The OSCE Magazine, which is also available online, is published in English and Russian by the Press and Public Information Section of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the OSCE and its participating States.

**Message from the Head of Greece’s OSCE Chairmanship Task Force**

Greece assumed the Chairmanship of the OSCE more than nine months ago with a pledge to do its fair share to alleviate tension and mistrust within the wider Europe. Less than three months before concluding our mandate, I believe we have made progress, as is confirmed by several articles in this issue of the **OSCE Magazine**.

We are determined to stay the course. Indeed, the need to restore trust between States is imperative, especially after the August 2008 events in Georgia, in order to confront today’s challenges to our common security effectively.

With respect to security, we are all closely interlinked. We all share the feeling of unease about the fact that the CFE Treaty remains in a state of limbo at a time when regional conflicts, ethnic tensions, border disputes and unstable relations between neighbours threaten to deteriorate into open crises. Furthermore, energy insecurity, improperly managed migration, trafficking in human beings, terrorism, violent fundamentalism and cybercrime give us serious cause for concern and reflection.

Against this backdrop, the Greek Chairmanship has launched a groundbreaking concrete initiative to restore trust: the “Corfu Process”. Through a series of informal weekly ambassadorial-level meetings at the OSCE — the natural forum for these discussions — the Chairmanship is making it possible for participating States to engage in a structured but open dialogue. Our hope is that the results of these deliberations can be submitted to the Ministerial Council meeting in Athens in December and pave the way for a robust collective response to today’s security threats and challenges.

Working towards Athens, everyone agrees that the Helsinki Final Act and other landmark OSCE documents provide a solid foundation on which to proceed. Other key OSCE mechanisms, such as the Platform for Co-operative Security, will also take pride of place.

The quintessence of the Corfu Process is our joint political will to preserve and strengthen co-operative and indivisible security in Europe and beyond. Working in tandem with the OSCE participating States, the Secretariat, field operations and institutions, the Greek Chairmanship will do its utmost to demonstrate its abiding faith in our common destiny and its desire for the peaceful co-existence of States.

Ambassador Nikolaos Kalantzianos
Athens, 1 October 2009

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**oscemagazine@osce.org**

Press and Public Information Section
OSCE Secretariat
Wallnerstrasse 6
A-1010 Vienna, Austria
Tel.: (+43-1) 514 36-6278
Fax: (+43-1) 514 36-6105

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The OSCE Magazine 2009: Greece

**OSCE Structures and Institutions**

Permanent Council (Vienna)
Forum for Security Co-operation (Vienna)
Secretariat (Vienna)
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (Vienna)
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw)
High Commissioner on National Minorities (The Hague)
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (Copenhagen)

**Field Operations**

**South Caucasus**
OSCE Office in Baku
OSCE Office in Yerevan
The Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference

**Central Asia**
OSCE Centre in Ashgabat
OSCE Centre in Astana
OSCE Centre in Bishkek
OSCE Office in Tajikistan
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

**Eastern Europe**
OSCE Office in Minsk
OSCE Mission to Moldova
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine

**South-eastern Europe**
OSCE Presence in Albania
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE Mission to Montenegro
OSCE Mission to Serbia
OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje
OSCE Office in Zagreb
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Front cover: The Ionian island of Corfu was the setting for a historic informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers on 27 and 28 June 2009. Photo: OSCE/George Kontarinis
I warmly welcome you to this island with its great symbolism of renewed hope and fresh beginnings. In Homer’s Odyssey, Corfu is the last stop before Ulysses reaches Ithaca, his final destination. Although Corfu serves as a comfortable resting place for Ulysses after a long and adventurous journey, it also proves to be a treacherous one, as he is constantly tempted to forget that he is not yet home and still has a few miles to go. It is on Corfu that Ulysses taps into his last ounce of strength and finds the resolve to finish the final stretch.

This year, which marks the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, is indeed a time to celebrate the remarkable progress that we have achieved together over the past two decades. We on the continent of Europe have enjoyed a relatively long period of unprecedented peace, security and stability. But the challenges we continue to face serve to remind us that much work remains to be done. The vision of a united continent built on universal principles and indivisible security, as embodied in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris, has not yet been transformed into reality for the whole of Europe. We have come a long way, but we have not yet reached our destination.

Foreign Ministers and representatives of the 56 OSCE participating States, along with the heads of major regional organizations operating in the OSCE area spanning Vancouver to Vladivostok, have travelled to Corfu to make a fresh beginning. Their hope is to continue a journey that started 35 years ago in Helsinki and to reach the final destination: a Europe free and united and at peace with itself.

Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis of Greece
28 June 2009

Lessons from ancient Corfu: “Joint odyssey towards European security”

Its relaxed ambience and verdant beauty were not the only qualities that made Corfu (Kérkyra) off Greece’s north-west coast the perfect setting for an informal but serious and no-holds-barred discussion on European security held in late June. The Ionian island’s deep connections with Greek mythology also served as a source of encouragement and inspiration for the foreign ministers as they embarked on a marathon debate over two days. The following are excerpts from the welcoming remarks of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis:
In the year 433 B.C., the battle of Sybota broke out across the sea channel that lies between Corfu and the Epirus mainland. At the time, it was by far the largest naval battle fought by two Greek city-states. It was the immediate catalyst of what was later called the Peloponnesian War — an all-out struggle between Athens and Sparta that over 27 years destroyed Athens, corrupted Sparta and wrecked Greece.

Thucydides, an Athenian general and historian who fought during the war, set out to write about what happens when human societies find themselves in an all-out struggle against each other. But he did not limit his account to what took place on the battlefield; he also described the devastation of the environment, the abuse of fellow human beings and the collapse of the economy.

Thucydides said that he wrote his historical tome not to gain the applause of the moment but so that it could become “a possession for all time”. He knew that the story of mankind was a continuous cycle that repeated itself. And now, we ourselves — having set out on the promising path towards lasting peace with the help of a corpus of adopted principles — know only too well what happens when human societies are drawn into confrontation.

Indeed, over the past ten years our approach to European security has increasingly been dominated by unilateral and confrontational actions. Protracted conflicts, ethnic tensions and unresolved border disputes continue to plague many of our participating States. In some countries, the transition to democracy is failing to maintain its pace or requires fresh impetus. Europe’s arms control and confidence-building mechanisms, including the CFE Treaty regime, need to be placed firmly back on track.

Perhaps most seriously, tension and mistrust within the wider Europe are preventing its countries from coming together in solidarity to confront shared global threats stemming from areas adjacent to the OSCE area.

This is the reason why we have gathered here in Corfu: not only to reconfirm our collective achievements in bringing about comprehensive and indivisible security but also to acknowledge our shortcomings and failures in addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Thirty-five years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the goal of a “Europe whole and free and at peace with itself” has still not been attained. I am convinced, however, that it is within reach. Here in Corfu, just a stone’s throw away from Homeric Ithaca, our joint odyssey for European security has only just begun.

