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**STATEMENT BY
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY
SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL, AT THE 1145th PLENARY MEETING OF
THE OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

16 September 2026

Agenda item: Opening of the UK Chairmanship

Mr. Chairperson,

We congratulate you on the commencement of your Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). The programme of work for the current trimester, presented by Lord Stewart Martin Wood, a deputy of the UK Foreign Secretary, gives the initial impression that the United Kingdom is keen to demonstrate its intention to return the FSC to its original mission of fostering dialogue on the politico-military aspects of security in Europe. It goes without saying that we support such an approach. However, let me be frank: we have repeatedly encountered situations where the rotating Chairmanships took up the helm with a big smile, as it were, proclaiming fine-sounding slogans about the importance of co-operation and de-escalation at the FSC, only to then drop the mask and, by the end of the latest round of negotiations, descend into outright Russophobia, concluding their tenure with tears of “grief” over the Forum and its fundamental principles. We therefore harbour no great illusions about the forthcoming meetings, especially in view of the politicized assessments we have just heard from those taking the floor. Nevertheless, we trust that, as befits a country that is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and one of the five nuclear-weapon States, the UK Chairmanship team will go about the fulfilment of its obligations with due responsibility. In relation to the Forum as the sole pan-European politico-military platform, this implies that the United Kingdom’s actions must strictly comply with the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE and that, in its activities, it must take into account the positions of all 57 participating States without exception.

In the present circumstances, what is called for from the Chairmanship of the Forum are efforts to prevent its further erosion. I would remind you that, by dismantling the material legacy of the Cold War and building mutual trust, our predecessors in the late 1980s pursued the goal of achieving more security with fewer resources and breaking the vicious circle of senseless, self-destructive military confrontation. The Forum was created to institutionalize that process.

However, these lofty goals were consigned to oblivion so as to allow NATO to keep hogging the forefront of the political scene. The collective West is not abandoning its illusory goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia by comprehensively propping up the military capabilities of that NATO-EU

proxy, Ukraine. The plying of the Kyiv regime with weaponry and military equipment over so many years, along with the egging-on of its anti-Russian policies, has led to a frankly egregious genocide in Russian-speaking areas. NATO countries are waging a total hybrid war against Russia through the Kyiv regime: their experts are involved in the planning of terrorist attacks on Russian territory and in the preparation of assassination attempts on prominent military and public figures; meanwhile, the Ukrainian armed forces are supplied with weapons, money, intelligence and liaison support for the killing of Russians.

And in these circumstances, the fact that, for example, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte speaks optimistically about the possibility of the conflict in Ukraine coming to an end “in the very near future” means absolutely nothing in itself, because when speaking to another audience he makes exactly the opposite statements, calling for an increase in the quantity of weapons being delivered to Ukraine, for the funding to be ramped up, and for the moribund Kyiv regime to continue to receive political support. We have not observed any changes in this area, including with regard to the actions taken by a number of European countries to torpedo the negotiation process aimed at resolving the Ukrainian conflict.

For the benefit of the Western delegations that have taken the floor today and that, going forward, will continue to participate actively in discussions on the situation in Ukraine, we should like to emphasize that Russia will work towards the achievement of a sustainable peace and has no intention of agreeing to any further “breathing spaces” for the Ukrainian armed forces. It is essential to take into account the new realities on the ground in the light of the Russian armed forces’ steady advances on the front line.

The course adopted by European participating States with regard to dragging out the hostilities in Ukraine is taking place in parallel with an intensification of Alliance countries’ military activity next to our borders. In Europe, no secret is being made about the fact that the upgrading of the network of airports, logistics, rail crossings and bridges, and their integration into the “Military Schengen” network, are subordinated to long-term military confrontation with Russia. The plan is that this confrontation will be made to enter its hot phase by 2029–2030 at the latest. On the “eastern flank”, new brigade-level military formations are being deployed, command structures and equipment depots are being established to further expand military presence, the logistics infrastructure is being modernized, and procedures for the cross-border movement of military contingents are being streamlined.

While the Black Sea has turned into a fully fledged arena for armed confrontation, when it comes to the Baltic Sea, NATO member States are already modelling specific scenarios for a blockade of the Kaliningrad region, alongside plans for the military and political isolation of Russian ports in the north-west of our country, including St. Petersburg. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski recently lent his voice to the NATO bloc’s reckless striving to escalate tensions around Kaliningrad: “I’m suggesting we should exercise so aggressively on our side as to make him [Russian President Vladimir Putin] uncertain of what we will do.” Perhaps the Polish delegation will explain, at future meetings, how this can be squared with the responsible behaviour expected of an OSCE participating State in the field of military risk reduction.

