division into "mentors" and "problem-kids"

The OSCE should function in the form of a continuous dialogue, exchange of information, expert assistance, contact network, also providing, in response to requests by governments, practical assistance on a fixed-term basis for concrete tasks.

The OSCE should turn from purely human rights issues and double standards to soft security problems and new challenges. It will require a substantial restructuring of its present operational instruments and structure – which are relicts of the 1970s and 1980s.

When the Budapest Summit of 1995 changed the name of the organization, this step had no institutional follow-up to turn the OSCE into a full-fledged international organization with instruments updated to the new historical and political context. Missions and institutions created in another political era to control and monitor the new democracies lost their adequacy and should be reformed to meet new goals.

It is obvious that new tasks require significant strengthening of the main organs of the OSCE, primarily the Secretariat and its structure, perhaps dividing its functions among the military-political, economics and humanitarian fields.

It is time for the OSCE to have a really strong Secretary General, as the principal executive body similar to the NATO Secretary General. His mandate should be enhanced from that of a solely technical nature to the one of a full political leader responsible for fulfilling the political tasks from the OSCE governing bodies and for the effectiveness of the Secretariat and budget execution.

In this respect it is necessary to remove the dichotomy between the Secretary General and Acting Chairman, which is handicapping the work of the organization, and to give an enlarged political mandate to the Secretary General, while reducing the term and the role of the Acting Chairman to its original scope up to the Helsinki summit in 1992.

What is really needed is the dismantling of such rudiments of the CSCE as ODIHR, HCNM, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (*БДИПЧ, ВКНМ, Офис по свободе СМИ*), turning them into strong departments of the Secretariat. That will save a lot of money while enabling a better control of their activities on the part of participating states.

All the field activities of the OSCE should be restructured as fixed-term roving missions. Permanent missions (OSCE ‘embassies’) are no longer needed and should be replaced by short-term expert task forces mandated by OSCE governing bodies to execute concrete projects requested by states in such fields as fact-finding, monitoring operations, evaluation missions, personal and special representatives, good service missions etc. Budgeting and mandates of such missions should accordingly be strictly limited. If requested and sanctioned by the involved, more than one such mission can work simultaneously in a country instead of multifunctional bodies. The same can be applied to the OSCE conflict resolution missions.

We are not bent on destroying the OSCE. Its wide geographical framework, comprehensive security approach, and multidimensional mandate correspond to the goals and the challenges of the time. The forum for cooperation in security issues should be retained as the main specialized organ for negotiating and decision-making on military aspects of security. While negotiating the new rules of procedure of the OSCE corresponding to the new institutional structure, the principle of consensus is indispensable.

We need to agree on a new financing system and contribution scale according to actual capacities and to work out a pattern of voluntary contributions as well as new personnel rules. We need to renew negotiations on the legal status and capacity of the OSCE to reach a decision through a convention.

The OSCE must retain its role as a active forum and focus for obligations and mutual standards and of a body to supervise them. All participating states confirm the existing obligations in their three dimensions.

But we will not go along with an organization which, instead of acting as a forum for inter-civilizational dialogue, remains an outdated Cold War platform for drawing up new “division and fault lines” and new schisms between the European West and East.

## **ROLE OF THE OSCE 30 YEARS AFTER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT – A Finnish View**

**Ambassador Aleksi Härkönen  
Permanent Representative of Finland to the OSCE**

For Finland, the 1975 Helsinki Conference remains an important milestone in our foreign policy after the Second World War. The Helsinki Final Act was one of the great compromises reached during the Cold War, leading to a period of détente and somewhat broadening and brightening the horizons for neutral states such as ours.

The end of the Cold War in Europe was skilfully managed by the great powers and other states, keeping most of the continent safe and secure in the middle of political upheavals. During that period, the CSCE/OSCE was utilized in new and innovative ways. Its principles were followed when new states emerged, and a number of mechanisms, structures and institutions were created. Finland was the host of the Helsinki 1992 Follow-up and Summit Meetings, which set the tone for the post-cold war CSCE/OSCE.

During the 1990s the OSCE served as a major instrument for conflict prevention, crisis management and finally post-conflict rehabilitation. It experienced successes, but at times its instruments, exclusively developed as soft security tools, proved insufficient. For Finland, the OSCE ceased to be the main forum for European security in the 1990s. We joined the EU and NATO's Partnership for Peace, which opened for us new ways to contribute to European security.

Thirty years after the Helsinki Conference, the OSCE is in crisis. It is alarming that consensus is difficult to reach on such basic issues as financing the organization. Everybody agrees that money is not the issue, but rather the deep divisions between the participating states regarding the compliance with existing OSCE commitments versus thoroughly reforming the organization.

We should take it as a point of departure that participating states will most probably not be able to resolve the underlying political problems in the OSCE area simply by getting rid of the OSCE.

Frozen conflicts will not be solved more easily nor forgotten if the OSCE is laid to rest. Suspicious elections will not become free and fair if the OSCE is not invited to observe them. Human rights, democracy and the rule of law will retain their significance for human and societal development. In brief, the OSCE commitments are not given to the organization as such, but governments are held accountable for their behavior towards other countries and towards their own citizens, even if the forms of international cooperation change.

Finland, along with other European Union member countries, is developing the Union's own capacities to deal with conflicts and to help solve crises. But it would be simplistic to believe that the OSCE, with its cooperative security approach, could be replaced by the European Union. The EU and the OSCE should continue to cooperate and to involve other regional organizations and organizations in other regions in their efforts.

The CSCE /OSCE has had a Mediterranean dimension from the beginning. Since the 1990s it has cooperated with a number of partner countries in the Mediterranean region as well as a number of Asian partner countries. In addition to regular conferences and seminars with Asian and Mediterranean partners, new OSCE outreach activities have been developed recently. An OSCE Election Support Team was sent to the presidential elections in Afghanistan last October, and a training needs assessment was made during the presidential elections in the Palestinian Territories last January. The OSCE could make an important contribution to confidence-building and democratization in countries and regions outside of Europe.



Thirty years after Helsinki, the OSCE is still an important tool for comprehensive security. It has an established place in European and Transatlantic security structures and a remarkable acquis consisting of ground-breaking principles, norms and commitments. An open and frank dialogue about the future of the OSCE will help all participating states to agree on the comparative advantages of the organization with regard to other forms of international cooperation.

It is in this spirit that Finland prepares to host a commemorative event on the occasion of the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and also to chair the organization in three years' time.

**THE EU COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY,  
THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY, AND  
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND  
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**Ambassador Christian Falkowski**

**Head of Delegation  
Delegation of the European Commission to the  
International Organizations in Vienna**

**INTRODUCTION**

It is a pleasure and honour indeed to speak on this occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. But let me first congratulate Dr. Mautner-Markhof and the Austrian Centre for International Studies for organizing this conference – as I understand the first of its kind.

Security has always been at the heart of the European project. The European Union was formed with the main objective of promoting peace and stability in a continent wrecked by war and traumatized by the horrors of political tyranny.

Today, over 50 years after this founding moment, with democracies and their values well entrenched, the security environment in Europe has dramatically changed. Security is no longer a matter of traditional wars – democracies do not want to fight wars. But threats to peace and security in the continent do remain. Regional conflicts persist and new threats such as terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose major challenges to the security of the United Europe. The tragic events in Madrid on 11 March 2004 are dramatic evidence of this.

Europe needs to maintain a high quality of security – security must therefore remain a strategic objective of the European Union. Fifty years ago, the founding fathers of the European project realized that the common search for economic development is indispensable for security. Today, we are convinced that security is the primary condition for development. Therefore, an essential EU policy is to promote and sustain a politically stable environment for our neighbours, and to share the benefits of our political and economic strength. And we want to see a well-functioning international order based on effective multilateralism, with international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe at its center. To achieve all these aims we need multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Defence Policy.

## **THE EU COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY**

### **Origins and legal structure of the CFSP**

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a creation of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty – the famous second pillar. Since then, a number of changes were introduced and new provisions were added to strengthen and further improve the Union's foreign policy.

The EU's Security Strategy provides the conceptual basis for the EU's external actions and outlines the main elements of the Union's foreign policy.

### **The new security environment**

The post-Cold War security environment is characterized by open borders, high trade flows, the spread of democracy and the drive for self-determination. The effects are the increase of freedom and prosperity for many people in several parts of the world.

However, problems do remain – regional conflicts for one. There is hardly a region of the world that has not seen a conflict over the last decade. Such conflicts cause instability, disrupt economic activity and reduce peoples' freedoms. Moreover, the impact of conflicts is not restricted to the crisis areas. With the "end of geography", conflicts in one area can easily affect other regions of the world.

The EU is a global actor in the new security environment. As a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's gross national product (GNP), the European Union has a huge responsibility and has to assume its role in the international arena---and it must be ready to contribute in an active and comprehensive manner to the maintaining of global security.

There is dramatic gap between Europe's great prosperity, security and freedom and the income of some other regions of the world. Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than two euros a day. The expected demographic changes in the world in the next 40 years from 6 to 9 billion people will further aggravate imbalances.

It is not only poverty as such but the lack of governance that is very often at the heart of the problem. Corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability generate poverty. A number of countries and regions in the world are becoming caught in a downward spiral of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Another main security parameter for Europe is its energy dependence. Europe is the second largest consumer and the biggest importer of energy in the world. And evidence has been established between energy consumption, environmental degradation and global warming.

### **Three new threats**

Against this backdrop of regional conflicts, poverty, bad governance, environmental degradation and energy dependence – three major threats can be seen.

The first and biggest threat is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – not in the sense of a Cold War arms race, but in the context of globalization: in a very dreadful scenario countries or groups not committed to our values could obtain weapons of mass destruction.

The second biggest threat is terrorism. Terrorism intends to undermine our open societies and to destroy the universal values of freedom, tolerance and democracy. Terrorism is connected by international networks, is well resourced, and lacks constraints. Terrorists are not interested in negotiations and seem willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is linked to religious fundamentalism, but its roots are manifold. In its substance, the new terrorism is a radical counter-movement against any kind of modernization, falsely perceived as western imperialism.

Therefore, our fight against terrorism must be aimed not only at its manifestations but also at the causes behind it. We need an intelligent combination of resolute action and gentle influence, of “soft-power” and “hard-power”. At the same time we must reject the notion of a “clash of civilizations”. We must fight the ideology of hate by upholding the values of democracy, tolerance and the rule-of-law.

The third threat that the European Security Strategy has to address is the phenomenon of failed states. They produce international insecurity and foster organized crime. Often, terrorist organizations are financed by the revenues of illegal activities in such lawless regions. Afghanistan is a case in point.

### **Two new strategies**

In order to counter these threats, the EU has adopted two strategies. The first strategy is to make a contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighborhood – through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a policy intended to foster regional security in Europe by supporting countries that share the EU’s fundamental values and objectives. As Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner put it, “we must export stability, so that we will not import instability”.

The second strategy is to build an international order based on effective multilateralism, where international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe play a crucial role.

### **THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY**

Enlargement shifted the external borders of the European Union and brought both opportunities and challenges. The main challenge is to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. The main opportunity is to have even more people benefiting from a large area of security and stability in a much “wider Europe”.

These challenges and opportunities are addressed by the European Neighbourhood Policy – a new policy that invites our neighbours to the East and to the South to share in the peace, stability and prosperity that we enjoy in the European Union. This zone of stability and prosperity should extend from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus and the Middle East and across the whole Mediterranean region. Our offer is valid for states in the European neighbourhood which are not applying for membership in the EU. This is a very important point. The ENP is not an

enlargement policy. It does not close any doors to European countries that may at some future point wish to apply for membership, but it does not provide a specific accession prospect either.

The implementation of the ENP is carried out by specific Action Plans drafted together with our partners. Seven of these have already been adopted and five others are under preparation. Action Plans draw on a common set of principles but are differentiated, reflecting the needs and capacities of each country as well as common interests. They can cover key areas for specific action such as: political dialogue and reform, economic and social development policy, trade and the internal market, justice and home affairs, and people-to-people contacts. Priorities for the specific actions are set by the two parties – joint ownership is a very important aspect of the ENP. It is a deal in the interest of both sides.

Action Plans involve close cooperation with international and regional organizations. In the case of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, there is a good overlap with the work of the OSCE.

Let me give you a concrete example: The Ukraine Action Plan of February 2005 has, in the area of political dialogue and reform, the priority “to further strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law”--a priority that obviously coincides with the scope of the OSCE Human Dimension, and cooperation within the OSCE is indeed envisaged. Strengthening democracy is to be achieved by three actions. Firstly, Ukraine must ensure that presidential and parliamentary elections are conducted democratically, in accordance with OSCE standards and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, including those on freedom of the media. Secondly, Ukraine must ensure that any further legislative reforms be conducted in line with international standards. Thirdly, the administrative reform must continue and local self-government must be strengthened in line with European standards.

## **MULTILATERALISM: STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

While the goal of the European Neighbourhood Policy is to share stability and prosperity with our immediate surroundings, on a wider level the European Union aims at promoting security and stability in the world by developing a rule-based international order founded upon a policy of effective multilateralism. The European Union’s commitment to multilateralism is a defining principle of its external policy. Taking international cooperation as a precondition for meeting numerous global challenges, the EU has a clear interest in supporting the continuous evolution and improvement of the tools of global governance. It is one of the main goals of the EU’s foreign policy to strengthen the United Nations – the pivot of the multilateral system – and to equip it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively.

The EU has demonstrated its potential through supporting the UN system and its commitment to global rule of law. The EU has lent its active and undivided support to the adoption and effective implementation of key multilateral legal instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, and it has taken the lead in several multilateral initiatives.

The EU is involved in a number of partnerships with key players in the international arena and in regional cooperation agreements. The EU cooperates with practically every region in the world within the framework of arrangements such as the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP (Asian Caribbean Pacific) countries and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With Russia, the EU has a special strategic partnership which is based on four “common spaces”: a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of external security; as well as a space of research and education, including cultural aspects.