Dora Bakoyannis, Foreign Minister of Greece
28 June 2009

### Corfu Process meetings:

**Guiding themes**

Following the debate in Corfu, the Greek Chairmanship proposed the following main themes for discussion — subject to review — at weekly informal meetings in Vienna within the framework of the European security dialogue. The “Corfu Process meetings”, which are at ambassadorial level, started on 8 September and will last until the final days leading to the Ministerial Council meeting on 1 and 2 December in Athens.

#### Common foundations and commitments in the OSCE area
- Implementation of norms and principles of international law in the OSCE area
- Co-operative security versus unilateralism
- Different levels of security in the OSCE area

#### Common challenges related to the economic and environmental dimension
- Energy security
- Security-related implications of climate change and other environmental challenges
- Security implications of migration

#### Common challenges of a politico-military nature
- Arrangements and instruments for arms control and CSBMs (confidence- and security-building measures), and their impact on building trust and confidence
- Non-proliferation and illicit arms transfers
- Terrorism and risks arising from criminal activities
- Cyber-security

#### Conflict resolution in the OSCE area
- Peaceful settlement of disputes
- Early warning and conflict prevention including mediation
- Crisis management
- Post-conflict rehabilitation
- Protracted conflicts in the OSCE area

#### Common challenges in the human dimension
- Human rights and fundamental freedoms
- Democratic institutions and the rule of law
- Tolerance and non-discrimination
- Freedom of the media
- Implementation of commitments in the human dimension

#### Guiding themes

- **Co-operative security versus unilateralism**
- **Different levels of security in the OSCE area**
- **Arrangements and instruments for arms control and CSBMs (confidence- and security-building measures), and their impact on building trust and confidence**
- **Non-proliferation and illicit arms transfers**
- **Terrorism and risks arising from criminal activities**
- **Cyber-security**
- **Peaceful settlement of disputes**
- **Early warning and conflict prevention including mediation**
- **Crisis management**
- **Post-conflict rehabilitation**
- **Protracted conflicts in the OSCE area**
- **Human rights and fundamental freedoms**
- **Democratic institutions and the rule of law**
- **Tolerance and non-discrimination**
- **Freedom of the media**
- **Implementation of commitments in the human dimension**

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During the Corfu Process meetings, participating States will review and draw up a list of:
- **Principles** that have not been consistently maintained;
- **Commitments** that have been either partially or selectively implemented and subjectively or unilaterally interpreted; and
- **OSCE mechanisms and procedures** for conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes that have either not been activated or have proved insufficient or outdated.

In preparing for the Athens Ministerial, the OSCE Ambassadors will bear three guiding matters in mind:
- **The basic principles** of comprehensive and indivisible security;
- **The existing commitments** across the three dimensions, with a view to their strengthening and further implementation; and
- **The need for strengthened co-operation** in crisis management, arms control and responses to new challenges.

[www.osce.org/cio](http://www.osce.org/cio)
Search for common solutions injects “new dynamism” into security dialogue

“Fascinating, wide-ranging and frank” is how the Greek Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Dora Bakoyannis, described the informal exchange of views among the foreign ministers of the Organization’s 56 participating States in Corfu. Over dinner at the Achilleion Palace on 27 June and continuing the next day at the Corfu Imperial Hotel, the foreign ministers reflected on three questions: Where have we failed to live up to the basic principles of comprehensive and indivisible security and how can we do more to live up to them? How can we strengthen the implementation of existing commitments across all three dimensions, and are new mechanisms required? What are the immediate challenges that we need to address? The following are excerpts from the discussions, focusing on the remarks of some of the previous and forthcoming OSCE chairmanships and covering a broad cross section of opinions.

Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov (Belarus) said that the current system concerning both hard and soft security was unsatisfactory to all. This provided participating States with sufficient impetus to launch serious negotiations concerning areas of agreement. Belarus found itself on the dividing line between existing large security structures — NATO and the EU on one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other. It was a party to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which provided it with valuable and specific security guarantees. However, the CSTO was a regional security arrangement and Belarus wished to see a continent-wide security guarantee covering the whole of Europe and the OSCE area. This was why it supported the Russian Federation’s proposal to build a common security area that would be all-inclusive and legally binding.

Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller (Denmark) said the idea of the OSCE had to be reinvigorated. Recent speeches by the presidents of the United States and of the Russian Federation, especially those concerning non-proliferation, arms control and nuclear disarmament, had given grounds for optimism. Regarding the Russian Federation’s ideas on European security, he said it would be interesting to know what sort of legally binding instruments were envisaged and who would enforce them.

Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht (Belgium) said he sometimes wondered if there were not too many organizations. If an international organization wished to survive, it needed to demonstrate “added value.” In the case of the OSCE, this lay in its field operations, in the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and in the possibility of its serving — on a legal and not simply political basis — as the cradle of an umbrella security agreement for the whole OSCE area. Efforts should be made to place the protracted conflicts on the agenda, as they were hampering progress. (Note: Yves Leterme was named the new Belgian foreign minister in mid-July. Karel De Gucht is now the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid.)
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner (France) saw the pragmatic talks in Corfu as an opportunity to restore confidence. Another possible positive signal that could be sent concerned Georgia: Would the Russian Federation enable some progress to take place by allowing EU observers to operate on the other side of the administrative boundary line? The dialogue could only advance if it was frank and acknowledged disagreements, including those concerning Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Colleagues should avoid acting on the assumption that “we are right” and should be willing to look for potential practical openings as well as “openings of the heart and mind.”

Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgi Bokeria (Georgia) found it unfair to say that the OSCE had failed in Georgia. While there had been room for improvement, the OSCE had performed its role well. There was a need to engage with everyone, including the Russian Federation, and to look to the future to seek common ground. Europe was much freer and more stable than it had been 30 years before and since more countries had become members of the EU and NATO. In addition, these countries had also become more prosperous and more democratic — and not at the expense of anyone’s security. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the hope was that no other walls would be erected elsewhere in Europe. NATO, the EU’s Eastern Partnership and energy diversity did not represent threats but progress and opportunities.

Foreign Minister Franco Frattini (Italy) was one of several speakers who stressed that any security dialogue should take a bottom-up approach so as to take real and concrete problems of ordinary citizens into account. Food security, climate change, organized crime, trafficking and violent radicalization were just some of today’s destabilizing factors, the combination of which comprised a sort of “fourth dimension.” As insecurity grew, so did frustration and humiliation. What was called for was a frank, inclusive and result-oriented intellectual discussion analysing the root sources of destabilization. Engaging civil society and creating a political early warning mechanism for the pre-crisis stage could help prevent tensions from escalating. “We can innovate”, he said: the time had come to take a fresh look at the Helsinki Final Act in the light of current threats.
Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb (Finland) said that the launching of a serious discussion on security policy in Europe had brought new dynamism to an organization that he felt had been “quasi-dead” a few years before. A “to do” list of practical issues included Georgia and other protracted conflicts, the CFE Treaty, climate change, energy security and the human dimension, including tolerance. It was too early to take a stand on a possible summit meeting but ideas were welcome. A lot depended on the progress made in Athens in December. The process was one in which all 56 participating States should feel more secure.

Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin (Kazakhstan) reviewed the security challenges and issues that were of concern to the OSCE community and which would definitely be dealt with by the Kazakh Chairmanship in 2010. The disagreements over the CFE Treaty and the absence of a meaningful security framework in the OSCE area could have serious repercussions on arms control regimes and issues of non-proliferation. Protracted conflicts in the OSCE area were damaging humanitarian, cultural, political and economic relations among nations and fuelling mistrust among the parties, which was in turn leading to an arms build-up. Many conflicts in the OSCE area had their origins in ethno-confessional factors, which was why he had suggested organizing a comprehensive conference on tolerance in 2010. (Note: Kanat Saudabayev was appointed Kazakh Foreign Minister in early September, succeeding Marat Tazhin who now serves as the Secretary of Kazakhstan’s Security Council.)

Foreign Minister Luis Amado (Portugal) reminded his colleagues that the post-Soviet period was over and that the new era called for an identification of priority measures that would bring about greater stability and security. Participating States had to understand that, as had been mentioned by the United Kingdom, the sense of security and protection of their territories felt by some was not necessarily shared by others. It was important to address confrontation through a process of engagement. The moment should be seized, especially since countries were in the middle of a financial and economic crisis of as yet unknown dimensions and consequences.
Noting the trends of continuity and change at play in European security, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg (United States) underlined the principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. The institutions that were created had adapted well over the years and the comprehensive approach embodied in the three dimensions remained the touchstone of European security.

Participating States needed to take advantage of the capabilities of the institutions and the “powerful” set of tools that they had at their disposal. To a large extent, the problems faced by participating States did not lie in the Organization’s lack of capacity or legal personality but in the lack of political will.

The distinctive quality of the OSCE was its concept of comprehensive and indivisible security — “comprehensive” in the sense of “inclusive” and “multidimensional”. The participating States’ recognition, even before the end of the Cold War, of the multidimensional and interrelated nature of security was one of the OSCE’s great achievements. The challenge now was to recognize that this basic concept was still alive and needed to be updated to take account of changes and new issues.

Security was not a “zero-sum game”. Participating States had to work together if they wished to deal with the challenges of the twenty-first century. Free and open societies were a key prerequisite for security, as were mutual understanding and respect. The “spirit of change” was epitomized by the new U.S. administration and the new U.S. President himself.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (Russian Federation) underlined the importance of informal discussions, outside blocs, where participating States could speak freely, without any restraints stemming from EU or NATO solidarity. A dialogue on Euro-Atlantic security could continue within all relevant forums, including the OSCE, but should not be monopolized by the Organization, to avoid it being enmeshed in its bureaucratic machinery. Emphasis should be placed on the co-ordination among five security organizations — the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) — to conduct the renewed dialogue, on the basis of the Platform for Co-operative Security, including the Russian proposal to hold a meeting of the secretaries general and/or chairpersons of these organizations in early 2010.

It was no longer sufficient, Foreign Minister Lavrov said, to merely reaffirm the OSCE’s principles and commitments; they also had to be implemented in practice. The Russian Federation’s contribution had already come in the form of a proposal to draw up a legally binding treaty on European security. Russia also remained in favour of continuing the reform of the OSCE to strengthen its capacity to carry out concrete actions. The OSCE had to be transformed into a “normal” and fully-fledged international organization with a legally binding constituent document — a charter or a statute.

If participating States were insisting that everything was fine and that there was no need to do anything, then what “process” were they referring to? The concept of indivisible security had collapsed, the politico-military area of the OSCE had become fragmented, and the project of comprehensive security was developing in a unilateral and unplanned manner with a focus on the human dimension to the detriment of the other baskets, including hard security and economic and environmental areas.

Responding to participating States who had expressed their readiness to consider the Russian proposal to develop a treaty in the field of hard security in Europe, Foreign Minister Lavrov said that he would continue to promote the concept in all appropriate forums.

Foreign Minister Vygaudas Ušackas (Lithuania) reminded his colleagues of the achievements of the Istanbul Summit and the Charter for European Security. The link between security inside and between States as set out in the Charter was still relevant and it was time to return to it for inspiration. The OSCE acquis should form the basis for the Corfu Process, which should move forward in a transparent manner without premature judgements being made as to its outcome.
Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić (Serbia) said that the OSCE had played an important role in the previous 30 years, especially in the western Balkans in the 1990s; since then, security in the wider European area had improved considerably. The current security system had failed on certain occasions and it needed improvement. Although security had many aspects to it, Serbia's particular situation and the challenges being posed to its territorial integrity left it no choice but to give emphasis to hard security. A mechanism was needed that would help to prevent problems arising in the future and would resolve existing ones. Serbia wanted to be part of a process that would lead to an arrangement in which there was no longer a frozen conflict on its territory.

Acting Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandogiy (Ukraine) agreed with those who believed that the present European security system reflected current realities and did not require a fundamental transformation. However, the system did require “partial reconstruction”: although it was not broken yet, it had to be fixed before it was too late. The first priority should be the unconditional respect for and compliance with the key principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-use of force (or of threats of force). What was needed now was to uphold those principles through a legally binding instrument; otherwise a lack of determined political will would undermine any future agreement. The principle of not strengthening one's security at the expense of others went hand in hand with the sovereign right of each State to join security alliances. This was particularly important because of the different military capabilities of the various countries in the OSCE area.
Security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region faces multiple challenges — some of which have long persisted within the OSCE area while others have originated outside it. As a number of foreign ministers said in Corfu, the security of Europe and security in Europe are closely interlinked. Since a plurality of threats requires a plurality of responses, trust among OSCE participating States is vital to our success in confronting these shared challenges.

BY MARC PERRIN DE BRICHAMBAUT

The OSCE area is rich in institutions dedicated to security dialogue and joint action. They operate bilaterally, subregionally and regionally, within the overarching framework provided by the United Nations Charter. To strengthen their ability to respond to challenges old and new within a renewed European security dialogue, the OSCE’s participating States can draw on all these institutions in accordance with their respective mandates and memberships.

At Corfu, several foreign ministers also noted that the OSCE, as Europe’s most inclusive and most comprehensive security organization, can serve as an “anchor” for this process. We should be willing to innovate, taking maximum advantage of what already exists both in and beyond the OSCE toolbox.