As the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, stated on 11 September this year, our country does not threaten, nor does it intend to threaten, European countries. However, those who seek to disturb the peace in Europe must also realize that the force groupings of the Russian armed forces in the Kaliningrad region and the border regions of north-western and western Russia, along with the Baltic Fleet, have all the resources required to ward off any aggression and to defeat any aggressor.

Mr. Chairperson,

The backdrop against which Europe’s sole politico-military platform operates is, to put it bluntly, becoming most alarming. However, you know that, according to the CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, the

FSC is intended to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict and to better contribute to the strengthening of security and stability and the establishment of a lasting peace in the OSCE area. Whether the Forum can begin a gradual shift towards fulfilling its tasks depends, in part, on your efforts too.

Over the past few years, our platform's credibility has taken a nosedive in view of the attempts by certain participating States to subjugate the FSC to their interests and use it as a propaganda tool. The Forum's once rich agenda has been squeezed to a bare minimum, while professional dialogue among politico-military experts is increasingly giving way to the parroting of stock confrontational slogans.

It beggars belief, but the fact is that, amid the escalation of international tensions triggered by NATO enlargement, Western participating States are refusing to engage in serious discussion of any steps that might at least partially mitigate the negative consequences of this escalation, including measures for the reduction of military risks and the prevention of incidents. Owing to the policies of Western countries, which have staked their all on achieving decisive military superiority and on exerting blatant coercive pressure on Russia, the system of international agreements on conventional arms control and of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) is going through extremely hard times. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Treaty on Open Skies have bitten the dust. Since 2020, the implementation of commitments under the Vienna Document 2011 on CSBMs has effectively been suspended, with Western participating States having opted for a "parallel regime of military transparency".

We note the UK Chairmanship's plans to hold a discussion on the parameters for the "management of military incidents". As we see it, attempts to "manage" anything – be it escalation, confrontation, incidents or crises – are counterproductive and do not strike at the root of the problem. This concept effectively implies that a number of States are to continue to enjoy a free hand in a highly confrontational environment, that there will continue to be provocations directed at Russia on the premise that we will respond with restraint. In essence, it is tantamount to walking a tightrope over a precipice. One does not need to be a military expert to realize that this can lead to nowhere good. We intend to set out our approaches to this topic in detail.

The overarching philosophy behind Russia's vision for building politico-military stability was reflected a while back in the well-known draft documents from 2021 on security guarantees, which are grounded in the notion that there is no alternative to engagement with one another based on the principles of equal and indivisible security, and that actions undermining each other's vital interests are unacceptable. If and when that moment comes, the future outlines of a new regime of conventional arms control and CSBMs must be based on rejecting the logic of confrontation. Key issues, such as NATO's aggressive eastward expansion, must be addressed. Only then will it be possible to initiate a meaningful discussion on conventional arms control and the principles on which it should be based.

The FSC has no future if NATO and EU countries continue to hinder the drawing-up of its traditional agenda. In this regard, we consider it important to reinstate the management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) in the programme of work, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of OSCE Ministerial Council decisions. We emphasize the importance of a balanced consideration of the inter-State and intra-State aspects of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (strictly within the framework of its provisions, of course). In addition, we look forward to receiving information from the Chairmanship on the outcome of the consultations regarding the possibility of holding the Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA and the Meeting of the Heads of Verification Centres.

In closing, we emphasize the special responsibility of the Chairmanship as a neutral moderator which, on behalf of the FSC (that is, all 57 participating States), is responsible for co-ordinating activities

and holding consultations on the Forum's current work, and that of the members of the FSC Troika, responsible as they are for strengthening the foundations of this autonomous OSCE decision-making body. In particular, we draw attention to the fact that the speakers invited by the Chairmanship must meet the FSC's high standards, adhere to a culture of dialogue and not exacerbate the already deep differences within the ranks of the participating States.

We note that France is leaving the Troika. We trust that the UK delegation and Greece as the incoming Troika member will work constructively in strict compliance with the Rules of Procedure and contribute, in a unifying spirit, to the implementation of the goals and objectives set forth in the Forum's politico-military mandate. In the present challenging circumstances it is especially important to show diplomatic wisdom and resist the temptation to pander to the attempts made at this platform by several States and their associations to fan the flames of confrontation.

Mr. Chairperson,

We wish you every success on the path you have announced for strengthening the FSC's institutional and political foundations.

Thank you for your attention.