Among the regional organizations, the OSCE is of particular relevance for building security in the EU neighbourhood. There are many points in which the agenda of the OSCE coincides with the aims of the EU foreign policy. The European Union has a large stake in the OSCE, not only because it shares the values, interests and objectives of the organisation, but also for the sheer fact that the EU Member States represent almost half of all OSCE participating states and the financial contributions of EU Member States add up to more than 70% of the OSCE budget.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to highlight the following points:

- Europe's Foreign Policy is based on a comprehensive approach.
- Guaranteeing Europe's security is not only a question of defense policy or military operations; it is also and foremost a question of conflict prevention, civil crisis management, and of common policies in the areas of: trade, economics, law, energy, health and environment.
- The actions foreseen in the Security Strategy in order to counter the proliferation of WMD and the spread of terrorism, as well as the actions against failed states and regional conflicts, can only be successful if they are a part of a broader policy involving conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
- The Union has an advantage in this respect because of its wide range of instruments. But in order to work efficiently, we need to apply all our instruments coherently, be it in the civil and military areas or in other sectors.
- The CFSP is one of many instruments of the Union's international relations, and it is complementary to other policies of the Union. Our collective structures must do justice to this broad agenda, while at the same time remaining flexible.
- The ENP is a part of our regional security policy. It contributes to the stabilization and reform of key geopolitical regions and to their long-term connection to Europe through specific Action Plans. It exports security, stability and prosperity to our neighbours and has, therefore, a clear security dimension.
- The peace and stability that we enjoy in the European Union today cannot be taken for granted. And the OSCE has an essential role to play, not only in preserving security, but also in reminding us that the only way to maintain stability is through daily work and cooperation.
- We should not assume that the achievements we see 30 years after the Helsinki Final Act are guaranteed and secured forever. On the contrary, we must not give up in our efforts to preserve our past achievements as a basis for future developments.

Or, to put it in the words of Goethe's Faust: *"Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast, / Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen. (That which you inherited from your fathers / You must earn in order to possess.)"*

# **EVOLVING SYSTEMS OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY**

**Frances Mautner Markhof**

**Director  
Austrian Center for International Studies**

## **REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

In the 21st century, states will continue to find it in their interests to participate in, cooperate through and support regional multilateral organizations.

Multilateral cooperation can provide the political critical mass to counter destabilizing activities and threats on a regional and global scale. In so doing, individual states achieve, through multilateral cooperation mechanisms, a higher level of political, security and economic capabilities and a broader spectrum of options essential for dealing with threats and instabilities, which could not be achieved acting alone.

Thus, regional organizations provide frameworks for cooperation for, among other things:

- Defining and supporting agreed principles and values
- Developing options/benefits which would not be possible unilaterally
- Agreeing on requirements and conditions for systemic stability/development, including, *i.a.*, self-regulation
- Peaceful settlement of disputes
- Crisis and conflict management
- Confidence- and security-building measures
- Risk and threat assessment
- Pursuing interests by and of all members

Through cooperation, options can be created and agreed that would otherwise not be possible or available, e.g., on a unilateral basis. Cooperatively agreed options must usually be balanced by agreed regulation or constraints. Resources can be made available on a cooperative basis that would not be available to individual states or groups. However, imposed options are neither perceived nor accepted as options but rather as constraints, with the corresponding reactions and lack of acceptance. Thus, multilateral cooperation offers more possibilities for stability, security and development, crisis management and prevention, and for pursuing individual interests.

The world of the 21st century is sometimes called a global world, and globalism is considered the main force driving development. But globalization has not made the world flat. The world is complex, connected, changing and sometimes chaotic. These, among others, are characteristics of evolving complex systems.

We will be concerned here, inter alia, with a paradigm change, basically a new way of 'seeing and judging events' (Clausewitz), demanded by the need to understand and deal with a complex system as a whole, as well as with its separate component parts. We shall discuss the evolving complex systems of multilateral regional organization and cooperation, democracy and security.

## **WHAT ARE EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEMS?**

What is complexity? Complexity refers to the information necessary to understand a system, but which is unavailable not only in practice but in theory. So it is information we need to know but do and can not have. Ideally, such a system is self-organizing and self-regulating. Its behavior is neither predictable nor controllable in the classical sense. It exhibits chaotic characteristics. In other words, it correspond to normal real system, behaving not as it is assumed to or supposed to behave (according to a mechanistic, predictable, linear paradigm) but in the way such systems actually do behave.

One might protest that such systems are unmanageable, but in fact one has been managing such systems for a long time, with more or less success. Like Moliere's *bourgeois gentilhomme*, we find out we have been speaking the "prose" of complexity for a very long time. But to understand and deal more effectively with complex systems, it is necessary and desirable to have a new way of seeing and judging events.

Included in the category of such complex systems are not only political, economic, financial and security systems, but complex organizations. Such systems do not develop in a predictable or linear manner and are subject to disturbances, surprise and the resultant discontinuities in functioning and development. It is at these discontinuities or critical points that a system's survival and development is tested—it either evolves to a higher level of complexity or tends towards systemic disintegration. Clearly, such systems require not only a new paradigm or approach, but also new requirements for leadership and management.

Perhaps the most critical condition for the survival of a complex system through adaptation and evolution is the preservation of those main elements, principles, and values which define the essence and identity of the system. This is what is meant by the endurance or survival of the system.

Complex systems are open systems. To survive and evolve, they require a constant input of resources from its environment - energy, information, human, materiel and other resources. Thus, these systems are sensitively dependent on their environment, not only for needed resources, but also because many systemic perturbations and sources of instability originate outside of the system itself, in its environment.

Cooperation in managing and meeting the requirements for resources is one of the most essential tasks to ensure that competition does not turn into conflict, with the resultant threats to systemic stability and survival. Survival also depends on capabilities to deal with change and challenges through adaptation, innovation, cooperation and evolution. For this, a system must seek an optimal balance between systemic diversity and redundancy, or between options and constraints (and thus a mechanism for self-regulation.) A complex system needs to seek continuously an optimal and dynamic balance between systemic diversity/options and constraints/redundancy.



Dynamic, complex systems exhibit chaotic behavior, and this disorder can, but does not have to, lead to a new kind of order – this is the idea of ‘order out of chaos’. But these systems do not necessarily survive – they can disintegrate or be destroyed. History provides many examples of this.

An important characteristic of these systems is the so-called ‘butterfly effect’. This results from the fact that complex systems are susceptible to chaotic behavior, which means that small local disturbances or fluctuations, or uncertainties in knowledge about a system, can become amplified and spread, leading to large, unpredictable, uncontrollable consequences. The ‘butterfly effect’ is closely connected to Clausewitz’ fog of war and the ‘law of unintended consequences’. Decisions and actions—and their results/consequences—must take the ‘butterfly effect’ into account. The aftermath of the invasion of Iraq is an example.

The “discovery” of chaotic behavior in a wide range of systems – physical, meteorological, biological, political, economic and financial – also demanded a change in point of view or paradigm. The necessity of dealing with the whole system could no longer be ignored – in order to understand what effects small perturbations or uncertainties on a local scale might have at the larger or global level. Thus, another major implication of the reality and pervasiveness of complexity and nonlinearity in real systems is that the mechanistic paradigm leading to reductionism (reducing a system to small constituent analyzable parts, then putting them together to predict the behavior of the total system) is not applicable. The whole must be considered *in toto*, as it is qualitatively far more than and different from the sum of its parts.

## **LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS**

In contradistinction to the mechanistic paradigm which has until recently dominated intellectual thought (since the great successes of Newton’s laws, which other, unrelated disciplines sought to copy, usually unsuccessfully), it must be clear that for complex systems, predictability and controllability is not even theoretically possible. How then are complex systems to be understood? What are the requirements for leadership and management of such systems? With unpredictability and uncontrollability, it is no longer possible to assume or aim for certainty of outcomes. Instead, a ‘certainty of response’ can and should be a realistic objective. This means the continuous developing and attaining of the capabilities and readiness to respond to actual and potential crises, change, unpredictability and surprise - through anticipation, adaptation, innovation, flexibility, communication and cooperation, including the cooperative development of options balanced where needed by constraints. The nature of a complex system demands this, and indeed such a change in aims and approach can only be welcome. In the real world of complex evolving systems, especially in the globalized world of the 21st century, certainty of outcomes cannot represent a realistic goal, if it ever did.

Regional organizations such as the OSCE and EU, together with their agreed principles, values and mandates, can and should be important elements in providing and ensuring the capabilities and readiness for a ‘certainty of response’. Thus, certainty of response means that a system, its individual components and those responsible for its leadership or management must develop and possess the principles, processes and capabilities to:

- Anticipate and recognize potential threats/instabilities in the system and its environment
- Anticipate and assess, rather than only react to, risks, change, events and developments

- Anticipate both possible and probable outcomes of decisions and actions
- Deal with uncertainty, surprise, chaos - as the 'normal' state of affairs
- Innovate and cooperate in order to develop the necessary options, policies and strategies in response to threats and actual/potential instabilities
- Balance options, where needed, by cooperatively agreed constraints or self-regulation
- Communicate necessary information on a timely basis

Certainty of (capabilities and readiness for) response are a fundamental requirement for the dynamic stability and survival, involving a new importance for information, communication, innovation, adaptability and cooperation, and placing new demands on the qualifications of individuals and leaders, and on the requirements for the evolution/development of the system.

We shall be concerned here with applications of these key aspects of complex self-organizing systems, which include democratic systems, the system of international terrorism, and regional multilateral organizations such as the EU and the OSCE.

## **DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS AND THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION**

Democratic systems are examples of open, evolving complex systems. As democracies did and do not come into existence in a perfect state, they are in need of constant improvement and adaptation. To envisage democracy as static or rigid, a system of governance which cannot and need not change or improve, is a distorted view of what is the great strength of democratic systems, namely, that democracy is distinguished from other political systems and forms of governance in that it is in theory perfectible. We do not have to destroy the system to get a better one. Change can be accomplished peacefully.

Democracy is a dynamic process, not a static state. Such systems are especially sensitive to disturbances and fluctuations both from within the system and from its environment. Whether a democratic system can and does survive and evolve depends on whether it is able/willing to deal with the challenges, threats and instabilities it continuously faces, which will be determined *inter alia* by its ability for adaptation, innovation and cooperation. All of this while preserving those principles, patterns and processes which constitute the essential identity of the system. Whether and how a functioning democracy is achieved will depend on the specific conditions (such as history, culture, economy) of each country.

We can now observe changes in democratic systems which may not be contributing to their endurance. Recall that a complex system, in order to endure, must preserve those basic principles, values, patterns and processes which define the essence and identity of the system. Otherwise, the system will in time become something else, something different from democracy. This applies not only to political systems in the process of democratization. Experienced observers of established democracies are increasingly pointing to key change which could threaten the essence of democracy.

Globalization is the most widespread of these changes, leading in some cases to demands that governments operate on market principles. The attempt to reduce government's role, if taken to an extreme, denies that there are certain essential responsibilities and functions which must remain the prerogative of governments and which should be performed by them as effectively and efficiently as possible. And these responsibilities cannot be met by operating solely on the basis of market principles, e.g., by 'outsourcing'.

One problem with the globalization model is that it is based on simplified models and assumptions of economic and other realities, enabling the appearance of ‘concreteness’ through mathematically based numerical and other predictions. However, this illusion of concreteness avoids the essential complexities and reality of economic, political and social systems – difficult if not impossible to model mathematically. This has led to what A.N. Whitehead described as the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’.

One of the most serious emerging challenges to democratic systems is the ‘marketization’ of democracy—the belief or ideology that good government must be based on those market forces and principles which drive globalization, and that these principles inevitably operate for the best. But the best for whom? The desire of many to simplify reality for the sake of modeling, analysis and prediction – or ideology - has contributed to the incorrect identification of their results with reality. It cannot be proven that all interventions in the market are harmful, nor that growth and profit should be the only criteria by which to judge an economic system and its outcomes. Democratic processes cannot be measured by and should not be unduly influenced or distorted by market practices.

The impacts of under-regulated global economic and financial processes on political systems, including democracies, and the reduced options with which such systems are thereby confronted, are a serious challenge to democratic systems and also show that, ultimately, all globalization is local.

### **THE EUROPEAN UNION: Challenges to the Process of Evolution**

The European Union long ago recognized that it could either export stability through enlargement or import instability through avoiding change and flexibility while maintaining static structures and processes. The EU’s main goal is now to increase and support democracy, security, economic prosperity and social stability, especially in the new EU member and candidate states as well as in other European countries. The EU represents a work in progress, a complex system in the process of adaptation and evolution. EU decisions for a fast-track expansion and, it was hoped, an even faster track for reform were intended to provide the EU with new capabilities and options to deal with the ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ of the Union.

The challenges and necessity of creating and maintaining a continuous and optimal balance between systemic options and constraints are nowhere more apparent than in the manner in which the EU was set up and functions, and in the current issues it must now deal with. To create a European Union of sovereign nation states, a considerable amount of sovereignty was negotiated away by each state, on favorable terms, to acquire the benefits/options associated with EU membership, in the process accepting the accompanying constraints (laws, regulations, rules and decision-making processes) of the EU system. A similar process is now taking place, in the form of EU enlargement and restructuring, and this represents the system adapting to new challenges and realities through organizing at higher levels of complexity. The ultimate aim is to increase the transparency, democratic legitimization and efficiency of the EU, while defining and agreeing on those tasks and functions for which the EU is responsible and those which remain within the sovereignty of each member nation-state.

The EU “constitutional” treaty was intended to support this process of achieving a more efficient, effective and democratically responsive EU, while providing new options for the EU’s functioning and development. While the future of this treaty seems very much in doubt,

the importance of moving forward with this process has become even more necessary and apparent.

The evolution of the EU through changes in its size and structure introduces limits on the options of its members, as well as controls or constraints to prevent economic, political and cultural destabilization. Thus, EU members see both the long-range political, economic and security advantages of expansion, as well as potential threats such as a feared deluge of more (legal and illegal) immigrants, with the concomitant disruption of labor markets, social/cultural structures and identities, and increased or potential threats to internal security. The events of September 11, 2001 have led to the stiffening of the conditions and requirements for internal security and migration.

EU restructuring was considered to be essential, before new members were added, but this has not been accomplished and remains one of its most urgent tasks. This restructuring concerns *inter alia* the rule of unanimity, qualified majorities, and use of the veto, as well as the limitation of members' representation in key EU decision-making bodies. Many are now of the opinion that a restructuring and deepening of the EU, with an increase in transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and democratic legitimization, will be necessary before further expansion can successfully be undertaken.