Specifically, the OSCE offers five unique capabilities:

• The OSCE has a series of forums that are indispensable to any consideration of hard security in Europe, including the Forum for Security Co-operation, the Joint Consultative Group (relating to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) and the Open Skies Consultative Commission. Tapping into the experience of these bodies will be essential to restoring the viability of Europe’s basic structure of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures.

• The OSCE is a forum for continued political contacts and for dealing with protracted conflicts and new threats and challenges. A special role is played by the Chairmanship and the weekly meetings of the Permanent Council, which are unparalleled in the European security institutions.

• The OSCE offers a set of institutions that support the implementation of commitments across the dimensions, or aspects, of security — namely, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM).

• The OSCE has a set of partnerships with Mediterranean and Asian States, which are useful in addressing issues related to the security of Europe, such as Afghanistan.

• In addition, the Organization can serve as a clearing house for promoting co-operation with and among other international organizations.
It has excellent relationships with the UN, the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe. The presence of the EU, NATO, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization at the meeting in Corfu testifies to the OSCE’s networking abilities.

This last point is important. The OSCE can help to promote coherence as the participating States seek to advance their dialogue in multiple channels. For this, the participating States have a mechanism — the Platform for Co-operative Security created in 1999 (see sidebar), which can enable them to develop the OSCE as a meeting place for information-sharing and co-ordination and to avoid efforts being duplicated.

For the OSCE to work effectively in these directions, the participating States have to decide that it should do so. Within the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 they drafted the “Decalogue” — the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States — and later signed up to the ambitions of the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. In the process, they transformed an itinerant conference into an organization and built up institutions (HCNM, ODIHR, RFOM) and field operations to foster the concept of comprehensive and indivisible security.

Each of these steps required the courage to look beyond immediate problems and envisage a security space without dividing lines and rooted in common interests and shared values. Each step required the will to act together, despite divergences, often in challenging circumstances. With renewed courage and will, the participating States can once again choose to put the OSCE to its best possible use.

The year 2010 will mark the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the twentieth anniversary of the Charter of Paris. These milestones provide participating States with an excellent window of opportunity to come together again and look ahead towards a common future. Our common achievements so far and the framework of the comprehensive concept of security that we have been pursuing for the past 35 years offer the participating States ample scope to conduct a thorough and constructive stock-taking of European security structures today.

Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut is the Secretary General of the OSCE.

Ten years on: Revisiting the Platform for Co-operative Security

When Heads of State or Government adopted the Charter for European Security at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November 1999, they committed themselves to strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE through the development of instruments and to the creation of new tools for conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

Attached to the Charter as its operational document was the Platform for Co-operative Security, which was an “essential element of this Charter” and reflected the commitment of the participating States “to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area where participating States are at peace with each other, and individuals and communitieslive in freedom, prosperity and security”.

Ten years on, and in the light of the renewed dialogue on European Security under the Corfu Process, it is worth recalling the concept behind the Platform and re-examining the mechanism it offers.

In brief, the Platform:

• Aims “to strengthen the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area”;
• Serves as the linchpin for the OSCE’s relations and co-operation with other organizations operating in the OSCE area, thus creating a unique role for the OSCE;
• Promotes the concept of “mutually reinforcing security-related institutions” co-operating “on the basis of equality and in a spirit of partnership”;
• Maintains an inclusive and open approach by declaring the OSCE’s readiness to “work co-operatively” with all organizations and institutions whose members “individually and collectively” adhere to a clearly defined set of principles;
• Outlines general modalities of co-operation, both at headquarters level and in the field, which are aimed at developing a culture of co-operation between international organizations in the OSCE area;
• Endorses the provision in the Charter for European Security that recognizes the key integrating role the OSCE can play “when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths”;
• Recognizes the growing importance of subregional co-operation, echoing the Charter’s presentation of the OSCE as a “forum for subregional co-operation”.

The OSCE organizes several regular events reflecting the spirit of the Platform for Co-operative Security. These include the Annual Security Review Conference and the annual meeting of the Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons, both launched in 2003, round-table meetings on the fight against terrorism, and meetings with field representatives of international organizations organized by the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre. In all these OSCE-led gatherings, the participation of experts, practitioners and representatives of regional and subregional organizations plays a vital role in developing a “culture of co-operation”.

“…Modern security threats are multidimensional and call for multilateral solutions. Enhanced co-operation between the EU, NATO, the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and others is called for. During the past years, the division of labour in the international security framework has improved. At the Istanbul Summit, we adopted the Platform for Co-operative Security to strengthen this kind of co-operation. This Platform has lost none of its relevance. New threats are emerging while old threats are taking new forms. And many long-standing conflicts remain unsolved. Our political environment is far from risk-free. The OSCE can contribute to these international processes. The activities of the OSCE, the UN and NATO — or the NATO-Russia Council — are interlinked.” — Finnish Secretary of State Perti Torstila, speaking at the OSCE’s Forum for Security Co-operation, 16 September 2009
From Corfu to Athens
A fresh beginning for security co-operation in Europe?

New developments with great potential to usher in landmark changes are often only vaguely perceptible in their early stages. The informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers on the Greek island of Corfu on 27 and 28 June might well mark one such development.

BY WOLFGANG ZELLNER

It could not have come at a better time: in the past decade, nearly every major item on the European security policy agenda has been hotly disputed — from new weapons systems, alliance memberships and arms control to protracted conflicts, energy security and the interpretation of the very principles that are intended to guide States in their behaviour and actions.

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, summed it up succinctly in Corfu: “Over the past ten years, unilateral and frequently confrontational approaches have increasingly dominated European security policy. This is a far cry from the principle of co-operative security to which the OSCE participating States committed themselves in the 1990 Charter of Paris.” Recently, one might add, almost 20 years after the signing of the Charter, the OSCE participating States have seemingly been at the point of losing much of what they had gained since the end of the Cold War.

Now, fresh opportunities have appeared on the horizon. The relatively new presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States have signalled their willingness to co-operate. U.S. President Barack Obama has pushed the “reset button” for better relations with the Russians, while his counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, has proposed a new European security treaty.

Both countries are trying hard to make progress in reducing strategic nuclear weapons under the START Treaty. Positive developments in this direction by the end of the year would give fresh impetus to the prospect of a constructive security dialogue — increasingly the only way forward favoured by Europe.

Given the fact of the war in Georgia in August 2008 — the ultimate wake-up call — the note on which the meeting in Corfu ended was reassuring. The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office announced that the foreign ministers had “agreed on the need for an open, sustained, wide-ranging and inclusive dialogue on security and concurred that the OSCE is a natural forum to anchor this dialogue.” She also asked the Chairperson of the Permanent Council in Vienna “to explore with all participating States ways for a more structured dialogue, and more specifically the priority areas that our dialogue should focus on and the modalities for its conduct”.

The first step has now been taken. On September 8, a series of “Corfu Process meetings” was launched in Vienna, and about ten more meetings are scheduled before the meeting of the Ministerial Council in Athens in early December. However, the journey looks set to be long and fraught with obstacles and potential set-backs. The loss of confidence has been so enormous that even if European security relations do improve, it will take years to repair the damage that has been done.

The next step should be a joint declaration at the Athens Ministerial — a kind of “road map” setting out which security issues are to be dealt with and under which modalities. As this would be the first such declaration since the Porto Ministerial in 2002, it would constitute a breakthrough. Furthermore, it would serve as a valuable guide for the forthcoming Kazakh and Lithuanian chairmanships.

KEY AGENDA ITEMS

One item that is likely to be high on the agenda is arms control, with particular reference to the future of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed in 1999 but has never entered into force. Along with the Open Skies Treaty, the original 1990 CFE Treaty is the only legally binding document underpinning European security structures. Indeed, co-operative security in Europe is unthinkable without the survival and further development of the CFE regime.

Another key agenda item concerns the unresolved conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus. Now almost 20 years old, these conflicts seem completely anachronistic and are a sign of the inability of OSCE States to agree on joint solutions. The peaceful conclusion of the conflicts in Transdniestr, Abkhazia and...
South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh would be a significant demonstration of the maturity of the participating States concerned and their ability to reach a compromise.

Equally important are energy security and human security throughout the OSCE area. Indeed, in keeping with the principle of addressing the concerns of even the smallest OSCE participating States, any subject raised should be put on the agenda.

Throughout the renewed dialogue, it is to be hoped that participating States focus on resolving concrete problems in a forward-looking manner rather than re-fighting the battles of the past. Confidence-building measures will help to restore trust, not through words but through deeds. For example, Russia could at least partially revoke its suspension of the CFE Treaty. The United States has already changed its missile defence plans in such a way that the originally planned deployments in Europe will not take place.

In addition, an early success in overcoming a stalemate in a relevant, but not too difficult, protracted conflict could accelerate the whole process by demonstrating the possibility of solutions based on mutual agreement. As the situation in Moldova has been “quiet” for some time now, the Transdniestria conflict might be a good candidate, especially as it is related to one of the most contentious European security issues, namely, the adapted CFE Treaty.

Twenty years ago, the world looked at developments in Europe with hope and expectation as the Heads of State or Government proclaimed in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe: “The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. … Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past.” Now, thanks to the Corfu Process, Europe may just get a second chance to dispel the relics of the Cold War once and for all. Seizing this opportunity will be crucial to the continent’s ability to tackle daunting contemporary challenges such as global warming or global poverty. One thing is certain: only through co-operation will the Euro-Atlantic area be able to safeguard and nurture its social, economic and cultural niche within a globalizing world.

Wolfgang Zellner is the Head of the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) and the Deputy Director of the University of Hamburg’s Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH). He holds a diploma in sociology and a Ph.D. in political sciences from the Free University of Berlin. From 1984 to 1991, he worked as an adviser to a member of the German Bundestag dealing with issues related to security and military policy and European arms control. He has published widely on European security issues, conventional arms control, national minority issues and the OSCE.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Open Skies Treaty are legally binding instruments. Although they are not OSCE documents, they are closely linked with the Organization.

The CFE Treaty and adapted CFE Treaty

Known as the “cornerstone of European security”, the CFE Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 by members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact within the framework of the OSCE. It introduced ceilings on five categories of conventional weapons and established a comprehensive verification system through on-site inspections and exchanges of detailed information.

“During the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union, the CFE Treaty proved to be a highly effective instrument for distributing military equipment among the former members of the Warsaw Treaty and the successor states to the Soviet Union,” says Wolfgang Zellner, Head of the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE).

At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, 30 States signed the adapted CFE Treaty (Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) to take into account the changed security environment in Europe brought about by the end of the Cold War.

However, the adapted CFE Treaty has not yet entered into force. On the one hand, a number of States Parties say that they will ratify it only when the Russian Federation fulfils its so-called “Istanbul commitments” concerning Georgia and Moldova, including the withdrawal of forces, the removal of ammunition stockpiles and the closing of military bases. On the other hand, the Russian Federation believes it has met most of its Istanbul commitments, and that furthermore, the implementation of the outstanding ones had no direct relevance to the CFE Treaty. From 12 to 15 June 2007, an “extraordinary conference” of the States Parties was held in Vienna at the request of the Russian Federation but proved inconclusive. On 12 December 2007, on account of what it said was a contradiction between the Treaty’s provisions and the current politico-military situation and also the lack of progress in the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty, the Russian Federation suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty until other States Parties ratified and began to implement the Agreement on Adaptation.
Looking back, moving forward
How the European security dialogue began

“We may be at the beginning of what could be a long and arduous process,” said the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, at the informal meeting of foreign ministers in Corfu. She reminded participating States that “in taking the dialogue forward through the Corfu Process, we must remember that bridging differences does not happen overnight. By the time the Heads of State or Government of the CSCE met in Helsinki in 1975 to put the finishing touches on the Helsinki Final Act, the participating States had held more than 2,400 meetings in Geneva and deliberated on nearly 5,000 proposals.”

BY THOMAS FISCHER

As the 56 participating States of the OSCE embark on a renewed dialogue on European security, perhaps it will help put things into proper perspective if we look back at the multilateral preparatory talks of the early 1970s — events that paved the way for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, eventually, for its transformation into the OSCE.

The Soviets had been trying to put the idea of a security conference for Europe on to the agenda of East-West talks ever since the 1950s. They wanted to create a platform for the discussion of issues still outstanding at the end of the Second World War. However, coming as it did in the early phases of the Cold War, the proposal hardly elicited any serious consideration from the West. On the contrary, it was dismissed as mere Soviet propaganda aimed at the long-term dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and at the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Europe. In 1966, when the Warsaw Pact States issued the Bucharest Declaration in which they presented their ideas concerning a new collective security system for Europe, there was no immediate reaction from the West.

Finally, in June 1968, NATO responded — albeit indirectly — to the increasingly pressing Eastern demands for a security conference by inviting the Soviet Union and its partners to engage in talks exploring mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) in Europe. From that point on, MBFR was to be the West's precondition for the opening of any further talks on European security.

TURNING POINT
The brutal military suppression of the Prague Spring by the Warsaw Pact States in August 1968 put a temporary halt to this new "dialogue" between East and West. However, paradoxically, the after-shock of this crisis gave the process a new dynamic. In March 1969, the Soviet Union sought to renew its call for a European security conference through the Warsaw Pact's more realistic Budapest Appeal. The Eastern alliance now refrained from mentioning the dissolution of the military alliances, and also from explicitly demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe. The only precondition it was still implicitly insisting on was the acceptance of the status quo in Europe, notably the recognition of the State of East Germany.