Another manner in which the EU could evolve is through „enhanced cooperation“, sometimes called a Europe of “different speeds“ or “concentric circles“, whereby groupings of countries in agreement on and accepted to be involved in critical steps regarding a set of key issues and goals, for example, defense and security, would join together and move forward in these issue areas, the others being relegated to outer „circles“. This process has already occurred in the introduction of the common European currency (Eurozone countries) and in the uncontrolled movement of persons among certain countries (Schengen Agreement). It is also beginning to emerge in the course of achieving unified defense, security and foreign policies.

The beginnings of an EU organized around different issues is becoming a reality. As the number of countries, of varying levels of political and economic development, increases which are or wish to become EU members, one is likely to see a differentiated and more complex organization of the EU. Proposals along these lines have been made regularly. Former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt have presented a model of enhanced cooperation <sup>1</sup> which foresees:

- An „organization of the European space“, defined by EU enlargement and addressing economic and free trade issues accompanied by a limited level of political integration, at most the existing level
- The „organization of a European common defense“ which, to be operational, must be based on those countries which possess significant military capability and on their public commitment to accept a mechanism of fast and effective decision-making, with a concomitant loss of sovereignty
- An „organization of EU countries able and willing to achieve much deeper political integration“. Since full integration of 25 or more countries with very different political and cultural traditions and economic development is not a realistic goal, the realistic option is integration for those countries which have the political will and nearly the same political, economic and social conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt: Time to Slow Down and Consolidate Around „Euro-Europe“, International Herald Tribune, 11.4.2000.

At present almost all such countries belong to the Eurozone. New institutions separate from but compatible with existing EU institutions must be created. The countries in this inner political grouping would have to be willing to sacrifice a level of sovereignty commensurate, ultimately, with political unity.

An EU organized along the above lines would create, for those involved at each level of organization, many important new options which would otherwise be unavailable to these countries. Participating states would have to be willing to relinquish increasing amounts of sovereignty (i.e. through the acceptance of more unified decision-making, rules, regulations and controls) as these higher levels of integration and organization emerged. In creating the EU, member states understood the advantages of giving up some of the options of sovereignty to gain far more through EU membership, which provides a new horizon of options and benefits which could never have been attained by each state individually. In the process, EU members have accepted additional constraints and an agreed, negotiated and legally binding diminution of their sovereignty.

The EU does not now have power, commensurate with its economic and financial strength in global security, defense or even political matters. Its individual member states have in general far less. The problems and resistance encountered in the process of negotiating further EU integration in the form of political union or unified defense, security and foreign policies reflect the unwillingness and difficulties which EU countries have in relinquishing national control in these areas, closely connected with power, sovereignty and national identity. However, the concept of sovereignty is in a state of flux, indeed undergoing radical change in some respects. The EU was created by member states who willingly gave up some of their sovereignty in exchange for far greater benefits related not only to economic power but also to political stability (the most important of which is a half century of peace among the EU countries) – the most impressive example to date of the ‘creative use of sovereignty’. Other major countries such as the United States, China, Russia and India maintain a traditional view of sovereignty.

This has, directly and immediately, confronted the EU, and Europe, with a critical choice: rapidly diminishing political and military significance, or unified action to change this state of affairs; and with the key question: will EU be able to influence the paradigm and principles of the future global system of order. Far more conflict and crises will have to be dealt with before a meaningful unified EU defense and security policy emerges. But the importance of a politically unified EU is becoming increasingly understood.

A Europe representing different levels of cooperation and integration and a higher level of organization in political and defense areas is emerging. The need for this has been foreseen for quite some time, if Europe is to attain and retain a political weight and influence commensurate with its economic power. Schmidt and Giscard noted in this regard: „The will to maintain a considerable degree of self-determination vis-à-vis the global powers will become an additional strategic motive for European integration. Individually, none of the European nation-states is in itself weighty and powerful enough to stand up to the major world powers, which will surely be tempted in the century ahead to solve their problems without taking adequate account of the interests of others. Only if we act together to complete construction of the EU into a fully operable entity can the European nations expect to maintain influence in the world.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt: Europe Runs Before It Can Walk, Bangkok Post, Post Publishing Co., 16.4.2000.

Giscard and Schmidt, in proposing their idea of concentric circles – or a Europe of different speeds - to achieve greater integration and unity, warned of the consequences of failing to modernize and restructure the EU for these purposes: „The haste to enlarge the union, combined with neglect for institutional reforms, can mislead the Union into a sequence of severe crises during the first decade of the 21st century.”

An all-inclusive and undifferentiated EU expansion to the East would strongly influence the kind and level of EU organization and integration which is feasible. If the EU limits itself to those states which can meet all requirements for full membership, then to the existing disparities and problems in Europe there would be added actual/potential instabilities caused and exacerbated by the creation of zones with markedly different levels of prosperity and security. This would lead inevitably to crises, conflicts and destabilization - sooner rather than later.

In seeking to encompass the large and the small, the faster and slower, the richer and poorer countries, involving contrasts, cooperation and competition, the key question will be: How should the EU organize itself, and on what principles? Will it be an EU of 25 or more disparate countries which may be unable or unwilling to integrate into one political or economic entity? Or is a Europe of different levels of organization and complexity more realistic and inevitable? This would lead to an EU of „different speeds“, or different levels of integration and organization, with a core group moving faster and further towards political integration, and other groups moving at various speeds and combining in various, less intensive ways. Implicit in this is whether all European countries (including Turkey) could even potentially fulfill all requirements for full EU membership and be incorporated in an effective manner.

Behind this lies a question similar to that once posed by Goethe over 200 years ago regarding Germany, when he asked: „ *Deutschland? Aber wo liegt es?*“ (“Germany? But where does it lie?”). Does it lie wherever Germans and their culture are to be found, or within the borders of a German state? Much of the history of previous centuries was bound up with the aggressive answering of this question, and others.

In this sense one must also ask: „Where does Europe lie, and where does it end?” Does Europe have, and should it have, borders and if so, how are these to be determined? And „What is Europe?” Is it strictly geographically defined, or is it an idea and a set of values? What are the inalterable principles, elements and patterns of existence which define Europe’s identity and essence, and thus the organizing principle for EU evolution?

These are the critical questions for the future direction, stability, security and prosperity of the EU, and for its role in the evolving global order. If successful, the changes and evolution now taking place in the EU and Europe, and the manner in which this is understood and accomplished, could provide an important model for other regions as well.

## **THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE, comprises an unique and important grouping of states, spanning the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and including many Central Asian states.

Questions and criticisms have emerged as to the role, effectiveness and indeed the need of the OSCE in the 21st century. These issues are in the process of being addressed. It would seem

that, in light of the present situations and challenges facing the EU and NATO, the OSCE is needed more than ever. The OSCE can and should complement both the EU and NATO, and is in the process of evolving to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

The key question for any multilateral organization is: what is it that the organization can, should or does do which an individual country or another grouping of countries could not do, or do much less effectively and efficiently?

The OSCE has the potential to become a focus for supporting, facilitating and improving—on a cooperative basis—not only democratic and democratization processes, but also the security, stability and economic and social development which these processes require. It has unique institutional capabilities in this regard, which should be strengthened and made more objective and transparent, while building on the principles and values agreed to by its participating states. It can and does serve the interests of all its member states. To continue to do so requires a new commitment – in terms of both political will and enhanced resources.

As with other complex organizations, the OSCE must adapt to its environment and to new situations and challenges through innovation and evolution. In the process of cooperatively developing new options, balanced where needed by new constraints/regulations, it becomes better adapted and capable of reacting to the inevitable crises and instabilities that will develop.

The OSCE can and should retain its unique capabilities to be a key part of a “certainty of response” to threats and instabilities, which also involves the ability to be a type of ‘rapid reaction’ mechanism for the prevention and control of conflicts and crises in its region. Enhancing this requires *inter alia* better OSCE capabilities for effective and timely decision-making and response, including the strengthening of the Secretariat and other OSCE institutional arrangements.

The tasks mandated to the OSCE which support democracy, security, stability and development include:

- Crisis prevention and management
- Peaceful resolution of disputes
- Confidence- and security-building measures
- Anti-terrorism measures
- Human dimension and social progress
- Rule of law
- Good governance and transparency
- Anti-trafficking measures
- Supporting economic progress and development, in cooperation with other organizations such as the EU with more expertise and resources in these areas
- Information and communication

Objective, reliable and sufficient information and communication are essential for maintaining security and functioning democratic systems. The cooperative development of such information for use in various participating states and media could serve the aims of:

- Supporting democratic processes and the economic and social development needed for this
- Facilitating better understanding of each other’s concepts and contexts (histories, cultures, achievements, problems, aspirations, current events)
- Providing cooperatively developed media content to all member states

For the cooperative development of information and communication to be effective, it is essential to emphasize not only individual standpoints and characteristics but also what countries have in common, and especially what they could achieve through cooperation which they could not do unilaterally.

Such an exercise in cooperation will also prove very useful for sharing experiences and problems of democratic systems and processes in both the new and older democracies.

The OSCE can serve as a forum for Russia to initiate a forward-looking process, in cooperation with other participating states, to develop new options for resolving disputes and conflicts based on agreed OSCE principles and utilizing OSCE processes and capabilities to support political, economic and social progress, especially in countries in its adjacent regions. Such cooperatively developed options are less likely to be seen as constraints, and cooperation within the OSCE framework can serve a country's interests and goals by creating options which it could not devise or realize acting unilaterally. All of this can also make a serious contribution to overcoming the causes and effects of terrorism.

## **SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**

The system or network of international terrorism has many characteristics of a self-organizing complex system, which it utilizes for its survival and development. These include:

- Adaptability and innovation
- Increasing diversity and dispersal
- Continuous input of necessary resources (human, financial, information, materiel etc)
- Dependency on and manipulation of communication/media

The system of international terrorism reacts and adapts to crises and setbacks more like an organism, reorganizing after each threat, setback or critical point at new, higher levels of diversity, redundancy and complexity, which can involve, when necessary, additional self-regulation or constraints. To survive, this system must maintain the essential elements of its identity and driving force based on its radical ideology. This is the 'constant' running like a leitmotiv throughout the time development or evolution of the system of international terrorism.

Overcoming the network of international terrorism means *inter alia* being able to identify if and how it is approaching a critical or turning point. At such points a system can either achieve dynamic stability through evolving to higher levels of organization, or will tend towards instability and disintegration. Such points will be connected with unpredictable and uncontrollable large amplifications of internal and external disturbances, fluctuations and perturbations, which can lead to instabilities. Especially under these circumstances it becomes essential to deny international terrorism the possibility of acquiring resources and developing options needed to survive and evolve at critical points for the system. This means the denial of all types of resources and of possibilities for adaptation, dispersal and self-regulation/organization. Also essential is preventing access to and manipulation of media for the communication of its message and ideology.

The aim is, through combating its radical ideology and denying the necessary resources and options for adaptation and survival, to prevent the system from preserving or strengthening the essential elements associated with its identity, motivation and operation.



## **RELEVANCE OF OSCE EXPERIENCE FOR OTHER REGIONS AND MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS**

Other regions could benefit from studying whether and how the experience of the OSCE could be relevant and adapted to their own specific conditions and requirements concerning multilateral cooperation and arrangements. Thus, such regional cooperation could include the development or enhancing of:

- Frameworks for regular, constructive dialogue and discussion on issues concerning the security, political, economic, environmental and other areas
- Cooperation to define and agree on key principles, standards and goals to be embodied in and supported by a regional cooperation organization
- Enhancing trust and transparency through better communication, information exchanges, and joint risk assessment activities
- Options for dealing with actual/potential traditional and non-traditional security issues, including terrorism, trafficking and WMD
- Mechanisms for crisis and conflict anticipation, prevention and control
- Confidence- and security-building measures to reduce the potential for crises and conflicts
- Support for a continuous process of participation in a cooperative multilateral mechanism which should be – and is perceived to be – in the interest of each participating state, while simultaneously serving the interests of all parties
- Measures to increase and/or build on the stabilizing effects of economic interactions and contacts within the region.

The achievements and challenges of the OSCE before the Helsinki Final Act, during and after the Cold War, can provide valuable experience for other regions. The OSCE is an important example of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts, and of the importance of regionalism and cooperation to achieve stability, security and development in an increasingly globalized and competitive world.

The OSCE experience shows that in the process of supporting, facilitating and improving stability, security, development and democratic processes, there are certain challenges to be met, and problems to be avoided or dealt with, such as:

- Providing short-term gains without long-term hope
- Frustration with the political, economic and social status quo
- Freedom (political and economic) without a future
- Destabilizing perception that nothing has moved, nothing can move, except by force
- Freedom and change must be accompanied by economic and social progress, essential for maintaining political systems based on human rights and the rule of law

A realistic balance must be maintained between the policies and potential, the responsibilities and resources of all involved – to avoid overstretch – and this includes not only material, human and financial but also military resources and capabilities.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Multilateral regional organizations such as the OSCE and EU are complex systems which, in the process of adapting to change, challenges and crises, can and should continue to be essential

elements in the ability to respond in a timely manner to threats, crises and instabilities – a ‘certainty of response’, the requirements for which include capabilities for cooperation, adaptability, innovation, communication, anticipation/assessment of risks and threats. This kind of ‘certainty of response’ will increasingly replace previous assumptions of the certainty or likelihood of outcomes – in policies, planning and implementation strategies. The reality of the uncertainty, unpredictability, uncontrollability, surprise and chaos which is inherent in events and systems is in fact far closer to the ‘normal’ state of affairs than the previous view or paradigm based on assumptions of predictability, controllability, simplification and linear development and represents a more useful and realistic way of ‘seeing and judging events’ in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

A new understanding of regional organizations, democratic and security systems as complex systems – and how such systems function, how instabilities can and do arise, and the mechanisms and requirements for evolution and survival - will also lead to requirements for new, more effective capabilities not only of the systems themselves but also of their leadership and management. This is necessary to deal with the crises, challenges and threats which democracies and regional organizations are facing in the 21st century. These include the system and ideology of international terrorism and the associated networks/activities of organized crime; the control of weapons of mass destruction; the strengthening of democratic systems and processes; and the challenges of globalization, including the amelioration/mitigation of its negative impacts, a more responsible support for development, and the ‘marketization of democracy’.