It was at this juncture that an initiative was unexpectedly launched by a third party — the Finnish Government. In a memorandum dated 5 May 1969, Finland called upon all European States and also the United States and Canada to make their position known regarding the idea of holding an all-embracing conference on European security. Neutral Finland expressed its willingness to organize preparatory talks on a multilateral level and proposed Helsinki as the site of a final summit meeting. Key elements included the participation of “all States concerned” (including the United States and Canada, as well as the two German entities), no preconditions on the content of the agenda, and careful preparatory work on the talks.

INREVERSIBLE PROCESS
In fact, the Finns had their own reason for making the idea of a security conference their own: to strengthen their country's neutrality and independence. Today, we know that initially the Finns had not expected to take major steps towards the realization of the security conference. Their initiative was largely meant to buy them time against the background of their
difficult relationship with their big Eastern neighbour.

Despite the Finns’ relatively low-level approach, most of the preconditions and procedures necessary to take the talks on to the next level were set out through the bilateral exploratory talks that the Finnish roving ambassador Ralph Enckell held in various capitals in Europe and North America in 1970 and 1971. By the end of 1970, most Western governments had agreed that the matter would be taken further in the multilateral setting of an “ambassadors’ tea party” in Helsinki.

Although these non-committal preparatory consultations had been designed for the explicit purpose of exploring the feasibility of holding a conference, the observation of a British diplomat at the time was prescient: “This is all very careful, but in practice the initiation of such talks in Helsinki will probably prove to be the beginning of an irreversible process.”

The fact that it would take another two years for the actual talks to finally take off was mainly due to the unresolved territorial issues in Europe and the parallel ongoing discussion among the superpowers concerning the start of MBFR talks. The signing in 1971 of the Four Power Agreement on the status of Berlin and the impending negotiations on a German-German treaty gave the conference initiative a broader and more international dimension. In May 1972, NATO ministers finally gave the green light for the holding of “multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe” at the level of Heads of Mission in Helsinki. When U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger managed to strike a deal with the Soviets regarding the parallelism of the MBFR and the CSCE process, the U.S. Government agreed to the opening date of 22 November 1972 for the talks.

SETTING THE STAGE

The launching of the CSCE process took place at the Dipoli Conference Centre in the Helsinki suburb of Otaniemi. When the “Dipoli talks” started, there were few set preconditions. Everything had to be established from scratch, including the agenda and the rules of procedures. The equality of participating States, the rule of consensus and the confidential nature of the talks were vital features. The informality of the discussions as well as the scant media attention helped to create an intimate atmosphere among delegations. The bloc members also soon agreed on a three-stage conference: an opening meeting at the level of foreign ministers, the actual working negotiations among diplomats and a final summit.

Drawing up the agenda for the talks proved more difficult. This is when the presence of the smaller non-bloc participating States proved particularly beneficial. Keen to make the most of the multilateral talks for their own national security interests, the neutral and non-aligned delegations demonstrated great resourcefulness.

It was, in fact, Swiss Ambassador Samuel Campiche who in January 1973 proposed grouping all the content proposals into four main “baskets”: (I) political and security matters, (II) economic and related issues, (III) human contacts, culture and information, and (IV) follow-up to the conference. This is the origin of the three-dimensional character of the present-day OSCE and of its framework for comprehensive security and co-operation in Europe. A list of ten principles guiding the relations of participating States was also drawn up.

During the remaining weeks and months of the Dipoli talks, which ended in June 1973, the delegations negotiated final recommendations that would serve as the mandates for the actual conference. Finally, two years of negotiations came to fruition when the Conference on Security on Co-operation in Europe officially opened at Helsinki’s Finlandia Hall on 3 July with 35 States taking part. A substantive working phase in Geneva followed, in which diplomats engaged in the first ever multilateral East-West negotiation process from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975. The historic summit envisaged by the Finns did take place in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975, when 35 Heads of State or Government signed the Helsinki Final Act, which has been called the “Magna Carta of detente” — a charter for relations not only between states, but also between states and individuals.

FROM DIPOLI TO CORFU

Comparing the early beginnings of the CSCE process in Helsinki with the recently launched Corfu Process initiative, the following observations are worth noting:

- Finland’s proposal of May 1969 for a European security conference took place against the backdrop of the Cold War. The continent was split into two ideological camps of similar weight, with the group of neutral and non-aligned States potentially playing the role of “balancers”.
- At that time, the United States’ priorities were the arms control and reduction talks (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or SALT, and MBFR), and ending the war in Vietnam. This enabled the European powers and the smaller non-bloc member States to take the lead in the CSCE process.
- When the participating States established the negotiation framework for the European security talks, they had to start on a blank slate; no prior all-embracing comprehensive security negotiations existed that could serve as a model. Today, all parties to the Corfu Process draw on the vast experience of the CSCE/OSCE.

- The war in Georgia in the summer of 2008 seems to have sent shock waves through Russia, Europe and the United States similar to those provoked by the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

After years of mutual finger-pointing, the major players at least now seem to recognize the need to sit down again, talk through their existing differences and find new ways to come to terms with them. And once again, it might well fall on the smaller European states within the OSCE region to channel and shape the exchange of opinions into a structured process.

Swiss historian Thomas Fischer is a research fellow with the Geneva-based Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies. From 2004 to 2008 he carried out a major research project on the role of the neutral and non-aligned states in the CSCE negotiations at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIIP), Vienna.

Sitting together over a menu of measures

The *Wienerwald* plays host to both sides of the Dniester/Nistru river

Over two days in June, the small town of Mauerbach in the hills just outside Vienna was — unbeknownst to its residents — the scene of an unusual event of considerable geopolitical significance. Its finest hotel, a popular getaway nestled in the Vienna Woods, had been carefully chosen by the OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Mission to Moldova to bring together key military and security officials from both sides of the Dniester/Nistru river — seven from the Moldovan capital of Chisinau on the right bank, and an equal number from the self-proclaimed Transdniestrian capital of Tiraspol on the left bank.

**BY KENNETH PICKLES**

With its wonderful views and cozy ambiance, Mauerbach was a setting tailor-made for an occasion especially meant to help improve the climate for dialogue and co-operation between the Government of Moldova and that of the breakaway region of Transdniestria. The hope was that this would contribute towards the OSCE’s long-standing efforts to facilitate the negotiations aimed at bringing about a political settlement to the 17-year-old conflict.

The OSCE and other international experts steered the discussion towards the existing comprehensive package of military and security-oriented “CSBMs” — confidence- and security-building measures — calculated to help eliminate the possibility of a resumption of armed conflict by decreasing tensions between Chisinau and Tiraspol and to help start a process of co-operation in all areas of security.