## **ADAPTING THE OSCE TO NEW CHALLENGES\***

**Ambassador Dieter Boden**

**Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany  
to the OSCE**

### **PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR THE OSCE**

Speaking or writing about the OSCE these days mostly provokes critical thoughts. There is no ignoring the fact that the organization is going through difficult times trying to reconcile within itself diverging views on a couple of key issues. Certainly, it is to the credit of the OSCE that nobody is more critical than its participating states, or some of them. And in the foreseeable future, this critical mood will outlast the festivities which may take place on the occasion of some remarkable OSCE anniversaries this year: 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, 15<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Paris Charter, 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the transformation of the OSCE from a conference into an organization during the Budapest Summit of 1995.

But this period of self-criticism, of soul-searching of our organization will also offer an opportunity – the opportunity of making it still more relevant in the future. Let us also not ignore the fact that other international organisations are facing the same dilemma: look at the ongoing reform discussion in the UN, as an example. One may add that as a consensus organisation, the OSCE is under a particular pressure to change, to adjust, to accept reform as a permanent process. In this regard, it has not done a bad job in the past, considering the dramatic changes in our political environment which have occurred since the HFA was adopted 30 years ago.

Now, doubts concerning OSCE's relevance have come up again, and in a radical way. What is the use of the OSCE? This was the headline of an article written by Michail Margelov, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council in Russia, the Second Chamber of the Parliament of the Russian Federation, and published in January 2004. Margelov's point is that with the end of the Cold War the OSCE has outlived its function. Furthermore, there are voices articulated recently in the Council of Europe, not least by its Chairman Terry Davis, that the OSCE should merge with the Council of Europe since a great number of the activity profiles of both organisations coincide. And, to give one further example: In June and September last year Russia and a number of CIS states went public with two statements in which the OSCE is criticized for applying double standards, for being lopsided and unbalanced with regard to implementing its three dimensions, for over-accentuating the third dimension and particularly election activities.

So there is enough of a challenge for the OSCE in light of such criticism which sometimes, as OSCE Chairman Rupel commented, is reflective of the re-emergence of new East-West fault lines. And the challenge has been taken up: at its Sofia Ministerial last December the OSCE decided to establish a "Panel of Eminent Persons" mandated to work out a report by end of June 2005. This report is to serve as a basis for a decision on how to strengthen the effectiveness of our organization, which should be taken at the next Ministerial in Ljubljana in December 2005.

\* This paper reflects personal views of the author.

## **THE ADJUSTMENTS WHICH THE OSCE CAN AND CANNOT MAKE**

I will not venture to speculate here on the outcome of the Eminent Person's deliberations, although it is not so difficult to anticipate some of the issues they will discuss. These are issues which have been on the reform agenda of our organization for some time, at least since the 2001 Ministerial of Bucharest, which took a formal decision on this matter. However, the establishment of the Eminent Person's Panel is a manifest confirmation of an awareness among OSCE participating states that the organization needs re-adjustment.

Re-adjustment in what way? In this respect, one thing should be clear: What you can adjust is structures, practises, modes of implementation, but not principles or values. From the beginning we should not let any doubt arise on that point.

But with that premise accepted, there should be openness on behalf of all OSCE participating states to discuss in the broadest possible way on how to improve our performance. We have always been proud of a specific culture of dialogue within our organization. It should apply fully in the current situation.

## **COOPERATION AND SECURITY WITHIN THE OSCE**

Our point of departure should be to identify the added value which the OSCE is able to offer to its participating states as compared to other international organizations. Here our usual point of departure is to reaffirm that the OSCE remains to this day the most comprehensive platform for pan-European cooperation and an open-ended security dialogue, that it has an all-inclusive states' participation extending from North America to the far eastern borders of the Russian Federation. It is true that other frameworks such as the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), or regular meetings between *i.a.* Russia, Ukraine and the EU may have come into being, but it is the OSCE alone which offers cooperation and dialogue on an equal footing. And it is the OSCE which reaches out to the Caucasus and Central Asia - regions which we have increasingly come to consider as adjacent and closely connected to European security matters. In this context, let us note the important role which the OSCE is currently playing in Kyrgyzstan in developments after the fall of former President Akayev's regime.

Equally, the OSCE has always been proud of its broad security concept and the flexible set of instruments which it has at its disposal for the implementation of its policy. As for the security concept, its guidelines can now be found in the "OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" adopted by the OSCE Ministerial in Maastricht in December 2003. It may justly be considered to be a major achievement in terms of trying to adapt our organization to newly perceived challenges after September 11 and in an environment which is characterized by intra-state conflicts and failing states rather than by military confrontation of the Cold War type. But it is at this point that a new controversial debate has been set off. It bears on where exactly the organization should put the focus of its work and which instruments it should preferably use.

## **SOME CRITICISMS OF THE OSCE**

There are those who hold the view, and I refer here to the Moscow and Astana statements by some of the CIS states, that in the work of the OSCE an imbalance has developed which is at variance with the concept which the founding fathers had put forth in the HFA. More concretely: that the OSCE is doing too little in the first and second dimensions while unduly stressing the human dimension and in particular election activities.

Let us try to look at this argument more closely. My first remark: it somewhat disregards the fact that, increasingly, in the OSCE of our day we are dealing with cross-dimensional

issues. We may find it difficult to use the Helsinki basket system particularly for some of those matters on which our organization has focused recently, be it anti-terrorism or trafficking.

But this is not to push the issue under the rug. As for politico-military matters, which is the first dimension, we have to admit that indeed little headway has been made in recent years on what already had been accomplished in the landmark agreements of the early 1990s, such as the Vienna Document or the Code of Conduct. Since then, we have entered into a period of implementation which, important as it may be for the matter itself, appears less spectacular than the adoption of new groundbreaking agreements.

The second dimension covering economy and ecology has always been something of a stepchild of the OSCE. There is a dilemma which our organization has been facing ever since Helsinki: the OSCE is not, and never will be, an organisation which develops, finances and implements economic projects. On the other hand, security in the comprehensive sense will never be conceivable without an economic leg. And, I may add from my field experience in Georgia: you will never succeed in conflict resolution without offering perspectives in the economic field. What our organization has been able to do is to come up with a couple of valid concepts, particularly in the area of promoting good governance. To some, this is just too meager.

## **POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED ACTIVITIES**

So, where is there room for increased activities in the first and second dimensions? In the politico-military field nothing speaks against a reinforced effort in confidence building, including trying to update the Vienna document. Moreover, there is clearly a need for further action in the fields of small and light weapons (SALW) and possibly non-proliferation. And there may also be use in holding a further seminar on military doctrines – as a brainstorming exercise to redefine some of our priorities in this area.

As regards the economic dimension, we may intensify our effort on good governance, taking up concrete aspects such as anti-corruption measures. The Maastricht Decision on Combating Corruption has set a signal in this direction. At the same time, the OSCE should continue to offer itself as a forum with a view to identifying practical needs of economic assistance for participating states, particularly in the framework of conflict rehabilitation. It is in this context that the proposed conferences on Energy Security and Transportation could make sense.

Advocating such enlarged activities, however, should not be understood as jeopardizing well-known assets which the OSCE has achieved in the human dimension over the last three decades. We would be ill-advised to scale down activities which rest firmly on values and principles to which we have all subscribed. What may be needed is a recommitment to these values and principles, but not their questioning or an attempt to readjust them.

## **OSCE ELECTION ACTIVITIES**

This certainly also applies to the election activities of the OSCE – an area which accounts for much of our international reputation. They remain based on the Copenhagen Document of 1990 which has stood the test of time. We may very well look into suggestions to improve practices or certain procedures in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the instruments provided in this regard by ODIHR. There may also be a need to work out some fresh rules, for example in the area of electronic voting which had little significance at the time when the Copenhagen Document was adopted. But let us be clear that we do not want to damage the substance, that we are unanimous in our common concern for human rights, rule of law and democratic values over the whole of the OSCE

area. Unfortunately, the recent discussion on OSCE election activities has occasionally produced polemic undertones; we should be careful to avoid misunderstandings.

## **OSCE INSTRUMENTS AND POSSIBLE NEED FOR THEIR READJUSTMENT**

Finally, a word on OSCE instruments and potential needs for their readjustment. It is impossible in that context not to raise the issue of the consensus rule. Its appropriateness has been debated ever since the OSCE came into being – recall the so called Kinkel/Koemans initiative in the mid-1990s, or the initiative to modify consensus pronounced only a little more than a year ago by our former Bulgarian CiO, Solomon Passy, at the beginning of his Chairmanship. All these attempts have come to nothing. The consensus rule may have important weaknesses – namely, and in the first place, that it can be used to hamper decision-making and that it helps to blur responsibilities, for example, by not exposing dissenters. On the other hand, there is one important asset: consensus stands for shared ownership. And be aware that in order to change the consensus rule you need consensus. As it looks currently, such consensus will not be available in the foreseeable future. Which means that the OSCE most probably will have to make the best of this rule.

During the current discussion on how to streamline our organization another argument has frequently been put forward: to strengthen its executive, in particular the Secretary General and his Office. To this effect we have taken a decision on the role of the OSCE Secretary General in Sofia. This can be taken as an indication that OSCE participating states have recognized a deficiency, but further action may be needed. At present, the position of the OSCE's Secretary General is weaker in substance than that of Secretary Generals in NATO and UN, to mention only these. Giving him some additional competences, accepting him, for example, as member of the OSCE Troika, could make our organization as a whole more efficient in its operations.

Addressing OSCE instruments and not mentioning its field missions would be to miss a most prominent point. All of us, including critics, are aware that they are the centerpiece of the OSCE's operational capabilities. To limit their role would be to change the character of our organization. Core tasks of the OSCE - for example, in the fields of conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict rehabilitation as well as in the human dimension - would be difficult to perform without the active involvement of our field missions. Additional tasks have been identified more recently, for example in politico-military areas such as elimination of stockpiles of ammunition, or of SALW. Any reform attempt must take this into account. There may be aspects for review including their regional distribution, their management, and the wording of some of their mandates – but the basic approach should clearly be to make them more efficient, and not to restrict their operation. Current events in Kyrgyzstan have once more shown how valuable an instrument they are for the OSCE.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

To conclude, I hope I could make it clear that OSCE is a “work in progress”. Adjusting the organization is a must, but should not be understood as turning it upside down. The task is rather one of renewing its energy and refurbishing carefully some of its operational elements with a view to making the engine as a whole more efficient.

Fifteen years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its state system, the OSCE is still facing important challenges. Some of them, such as the “Frozen Conflicts” are a heritage from the past; others, such as anti-terrorism, intolerance, trafficking, and migration have come up forcefully in more recent times.

As part of a broad international effort, we need a functioning OSCE to tackle these challenges.

# **THIRTY YEARS OF EFFECTIVE HELSINKI COMMITMENTS**

**Marc Perrin de Brichambaut**

**Secretary General<sup>1</sup>**

**Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**

## **LOOKING AT THE FUTURE THROUGH PAST ACHIEVEMENTS**

Ambassador Boden has just given us a strong, stimulating and forward-looking presentation which wonderfully encapsulates the current situation of the OSCE. I would have very little to add to it. My purpose is much more modest. I shall try to look at the current issues facing the OSCE through the prism of looking backwards at 30 years of history which the organization has gone through, which has doubtless been a remarkable success and quite an outstanding trajectory and course. We have to bear in mind how this process became progressively an organization, how it espoused the developments on the European continent and how it helps them along, and through what stages it has gone. This retrospective approach can give us clues on how to address the issues which Ambassador Boden has reminded us we now face. Being French, I see three phases in OSCE history, corresponding to practical, different stages in the situation of European continent and in the interaction between the process, the organization and evolving historical circumstances.

## **INITIAL PHASE**

There was an initial pioneering phase, which was an important and basic one, where the process of CSCE played an extremely innovative, original role, first in Dipoli, then in Helsinki proper, 30 years ago. We are not yet celebrating anniversaries, but we have to bear in mind that at that time the CSCE was a diplomatic process which was largely security-centered, because this reflected the situation of the continent at that time. But the mere fact that the 35 states which were present at those meetings agreed to meet and consult and to adopt jointly by consensus, which is a heritage from this period, a series of carefully crafted documents was at that time a remarkable breakthrough. What happened 30 years ago was not only that a new multilateral format was invented but that it had the scope of progressively building over the bipolar relationships that existed among participants and to transform a number of texts which had already been agreed upon within the United Nations into a set of common statements: the Decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act, the Declaration of Principles Providing for Mutual Relationships Between Participating States, which really made a difference in the historical context of the time and reflected a political will on the part of all the participants to move beyond words in order to effectively implement a number of rules which had been commonly agreed upon through peaceful activities throughout a continent which at that time was still divided.

So although the problem of security was central and the follow-up of the initial Helsinki first basket agreements was a fruitful and spectacular one, there was already at that time a focus on a broad definition of security which included a reference to a number of areas for enhanced cooperation which were broad and diverse and where the human dimension, very central and important, existed alongside economic, technological and ecological developments in a broad package approach. I shall not go through the many follow-up meetings which were the heart of the process throughout the 1980s - they were practically a constant set of exchanges and processes.

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<sup>1</sup> Since June 2005.



What I think we should remember from the big breakthrough of this initial phase was the commitment by the signatories of the Final Act to the actual process of implementation. Implementation first by continuous contacts that were meant to create and foster trust and develop continuously acts of transparency over the course of time, and this indeed in the 1980s had its ups and downs. The political process remained precarious, but it was accepted and it created the habit of discussion and openness, which is the heart of the heritage of the OSCE today. The procedures that were adopted by the participating states and in particular the consensus rule meant that there had to be a respect for the sensitivity of each partner, that there also had to be an effective restraint by each partner in the conduct of their domestic affairs. Those rules required an acceptance that the discussions that took place took into account preceding texts and preceding commitments that had already been agreed in order to move forward.

Therefore, there was an accretion process in terms of progress within framework that was built progressively step by step with a balanced approach and an idea that the standards and references adopted in common would become something that had relevance in the internal life of each state. This was outside of the construction of the process of the European Union, probably the first time it was accepted that the diplomatic process would result in approaches that reached deep into the daily life of each participating country. Indeed those principles adopted at Helsinki and thereafter were broadly publicized-- they came to represent norms which directly inspired events and actions of individual citizens and encouraged open and cooperative initiatives whose purpose was to stimulate and accompany the social and political changes taking place on the European continent.

I will leave it to historians to determine whether this diplomatic process and its internal dimensions were a central factor in the changes that took place in Europe throughout the 70s and 80s. However, it is widely admitted that this process did play a very positive role in easing relations between European states and that it had an impact on key changes within countries. So the achievements of the first phase remain the unchallenged basis which today are still foremost on everybody's mind regarding the current state of the OSCE and they are an example for other processes which can develop in other geographic contexts.

## **SECOND PHASE**

The second phase which was experienced by this process and organization I would describe as a phase of achievement. The Charter of Paris and the results of the 1992 Helsinki Follow-Up Conference were the expression of the advent of a new era in Europe. The end of the division of the continent opened the way to a real convergence of views among the participants in the process and a real new ambition for the process itself. This new convergence allowed for greater consistency in the engagements which all participants had undertaken in the area of individual and collective values. And this is clearly reflected in the different quality of the nature of the texts which were adopted in this new phase particularly at the beginning of the 1990s, and the way they were subsequently consolidated. The Charter of Paris included some elaborations of the initial Helsinki principles which went well beyond the stage of ideological détente; they were much more detailed and if one looks at Chapters 6 and 7 of the new Helsinki Declaration, one finds an absolutely explicit and unanimous agreement as to the normative values of the principles underlying the process.

At the Helsinki Follow-Up Conference there was a moment when the CSCE seemed to be everybody's instrument of choice for dealing with the new tensions which were then becoming apparent in Europe. It is quite remarkable, with the benefit of hindsight, to recall that Chapter 3 of the Helsinki decisions foresaw that the CSCE could take on, on its own political authority, peacekeeping missions acting as a regional organization in the meaning of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter and call on the help of NATO and the WEO. This was at the time a very bold statement which was nevertheless accepted by all members and this was a little more than 10 years ago. It was in this very positive atmosphere that the CSCE progressively took on an

institutional dimension, first adopting a rotating presidency then a Secretary General at the Stockholm meeting and became a permanent process as we know it with a representative council, a Permanent Council with a Security Forum. At Budapest it transformed itself - at least in name - into a real organization, although it still does not have legal personality of its own and this remains an intriguing question. But basically, in this atmosphere, the new organization acquired: the High Representative for National Minorities, a European Court for Conciliation and Arbitration, which has not been tremendously active but which still remains a potentially useful tool on a regional basis, an Economic Forum, an ODIHR which was created at this phase experienced a very fast growth of its responsibilities, activities and expanded in broad fields including tolerance, media, which rapidly allowed it to acquire a great deal of authority in its process of supporting and observing electoral processes.

As was mentioned, it is worth seeing how this sort of 'spring' of the OSCE turned out. There were clearly setbacks during the Yugoslav period in the sense that it was not OSCE that was finally used as the key tool in order to handle the problems of the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia. But it was the invention of OSCE field missions-- and the first OSCE field mission was indeed in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vovodina and stayed there for some time--it was the experience of the OSCE field missions throughout the Yugoslav conflict including in the final phase of the Kosovo crisis which proved the most unanimous and probably the most successful non-military tool for managing the crisis on the ground. And it is thanks to this experience that there now have been broad developments regarding OSCE missions. During this period the human dimension has undergone a remarkable increase in its activities and has acquired a particular standing, including a public standing, in the validation of election results, with the consequences outlined by Ambassador Boden.

With all these initiatives the OSCE did achieve during that period a remarkable degree of implementation to make the domestic affairs of each member state more mutually transparent to the other member states. As we know this started to provoke some misgivings. Different types of approaches persisted among the different societies included in the process. In fact this was also a time of enlargement and broadening of the reach of the organization, and some of the new societies were clearly less advanced on the road to integrating the values and the principles of the OSCE into their domestic practice. Therefore, the function of encouragement and facilitation which is clearly the substance of this second period is a major heritage for the future. So, crisis and hopefully renewal.

### **THIRD PHASE**

With the final years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the OSCE found itself in a period where it has basically two parallel tasks. The first is to continue carry out, and it is a never-ending task, the role of guardian of common values throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and the Euro-Asian area. The second task is to find its appropriate place in a remarkably evolved institutional and political context. The enlargement of both NATO and the European Union and the links that those two organizations have established around themselves are clearly results of the remarkable attractiveness of both of these organizations to new members, which have shifted the lines of division and exchange within the European continent. This enlargement process has made a significant difference in the rules of the game and the interplay of actors within the OSCE. The members of the EU act together with increasing frequency. They now carry considerable weight in the discussions of the Permanent Council as well as of the Security Forum. On the other hand NATO has a broad scope through the Partnership for Peace, and has acquired a number of cooperation activities which in many ways shadow some of the potential security exchanges within the OSCE itself. The OSCE, therefore, has difficulty in finding the proper profile in this new context, since some of its historical activities now partially overlap with what has become the domain of the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe, and therefore the OSCE has to find a way of fitting itself into a network set of relationships among organizations.

It is a fact that in this new context there has been a remarkable amount of initiative in renewing the efforts of participants towards new dimensions which, as Ambassador Dieter Boden reminded us, are extremely relevant and germane to our societies and to all participants. The recent initiatives in the new dimensions of security issues - we all have in mind the pioneering work which is taking place in the field of small arms, light weapons and stockpiles of ammunitions - are also reflected in the problems where the exchanges in the fields of terrorism, trafficking, intolerance, the struggle against all kinds of discrimination are clearly areas where the OSCE is perfectly in line with its values, its principles and also with real effective needs within all the area of its Member States. So this innovative work is continuing and is in step with the heritage of the organization. What it perhaps lacks is visibility and impact on public opinion. There may be insufficient awareness of the new dimensions in the practice of the OSCE in today's activities.

Meanwhile the network of 18 missions by the OSCE which exist and which are highly diversified and adapted to the specific needs of each area continue to be a key tool and also a discrete one—too discrete—in the management of conflicts and to have an original role in providing stability wherever they are deployed. They unfortunately are also deployed in areas where the conflicts are cold frozen and have proved intractable over the years, but their very presence in the context of those conflicts are a clear indication of the commitment by all members of the organization to want to achieve progress in those highly difficult environments which in the present conditions are basically focussed on three regions: Moldova, Caucasus, and Central Asia.

The one area where the OSCE has great visibility is the issue of electoral monitoring and this is the one area where the general public sees visually on election evenings the involvement of the OSCE members and the statements which they make on such occasions. In this sense the symbol is very strong and as we know this carries risks and a certain amount of resentments from some of the participants within the process, but it is also a clear sign that the association between the symbol and the norms continues to be very strong. And that whatever the differences of interpretation by different states of those norms there is an ongoing process of dialogue, and open discussion and transparency of those issues, which is unchallenged.

## **FUTURE CHALLENGES**

So, new circumstances, new challenges, new difficulties--there is clearly, as we have been reminded, a sense of seeking a new balance and a new impetus. The existing tools—the Permanent Council, the Forum—are there. The Chairman in Office and Secretary General are available—but a coming back perhaps to some of the initial sources of inspiration in terms of the balance within the process and in terms of the equal footing and exchanges among the members of the organization is called for and is likely to emerge from the deliberations of the eminent persons who are discussing the issue. The security area, the economic, ecological and technological dimensions, clearly have a great deal of untapped potential that is relevant to many members of the organization. They could prove a fertile ground for further initiatives which would in fact strengthen the existing initiatives and the activities within the human dimension.

The OSCE is facing in a way a test of time. The transformations which Europe has undergone have been remarkable. The CSCE and the OSCE have made a very original contribution to this. But those transformations are not finished, in fact there is a lot still to be achieved on all sides by all members in order to fully live up to the ambitions of the initial founding fathers of Dipoli and Helsinki. The OSCE is now entering this fall a very key moment when it will have available the conclusions of the Panel of Eminent Persons; it will have in front of it the results of a series of contacts undertaken to find a new and sound footing for its work and future ambitions. And I am sure that the outcome of this period of discussions will be a series of concrete understandings on the basis of the new commitments to the initial values of the organization.



# **BUILDING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE: THE OSCE ROLE**

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*“More than an end to war, we need an end of the beginnings of all wars.”  
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 12, 1945*

## **OSCE MILESTONES AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has become a major multilateral institution bringing together 55 participating states extending from “Vancouver to Vladivostok the long way around.” It has been dedicated primarily to the prevention of violent conflict not only through reliance on traditional “hard” measures of security, but also by linking long-term security building to a wide variety of human dimensions that also have direct bearing on causing, or conversely on preventing, violent conflict.

Beginning with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (as it was then known) has constructed a normative foundation for security and cooperation in Europe based not only on confidence-building measures and arms control, but also through its concern with “good governance” and respect for human rights and the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These normative principles played an important role in undermining the legitimacy of communist governments in Eastern Europe that failed to implement the principles to which they had subscribed at Helsinki. Following the collapse of the communist bloc in 1990, the OSCE strengthened its normative base and established an institutional structure to enhance its capacity to implement its principles on a continuing basis. The Copenhagen Document on the human dimension in 1990 strengthened and expanded the provisions concerning good governance, democratization, freedom of the media, and rule of law as a foundation not only for better government but for peace in the region. The Charter of Paris signed at a Summit Conference in November 1990 created a range of new institutions that especially focused on implementing the new human dimensions provisions, as well as strengthening the conflict prevention capacities of the CSCE. This included the creation of the Conflict Prevention Center based in Vienna and the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights based in Warsaw, with the primary task of assisting governments to conduct elections and to monitor them to determine whether or not they were conducted in accordance with international standards and OSCE commitments.

In a human dimension meeting in Moscow in 1991, the participating states declared that the engagements taken on the human dimension were of direct concern to all participating states and that none of them could any longer consider these issues to fall exclusively within the internal affairs of the state concerned. Finally, in the Helsinki Follow-on Conference and Summit in 1992, the CSCE created the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, based in the Hague, to mediate conflicts between persons belonging to national

minorities and the governments of states where they reside. It also authorized the creation of Missions of Long Duration under the Conflict Prevention Center that could work on a continuous basis on the ground in regions of potential or actual violence to prevent conflicts from turning violent and to assist in the resolution of so-called “frozen conflicts.” After 1995 these missions were also mandated to engage in extensive peace-building in post-conflict societies, beginning with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia following the signing of the Dayton Accords.

## **OSCE PRINCIPLES, GOALS, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

The long-term goal of many of these principles and institutional arrangements has been to promote the growth of democratic governments throughout the region, founded on the rule of law, under the belief that a region of democratic governments will also be a region of international peace. This is based on the conclusion of a substantial amount of social science research conducted in many countries, but most often identified with the research of Michael Doyle of Columbia University and Bruce Russett of Yale University, that has found that for the past two centuries at least, democratic states have never (or almost never) engaged in war with one another.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, they find that states that share democratic governments and are simultaneously linked by extensive economic interdependence and membership in a thick web of international institutions are far less likely even to become involved in militarized international disputes involving the threat or actual use of force. This is not to say that democratic states are inherently peaceful, as they often engage in violent disputes and even wars with authoritarian states, but they generally do so by stimulating the population to support military action through demonizing the authoritarian leader of the non-democratic state.

## **DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, “DEMOCRATIC PEACE”**

The primary reason for this peaceful behavior among democratic states, I believe, is that citizens and political elites in democratic states learn through the democratic process that conflicts of interest may be resolved peacefully. Although the outcome of the democratic process usually leaves some parties winning while others lose on any given issue, if the process is considered to be fair, then losers accept their loss with the understanding that across a wide range of issues the process will assure a fair balance over the long run. Furthermore, the transparency of the democratic process means that preparation for warfare cannot go unnoticed, allowing plenty of time for negotiations before states resort to the actual use of military force. This, of course, requires that democracy grow organically and be internalized within the beliefs of entire populations. It must also be based on checks and balances and the dominance of rule of the law over the rule of any individual. It is strengthened by an energized civil society and citizens who actively participate in the political life of their country.

Therefore, regions in which all states have established stable and open democratic systems ought to become “no war” zones in which disputes will no longer be settled by violence. Just as the goal of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act was to promote security and cooperation in Europe through strengthening the rights of individuals in relationship to their governments, so the goal since 1990 has been to develop a region composed of democratic states in which expectations

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<sup>1</sup> There is an extensive literature in international politics on the “democratic peace.” Perhaps the two most definitive and recent general statements of the argument and presentation of evidence in support of the conclusion may be found in Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: Norton, 1997) and Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001).

of war, and concrete preparations for war with other participating states, would eventually fade away.

## **OSCE, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND GOOD GOVERNANCE**

Thus, nourishing and building democratic institutions and practices among OSCE participating states has been a primary goal of the organization since 1990, not just for its own sake but because of the confidence that this will be the best guarantee of peace within the OSCE region.

The OSCE has, therefore, looked with good reason upon the promotion of democracy and “good governance” - including the rule of law; freedom of the media; and free, fair, open, and competitive elections - as an integral part of its overall role in conflict prevention. Of course, this procedure differs from other conflict prevention activities in situations where the threat of violence is imminent or where violence has recently occurred and threatens to break out anew, as these situations typically require an immediate, proactive response to head off escalation to violence. By contrast, “good governance” as a conflict prevention activity focuses on the long-term and seeks, through a series of efforts, to promote a gradual shift towards more open, democratic societies.

The OSCE approach generally presumes that democracy, to be successful and to promote conditions of long-term peace and stability, must spring from within a society and the people who inhabit it. It must grow organically and cannot be imposed from outside, certainly not through force of arms. Furthermore, no single model of democratic process will take hold in all cultures and historical circumstances, so each society must be allowed the time to develop its own forms of political participation and democratic governance.

Therefore, the OSCE must generally operate through the education of peoples and their governments to be more open to democratic values. Virtually all of the 25 OSCE missions and field activities, including the 18 currently active, have the promotion of democracy and good government among the major components of their mandate, but each must approach that goal differently. Although all OSCE states committed themselves to establish democratic societies in the Copenhagen Human Dimension document of 1990, many remain far from realizing the normative goal of embracing democratic practices. This is not all that dissimilar, however, to the situation after the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, when many participating states fell short of meeting the normative principles set forth, especially those in the Decalogue of norms and principles that served as the prologue to the Final Act. Nonetheless, the CSCE worked slowly and persistently to encourage states to meet their commitments and to respond to the demands of their citizens, and the result was the series of political changes that peacefully spread across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90.

Similarly, after the CSCE adopted more stringent standards of democratic practice for its participating states in 1990, which many of them fall far short of meeting in practice, the OSCE has again had to adopt a process of gradual transformation, cajoling and enticing states to move towards the normative standards set forth in the CSCE’s vast *acquis* dealing with democratization. Frequent seminars led by international experts, training courses on issues such as policing in a democratic context, or assistance with the development of new courses on political practices within the schools and universities can all contribute to long-term growth of democratic values. These practices are used most frequently in those societies where the appearance of modern democratic systems seems farthest away, in locations such as Belarus, most of Central Asia, and many of the states of the Southern Caucasus. Here governments generally resist installing anything more than the superficial trappings of democracy, so the

OSCE must build democratic values slowly and indirectly, mostly working with the young and with elements of civil society that may be more receptive to democratic values than political elites.

In other societies, especially those that had hopes of joining European institutions such as the Council of Europe, the European Union, or NATO, the process could be more direct. Thus, in countries such as Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine, the OSCE missions worked closely with governments, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in order to bring laws closer to compliance with the OSCE norms and to assist in the implementation and enforcement of those laws in order to meet international standards. In this case, a clearly defined goal of bringing these political systems to a level of democratic practice needed to meet the criteria for entry into European institutions was attainable within a finite period of time, and the OSCE approach to promoting democracy could thus be more direct.

After September 11, 2001, “good governance” also took on a new meaning within the OSCE context. It became clear that several of those states and regions that were furthest from meeting OSCE standards were also the same regions where the risk for terrorism to arise among the population was greatest, or at least where there was a serious risk that terrorist networks might receive support and sustenance from a disaffected population. Thus, promoting greater political participation and a sense of identity with the state became not only a normative goal, but one that was immediately linked to the struggle to limit terrorism. Providing channels for legitimate dissent in some of the most authoritarian states of the region thus became essential. Furthermore, specific measures that were introduced to control terrorism, such as more effective policing and border controls, also required training border guards and internal security forces in the process of law enforcement within a democratic system, where the rights of persons are respected even as law enforcement is carried out.

## **OSCE ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION AND PREVENT CONFLICT**

Primary responsibility for long-term democracy-building generally lies with the “missions of long duration” and other field activities of the OSCE, which are permanently stationed on the ground in regions that experience a serious democratic deficit, or where violence is threatened or has recently occurred. Here, long-term relationships may be built with both governments and elements of civil society, who may trust the OSCE mission as an honest broker in case of conflict because of their long experience of working alongside them. It also means that OSCE mission members should, if they are in their posts long enough, have a deeper knowledge of local circumstances than any intervention that enters a region from outside. Thus, the 25 OSCE missions, of which 18 are still in service, provide the “eyes and ears” of the OSCE on the ground. They constantly monitor for “early warning” signs of possible brewing trouble, and the Head of Mission or a mission specialist may often intervene in local conflicts as they happen in order to prevent them from escalating beyond the local level. This has been a significant part of the OSCE missions in Belarus, Central Asia, and the Southern Caucasus.

The office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities has the possibility of entering into conflicts that appears anywhere in the OSCE region involving grievances between persons belonging to a national minority and their government. The HCNM may enter into such situations early and at the local level, without having to receive authorization from any OSCE body. His function is to serve as a “go between” for governments and persons belonging to minorities, not to act as an advocate for minority causes. His efforts thus must always be directed towards working towards practical solutions that both governments and persons



belonging to minorities can accept. But he does also seek to avoid a common problem that may arise in any democratic polity, especially in young ones, namely the tendency, in de Toqueville's words, for a "dictatorship of the majority" to arise, in which the will of the majority governs without paying due regard to the interests of minorities. For example, this has been and still is an important role played by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in interceding in disputes in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between the ethnic Macedonian majority and an ethnic Albanian minority or in Latvia between the ethnic Latvian majority and an ethnic Russian minority.

## **OSCE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTION PROCESSES**

Although free, competitive, and fair elections are not a sufficient condition for democratic governance, they are a necessary one. Therefore, while going well beyond election monitoring in its democracy-building activities, the OSCE has also created in the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, based in Warsaw, a substantial capacity to assist countries in setting up and running elections, as well as monitoring the entire election process from the campaign through counting and certifying of votes to assure that they are conducted according to OSCE and other international standards. Typically, small teams of observers are deployed on the ground weeks or even months prior to an election to observe the campaign, registration process, and other preparations for the election. These teams normally swell many fold in the days prior to and just after an election, as OSCE election monitors fan out to local stations throughout a country or region to observe the conduct of that election on the ground and close up. The results of these observations are then summarized in detailed election reports made available to the governments of the concerned states as well as to the general public. This process has proven to be of special importance in highly contested elections, including recent elections in the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine, where in both cases the ODIHR report led to the overturning of an election result and the conduct of new elections and more open procedures. Thus, in many ways both Georgia's "rose revolution" and Ukraine's "orange revolution" were facilitated by OSCE election monitoring.

Finally, free elections and democratic practice require free and competitive media, including print and electronic media. Therefore, in 1998 the OSCE created the Special Representative on the Freedom of the Media, based in Vienna, to promote free and open journalism throughout the region and, especially during electoral campaigns, equal access to the media by all legitimate candidates. All of these OSCE institutions thus coordinate their efforts to promote more open democratic processes throughout the OSCE region. To the extent that these efforts are successful, the theory of the democratic peace argues that this should not only promote better governance but international peace and security as well.

## **CHALLENGES FACING THE OSCE**

In spite of this substantial growth in the institutional capacity to promote democratization as a source of peace and as a prophylactic against anomic violence and terrorism, the capacity of the OSCE to carry out these tasks effectively has faced serious challenges and obstacles during the past few years. Thirty years after the Helsinki Final Act was signed, and 15 years after the signing of the Charter of Paris and the Copenhagen and Moscow human dimension documents, the OSCE seems to have lost momentum in the development and diffusion of its normative base. Indeed, a few states are beginning to challenge the newer norms in an attempt to return to the dominant principles practiced during the Cold War and prior to the 1991 Moscow document, where the Helsinki principle on non-intervention in the internal affairs of states was held by the Soviet Union to be absolute. So today, Russia appears to want to go back on the

commitments taken as the Cold War came to an end, when it and all other participating states agreed to give the OSCE a “*droit de regard*” over their fulfillment of the OSCE commitments, taking precedence over the principle of nonintervention.

By attempting to restore the almost absolute right of state sovereignty, it threatens to take away the very provision that has allowed the OSCE to develop its essential capacities over the past ten years. This applies especially to the democratization activities of the OSCE, which Russian leaders and spokespersons have denounced in recent months. No doubt that was a reflection of their general disappointment with the outcome of the recent elections in Georgia, Ukraine, and even in Kyrgyzstan, and their most virulent attacks have been directed against ODIHR for what they describe as the subjectivity of its election-monitoring process.

The Russian disaffection with the OSCE, however, runs considerably deeper. As the Cold War was coming to an end, Russia promoted making the CSCE the primary post-cold war European security structure that would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization as the foundation for pan-European security. The West, in its desire to protect and reform NATO, resisted these efforts forcefully, causing them to fall far short of the proclaimed Russian goals. Therefore, now that NATO has not only continued to exist but has enlarged to absorb many of the former Warsaw Pact states, Russia feels with some justification that its interests have been ignored in the *realpolitik* game that followed the end of the Cold War.

In many ways the current crisis began with the dispute over how to respond to the crisis in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Russian political leaders had been reassured by NATO, affirmed through a series of agreements between the Russian government and NATO, that NATO would not engage in military action “out of area” without political authorization of either the United Nations or the OSCE, where Russia had a more direct voice than it did in NATO decision-making. Yet the decision by NATO to undertake a military campaign in 1999 without such an authorization, in which Russia also perceived that NATO was using the OSCE for its own strategic purposes, was deeply resented by the Russian political elite. The same year also marked the transition in power in Russia from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin, which also was associated with a shift in Russian attitudes towards the OSCE that became evident by the 1999 Istanbul Summit, even before Putin assumed the formal position as Russia’s president.

However, for a time after the Russians became disillusioned with the OSCE, they nonetheless continued to participate because they saw that the organization served some concrete Russian interests. Nowhere was this more apparent than with regard to the OSCE missions in both Latvia and Estonia. After independence was achieved in these two former Soviet republics, large minorities of ethnic Russians were living in these two states. However, all Russians who entered the regions after their allegedly “unlawful” incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940 were in both cases declared to be non-citizens. They lost their international passports and many lost their right to vote in these new “democracies.” The Russian Federation not surprisingly has taken great interest in the fate of its ethnic Russian co-nationals in the newly independent states in their “near abroad.” Beginning in 1992, OSCE Missions were established in Both Latvia and Estonia, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities worked tirelessly to try to bring these regimes up to Western democratic standards. Indeed, new laws were often passed that appeared to improve the situation, but the implementation of these new laws was often slow and incomplete, especially in Latvia.

In spite of these problems, Western Europe and the United States pushed to bring these two OSCE missions to a conclusion at the end of 2002, while also admitting both countries into NATO and the European Union, well before their actual behavior was in compliance with

OSCE and general European norms and standards. This proved to be a serious mistake, because almost immediately thereafter Russia began to cease having any strong interest in perpetuating the OSCE, which no longer served any concrete Russian interests. Furthermore, it eliminated the leverage that Western states had used in the past to encourage Russian support for maintaining an OSCE Monitoring Group in Belarus and the Assistance Group in Chechnya, so the former was given a far weaker mandate and the latter was closed down altogether in 2003.

Another issue that has created some tensions between Russia and most of the other participating states involves Russian troops stationed in both Georgia and Moldova. In 1993 the Russian Federation signed an agreement with the Republic of Moldova to remove troops that were stationed in the breakaway Transdniestria region on the left bank of the Dniestr River, but the agreement was not ratified by the Duma. Subsequently, Russia made several other commitments within the OSCE context to withdraw its troops by the end of 2002 from both Georgia and the Transdniestria region of Moldova, most clearly formulated at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit. Although troop levels in Transdniestria have been reduced and an agreement has recently been reached with Georgia to withdraw Russian forces by 2008, the issue of Russian troops stationed abroad contrary to the wishes of the host countries remains a source of tension between Russia and its OSCE partners.

But the major source of tension has involved the role of the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in monitoring elections. In this respect, to some degree the OSCE has become a victim of its own success. On several occasions ODIHR's election reports have resulted in popular uprisings and the overthrow of officials elected in apparently fraudulent elections. This process began with the "rose revolution" in Georgia during the winter of 2003-04, followed by the "orange revolution" in Ukraine in late 2004. As ODIHR had also presented a somewhat critical report of the Russian presidential elections as well, Russia's political leadership, especially President Putin, was already critical of ODIHR. When ODIHR also released its preliminary report indicating that the election process in the second round of Ukraine's presidential election did not meet OSCE and international standards, President Putin tried to intervene in support of the government's candidate, Viktor Yanukovich. He was thus further embarrassed when the Ukrainian Constitutional Court considered ODIHR's report as a major factor in declaring that the elections were fraudulent and needed to be held again. The second running of the elections resulted in the election of the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, creating a great embarrassment for President Putin, who has subsequently been openly critical of the allegedly biased way in which ODIHR fulfills its function of monitoring elections. His argument was further reinforced following disputed results in 2005 of the elections in Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in an uprising that forced President Akayev from office, albeit in circumstances that were quite different from those in Georgia and Ukraine.

## **RUSSIA'S PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE OSCE**

Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of these actions has led the Russian Federation, actively supported only by Belarus among the 55 OSCE participating states, to call for dramatic changes in the structure and functioning of the OSCE. Among Russian proposals have been the following:

- (1) The OSCE should rebalance the three Helsinki "baskets" and concentrate more heavily on the security and economic dimensions, while reducing the Western emphasis on human rights.

Specifically, this includes placing the emphasis in election monitoring on “objective criteria” rather than on subjective evaluations, while also cutting back substantially on the overall OSCE project to bring about Western-style democratic transitions in OSCE participating states. It also would include a greater emphasis on contemporary security threats such as combating religious fundamentalism and terrorism, as well as focusing more on the promotion of economic development as a prerequisite for political change.

(2) The focus of OSCE monitoring should also be rebalanced, so that equal attention is paid to monitoring both “west and east of Vienna.” The OSCE practice has been to stigmatize the former communist countries as undemocratic countries that need to be carefully monitored, while assuming that countries with a long history of democratic practices actually operate in a consistently democratic manner. In the Russian perception, this assumption often leads the OSCE’s Western-dominated institutions to adopt a “double standard.”

(3) The role of the Secretary General and the Secretariat should be strengthened. In this regard, the Russians would give special priority to giving the office greater political and operational control over the OSCE Missions and field activities, in order to prevent Heads of Missions from acting on behalf of the interests of their own country rather than the OSCE as a whole.

All of these proposals, however, have also been accompanied by a rhetorical attack on OSCE institutions and principles that reminds many like myself who have observed the OSCE since its founding in 1975 of the rhetoric of the “cold war” days, especially of the kind of rhetoric not heard in the OSCE since the Madrid Review conference in the early 1980’s.

On the surface, many of the Russian criticisms sound sensible and some undoubtedly have merit. However, taken as a whole, they threaten to undermine the normative basis that the OSCE assumed at the end of the Cold War. Of greatest significance is that they threaten to repudiate the Moscow Document of 1991 providing OSCE states with a *droit de regard* over other participating states when it comes to the fulfillment of OSCE obligations, replacing this provision with a literal interpretation of the Helsinki Decalogue’s provision against intervention in the internal affairs of states, which had been the mantra of the Soviet government for the first 15 years after the signature of the Helsinki Final Act until it was superseded by the Moscow Document in 1991. The Russian attacks will also negate many of the provisions of the 1990 Charter of Paris and Copenhagen Document on the human dimension of security. Since one of the major strengths of the OSCE has been the intimate link between the human dimension and international and human security, turning back the clock in this fashion would essentially destroy the OSCE as an instrument for creating and diffusing normative values about good governance and human dignity as a foundation for security.

By also targeting OSCE Missions and field activities, the Russian criticisms also threaten to undermine one of the other unique strengths of the OSCE, namely its ability to station “missions of long duration” on the territory of countries and regions where violent conflict is threatened or has broken out. This process is reinforced by the capacity of the OSCE’s High Commission on National Minorities to provide almost immediate assistance to parties to a conflict that breaks out anywhere on OSCE territory that involves persons belonging to national minorities. It is the long-term presence of missions on the ground that develop a close knowledge of the situation in conflict-prone regions and the flexibility of the OSCE to respond rapidly when violence threatens, supported by the office of the High Commissioner, that distinguishes the OSCE from other international institutions, including the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, and NATO. If this capacity is in any way undermined

by new reforms, then the OSCE will lose its most distinctive strength, effectively undermining its essential *raison d'être* in the post-cold war structures of European security.

The challenge, therefore, facing the OSCE at this critical juncture is to find ways of responding to legitimate Russian concerns, taken at face value, without at the same time undermining the normative foundation of the OSCE or its flexible operational capacity in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The fact that there was a serious budgetary crisis at the end of 2004, and that the 2005 budget was not approved until May of 2005 largely as a result of Russian objections, combined with the inability to reach a consensus on a final communiqué at three of the last five annual OSCE ministerial meetings, suggests that Russian concerns about the OSCE present a serious challenge to the ability of the OSCE to function effectively.

## **ENHANCING SECURITY INTERESTS THROUGH SUPPORT OF THE OSCE**

Although both the United States and the European Union support the OSCE at a general level, both have also been preoccupied elsewhere: The United States, of course, has been heavily focused on the Middle East ever since the end of the Cold War and even more so since 9/11. It has, therefore, from time to time, found the OSCE to be a useful mechanism to serve US interests in the broad European region, where limited attention and resources make it useful for the United States to pursue a multilateral approach. At the same time, on key issues such as the threat of terrorism, for example, the United States has preferred to act unilaterally, occasionally bilaterally with Russia, or at other times through “coalitions of the willing,” rather than trying to achieve consensus within diverse institutions such as the OSCE.

The European Union has also been preoccupied largely with its own internal affairs, both enlargement through the addition of many new members from among OSCE participating states, and through deepening its commitments. In an effort to construct a Common Foreign and Security Policy it has on occasion created institutions and processes that seem to duplicate those already present in the OSCE and even to come into competition with the OSCE in some field operations, especially in its immediate “neighborhood” in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, from Belarus through Moldova and Ukraine and into the Balkans. In spite of the abortive attempts to agree on a single, if misnamed “Constitution” for Europe, the European Union clearly has a capacity to play a significant role in security, democratization, human rights, and economic development as part of its “neighborhood policy.” However, the absence of either strong Western European interests or a history of extensive involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia still leaves these two regions as vital areas, but also areas of great potential instability, where security and development will of necessity have to involve the active participation of Russia and the United States. And the only existing institution through which such action can be undertaken on a cooperative basis remains the OSCE.

In spite of these constraints, there are ways in which the OSCE can be strengthened through specific reforms, some of which at least respond at face value to Russian criticisms. However, it is essential that these reforms neither undermine the normative core of the OSCE in the human dimension nor limit its flexibility to work on the ground in regions of potential or actual violent conflict in order to promote a resolution of conflict and effective peace-building activities. It is essential to emphasize that the OSCE needs Russian participation, and Russia needs the OSCE. The OSCE needs Russia because Russia is intimately involved in many of the vital issues and regions where the OSCE currently works, and it is hard to imagine how the problems facing these regions can be solved without constructive Russian involvement. Russia needs the OSCE because it is the only regional security institution linking it to Western Europe and the United States at which it formally has an *equal* seat at the table. It further needs

the OSCE because it can be the most effective instrument to promote stability in the regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which currently pose the most serious external threats to Russian security.

If Russia's political leaders can see beyond their personal anger and embarrassment regarding elections in former Soviet states and focus instead realistically upon the most pressing external security threats to Russia today, they will realize that these primarily come not from an enlarged European Union or NATO, not even from an economic and military emerging rival in China, but from instability along the southern borders of the Russian Federation. Although they, not unlike the United States, have tended to prefer unilateral and largely military actions to deal with imminent threats to their own security, they should realize that effective multilateral efforts under the umbrella of the OSCE, where they are an important participating state, are far more likely to enhance Russian security interests than the kinds of short-sighted recent actions they have taken, as, for example, the decision to close down OSCE border monitoring in Georgia and to replace it with unilateral Russian measures. In spite of these considerations, there is no assurance that Russian leaders will recognize their long-term security interests in preserving an effective and flexible OSCE, linking the human dimension and international security.

If a choice has to be made, it seems clear to me that an OSCE that remains faithful to its normative foundations and that preserves and strengthens those operational capacities in which it has a comparative advantage in the field of conflict management must be preserved, even if it means the withdrawal or marginalization of the Russian Federation. At present, Russia, along with Belarus, has become largely isolated within the OSCE, primarily as a result of its own actions. However, because of the consensus rule, it still has the capacity to block effective action by the organization as a whole. This impasse cannot continue indefinitely. It will require a great deal of skillful diplomacy on the part of OSCE participating states to avoid having to make a hard choice between two very undesirable options, namely agreeing to a seriously weakened OSCE with Russian participation or an OSCE that maintains its core principles, but without the participation of one of its essential states.

## **STRENGTHENING THE OSCE FOR THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY**

Therefore, I turn in conclusion to some ways in which I believe that the OSCE as a whole can respond constructively to some of the major criticisms leveled against it without undermining its core values and operational capabilities.

First, the office of the Secretary General needs to be strengthened in any case in order to provide continuity for the institution that cannot be provided by the current system of rotating chairs-in-office. The office needs to be led by a dynamic and eminent person, who is perceived as a legitimate international leader within the OSCE community of states. This person should be capable of acting politically to support the work of the chairman-in-office, the Conflict Prevention Center or its successor, and the High Commission on National Minorities in order to assist in the settlement of conflicts such as the recent ones in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan when high-level support may prove useful. The Secretariat also needs to have an enlarged professional support staff focused not only on conflict prevention, but also on the wide range of conflict management and peace-building activities in which the OSCE is engaged. An analytical center to provide support for the work of missions in the field, recruitment of a more professional staff to serve both in Vienna and in the field for longer periods of time, and better training of mission members and secretariat staff are essential to provide the Secretariat with the capacity to deal with contemporary issues facing the OSCE in the 21st century.

The Secretary General should also be empowered to exercise some operational influence over Heads of Mission to ensure that they operate within their mandates and do not represent the interests of only one or a few participating states - this is essential to preserve the consensual basis on which the OSCE operates. At the same time, it is necessary to give Mission Heads sufficient flexibility to make operational decisions at the local level, so that the OSCE can retain its flexibility rather than becoming a highly bureaucratized and centralized international organization such as the United Nations or even the European Union, which too often limits the effectiveness of these institutions, especially preventing them from responding rapidly in volatile regions, which remains the unique strength of the OSCE. Achieving such a delicate balance will admittedly be difficult, but it is also essential to maintain simultaneously the effectiveness and the widespread legitimacy of OSCE field operations.

Second, without abandoning in any way its commitments in the human dimension, including activities in good governance, human rights, rule of law, freedom of the media, and the rights of persons belonging to minorities, the OSCE also needs to reinvigorate the first-basket activities in the area of security. Briefly, this includes moving ahead rapidly with the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty, bringing many OSCE participating states within the CFE regime that were not previously there, since they belonged neither to NATO nor to the Warsaw Pact when the original CFE Treaty was signed in 1990. This should be accompanied by the updating of the Vienna document on confidence and security-building measures so that it meshes more effectively both with the Adapted CFE Treaty and with new OSCE initiatives in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

Most significantly, however, the major security challenge facing the region today comes from a wide range of illicit trans-border activities that threaten both the security of individuals and of states. This “dark side of globalization” includes trafficking in small arms and light weapons, drugs, currency, human beings, and perhaps - in the extreme case - materials useful for the production of biological, chemical, or nuclear (including radiological) weapons. The interconnections between criminality and terrorist organizations is generally recognized, and yet few effective measures have been put into place to try to break the nexus between these dangerous transnational activities. At the same time, regulation of illicit trans-border flows must be carried out consistent with the provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act which (albeit in a very different context) sought to promote the free flow of persons and goods across national borders as a basic principle of human rights. Because of its linkage between these two dimensions, and because of its history of operating on the ground in the regions where the greatest trafficking of illicit materials is occurring, the OSCE is uniquely positioned to play a leading role in this activity. Such a new focus, integrating many activities in which the OSCE is already actively engaged, could provide a new consensus among all participating states (especially for Russia, whose interests are most directly threatened by illicit trans-border trafficking) around low visibility but effective international cooperation to deal with a real, concrete threat to the security of all participating states and all citizens of the region.

Third, the OSCE does need to balance some of its security and human dimension activities in terms of their geographical focus. Without abandoning its efforts to assist states in transition to promote good governance and democratization, where most participating states welcome OSCE engagement, the OSCE should also focus more attention westward. Older democracies within the OSCE need to acknowledge that nowhere has the perfect democracy yet been created, and democratization is a process on which all 55 participating states are embarked, even if some have been working at it longer than others. Furthermore, new technologies introduced in some Western countries, such as electronic voting without any permanent record being kept, used in

some US states in the 2004 election, represent an invitation to fraud and thus constitute a serious threat to democratic processes even in the world's most experienced democracies. At the same time, with limited resources (in part due to the budgetary challenges introduced by some larger participants), the OSCE must target most of its expertise in election-monitoring at those regions where serious violations of OSCE commitments are most likely to occur, and we should recognize that "rebalancing" OSCE involvement west of Vienna will require more, not fewer resources for the miniscule budget on which the OSCE now operates.

Similarly, OSCE involvement in issues concerning the rights of persons belonging to minorities or even regional secession need not be exclusively focused towards the East. In principle, there is no reason why OSCE institutions such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities, albeit with a modification of the mandate for the office, ought not to assist in the settlement of issues such as the status of the Basque minority in Spain, the Kurdish minority in Turkey, the status of Quebec within Canada, the conflicts between Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, or the rights of indigenous peoples in both the United States and Canada. Such a "rebalancing" might remove some of the stigma attached to the involvement of current OSCE activities in participating states and emphasize that the OSCE's role is not one of condemning States, but one of assisting states and their citizens to resolve differences peacefully and arrive at mutually beneficial solutions to their problems. This suggestion will no doubt be received with considerable sensitivity and probably great opposition in most Western European and North American countries. However, that very fact may assist political leaders in the West to empathize more readily with their counterparts in former socialist states, where the OSCE has heretofore been most active, thereby increasing Western sensitivity to the perception held in many states located "east of Vienna" that OSCE involvement implies a stigmatization of the integrity of their nation. We need to instill the norm that the OSCE's role is one of assisting all participating States in complying with their OSCE commitments to achieve a more just and peaceful society.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Finally, I would like to conclude by emphasizing that none of these "reforms" or reorientations of OSCE activities should detract in any way from continuing its important mission in conflict management and the promotion of good governance on the ground in the OSCE region. The OSCE has already played an essential role in: assisting failed states such as Albania in 1997 or Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995; preventing violence to reignite in secessionist regions of Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan; monitoring terrorist activities in Chechnya and Uzbekistan; trying to reduce illegal trafficking of all kinds in places such as Ukraine, Moldova, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and dealing with flagrant violations of human rights in countries such as Belarus and Turkmenistan. It has been more successful at these activities than most observers realize, in part because its success consists mostly in the cumulative effects of thousands of small achievements, often imperceptible even to well-informed observers. This success has been enhanced by its flexibility and adaptability, by its capacity for rapid response, and by its continuous presence on the ground in some of the most unstable regions where contacts with citizens, local NGOs, and local governments may prove more effective than activities undertaken solely at the state level. It promotes the development of good governance "the old fashioned way," by education, persuasion, and support, rather than forcing alien political structures on populations that have no experience with the kinds of institutions generally associated with most Western democracies.

To be successful in these tasks it needs several things. First and foremost it needs greater, not reduced, commitments of resources, talented personnel, and above all energetic involvement



from its major participating states, including the United States, Russia, and the European Union member states. Second, it needs to strengthen and professionalize its central institutions, especially its secretariat, without creating an overly large and bureaucratized organization, and it needs to improve its capacity to mobilize cadres of trained civilian personnel to respond to crises anywhere in the region when they occur. Third, it needs to cooperate with other regional and international organizations to work out an effective division of labor, in which competition for dominance in certain functions will cease but where no important functions will fall through the cracks.

In my view, the major threat to European (including transatlantic) security since the end of the Cold War is not an external enemy, as in times past, but rather the region's own past. The European state system that evolved after 1648 was able for a time to maintain a modicum of stability on the continent, often at the expense of the colonization of much of the rest of the globe. But the *realpolitik* tradition in European power politics, founded as it was upon the principle of *raison d'état*, led to its logical result in the two great wars of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The greatest single threat to European security in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century is that it might return to that system of the past in which security depends upon the flexible operation of a complex system of power balancing among independent great powers, or in its modern form by coalitions of states acting collectively as a great power.

At present the OSCE represents the only international institution in which those potentially competitive great powers that share a common European heritage - Russia, the European Union states, and the United States - work together under a single security umbrella. Its normative core provides the foundation for the creation of – in the words of the great European-American scholar of international relations, Karl Deutsch – a “pluralistic security community” based on the norms of democratic governance and the peaceful settlement of intra-state and inter-state disputes within a framework of comprehensive, cooperative security.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the challenges currently facing the OSCE have broad implications far beyond their short-term institutional content.

The OSCE's response to these challenges will ultimately be a measure of whether or not this region is really prepared to turn away from its past history of power politics and destructive war by further extending the institutional framework for broad, regional, cooperative security. The failure to surmount these challenges in this first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will represent a significant step backwards in the effort to escape from Europe's past. A willingness to work together to solve current problems and to strengthen the OSCE will, on the other hand, represent a significant step towards constructing new possibilities for a more peaceful Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, founded on the interconnected principles of human rights, good governance, human and national security, and international cooperation.

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<sup>2</sup> For the original conceptualization of pluralistic security communities, see Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). For a more contemporary examination of this concept see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

# **OBSERVATIONS ON GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE**

## **SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

**William Pfaff<sup>1</sup>**

We approach a turning point in the structure of international relationships and the role of international organizations such as the OSCE. OSCE and NATO are perhaps the most affected by this, since both were created out of the cold war, the latter at the cold war's start as a response to its military threat, and the former as -- unintentionally but in the event -- an agent of the cold war's liquidation.

NATO found a post-cold war half-life as a mechanism for democratizing ex-Warsaw Pact armies but now its future is quietly being fought over between the U.S., which wishes to make it an auxiliary force to U.S. foreign policy -- a "tool box" in war and a post-war, or post-intervention, police, pacification, and nation-building force-- and those who resist that reformulation of what originally was a focused alliance of nominally equal allies. OSCE is faithful to its original spirit and mission but in changed conditions that cause tension with a Russia which regards the organization as being pressed to become an agent of American policy.

The European Union is also at a crucial and fascinating turning-point as a consequence of expansion and the crisis over ratification of the European constitutional treaty. But that is another subject.

Let me make a brief historical recapitulation. The collapse of Communism ended the postwar bipolar international structure of political power and invited its replacement. This has not occurred; the issue remains unresolved. The Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of an emerging structure of multilateral power and influence in which a united Europe, Japan, China and eventually India were to share influence with the US and a reformed USSR. He later proposed a new European structure based on the notion of a "common European home."

The first Bush administration, following the Gulf War, spoke about a New World Order without developing what that would mean, although insofar as it was worked out in Washington circles, seemed to have imagined at least the possibility of US troop withdrawal from western Europe in exchange for what was happening in the Warsaw Pact. The crisis that ended Gorbachev's presidency and dissolved the USSR arrested change, being followed by a decade of economic disorder as well as great and still unresolved political uncertainties in Russia.

This confirmed the American consciousness of having arrived at a "unilateral moment" as the "sole superpower". Next came the internationalization and deregulation of markets, an initiative of the Clinton administration, producing profound political as well as economic instabilities internationally (unanticipated and underestimated at the time), which laid the base in trade and finance for a globalization of American political conceptions and activity, as well as of the infrastructure of its military power, whose global deployment became increasingly seen as essential to American national security.

After 9/11, conservative American hostility towards international organizations and those limitations on American action that are part of formal alliance relationships combined

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<sup>1</sup> Political Analyst and Journalist

with certain persisting "Wilsonian" ideas in American political culture to strengthen those favoring the creation of a new form of world governance, a monopolar union of the democracies under American leadership. This found formal expression in the 2002 Bush Administration National Strategy declaration's claim to a privilege of unilateral and preemptive interventions by the United States in what is held to be the common interest, followed in 2003 by the invasion of Iraq. This was given a new intellectual formulation in the argument that the UN was no longer relevant to the situation produced by terrorism, nor competent to deal with it. (The same judgment was implicitly made about NATO, where the US has ceased to work within an alliance political framework of equality and consensual action, substituting a system of coalitions adapted to specific American military goals and needs.)

The new international conceptions of the administration explicitly rejected the prevailing Westphalian principle of absolute national sovereignties as outmoded and tending towards international conflict (Condoleezza Rice developed this argument in addressing the IISS in 2003, saying that a multipolar distribution of international power implies competition, and competition produces war). The United States implicitly asked for a new international system, as yet to be fully described, in which the existing democracies would give up the multipolar notion of international relations and search for power balance, replacing it with a new alliance under American direction to keep international order and maintain the peace. This has been received with hostility by Russia, China, France, Germany, and by other of the European powers (although by no means all). The issue has been in abeyance, as American policy in the second G.W. Bush government turned to mending transatlantic relations, but no doubt it will arise again, as it is an expression of certain central tendencies in American political culture.

I began by speaking of turning points for international institutions but implicit in all of this is an American turning point as well, or indeed an American national crisis of policy and indeed of identity. It is logical although by no means certain to expect a resolution or decisive development in American policy perceptions and action by the time of the next presidential election. However, events may take a hand preemptively, in the Middle East, with decisive success or failure in finding a resolution of the Palestine-Israel conflict, or in continuing instability and uncertainty, or even breakdown, in Iraq and the region, or in some new American initiative. This might on the one hand threaten collapse of the central thrust in Bush administration policy, or on the other hand produce significant progress towards the sought-after pro-American "democratization" of the "greater Middle East." (I exclude consideration of the financial, social and political stresses inside the United States itself, which are not negligible, and could have an important influence on events.)

It is relevant to ask if the form of power the United States finds itself possessing and chooses to employ in its "unilateral moment" -- military power, deployed in the service of a militarized policy -- is really relevant to the real nature of the present crisis of the international system, which is political and moral. For this reason Europeans may find that they are better equipped to address the challenge than is the United States.



AUSTRIAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**ACIS-OSCE**

**CONFERENCE TO COMMEMORATE THE  
30<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT**

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

**Frances Mautner Markhof**

**Austrian Center for International Studies**

On the occasion of the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, the inaugural conference of ACIS, the Austrian Center for International Studies, organized in cooperation with the OSCE, was held in Vienna on 21-22 April 2005. The program of this conference is included at the end of this report.

The main areas addressed at this conference were: the evolving role of the OSCE in achieving security and stability; the role of the EU; new challenges to democratic systems and the emerging order in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; and the relationship between security and democracy in the OSCE area. In connection with these main areas, relevant experiences would be analysed for what can be learned going forward.

Some of the key questions addressed concerned the evolution and challenges to democratic systems, and the security requirements of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as well as the evolving role of regional organizations, in particular the OSCE. These questions included:

- What are the forms and functions towards which multilateral regional organizations should evolve, and how is this to be accomplished
- How can these organizations serve the interests of all members
- Under which conditions would member states wish to continue or provide political, financial, human and other commitments and resources.
- How can such organizations best deal with actual and potential instabilities and crises within these systems as well as in their environments.
- What are the new sources of change and instability, and how do these impact the emerging regional and global order.
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**DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY**

Democracy, security and good governance are inseparable, and this includes the rule of law and human rights. Since the Helsinki Final Act, this link between security and democracy has

existed and been acknowledged, as well as the idea that human rights and security are inseparable. The CSCE and then the OSCE in the 1990s were instrumental in helping states consolidate their democratic processes, and provided the mechanisms whereby states can assist and have assisted each other in the democratization process.

Democracy cannot exist in a vacuum, nor be imposed from above. It must rest on a solid structure of human rights, rule of law, good governance and the necessary institutions of civil society. Security, as well as a perspective on economic and social progress, are essential for functioning democracies. Providing freedom without a future is a prescription for failure.

The spread of successful democratic systems takes place by example, not by force. Whether and how a functioning democracy is achieved will depend on the specific conditions of each country. Many different paths have been taken, for example in East Asia, where economic prosperity preceded and supported democracy, and in some of the countries of central and Eastern Europe, where there was a more parallel development of the economic and political systems. Russia, again, was an exception.

All forms of democracy are fragile, both in terms of endurance of democratic principles and of susceptibility to transformation into other less benign political systems. There has always been a constant tension between equality and freedom, and finding the right balance between these. Overextension, or 'imperial overstretch', can arise through excess and inefficiencies in military expenditures and commitments and can become a source of instability.

Democracy is imperfect and in need of constant improvement and adaptation. Democracy is distinguished from other political systems in that in theory it is perfectible--one does not have to destroy the system to get a better one. Change can be accomplished peacefully.

## **EVOLVING ROLE OF THE OSCE AND EU**

The European Union has been at the forefront of exporting stability and security. It has been a club that many states wish to join and for which they voluntarily accept the membership conditions, namely pluralistic democratic systems, rule of law, human rights and market-based economic systems. Thus democracy has been exported by example and not by force. The EU supports a comprehensive approach to foreign policy, based on complementarity and conflict prevention. It also supports the unique role of the OSCE.

Europe has been encouraged to take a larger role in international foreign and security policy, commensurate with its economic status and power, including a stronger Euro-Pacific dimension (in addition to its Euro-Atlantic dimension).

The EU cannot replace the OSCE, with which it cooperates. The OSCE should play the leading role in supporting democratic transitions and good governance, including human rights and the rule of law. It also has a key role in the prevention of conflicts and peaceful resolution of disputes. In general, OSCE is in the position to lead, in cooperation where necessary with the EU and other organizations, on many 'soft-security' issues and operations.

The OSCE is currently under criticism by Russia, which claims there is not a fair balance in OSCE criticism of democratic processes and other issues in the older, newer and aspiring democracies, and speaks of an instrumentalization of the OSCE. Russia does not see, but wishes the OSCE to operate by, accepted and objective standards for OSCE interventions in internal affairs, e.g., election monitoring. Russia aims to have a better balance between the

OSCE's support for democratization and human rights on the one hand, and economic and security issues (including terrorism) on the other.

The OSCE has taken these criticisms seriously and is addressing these issues constructively. It is clear that it cannot function effectively without Russian commitment and support. But it is also essential that Russia recommit to the basic principles and standards of the OSCE, embodied in the HFA.

Thus, the OSCE can adjust structures and implementation but not principles. It should, however, consider if and how it can constructively respond to the criticism that it unduly stresses the human dimension and election processes at the cost of other key areas such as security, CSBMs, economic dimension etc.

Russia has experienced cataclysmic changes and considers that in some cases the process of democratization can move too fast, leading to potential instability. The historically unprecedented attempt to impose democracy and market economy from the top down, after the fall of the Soviet Union, created the basis for much of its present problems and instabilities. It was pointed out that Russia may increasingly look to East Asia and to learn from its experience.

The OSCE should focus on a broader definition of security including the human dimension, economic and traditional security, rule of law, implementation of norms and standards, fostering transparency and trust. Within this context it should also support and facilitate, on a cooperative basis, democratic processes. OSCE field missions are essential. The OSCE is a work in progress, requiring not only adaptation but also strengthening.

It was emphasized that even if the OSCE would no longer exist, governments would still be obliged to be accountable for their behaviour and policies, externally to other governments and internally to its own citizens. Neither human rights, the rule of law nor democratic systems or aspirations would cease to exist.

The OSCE will remain the unique forum for dialogue among the countries of North America, Europe and Central Asia, with growing OSCE cooperation with countries in East Asia and the Mediterranean region.

The possibility of adapting the experiences of the OSCE to other regions, in particular East Asia, should be examined in light of the need for a functioning multilateral mechanism for security dialogue in the East Asia region, where there are many different, uncoordinated efforts at cooperation, but as yet no unifying concept or process. Such a subregional entity, to be successful, must involve both Japan and China, as well as other key countries. Thus, a key issue is finding a structure within which both Japan and China would be willing to cooperate. This should also build upon existing experience and areas of cooperation and interdependence, including in the economic sphere.

## **NEW APPROACHES AND ISSUES**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as in the past, real political, economic and security systems have been characterized by unpredictability, uncontrollability, surprise and chaos. This discontinuous and unpredictable development is the normal state of affairs for such complex systems. Thus, certainty of outcomes is no longer even theoretically possible. Instead one must settle for a sophisticated and effective 'certainty of response'.

The OSCE can provide an unique part of this necessary ‘certainty of response’, which is required to recognize threats, to deal with crises and instabilities in complex systems and their environments, and to devise options cooperatively and creatively to manage change.

It was considered useful to pursue a new systematic approach to the management of evolving complex systems and their associated problems and possibilities, including those of the OSCE. This approach is based on an objective understanding of the realities, requirements and characteristics of evolving self-organizing and self-regulating systems, which comprises also regional organizations. Such an approach could be especially useful in anticipating and dealing with crises, and in understanding the new demands placed not only on the systems but also on the qualifications of those managing such systems.

A discussion on the (changing) boundary between sovereign and human rights is essential, including the issue of sovereignty and whether or not it is absolute or can and should evolve. The reality of the matter is that sovereignty is evolving, as seen by developments at the end of the last and beginning of this century, and the question is how this evolution of sovereignty affects, and is affected by, the emerging regional and global order as well as multilateral organizations.

The role of international cooperation and multilateralism remains paramount, and the benefits of cooperation can provide solutions to current and future challenges, including terrorism. Above all, managing change will benefit from cooperation. Cooperation can create options and achieve goals which individual countries acting unilaterally cannot devise or realize.

This conference raised and discussed many important questions, proposed new ideas and approaches, all of which will provide directions and focus for further study, debate and policy proposals.

**DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY  
AND THE  
EVOLVING ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**PROGRAM**

**Thursday, 21 April 2005**

**Opening Session**

Introduction: Dr. Frances Mautner-Markhof, Director, ACIS

Welcoming Address: Mr. Didier Fau, Director, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE.  
*Management of Change in a Time of Transition.*

Senator Adlai E. Stevenson. *Challenges to and Crises in Democratic Systems.*

Dr. Natalia A. Narochitskaya, MP, Vice Chairman, Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma, Russian Federation. *Russia and the OSCE in the New Geopolitical Context.*

Ambassador Aleksii Härkönen, Permanent Representative of Finland to the OSCE. *Role of the OSCE 30 years after the Helsinki Final Act - a Finnish view.*

Discussion

Ambassador Christian Falkowski, Head of the EU Delegation to the International Organizations in Vienna. *The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU Neighborhood Policy, and Cooperation between the EU and Regional Organizations.*

Dr. Frances Mautner-Markhof. *Regional Organizations as Evolving Complex Systems: What This Means for Democracy and Security.*

Discussion

**Reception, Hofburg**



**Friday, 22 April 2005**

**Session 2. Role of the OSCE 30 years after the Helsinki Final Act**

Chairman, Senator Adlai E. Stevenson

Dr. Dieter Boden, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE. *Adapting the OSCE to New Challenges.*

Mr. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense, France. *Thirty Years of Effective Helsinki Commitments.*

Discussion

Professor P. Terrence Hopmann, Brown University; Fulbright Professor, Vienna Diplomatic Academy. *Building Good Governance and Security in Europe: the OSCE Role.*

Mr. William Pfaff, Political Analyst and Journalist. *Observations on Geopolitical Change since the End of the Cold War.*

Discussion.

**Summary and Conclusions of the Meeting**