Opening the seminar on behalf of the Greek Chairmanship, Ambassador Charalampos Christopoulos, Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office, reminded the group that these CSBMs were originally designed in 2004 and 2005 by the three mediators of the conflict settlement — the OSCE Mission, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In a demonstration of unanimous support for the package, the three had jointly presented the package to Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transdniestrian leader Igor Smirnov in July 2005. (Vladimir Voronin now sits as a
activities which could give or miscalculation of military and of misunderstanding dangers of armed conflict “contribute to reducing the of 1975 put it, were meant to and, as the Helsinki Final Act ing measures were voluntary al Ammunition. on Stockpiles of Convention- Security, and the Document Politico-Military Aspects of tion, the Code of Conduct on Exchange of Military Informa- tors, the document Global Conventional Arms Trans- fers, the document Global Exchange of Military Informa- tion, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, and the Document on Stockpiles of Convention- al Ammunition. The first confidence-build- ing measures were voluntary and, as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 put it, were meant to “contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities”. Zdzislaw Lachowski, Senior Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, who has published widely on European military security and arms control, says that “during the Cold War, the voluntary rules of openness, restraint and co- operation in military affairs set out under CSBMs played a real part in easing tension in Europe and in avoiding conflict between the rival blocs”. He describes how CSBMs progressively developed even after the fall of the Berlin Wall and helped to maintain stability during the momentous changes taking place in Europe. Negotiations on CSBMs, resulting in the adoption in 1986 of the Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures and Dis- armament in Europe, paved the way towards enhanced political dialogue. The agreed commitments in Stockholm were further elaborated in the Vienna Document 1990. The successive CSBM documents of 1992 and 1994, agreed in the spirit of co-operative security, were the stepping stones leading to the Vienna Document 1999 adopted at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul. Negotiations on the fur- ther development of CSBMs take place within the OSCE’s Forum for Security Co-opera- tion (FSC), which meets every week in Vienna to discuss and take decisions regarding military aspects of security in the OSCE area. “Today, in the early twenty- first century, the concept and process of CSBMs find them- selves increasingly called upon to respond to new risks and challenges in the field of security, including the non-State and non-Euro- pean dimensions,” says Mr. Lachowski. “There is a growing focus on measures and arms control-related arrange- ments below the continental level — at the regional, sub- regional, bilateral and intra- state levels — and growing interest in whether these approaches could usefully be applied beyond the Euro- pean continent.”

What are CSBMs?

The negotiation, implementa- tion and promotion of an elaborate system of confi- dence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) is widely considered to be one of the most outstanding contribu- tions of the CSCE/OSCE to the efforts of participating States to raise levels of transparency, trust and mutual reassurance in the security sphere.

The OSCE has developed an impressive acquis of CSBMs and norm-setting documents related to data exchange and the verification of information on mili- tary holdings and activities. Both politically binding and voluntary, these are embodied in such agreements as the Vienna Document 1999, the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Trans- fers, the document Global Exchange of Military Information, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, and the Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition.

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Colonel Sergiu Guită from the Defence Ministry of Moldova (left) joins the Transdniestrian delegation for a photo, with General Albert Moinard (back to camera) from the OSCE Mission looking on. Despite the steady rain, the social part of the event contributed in no small way to mellowing the mood. Both sides gathered at a typical Austrian wine tavern, chatted amicably and proposed toasts to each other.

particular difficulty — in spite of the special benefits CSBMs bring to the parties involved in these cases. “When an immediate resolution is not likely, as in Moldova, the measures can at least lead to a reduction in tensions,” he said. “Moreover, CSBM agreements between a central State and an entity that are aimed at addressing practical problems do not predetermine the solution to the status issue itself. However, CSBMs that are to the mutual advantage of both sides, such as those dealing with disaster relief, can be a good starting point.”

Bernard Aussedat gave an overview of the CSBMs, which cover such areas as disarmament, creation of a co-ordinating body, regular exchanges of military information, mutual inspections of weapons manufacturing factories, and joint training in peace-support operations. He and the other experts had leaned heavily on the experience gained by the OSCE and the international community through the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Vienna Document, and the regional arms control arrangements under the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Flexibility was an underlying feature of the proposals, he said, in the sense that possibilities existed for the selective application of various elements and for new proposals to be incorporated.

“The main task now should be to open a permanent dialogue through an expert working group that will carry this process forward,” Mr. Aussedat said.

**PRODUCTIVE AND USEFUL**

Agreeing on the need for CSBMs, both sides warmly welcomed the opportunity to take part in the “productive and useful” exchange and to hear the opinions of international experts. They also recognized that it was in their mutual interest to include co-operation between their respective law enforcement bodies and explored

The OSCE in Moldova

In the spring of 1992, rising tension between the Government of Moldova and that of the separatist Transdniestrian region escalated into violent conflict, resulting in more than a thousand casualties and more than 100,000 people temporarily displaced. A ceasefire agreement was signed in Moscow in July 1992 and the parties committed themselves to negotiating a settlement to the conflict.

In 1993, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the forerunner of the OSCE, established a mission in Moldova, based in the capital Chisinau. Its goals were to assist in negotiating a lasting and comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, and to reach an understanding on a special status for the Transdniestrian region.

The OSCE Mission takes part in the Joint Control Commission, which supervises the ceasefire in the Security Zone — the area on both sides of a “line of control” separating the military forces of the two sides. Members of the OSCE Mission frequently patrol within the Security Zone.

Since 1999, the Mission has also been charged with the responsibility of facilitating the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armament from the region and to ensure the transparency of this process.

In addition, the OSCE Mission promotes a broad spectrum of human dimension issues such as human rights, including language and minority rights, democratization, media freedom and the fight against human trafficking.

Confidence-building efforts go beyond the military and security sector. Activities aimed at improving dialogue and co-operation span a wide range of areas that encourage people-to-people contacts and help improve the lives of residents of both banks of the Dniester/Nistru river.

For example, the Mission fully supports several working groups of experts from both sides who meet to discuss and explore joint activities and projects in matters of mutual concern, including health care and social protection, transportation and infrastructure, agriculture and the environment, and trade and economics.

The Mission to Moldova has a branch office in Tiraspol and an office in Bender, a city on the right bank that is controlled by Transdniestrian de facto authorities. This presence enables the OSCE to be in constant and direct contact with both sides of the conflict and to play a lead role in co-ordinating a joint approach to confidence-building.

The Mission comprises 13 international staff members supported by a national team of 37.
ways in which this could be done. Not surprisingly, there were differences in opinion on
exactly when and how the CSBMs should be applied, but all participants argued their points
in a constructive manner.

While the main discussions were taking place, representatives of the so-called “5+2”
talks — the three mediators, observers from the EU and the United States, and the chief
negotiators from the two sides — held informal consultations and agreed to explore possibilities
for resuming the settlement negotiating process within the official 5+2 format later this year.
The Permanent Conference on Political Issues
in the Framework of the Transdniestria Settle-
ment, as the format is officially known, has not
met formally since March 2006.

The seminar deep in the Wienerwald to make any dramatic break-
throughs, it did succeed in accomplishing its
goals: It enabled specialists on both sides to re-
establish contact with one another, to consider
the ways in which the CSBM package could be
implemented and, perhaps most importantly,
to explore the creation of a mechanism to carry
the process forward. The presence of key high-
ranking representatives from the defence, inte-
rior and security establishments on both sides
sent an encouraging signal, as did their agreed
statement expressing willingness to continue
talks under the auspices of the OSCE.

“Since then, follow-up meetings with the
OSCE Mission have already taken place in
Chisinau and Tiraspol,” says Ambassador Philip
N. Remler, Head of the OSCE Mission to Mol-
dova. “There’s a great deal of work still to be
done, but a good start has been made. With
patience and good will and with the help of
the experience and expertise within the OSCE,
we hope to see more progress in the coming
months.”

SALW weapons destruction in Moldova

Bulboaca, a training area about 35 km east of Chisinau. In 2007 and 2008, the OSCE helped the Moldovan Ministry of
Defence to destroy more than 12,500 rounds of artillery ammunition weighing 336 metric tonnes. Funded by Finland, the
activities were part of a comprehensive programme to help the Government of Moldova to adopt best practices in the
storage, handling or disposal of small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition. Similar assistance could be
offered to the Transdniestrian authorities as part of the CSBM package.
Ivar Kristian Vikki assumed the post of Head of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan on 15 September, succeeding Ambassador Vladimir Pryakhin of the Russian Federation.

A Norwegian national, Ambassador Vikki served as Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia from 1999 to 2002 and as Head of the United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, from 2003 to 2004. In April 2004, he was appointed Head of the OSCE Centre in Almaty (later OSCE Centre in Astana), Kazakhstan, a position he held until April 2008.

“A lesson that has stayed with me after my experience in the Caucasus and Central Asia is that one must always be willing to listen and to learn, especially because every OSCE field operation is different,” he said. “I will take a similar approach in shaping our programmes and activities in Tajikistan, ensuring that they are firmly underpinned by our participating States’ common values and commitments.”

In 1997 and 1998, prior to his assignments in Georgia, he was Head of the Office for the Norwegian Refugee Council/United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, and the Russian Federation.

Ambassador Vikki was Head of the Norwegian Defence Staff’s politico-military section from 1982 to 1988, having served as its senior analyst from 1975 to 1981. From 1989 to 1994, he was engaged in research in international affairs.

He attended the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s International Training Programme, the NATO Defence College in Rome and the Norwegian Senior Leadership Programme. A graduate of Oslo University, he specialized in American and English literature. He also did exams in Russian literature, history and political science.

Dimitrios Kypreos of Greece assumed his duties as Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia on 21 September 2009. Prior to his OSCE appointment, he served as Greek Ambassador to Hungary, a post he had held since 2006. He has also served as his country’s ambassador to the Russian Federation, simultaneously accredited to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (1997-2002), and to Germany (2002-2005).

Earlier in his diplomatic career, he was assigned as Consul in Frankfurt, General Consul in Milan and Counsellor at the Greek embassies in Paris and Prague.

Ambassador Kypreos has actively contributed to various initiatives in south-eastern Europe and within the framework of the European Union. During the Greek EU Presidency in 1994, he was Liaison Officer with the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and worked as part of the group supporting EU mediator Lord Owen.

He was later assigned as Head of the Department for South Eastern Europe at the Greek Foreign Ministry (1995-1997). More recently, he was Co-ordinator of the South-East European Cooperation Process during its Greek Chairmanship and National Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2005-2006).

“It is a great honour for me to serve once again in the cause of peace and stability in south-eastern Europe, this time in close association with the OSCE and Serbia,” said Ambassador Kypreos.

“The Mission is especially well accepted here because of the good work it has accomplished so far. My main challenge is to continue along this path and assist the host country in successfully carrying out its reform process and meeting OSCE standards on the road towards European integration.”

Ambassador Kypreos holds a degree in law and economics from Athens University. Apart from his native language of Greek, Ambassador Kypreos is fluent in English, French, Italian, German and Russian.

He succeeds Ambassador Hans Ola Urstad of Norway.
Jose-Enrique Horcajada Schwartz, a Spanish national, assumed the post of **Head of the OSCE Office in Zagreb** on 11 May 2009. He succeeded Ambassador Jorge Fuentes Monzonis-Villalonga, also from Spain.

Since September 2007, Ambassador Horcajada had served in various capacities in the OSCE Mission to Croatia (from 2008, OSCE Office in Zagreb), including a stint as Head of the field office in Sisak. Prior to his appointment, he was head of the Executive Unit and acting deputy head of the Office.

Before pursuing a career in foreign policy, Ambassador Horcajada served in the Royal Household of the King of Spain, at the presidency of the Government, and at the Directorate for Defence Policy (International Affairs). He has built considerable expertise in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, having served in various capacities with the Spanish Representation to the Political and Security Committee and the EU Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group in Brussels.

In 1994 and 1995, he worked for the EU Monitoring Mission in Former Yugoslavia, serving as a monitor in Tuzla, as a senior operations officer for Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zenica, and as Head of the European Commission Monitor Mission field office for central Bosnia in Travnik.

A former colonel in the Spanish Royal Marines, Ambassador Horcajada graduated from the Spanish Naval Academy in 1981. He specialized in foreign policy at the **Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales** in Madrid, and in international humanitarian law. He also attended the Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia.

Ali Bilge Cankorel of Turkey was appointed **Head of the OSCE Office in Baku** in April 2009. An experienced diplomat, he served as Turkish Ambassador to Afghanistan (1995 to 1997) and to Ukraine (2001 to 2005).

Other diplomatic postings include Ottawa, Beijing and the United Nations Office in Geneva, where he represented Turkey in various capacities.

At home in Turkey, he has been involved in bilateral political affairs and multilateral economic issues, most recently as Adviser in the Foreign Ministry and as special envoy on a number of missions. He served as Head of European Community/European Union Affairs in the State Planning Organization of the Prime Minister’s Office in Ankara, where he chaired the Inter-ministerial Committee of Co-ordination for Integration with the European Union (1987 to 1991).

Ambassador Cankorel also served as Government Agent at the European Court of Human Rights (1998 to 1999) and as Co-ordinator of State Protocol (1999 to 2001).

Born in Istanbul, he graduated in political science from the University of Ankara in 1969 and completed a master’s degree in international relations from Ohio State University in 1970.

He succeeded Jose-Luis Herrero of Spain, who assumed the post of Head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje earlier this year.
Banners in Corfu’s old town drew attention to the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers.