Migrant political participation: a review of policies and integration results in the OSCE region

Research Paper

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Executive summary

This paper assesses the state of implementation and practice of the civic and political integration of migrants and identifies the key channels and actors active in this process. The paper calls for systematic monitoring and evaluation of integration practices and policy outcomes and reviews the existing comparative quantitative research with the aim of understanding the relationships between integration policies and the civic and political participation of migrants, while also considering a wide range of individual and contextual factors. In addition, key recommendations are provided to improve migrant civic and political participation.

The civic and political participation of migrants is more relevant now than ever, as migrants and their offspring constitute a growing social group in societies across the OSCE area. Only through participation, in one form or another, will this group be enfranchised and equal. Therefore, understanding if and also how different social groups participate is essential. Political participation can be measured in a variety of ways. The most conventional way is voting. Far more people vote in elections than undertake other forms of formal or informal political participation. Besides voting, this paper also explores different forms of civic and political participation, such as volunteering, trade union membership, being a party member, migrant organization membership and naturalization, to name a few examples.

Systematic monitoring and evaluation of the political opportunity structure, both mainstream and targeted for migrants, as well as of different types of activities initiated by actors on migrant civic and political participation (e.g. trade unions, migrant organizations, political parties, etc.) is needed. Such a process is essential in order to determine whether their outputs have effectively improved migrants’ participation outcomes. The inconclusive findings on the effectiveness of ‘civic integration tests’ are explored as a concrete example.

At present, most research builds on an outcome-based monitoring system which fails to uncover the underlying process of migrant political participation. A more robust methodological approach using new international datasets can better explore the nuanced links between policies and societal outcomes. To be able to draw solid conclusions about the links between policies and outcomes, research must simultaneously take into account a wide range of policies, individual level factors and contextual factors, all of which influence a specific integration outcome. Significant analysis is necessary to evaluate whether the available migrant participation statistics are the outcomes of targeted integration policies or other factors influencing societal integration, such as personal background, general structures in society, general government policies, general conditions in society or similar structures, policies, and conditions in migrants’ country of origin.

In order to improve migrant political involvement, greater opportunities for consultation and political participation are needed, as well as access to positions of responsibility and representation.
1. INTRODUCTION

Background

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) commissioned Thomas Huddleston, Policy Analyst with the Migration Policy Group, to write two background papers on different aspects of the civic and political participation of migrants in Europe. Intended primarily for the use of decision-makers and migration experts, and to contribute to planning and discussion at a roundtable discussion on migrant civic and political participation held on 14-15 November 2017, this paper assesses the implementation and outcomes of political participation policies for migrants in selected OSCE participating States, discussing indicators and factors relevant to this participation, and offering recommendations and a bibliography of existing comparative European research on policy implementation and migrant outcomes. The other paper provides an overview of existing international and European legal standards, political commitments and national policies in Europe, and annexes excerpts from international human rights legal instruments related to civic and political rights of foreigners.

The paper is based on extensive desk research, including a literature review on empirical research on migrant political participation as well as analysis of relevant data retrieved from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), a database on migrant integration policies which includes a number of OSCE participating States. However, it should be noted that more information on this topic exists on parts of the OSCE region, in particular the European Union, where more recent research has been conducted on these issues and produced data available for analysis. This paper therefore attempts to cover the OSCE region as far as possible, but, as it is based primarily on review and analysis of existing available data sources on migrant civic and political participation, there is greater detail offered on more West European participating States.

Working definitions

The International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion Network’s (IMISCOE) state of the art report identifies three components of migrant participation in public affairs:

- **Participation** (the active dimension of citizenship by which individuals take part both conventionally and non-conventionally in managing the affairs of a given community)
- **Mobilization** (the process of building collective actors and collective identities to take part in managing the affairs of a given community)
- **Representation** (not only the system by which a community selects a legitimate group of people to manage its affairs, but also the outcomes of that system—the extent to which this group of people and their views are a legitimate reflection of the community)

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1 IMISCOE, or International Migration, Integration, and Social Cohesion, is an EU-funded Network of Excellence that brings together some 400 selected, highly qualified researchers of 22 established European research institutes.
These activities range, in the very least, from naturalization through to formal participation (volunteering, membership in trade unions, political parties, voting, consultation, elected office) and informal participation (petitions, protests, and community organizing). Participation, mobilization and representation are all dynamic processes that can be measured:

- In many dimensions (i.e. active in a trade union, but not a political party)
- At the individual, group, and societal level;
- Within a certain context (local, regional, national, European, and international);
- Over time (not one moment or threshold but different stages);
- In many directions (moving towards or away from equal outcomes with nationals).

Civic and political participation of migrants

Participation of all members of society, including migrants, in the political decision-making process is crucial to the legitimacy of democratic political systems. Despite the increasing diversity of societies across the OSCE region, OSCE participating States continue to face challenges in facilitating migrants’ political participation. Over the last three decades, the OSCE participating States have agreed to a large number of commitments in the field of political participation in democratic governance processes, including those related to the participation of migrants, such as:

- The obligation to respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination and the right of individuals and groups to establish their own political parties or other political organization; including the guarantee of the right of association and the right to freedom of expression including the right to communication.\(^2\)
- The obligation to promote the integration of migrant workers in host societies of participating States, in which they lawfully reside, while encouraging their active participation in integration processes.\(^3\)

The OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Political Party Regulation also highlight that while international obligations recognize nationality and citizenship as reasonable considerations in the restriction of political participation rights, human rights instruments applicable in the OSCE region provide foreign nationals and stateless persons with the same general protection of rights as they do citizens.\(^4\) Further, in particular in the context of elections, the European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level\(^5\) can be seen as setting a standard within Council of Europe (CoE) member states which are also members of the OSCE region to allow foreign residents to vote and stand in local elections.

OSCE participating States have different approaches to political participation in terms of their legislation and policies, which provide a regulatory framework for the exercise of key rights as a pre-condition for political engagement, such as electoral rights, freedom of association as political parties, membership of

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\(^3\) Concluding Document of Budapest, 6 December 1994 (Decisions, chapter VIII), Para.31 <http://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true>

\(^4\) Para 120 of the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Political Party Regulation <http://www.osce.org/odihr/77812?download=true>

\(^5\) https://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/Source/migration/conv_%20participation_foreigners_public%20life_144.doc
and participation in political parties and others. These differences also apply to migrants’ membership requirements for political parties and candidacy requirements.

Across the OSCE region, participation in political and public affairs varies. In general people are increasingly more involved in alternative forms of political participation and more detached from traditional democratic institutions such as political parties. Participation in political life through freedom of association and freedom of expression or the formation of political parties should be based on the principle of non-discrimination in accordance with OSCE commitments. This paper explores migrants’ engagement in these different forms of civic and political participation.

The political participation of migrants forms a core element of OSCE commitments both from the perspective of fundamental human rights, such as the right to freedom of assembly, association and expression, and the right to non-discrimination, as well as ensuring access of migrants to decision-making processes within political movements and trade unions. The respect of these rights and migrants’ ability to advocate as members of civil society and the media can serve to increase migrants’ integration in host societies and contribute to political stability in OSCE participating States. While the legislation and policies regulating political participation of migrants vary across the OSCE region, these differences, as well as the common obstacles these groups face when engaging in political life, merit discussion.

This paper assesses the implementation and outcomes of political participation policies for migrants in the OSCE region.

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2. FUNDING AND PRACTICES: THE MISSING MIDDLE

While the body of knowledge on the political integration processes of migrants is continuously growing, significant gaps still remain. Comprehensive mappings are needed of the administrative and financial inputs that governments and other actors are dedicating to deliver on their policies on paper and their commitments in international fora. What is currently available are voluntary information exchanges like the EU integration website and best practice guides like the European Commission Handbook on Integration and the Council of Europe Handbook on Consultative bodies. While a rich body of empirical research exists, more ambitious research projects are still needed in order to assess the state of implementation and practice.

Monitoring could be undertaken of how much and to whom public funding is allocated to promote migrant participation in public affairs at the EU level and within countries at local, regional, and national level. A comprehensive inventory could be made of the work of key actors on migrant civic and political participation in:

- Trade unions
- Voluntary sector
- Religious organizations
- Migrant and diaspora associations
- Consultative bodies
- Political parties
- Bodies responsible for electoral participation

This inventory could include the type of activity (i.e. information, dialogue platforms, get-out-the-vote campaigns, outreach) and these activities' outputs, both quantitative (i.e. number of persons reached, meetings held, voters mobilised, new members or candidates attracted) and qualitative (satisfaction of target population, dialogue participants, new voters, level of activity and leadership i.e. among new members, qualification of candidates).

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7 https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/
A review of any evaluations or studies of these practices could then determine whether their outputs have effectively improved migrants’ participation outcomes. For instance, programmes in the OSCE participating States located in Western Europe that have turned “civic integration” (granting rights, security of residence and social solidarity, e.g. access to nationality/residence, family reunion, economic rights, social rights, etc.) into tests, contracts, and points systems have been criticised as ineffective.\textsuperscript{11} While the underlying idea is that such programmes give migrants the tools to become politically, socially, and economically integrated, recent research suggests that there is little evidence that these requirements play a central role in tangible, long-term integration outcomes. While a positive effect of civic integration policies on political integration has been observed, the same cannot be claimed for economic and social integration outcomes.\textsuperscript{12} Such preliminary assessments consider that these obligatory conditions are unclear and narrow in their view of integration, costly (sometimes for the state, but mostly for migrants), exclusionary (of certain migrants and the host society), and ineffective for addressing migrants and local communities’ needs for civic and political participation.


\textsuperscript{12} S. W. Goodman and M. Wright, \textit{op.cit.}
3. MIGRANTS’ OUTCOMES IN POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The intended ends of integration are often framed as an equality of outcomes, whereby migrants and their descendants are able to participate in society at the same levels as the native population. This is more relevant now than ever, as migrants and their offspring constitute an ever larger social group in host societies and only through participation, in one form or another, will this group be enfranchised and equal. Therefore, understanding if and also how different social groups participate is essential. The level of civic and political participation across OSCE region remains low for nationals and is likely lower for non-nationals. “The political quiescence of migrants” considered that these lower levels of civic and political participation were a sign that economic migrants and their families tended to be apolitical. Migrants were thought to be passive because they preferred to participate in less conventional or work-related ways like trade unions, did not mobilize to demand conventional political rights, and came from countries of origin with low levels of democratization and citizens’ participation.13

The IMISCOE state of the art report14 takes a more balanced view that foreign-born are no less and no more capable of political integration than the native-born. The fact that migrants are generally less civically active than nationals is not an indicator of an apathetic attitude towards politics. But nor should it be exaggerated that migrants have some hidden potential to become “the perfect citizen”15 and an emerging transnational force.

Evidence from both quantitative and qualitative comparative surveys suggests that the foreign-born are, when compared to the native-born, slightly less but similarly active in the various forms of conventional participation, while being slightly more and differently active in less visible and conventional ways. MIPEX 2015 data16 reveals that long-settled non-EU-born adults seem on average almost as likely to participate politically as non-migrants with similar levels of education. In the 2000s, 37% of long-settled residents (10+ years' stay) reported recently taking part in a political party, association, petition, demonstration or contacting a politician, compared to 43% for non-migrants. Political participation was generally equitable for migrants in the Nordics, Benelux, France, Spain and the UK, and actually higher than for non-migrants in Croatia, Ireland and Portugal. On average, the level of political participation was similar when comparing the university-educated across Europe (53% on average for migrants, compared to 56% for non-migrants) and just slightly lower when comparing the low-educated across Europe (22% on average for migrants, compared to 33% for non-migrants). The gaps in political participation levels were greatest between migrants and non-migrants in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Estonia, Slovenia, and between high- and low-educated migrants in Austria, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg.

13 M. Martiniello, Marco,Quelle participation politique?, in Collectif, La Belgique et ses immigres. Les politiques manquées (Bruxelles: De Boeck Université, Pol-His, 1997).
15 S. Carrera, In Search of the Perfect Citizen?: The Intersection Between Integration, Immigration and Nationality in the EU (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
16 http://www.mipex.eu/
The civic participation outcomes of natives and first-generation migrants in selected OSCE participating States has further been analysed on the basis of “indicators” of civic participation taken from the questions in the European Social Survey (ESS). Migrants outperform non-migrants only on the indicator of participation in demonstrations, and even then, only slightly. The area in which migrants and nationals take part the most is symbolic actions (petitions, boycotting, and demonstrations) and the least is joining political parties. However, a fuller picture of the ESS data suggests that the differences between migrants and natives almost disappear once observers take into account less conventional and visible forms of participation like informal help to humanitarian aid, human rights, and migrant rights movements like the ‘sans papiers’ movements. Indeed, these organizations see slightly higher levels of participation by migrants than by nationals.

Until recently, research on migrant political participation has focused on rates of ‘participation’ and has neglected the association between forms of participation. The methodological advantage of studying ‘participation’ (in at least one political act) versus ‘non-participation’ is that it often allows researchers to overcome the issue of a relatively small sample size. By delving deeper into different acts of participation, we not only come to understand more about how individuals become politically engaged but also about whether and why inequalities exist in types of participation between groups. Preliminary research suggests that the main factors determining participation are different for migrants than the majority, impacting not only on the decision whether or not to participate, but also on how to participate. Rather than a distinction between conventional and unconventional participation and voting, findings point to distinct processes at work when it comes to predicting voting, contacting politicians, individual unconventional participation, and collective participation, and caution against simply adopting standard typologies of political participation when studying migrant political participation.

Furthermore, the literature on transnationalism has also concluded that transnational links do not harm political integration. Just as citizens can be simultaneously active at the different levels of local, regional, and national politics, so can civically active migrants meaningfully participate in the local, regional, and national level in different countries’ political systems.

Overall, the degree of political integration in a diverse society and the effectiveness of participation policies are difficult to assess. Limited quantitative data is available on the composition of associations, the public sector, and representatives disaggregated by nationality and country of birth of respondents, their parents, and grandparents. It remains difficult to fully capture the civic participation outcomes.

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18 The European Social Survey (ESS) is the best available source in this field. The survey is repeated every two years, allowing the pooling of data and drawing more general conclusions regarding immigrant civic engagement. The full dataset captures natives, first and second generation immigrants, providing for direct comparisons between these groups. As a word of warning, ESS sample of immigrants may not be fully representative and, as such, may overestimate the level of immigrant civic participation. The fact that the ESS use population registers to select people for interviews in a European language may have an under-sampling of newcomers and a selected bias towards the linguistically-integrated and naturalized.

19 E. A. De Rooij, op.cit.

20 Transnationalism is about the greater links between people in different countries and the loosening of boundaries between countries and cultures.

21 D. Jacobs, F. Delmotte and B. Herman, B. “Political participation for migrants: the MIPEX results”, In Legal Frameworks for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (Brill, 2009) pp. 219-238.
The framework for measuring migrants’ citizenship and political participation was significantly improved in Europe with the adoption by the European Union of the 2010 Zaragoza declaration on a set of common “core indicators” of migrant integration. Building on the Zaragoza indicators, the European Services Network (ESN) and the Migration Policy Group (MPG) have jointly developed a framework to monitor the integration of migrants and evaluate integration policies.

Core indicators
- share of migrants that have acquired citizenship
- share of migrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits
- share of migrants among elected representatives (no data collected yet)

Additional agreed indicators
- trust in public institutions (no data collected)
- voter turnout among the population entitled to vote (no data collected)
- sense of belonging (no data collected).

POLITIS used qualitative interviews to better understand the life trajectories of 176 civically active immigrants and the facilitators and obstacles to participation that are common across Europe. Its coded database points to general trends and patterns that can later be tested in representative quantitative research.

www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de

The Localmultidem project provides results for selected cities regarding immigrants’ levels of political integration in terms of political attitudes and orientations (like trust, knowledge, belonging) and civic and political participation (both conventional and non-conventional).

www.um.es/localmultidem

‘Pathways to Power’ explores political representation of citizens of immigrant origin and its social, political and institutional context in seven OSCE participating States (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom). The project seeks to advance knowledge on descriptive representation of citizens of immigrant origin at the national and regional levels over a twenty year period.

www.pathways.eu/

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The voluntary sector

The ESS analysis suggests that migrants may volunteer their help to others as much as natives do, though not always through work with a conventional organization. INVOLVE, an INTI-project in six countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, the UK) focused on the ways in which migrant volunteers promote integration. Volunteering plays a role as an indicator of integration – and one which contributes to several other indicators as it enables migrants to acquire basic knowledge of the host society, to participate in society through non-formal and informal education and to improve their employability on the labour market. Volunteering enables the host society to better deal with increasing diversity and to accommodate change, as well as being a means by which both migrants and non-migrants meet and take civic action on community issues that matter to both of them. Networking between migrant and mainstream organizations was a key component of success. And government at different levels can help create an enabling environment both for volunteering in general and for migrants to get involved in volunteering. The best initiatives start bottom-up – but need a framework in which to emerge.

Two trajectories that migrants take to become active in civil society were identified in the POLITIS interviews.24 One path is taken by “civic entrepreneurship.” At some point in their settlement process, migrants undertake informal activities (family, cultural, social, professional, and so on) that make them into a “network node” (i.e. person with contacts to own ethnic or multi-ethnic groups). In a next step, they may found their own organization and make their own positions of authority, in order to get better visibility, recognition, or access to funds.

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<th>Civic entrepreneurs:</th>
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The other path is taken by “civic outreach” based on a successful first contact between migrants and organizations. Outreach is the important channel for people in general to join an organization. Studies suggest that those born and educated in a country are more able to enter public life on their own, whereas those born abroad usually get mobilised by those who are already politically active.25 While nationals are often recruited through their private, family or professional ties, POLITIS’ literature review found that migrant volunteers are more likely to contact an organization either at a public event, or as the client of its services. The organization might take the lead by appointing a specific outreach person, who POLITIS refers to as a “gate-opener” or “mobiliser.” Those who are also migrant members of the organization serve as “role models” for the organization’s target group. The presence or absence of these gate-openers is a particularly important factor that affects whether, when, and how migrants get involved in public life. Interestingly, research shows that the way in which non-Western migrants participate seems to be more a function of the channels through which they are recruited, rather than of their own personal resources and political engagement.26

26 E. A. De Rooij, op.cit.
Gate-openers either come into contact with “members-in-waiting” or “active searchers.” A gate-opener goes to public events to recruit migrants who indicate a general interest in its general activities. These persons could be called “members-in-waiting.” Equally, an migrant might take lead as an “active searcher.” As a participant at a public event or as a client of the organization, they indicate their specific interest in the organization and, in a next step, are welcomed by a gate-opener. Some unique characteristics that might distinguish “active searchers” are past experience in the same field in their country of origin, or no right to work in certain countries of residence (i.e. asylum-seekers and categories family reunion migrants). One conclusion drawn by POLITIS is that organizations may lack “gate-openers,” knowledge of where to find “members-in-waiting,” and the ability to identify “active searchers.”

Whether these two ways of making the first contact lead to civic participation depends on the organizations’ capacity and willingness to find an “adequate first task” for new migrant members, orient them within the organization, and build their capacities through “mentoring and coaching.”

Migrants have better opportunities to volunteer when organizations adopt not only outreach strategies for migrants, but also a general policy on the inclusion, retention, and advancement of new members. POLITIS notes that migrant organizations have a relative advantage with greater access to the target population and fewer internal participation barriers, especially language.

Both the civic entrepreneurship and civic outreach paths demonstrate that migrants’ opportunities for civic participation are shaped by the behaviours of host society organizations. Civic entrepreneurship is dependent on the conditions in the voluntary sector—both in general (bureaucratic requirements, legal procedures, fees, public technical and financial support) and for non-EU migrants (support for migrant associations and policies on integration and equal opportunities). POLITIS notes that the founding and operation of an migrant association often involves co-operation with native residents27. Civic outreach is dependent on the policies of organizations and the actions of its individual members (outreach to members-in-waiting, receptiveness to active searchers, etc.).

The fact that some civic and political groups have a greater need for migrant members than others helps determine both their interest and effectiveness in outreach28. Migrant associations can only sustain their membership and leadership by organizing people in similar situations around common interests, such as home-country culture and politics, remittances, and community needs. Some migrants’ rights NGOs may also find that they can better advance these goals by having migrants as their staff, if not their directors. Their activities bring them closer to the migrant population by encouraging them to naturalize, vote, organize, and demonstrate or petition on issues of migrants’ rights. Depending on the national legal

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27 D. Vogel, *Highly Active Immigrants – A resource for European civil societies* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008).
28 J. Hochschild and J. Mollenkopf, *op.cit.*
system, these NGOs cannot bring forward a discrimination case if they first do not seek out potential migrant victims and convince them to become litigants. Most religious groups are inherently interested in reaching out to new communities, either to provide spaces of worship for the faithful, convert new members, or deliver services to those most in need. Whether mainstream civil society—from a trade union to a school, a civic or neighbourhood organization—recruits migrants is influenced by the immediate context. These variables are both objective (inequalities and competition for resources) and subjective (attitudes and levels of trust and understanding between groups). Political parties decide to prioritize migrant outreach based on a political calculation of this context. They weigh the opportunity to mobilize a new constituency against the potential cost to their current position and electoral power. Depending on how much a country’s integration policy is politicised, parties in government may also make this calculation when deciding whether or not the state has a role to support migrant civic inclusion.

b. Trade unions

Unions are good for migrants and can deliver significant benefits\(^{29}\). In addition to an invaluable gateway to exercising a range of social rights, union membership appears to increase migrant social networks and individual social capital and is associated with higher levels of political participation\(^{30}\). The fact that all members, regardless of citizenship or legal status\(^{31}\), are granted intermediate political rights (granting equal rights to all members to vote and participate within the organization) and forms of representation made unions the historical cradle of migrants’ political participation\(^{32}\). That said, research on the OSCE participating States located in Western Europe has long suggested that migrant workers are less unionised than local workers\(^{33}\). Drawing on the Migrant Citizens Survey (ICS) data\(^{34}\), membership seems to depend heavily on the local and national context. Many more migrants say that they belong to trade unions in Belgian, French and Italian cities and Budapest—and at comparable or higher rates than the average person in the country. Far fewer migrants are reportedly unionised in German, Spanish, and Portuguese cities in comparison to the general population in these countries\(^{35}\). ESS analysis also suggests that migrant members are slightly less likely to be involved in civic activities outside the union like political parties or demonstrations\(^{36}\).

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\(^{34}\) <http://www.migpolgroup.com/diversity-integration/immigrant-citizens-survey/>

\(^{35}\) T. Huddleston and J.D. Tjaden “Immigrant Citizens Survey–How immigrants experience integration in 15 European cities” (Brussels: Joint publication of the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, 2012)

\(^{36}\) Aleksynska, op.cit.
However, according to the database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS)\textsuperscript{37}, there is a general downward trend in unionization rates for the majority of OSCE participating States that are members of the EU, Switzerland and Turkey. Unionization rates have remained fairly stable in Iceland, Canada and the United States. Looking more specifically at migrant unionization, research shows that the unionization rate of migrant workers in Europe and Canada\textsuperscript{38} is lower than that of locals. This gap can be attributed only in part to the impact of labour market segregation. Even when migrants work in the same industrial sectors as locals, they fail to reach the same level of unionization. Thus migrant workers who may be in greatest need of union representation because of their vulnerable status lag behind local workers in their rate of unionization. The gap between the unionization rates of locals and migrants is one reflection of the problem with the incorporation of migrant workers into the labour market, and their acquisition and exercising of certain economic and social rights.\textsuperscript{39} Research has tried to identify barriers to unionization and found that trade unions in some countries do not attract high levels of migrant participation due to the costs of membership, a lack of trust\textsuperscript{40}, and a low level of outreach to migrant women, especially in the informal and domestic sectors\textsuperscript{41}. Research on unionization trends in the United States is usually disaggregated by ethnicity in addition to migrant status/background. While Latinos’ membership rates overall still lag behind African-American and white workers\textsuperscript{42}, longitudinal data reveals that African-American workers tend to join unions at higher rates than whites, even when studies control for differences in education, industry, and occupation\textsuperscript{43}.

c. Migrant associations as means of integration

The multicultural hypothesis on migrant civic participation gained ground through fieldwork on “ethnic social capital.” This research, inspired by Robert Putnam’s work in the US, was started in Amsterdam and other Dutch cities by sociologists\textsuperscript{44}. They found that two aspects of social capital—the level of membership in and networking among migrant associations—relate to an migrant group’s wider level of trust and participation in public life. The more migrants become members of group associations and the more those associations link together in a network, the more trust is created among migrants and the more opportunities to participate in the wider political life in their country of residence. Conversely, migrant groups with low levels of membership in group associations that are poorly networked together tend to have lower political trust and participation rates.

\textsuperscript{37} J. Visser, ICTWSS: Database on institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage setting, state intervention and social pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007, 2011, \url{http://www.uva-aias.net/en/ictwss}


\textsuperscript{39} A. Gorodzeisky and A. Richards, \textit{op.cit.}


\textsuperscript{41} E. Kofman, \textit{Gender and international migration in Europe} (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd, 2000).


\textsuperscript{43} G. DeFreitas, “Unionization Among Racial and Ethnic Minorities”, \textit{Industrial and Labor Relations Review}, vol. 46, no. 2, 1993, pp.284–301; J. Rosenfeld and M. Kleykamp, \textit{op.cit.}

Comparative research has empirically tested the questions raised by Fennema and Tillie’s findings. A first tentative step was made by the contributors of a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.\(^{45}\) Taken together, the research findings collected and presented in the special issue suggest that how significant ethnic social capital is for political participation outcomes is dependent on the city and country one lives in.\(^{46}\) Nevertheless, Fennema and Tillie’s preliminary conclusion was that membership in ethnic associations at best improves political participation and, at least, does no harm. More recent research suggests that membership in ethnic associations fosters membership in cross-ethnic organizations and trade unions, and migrants who are members of one tend also to be members of the other.\(^{47}\) It is apparent that migrants’ political participation rates are strongly influenced by their level of social capital, which is strengthened through membership in both ethnic and mainstream associations. The research results of the Localmultidem project\(^{48}\) may reinforce this argument for greater public investment in migrant self-organizations if they are playing a key role to promote migrant participation in many areas of public life, and, in that way, to enhance the representativeness of mainstream associations and politics in a diverse society.

Migrants’ relationship with migrant organizations varies significantly from country to country and city to city. The Migrant Citizen Survey research indicates that not many more migrants are members of an migrant organization than of trade unions or political organizations.\(^{49}\) Scholars have tried to uncover the factors affecting conventional and contentious forms of participation in which migrant organizations engage. Networks of migrant organizations seem, in fact, to affect political engagement differently depending on the context where organizations operate.\(^{50}\) Findings continue to suggest that migrant networks are likely to foster migrant actors’ political integration in multicultural contexts through conventional politics, supporting initial research undertaken in multicultural cities like Amsterdam, where the argument linking networks to migrant communities’ political integration was first developed.\(^{51}\)

d. Consultative bodies

There has been limited comparative mapping of migrant consultative bodies in Europe. What exists are indicators (MIPEX) and best practice overviews based on non-comparative questionnaires or expert meetings and small field studies.\(^{52}\) In less than half the OSCE participating States that belong to the EU, recent MIPEX data\(^{53}\) found that migrants can be consulted through national consultative bodies. Closer analysis shows that most of these bodies are not strong and independent enough to create meaningful

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\(^{47}\) Ibid.
\(^{48}\) Localmultidem Project (Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level), (2009), http://www.um.es/localmultidem/
\(^{49}\) T. Huddleston and J.D. Tjaden, op.cit.
\(^{51}\) Fennema and Tillie, 1999, op. cit.
\(^{52}\) S. Gsir, and M. Martinello, Local consultative bodies for foreign residents—a handbook (Council of Europe: Strasbourg, 2004).
\(^{53}\) <http://www.mipex.eu/>
opportunities for migrants to improve policies. These bodies, especially new ones, tend to be weak, government-led, sometimes government-appointed and too poorly funded to effectively engage migrants and represent their diverse interests. While migrants in Switzerland are consulted by local and national government, as well as nearly all cantons, mostly through permanent structural bodies, in Iceland organizations working on immigration issues are consulted on an ad hoc basis, generally when legislation, action plans etc. on migrant's issues are being drafted. Until recently Norway was home to one of the strongest consultative bodies internationally, however, since the closure of the Contact Committee for Migrants and the Authorities (KIM) in 2014 consultation now happens on an ad-hoc basis. While the US has no formal structure for consultation of foreign residents on national level, several cities and states have recently recognized the importance of integration and created Councils of New Americans, though with relatively basic mandates. Canada is the only major destination country without migrant-led consultative bodies.

There is a very strong correlation between consultative bodies and financial support for migrant associations: whether or not robust consultative bodies are established in a country is linked to whether or not migrant associations have access to funding at the different levels of governance. The findings suggest that countries that expect national bodies to be proactive and representative also provide funds for consultation and activities to engage and inform migrant communities. Without this support, members are supposed to represent NGOs and communities but without the necessary outreach to ensure these contacts and information flow. Poor communication between members (either elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents and/or selected and appointed by the state) and the migrants and minorities whom they represent, reduces trust and interest in these bodies and hinders these bodies’ abilities to communicate with the public. Huddleston (2010) proposes two possible interpretations of this finding. On the one hand it could be that governments which fund the creation of migrant associations are more likely to consult with them. Equally, on the other hand, an explanation could be that the countries which organize consultations are more likely to grant funding to the migrant associations that participate.

Consultative bodies have limited success when migrants are not satisfied with the bodies’ role in decision-making, membership criteria, and operating rules. Ethnographic research in Barcelona and Bologna suggests that these bodies have the most benefits for governments (who gain legitimacy and a politically correct image), some benefits for migrants’ rights NGOs (who are contracted for public service delivery) and very little benefits for migrants (who are politically neutralized). As noted earlier, consultative bodies have little impact on actual policies where policymakers are not obliged to meet with them regularly and take into account their recommendations. One three-country study argued that consultative bodies divert migrant associations out of mainstream politics and into more marginalised and state-dominated structures. To avoid consultative bodies becoming “illusions of participation”, the Council of Europe’s Handbook puts forward these recommendations:


- **Composition**: open-ended and differentiated membership, equal representation from migrants and local communities, wide representativeness of migrant members
- **Selection**: Election by migrant residents or associations, rather than nomination by authorities
- **Objectives**: clearly defined, prioritized, funded, and regularly assessed
- **Activities**: consultation and promotion of civic and political participation
- **Functioning**: right to be informed and consulted, initiate consultation, receive a response, and receive necessary financial and human resources

An example of such a body is the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations in Finland.59

### Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations – Finland

The Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (ETNO) consists of the national level ETNO and the four regional level ETNOs. The national Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (ETNO) is appointed by the State Council every three years, is funded by the Ministry of the Interior and the secretariat operates within the Ministry of the Interior. Migrants and ethnic minorities are represented in ETNO through NGOs. These member NGOs representing migrant communities and ethnic or religious minorities are re-elected every three years through an open call. The State Council appoints the NGOs, after which these elected NGOs appoint their representatives in ETNO without any special state intervention.

#### e. Realizing electoral rights

While a growing number of migrants become citizens and obtain the right to vote, they often remain less likely to participate in elections than others, even where they are granted rights to vote or stand as candidates at the local level, and in some limited cases at national level.60 More quantitative comparative research is required on the electoral participation of migrants and ethnic minorities. National-level studies have been regularly conducted in the traditional countries of immigration and the UK, and recently in the OSCE participating States located in North and Northwest Europe.

MIPEX 2015 finds that more inclusive voting rights within the EU lead to higher shares of enfranchised non-EU citizens resident in the region, according to rough 2011/2 estimates for 24 OSCE participating States that are members of the EU. Inclusive voting rights have expanded the franchise to nearly all non-EU citizens in Estonia, Finland and Ireland at the local level61. Large numbers of non-EU citizens have also been enfranchised at the local level in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden (around 85%) as well as in Belgium and Luxembourg (62% and 68.2%, respectively). More restrictive voting rights have enfranchised only a minority of non-EU citizens in Lithuania (14%) and Hungary (25%). Earlier, Groenedijk reviewed available national data on the use of non-EU national voting rights at local level and

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61 Estonia: voting rights for all foreign nationals residing in municipality and have permanent residence permit (3 years residence). Finland: voting rights for all foreign nationals with minimum 2 years residence, Ireland: voting rights for all foreign nationals who are ‘ordinarily resident' in the municipality where the election is held
their link with integration. The non-national voter participation rate rises and falls over time, depending on the size of the population (immigration flows and naturalization rates) and the salience of campaign issues for these communities. Rates also differ between migrant groups and between local political contexts. Data shows that passive electoral rights (the right to stand as a candidate) have increasingly been used by non-nationals at the local level and that the number of non-nationals being elected is increasing.

Granting voting rights at local level has had no negative effect on naturalization rates and, indeed, may help migrants see the benefits of participating in decision-making. Migrants who use their local voting rights may thus have a greater awareness of the full voting rights that come with citizenship.Granting or restricting local voting rights may also have an impact on how migrants participate politically in other ways, which was a finding of a comparison between Swiss cantons Neuchâtel and Zürich.

Research in the countries that extend electoral rights at local level to migrants point to various next-step challenges to attaining equal participation rates for migrants as for nationals: some critical factors are initial reception conditions, political party outreach, and the density of networks, levels of political trust, and the level of establishment among different migrant communities. Furthermore, authorities may need to evaluate whether information and guidance campaigns are reaching their target communities. A recent experimental study, where individuals were randomly assigned to receive visits from political activists during the lead-up to the 2010 French regional elections, revealed that receiving a door-to-door visit from a canvasser increased the turnout of migrants without affecting non-migrants. A post electoral survey revealed that migrants initially had less political information, which could explain the differing impact across the two groups. These findings suggest that voter outreach efforts can successfully increase migrants’ political participation, even without specifically targeting their communities and concerns.

f. Party membership and orientation

The assumption of how migrants become active in political parties is a one-way transition. Migrants get their start in migrant organizations as a stepping stone into established political parties. Their work on the specific needs of migrant communities introduces them to the mainstream political issues that will become the main focus of their work for the party’s base. The one-way direction was partly confirmed by the handful of interviewees among migrant party members, conducted within the framework of the POLITIS project which focused on the civic participation of naturalized citizens and foreign residents. Activism in the migrant community preceded party membership for two-thirds (known as the migrant-plus-mainstream pattern). Yet a significant one-third started in political parties before developing networks in the migrant community (mainstream-plus-migrant pattern). Whether party members took the easier first route or harder second route depended on their level of education, language proficiency, and their socio-professional status. The POLITIS research suggests that this progression is not a switch from one to the other, but rather a combination of the two. Migrant party members were also active within

62 K. Groenendijk, Local voting rights for non-nationals in Europe: what we know and what we need to learn (Migration Policy Institute: Washington, 2008).


migrant communities, worked within the party on both mainstream and migrant issues, and served a diverse party base of both migrants and non-migrants. Where political parties become aware of the role that the migrant electorate can play in local elections, some become interested in:

- Enlarging their base to include these groups
- Adapting their political agendas and raising new issues to reflect their needs
- Moderating the influence of anti-immigration groups

Migrant voters tend to vote and join traditional parties—only rarely do they found migrant or ethnic minority parties. Some studies consider that they are more likely to join political parties with diverse party leadership and vote for migrant candidates within traditional parties’ lists. The IMISCOE state of the art report states that no general theory can be made linking migrant background to electoral behaviour. Rather, it recommends that further comparative research views so-called “ethnic voting” as context-specific by investigating its incidence in different political systems (i.e. voter registration requirements, voting systems, rules for determining voting districts) and societal factors (i.e. residential concentration, level of ethnic social capital, and experiences of discrimination). Even in the most favourable cases (a homogenous migrant population voting in a system for individual migrant candidates and small parties), these local parties have been found to be rarely successful in elections.

Migrants are likely to be changed by participating in political parties as much as they change the political parties by participating in them. Migrants may change their partisan loyalties to join the most inclusive party or movement, whose programme may later change their views on other subjects. They begin to align themselves according to the country’s political system, identities, and categories of ethnic minorities. These party members, whose primary aim is to win votes and public recognition, often adapt the way they talk about their own identity to the public and their community in order to conform to the established national conventions on the role of ethnicity, religion, or nationality in politics. They may cross boundaries without changing the established system, blur boundaries by bringing together previously separate groups within the system, or entirely shift boundaries to the point that migrants become established part of the system.

When it comes to outreach, despite the incentive to try actively to reach new groups and close the “diversity gap” between political parties as public representative organizations and diversity dynamics in democratic societies, DIVPOL findings show that political parties are particularly ineffective when it comes to attracting people of migrant background. Even though parties are currently running a number of schemes to reach out to migrants and migrants’ communities (e.g. in Germany, Ireland, Spain), the number of large-scale and structurally anchored campaigns explicitly inviting migrants to affiliate themselves to a party is negligible. The journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies (ERS) has published a

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65 J. Hochschild and J. Mollenkopf, op.cit.; M. Martiniello, op.cit.
66 M. Martiniello, op.cit.
67 J. Hochschild and J. Mollenkopf, op.cit.
69 J. Hochschild and J. Mollenkopf, op.cit.
Special Issue on Migrant Incorporation in Political Parties, specifically focusing on political parties’ attitudes and measures to involve migrants\textsuperscript{71}. The contributors to the Special Issue explore party strategies that address migrants’ political inclusion, such as affiliation policies, welcoming procedures and the inclusion of diversity in selection procedures of party officials and candidates, drawing on new perspectives on the linkages between political parties and civic associations.\textsuperscript{72}

g. Demographic and substantive representation

The demographic representation of migrants and their descendants is an increasingly important area to track in countries of immigration. This quantitative data-gathering is especially needed for countries without readily available statistics on politicians’ background, measured in terms of their and their parent’s country of birth and self-identification.

The DIVPOL preliminary findings reveal striking differences in the extent to which citizens of migrant origin are represented, or rather under-represented, in the eight legislatures. Migrant origin MPs tend to be underrepresented in key positions of party and committee leadership, although this may be a temporary effect resulting from their generally lower levels of parliamentary experience in some countries. A considerable variation exists across countries, with the highest percentages of MPs of migrant origin (at around 11\%-12\%) in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, to 3\% to 7\% in Belgium, Germany and France, with much lower percentages in Greece, Italy and Spain. The proportion of MPs of migrant origin in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France is in line with the percentage of foreign-nationals in their respective populations. However, it is important to highlight that in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, using percentages of foreign nationals masks a considerable number of naturalized citizens of migrant origin, and furthermore masks their immediate descendants.\textsuperscript{73}

In the OSCE participating States that grant migrants active as well as passive electoral rights, available data indicates that more non-national candidates have been nominated and more are successful at being elected as compared to those without voting rights\textsuperscript{74}. Similar findings have been found in Switzerland, as touched upon earlier in the report\textsuperscript{75}. This trend is partly explained by the outreach from a greater number of political parties, which come from a wider range across the political spectrum. In general, and similarly to other under-represented groups, migrants’ first elected office is typically in local government\textsuperscript{76}. The local level may be easier for newcomer communities to influence and for their politicians to orient themselves in the country’s political system. At national level, those successfully elected to legislatures in four OSCE participating States (France, Germany, Sweden, the UK) tended to come from left-of-centre parties and in multi-member constituencies with a high migrant population\textsuperscript{77}.

\textsuperscript{71} J. of Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(5).
\textsuperscript{73} I., Dahnke, et al., op. cit.
\textsuperscript{74} K. Groenendijk, “Local voting rights for non-nationals in Europe: what we know and what we need to learn”, Migration Policy Institute, 2008.
\textsuperscript{75} M. Giugni, 2007, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{76} J. Hochschild and J. Mollenkopf, op.cit.
Demographic representation in elections may or may not lead to substantive representation in parliament. Wüst and Saalfeld’s 2009 four-country study observed that migration-specific issues were the core work for most national legislators with an migrant background, except for those in leadership positions. Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst’s book, “The Political Representation of Migrants and Minorities”, provides further data and quantitative analysis on migrant voter participation rates and demographic representation on electoral lists and in national parliaments in several OSCE participating States. This and other comparative research on substantive and demographic representation can demonstrate how politicians with a migrant background influence their fellow politicians, the decision-making process, its outcomes, and its impact on migrant communities. Similar findings came out of the DIVPOL project, pointing to the fact that the identity marker “migrant” should not limit the party role of a politician; however, de facto this marker is often used in practice. Most politicians of migrant background reported that they had had to deal with the topic of migration and integration in their political career. While many of them brought an interest in this topic with them, others were encouraged by party colleagues to engage with it. In Italy and Spain, where the vast majority of politicians of migrant background entered politics via involvement in ‘ethnic’ associations, their party-political work is almost exclusively limited to the topic of immigration.

Representative institutions have also started to respond to the issue of underrepresentation by the introduction of gender quotas, reserved seats and target figures for disadvantaged social groups. However, categories such as gender, race and class are intertwined and interrelated. An increasing amount of research has also started to explore the interactions of belonging to more than one of these groups, applying an ‘intersectional’ perspective. Research indicates that the impact of gender and ethnic quotas only furthers the inclusion of groups that are already dominant in other ways: white women benefit from gender quotas, ethnic minority men from ethnic quotas. In opposition to the ‘double jeopardy’ hypothesis, studies have likewise found that women with migrant backgrounds are better represented in some elected assemblies than their male counterparts. The most recent research on the topic in fact suggest that similar mechanisms produce different outcomes for different (sub)-groups in society, and the effect of identity mixes is contextual and differs across dimensions of representation.

Research in Canada has examined how migrant and visible minority status, and the intersection of the two, affect women’s ability and willingness to participate in conventional and unconventional political activities. Findings reveal that the intersection of migrant status and ethnic background is relevant to political integration. When focusing on conventional political activity, women from an ethnic minority and migrant women are less likely to engage than native-born majority women. The lack of political integration is particularly acute, however, for migrant women from an ethnic minority. Resources and

79 I., Dahnke, et al., op. cit.
83 L.M. Mügge and S. Erzeel, op.cit.
socio-demographic profiles are limited in their ability to explain participation deficits in the political participation of ethnic minority migrant women and lead the authors to suggest investigating the role of mobilization networks in explaining participation differences deserves further investigation, especially given their variation across Canadian women. These findings are not paralleled when the focus shifts to unconventional political activity. While migrant women from an ethnic minority reveal levels of participation below those found for native-born majority women, there are no visible differences in participation levels between migrant women from an ethnic majority and native-born minority women.

h. Migrants’ civic engagement in OSCE participating States belonging to the EU

The POLITIS research also brought forward qualitative results on what civically active migrants think about engagement at EU level. The two features that POLITIS interviewees appreciated most about the EU in comparison to their continents of origin were its transnational democracy and its appreciation of cultural diversity. The researchers noted that when interviewees made positive reference to the motto “unity in diversity,” it was often accompanied with a hope that it will include all migrants and a fear that it may not include those of certain ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds. Interviewees tended to see the EU institutions as forums for discussion and sources of funding, especially where national governments express little interest in immigration and integration. They spoke of the importance of EC legislation and the obstacles to its national, regional, or local implementation.

i. Naturalization

The IMISCOE report sees a connection between studies on migrant political participation and a renewed interest in citizenship in all EU Member States. The integration effect of naturalization has been an important topic of research in traditional countries of immigration. Naturalization does not make migrants civically active. Rather, migrants who are already civically active will participate more after naturalization, especially in the areas of life reserved for nationals. International research observes a “citizenship premium”, at least in economic terms, in many OSCE participating States that are members of the EU. New citizens who benefit from full access to the public sector and private employers’ preference to hire nationals experience greater economic and occupational mobility in the years immediately after naturalization. Smaller studies suggest that new citizens in this period are more likely to join trade unions and become involved in political life in their country of residence and origin. The POLITIS interviewees noted that naturalization gave an added legitimacy to their civic activism on social or humanitarian issues. They felt encouraged as new nationals to take on responsibilities as representatives or mediators between nationals and non-nationals.

Over the past quarter century, the rising settled immigration population in Europe has produced more eligible candidates for the acquisition of nationality. MIPEX 2015 results show that in most OSCE participating States covered by the research, more than half of the migrant population adults have lived there long enough to become citizens. At least two thirds meet the residence requirements in Austria,

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86 M. Martiniello, op.cit.
France, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and the Baltic states. An important share of eligible applicants are second generation adults born and raised in Austria, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands (15-20%) and in Estonia and Latvia (around 40%). Acquisition rates have tended to rise, except in countries that make the process deliberately more difficult. Only a small percentage of the non-nationals eligible to acquire nationality actually apply. These low levels are striking in comparison to the traditional countries of immigration like Australia and Canada that emphasise the importance of naturalization. The factors that influence the naturalization rate are the length of residence, income levels, type of employment, education level, home ownership, family or social ties to the country. Others include the geographic proximity between country of residence and origin, future migration or return plans, and access to information on procedures.87

Better international data and research is uncovering the links between policies, naturalization rates, and social integration outcomes. The 2012 Migrant Citizens Survey (ICS)88 puts this emerging evidence to the test by asking migrants how they see citizenship as part of their own settlement and integration in society. Overall, around three out of four migrants in most ICS cities said that they are or want to become citizens. The major exceptions are the cities in Italy, where around half of foreigners surveyed were either not interested or were unsure. The ICS sample suggests that naturalization of migrants is more common in established countries of immigration as well as in situations where the relocation of groups of migrants was facilitated, such as in Hungary and Spain. ICS results raise concerns over the full long-term inclusion of foreign residents in several countries. Migrants who are not citizens of their country of residence or other EU countries are mostly absent from national politics, possibly exposed to the threat of expulsion, and, in several OSCE participating States that are also EU members, excluded from public sector jobs, some professions, and full social rights. A worrying half of long-settled residents do not naturalize because they see no difference with their current status or find the procedure too difficult (20-55%).

To assess the impact of different naturalization procedures on migrants’ perceptions of citizenship, the views of 119 migrant representatives in five countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Sweden) were solicited in a qualitative 2007-2009 INTI-funded study entitled, “Be naturalised – Or become a citizen?”89 They agreed that naturalization makes full political participation possible for migrants, whose activities and bridging functions should be better recognized and encouraged by the host society. The introduction of numerous requirements or a points-based system was roundly seen as confusing, bureaucratic, and impractical. Minimum knowledge of a society’s language, tested through a flexible and objective procedure, was spoken of as a measure that both nationals and most naturalizing migrants could pass. Interviewees also found it uncontroversial to deny full residence security to those proven to be a legislative threat to public order and national security, so long as former convicts were not excluded. Naturalization ceremonies were welcomed as a celebration of what can be an important and emotional moment in migrant’s lives. Citizenship tests or income/accommodation requirements were criticised by

88 T. Huddleston and J.D. Tjaden (2012), op. cit.
most as discriminatory for new citizens and particularly exclusionary for vulnerable groups. While the effectiveness of integration tests is yet to be established, such tests have become more widely used, the standards required to pass have increased and their scope has expanded beyond language assessment to include “citizenship” questions about state’s social and political affairs. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), in a Resolution entitled “Integration tests: helping or hindering integration?” recommend states to reappraise their approach to integration testing as part of citizenship applications90.

Overall, citizenship policies emerge as a – if not the – major factor determining migrant naturalization rates. Vink et al. apply a cross-national perspective to analyse citizenship uptake among first generation migrants in 16 OSCE participating States that are also members of the EU. The results reveal that more accessible citizenship policies matter little for migrants from highly developed countries, particularly those with fewer years of residence, but matter significantly for migrants from less developed countries. In fact, not only are these migrants twice as likely to naturalize in countries with very open citizenship policies, but they are also the ones particularly affected by these policies91. Furthermore, MIPEX literature review reveals that the restrictiveness of the policy has a greater effect on their naturalization rates than other individual and contextual factors. The acceptance of dual nationality is one of the most important policies affecting naturalization rates, both in the country of origin as the country of residence92. According to the EU-funded project ACIT93, migrants who come from countries allowing dual nationality are 88% more likely to naturalize in their new country of residence. The acquisition of citizenship is not only a result of migrants’ integration, but also a status that further improves their social, economic, and political integration. Naturalization also seems to lead to better employment outcomes and higher levels of social and political participation for certain naturalizing migrants94.

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4. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE PARTICIPATION OF MIGRANTS AND THE IMPACT OF POLICIES

Laying out a framework for monitoring active citizenship, Huddleston argues that, beyond the technical challenges in the construction of outcome-based monitoring systems, there lie several theoretical shortcomings in this approach. A simple monitoring of the integration outcomes of migrants is not the way to evaluate the success or failure of integration policies. Changes in the situation of migrants do not necessarily mean that integration policies lead to the specific integration outcomes, as is often claimed by policymakers.

Drawing robust conclusions about the links between policies and outcomes requires simultaneous consideration of a wide range of policies, individual level factors and contextual factors, all of which influence the specific integration outcomes. Comprehensive analysis is needed in order to evaluate whether these migrant participation rates are the outcomes of targeted integration policies or other factors influencing societal integration such as personal background, general structures in society, general government policies, general conditions in society or similar structures, policies, and conditions in migrants’ country of origin.

Only multivariate multi-level research that assesses the role of all of these factors can help us understand the drivers behind integration outcomes and set reasonable expectations for the outcomes of integration policies.

For the first time, MIPEX 2015 brought together data on integration policies and linked them to statistics on the potential beneficiaries, real beneficiaries and the outcomes of these integration policies. To date, MIPEX has the greatest usefulness for research and policymaking, with the most robust data collection method through objective policy categorizations by national experts and the widest coverage in terms of policy areas, indicators, and countries (now more than 35). A 2015 study reviewed 21 comparative multi-level quantitative research papers, exploring the links between integration policies, the integration situation of migrants and a wide range of individual and contextual factors. Taken together, the findings of the MIPEX literature review indicate that a number of individual and contextual variables explain most of the variation between countries in terms of migrants’ labour market integration, educational attainment, naturalization and political participation. The significant macro-, meso- and micro-level factors are discussed below.

a. Country level: political opportunities at different levels of governance

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How migrants participate politically in a country is contingent on its “political opportunities structure.” Migrants are thought to have better political participation outcomes in systems that are generally more open to political outsiders and newcomers (i.e. higher degrees of federalism, decentralization, proportional voting, and wide coalition governments tend to be more inclusive migrants’ local participation)\textsuperscript{98}. MIPEX secondary analysis also found that the countries with favourable migrant political participation policies were also those most actively fighting corruption, as measured by the World Bank\textsuperscript{99}, and most generous in their welfare policies, as measured by the Expected Benefit Index\textsuperscript{100}.

Recent comparative research is looking into which level of governance has the greatest impact on migrants’ political integration. National-level policies may set migrants’ rights, attitudes and orientations in the political system, whereas local-level policies may have a greater effect on participation rates and the emergence and mobilization of civil society. For instance, comparative studies have found that a local government’s relations with migrant organizations directly influenced their level of activism and effectiveness in public life\textsuperscript{101}. The Localmultidem project\textsuperscript{102} provides data and analysis of the significance of the general and targeted political and discursive opportunity structure at different levels of governance in several OSCE participating States. Research looking into the role of integration policies in lowering migrant-native disparities in political engagement suggests that countries with more comprehensive and migrant-friendly integration policies, as measured by MIPEX, also exhibit the lowest political engagement gaps\textsuperscript{103}. Alongside other factors, the researchers explain this through the comparable lack of legal and institutional barriers to migrant engagement in these countries.

The culture of political participation, as measured by the average political participation levels in the country, has a positive and highly significant effect on all migrants, both newcomers and long-settled residents, from developed or developing countries or from violent or peaceful countries\textsuperscript{104}. Migrants are also more likely to be politically active in countries with higher levels of trade union membership\textsuperscript{105}. Similarly, migrants’ intention to vote and self-reported voter turnout levels are significantly driven by the

\textsuperscript{98} Localmultidem Project, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{102} http://www.um.es/localmultidem/
\textsuperscript{103} M. Helbling, L. Bjerre, F. Romer and M. Zobel, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{105} ibid; ibid.
level of voter turnout among the general population in their country of residence\textsuperscript{106}. In other words, migrants living in countries with high levels of voter participation in national elections report higher voting intentions and higher levels of voter participation. Further empirical research can determine whether these findings are a sign of a country’s immigration flows and/or its integration processes. Countries with highly active populations may attract the types of migrants who tend to be highly active (i.e. with certain social advantages or from certain countries of origin). Another potential explanation for the positive effects of the contextual indicators discussed may be that they are a reflection of “successful” integration into given political and social context\textsuperscript{107}. Migrants living in a specific city or country over time may pick up the same behaviours as nationals and end up participating and trusting as much or as little in public affairs. National-level factors may also affect the behaviour of migrant organizations. How active an migrant or anti-racist organization is at national and super-national level may be best explained by national factors like the inclusiveness of the citizenship model and the relative influence of the extreme right\textsuperscript{108}.

\textit{b. Individual level}

Factors that influence civic participation are often the same for both migrants and natives. People will participate more or less in public life depending on their age, education level, homeownership, occupation, and ethnicity. For instance, the ESS analysis showed that migrants, like non-migrants, participate more as they become better educated and closer to middle age.

Nevertheless, the same factors that influence the overall population may have a different impact on migrants. Education, according to POLITIS, may be more important for migrants, who use their educational achievements as a source of self-confidence and means of recognition by host society civic actors\textsuperscript{109}. Gender may be less important if one follows the ESS analysis\textsuperscript{110}: this dataset showed that male and female migrants tended to participate at similar rates. The major reasons for lower participation rates among people born outside the EU may have more to do with their status as an migrant in the EU and less to do with their status as a man or a woman. However the gender aspect of political participation has not been sufficiently explored in immigration research\textsuperscript{111}.

Other characteristics are distinctive to migrants: nationality, immigration status, date of entry, the level of democratization in the country of origin, and perceptions of racism.\textsuperscript{112} Proficiency in one of the official languages of the country of residence emerged as a factor that is of particular relevance for migrant

\textsuperscript{106} B. Voicu and M. Comşa, \textit{op.cit.}; S. André, J. Dronkers and A. Need, \textit{op.cit.}


\textsuperscript{110} M. Aleksynska, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{111} E. Kofman, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{112} J. Hochschild and J. Mollenkopf, \textit{op.cit.}
groups compared to majority populations. Language proficiency was found to be statistically significant in all quantitative case studies included in the special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies on the effect of ‘ethnic’ social capital on political engagement.\textsuperscript{113} Being able to at least speak if not write the country’s language was often cited by the POLITIS interviewees as a precondition to taking part, and especially a lead, in its politics and mainstream organizations. Length of residence and acquisition of citizenship were also identified in the ESS analysis. It is not surprising that the longer an migrant lives in the country, the more he or she will become involved in its public affairs. Yet civic participation also increases when citizenship is granted to migrants, regardless of how many years they have lived there before. Naturalization, which is a form of civic participation in itself, removes the legal obstacles to full civic participation and has an important catalyzing effect on the integration process.\textsuperscript{114} Empirical research continues to unveil the relationship between these factors and migrant political participation. De Rooij finds that the time spent in the new country of residence is equally important for both Western and non-Western migrants. This finding supports the theory of exposure to the new society rather than the classic version of political socialization theory, which stresses the importance of pre-adult socialization. Furthermore, the greater sense of belonging and stake in society that accompanies having obtained citizenship indeed provides additional explanation for non-Western migrants.\textsuperscript{115}

“Soft” factors that influence the civic activation of migrants were brought to the fore by the POLITIS project’s qualitative approach. Those with little education try to compensate by playing on personal strengths such as charisma, leadership skills, and past experience of (and persecution for) civic participation in their country of origin. Both the absence and presence of a personal support network were cited as factors that encouraged them to become civically active. Some primary migrants chose to engage in public life only once they have been reunited with spouses and children and made friends in the community. Others chose to join organizations as newcomers, precisely as a means to develop a social and professional network. Other distinctive characteristics of migrants, which are often discussed in public debate, actually have an ambiguous impact on their political participation. Migrants’ attitudes and values, their transnational ties, and their experiences of racism may push people into or out of civic and political life in their country of residence.

c. Group level

A person’s migrant group has been highlighted in past empirical studies and reconfirmed in the ESS analysis\textsuperscript{116} as a relevant factor affecting their civic and political participation. Migrants with similar personal but different group characteristics may participate to a different extent and in different areas of


\textsuperscript{115} De Rooij (2011).

\textsuperscript{116} Aleksynska, op.cit.
public life. In ESS, the levels of migrant civic participation across Europe were highest among Asians and Latin Americans, lowest among citizens of former Communist states, and average for Middle Easterners and Africans.

The relevance of group-level factors can be broken down into the conditions in countries of origin, the relationship between countries of origin and residence, and the experience of migration and settlement in countries of residence. An migrant group may have experienced forms of civic and political participation in a country of origin with a different political and democratic system to that of their country of residence. Migrants, regardless of their individual abilities, are more likely to participate in their country of residence if they settle in countries bordering their home country or with other strong historical, linguistic, or cultural links. There may also be factors common to an migrant group’s experience of migration and settlement, including reasons for migration (political or not), relative population size (real or perceived), and geographic distribution. These factors may help explain why some groups and not others engage in public life or are engaged by public organizations.

The level of political participation in the country of origin is also an important predictor of the level of political participation in the country of residence for migrants from developing countries and for Muslim migrants. The greater the level of political participation in the country of origin is, the greater the level of political participation of migrants from that country in the country of migration. The level of civil rights and democracy in the country of origin also has some effect on civic and voter participation. Participation is also significantly higher among migrants from developing or non-Muslim countries experiencing violent conflict. This effect only materializes over the long-run, meaning that migrants from conflict zones make a later but greater contribution to the political life of their new country compared to migrants with similar characteristics from peaceful countries. This evidence is consistent with the idea that conflict leads to specific selection of migrants and refugees, a lower likelihood of return to the country of origin and a greater motivation to reconstruct one’s life in the country of residence. It is also consistent with the theory that witnessing violence can be source of personal development and collective activism after trauma.

d. Public opinion

Public opinion might also factor into how migrants can participate politically in their country of residence. For instance, the general public’s acceptance of migrant candidates for different offices is frequently the subject of national and Eurobarometer polling on non-discrimination and diversity. Public opinion might also be linked to the adoption of political participation policies, as suggested by the MIPEX secondary analysis. Although a country’s nationality policies are related to many more historical and cultural factors than whether or not the public supports easy naturalization, there is a statistically significant relationship between public opinion and political participation policies.

119 M. Aleksynska, op.cit.
120 M. Aleksynska, op.cit; Andre et al., 2010, op. cit.
significant correlation between the MIPEX score on political participation and public support for more ethnic diversity among political representatives. The more open the political opportunity structures for political inclusion of third country nationals are, the higher the support for the idea that there should be more MPs of a different ethnic origin. Jacobs et al. hypothesize that it is public opinion which pushes policy in a certain direction (either more inclusive or less inclusive), even if they do not exclude the fact changing political opportunity structures may also an impact on public attitudes.\(^\text{122}\)

A recent review of eighteen studies tested the statistical relationship between integration policies (mainly measured through MIPEX) and public opinion toward migrants.\(^\text{123}\) Overall, findings show that integration policies are strongly associated with the general public’s level of perceived threat from migrants and, perhaps, to their level of anti-migrant attitudes. Inclusive policies can be said to reduce the level of perceived threat while exclusionary policies tend to reinforce perceptions of threat. Exploring further the link between integration policies and public opinion, Meuleman and Reeskens show that countries with more exclusionary integration policies tend to have publics that perceive higher economic and cultural threats from migrants. Furthermore, policies most highly correlated with these threat perceptions are political participation policies, meaning that non-nationals tend to have fewer political rights in countries where the public tends to perceive migrants as economic and cultural threats. The authors offer the explanation that although these policies are usually not the most important for migrants in their everyday life, they are often subject to high levels of media attention and very symbolic for the public.\(^\text{124}\)

More recent research reveals that more positive opinion climates toward migrants increase foreigners’ political engagement, and this effect is particularly strong among those who are dissatisfied with the political system.\(^\text{125}\) Interestingly, their effect is limited to non-institutionalized political action, as the opinion climate has no observable impact on participation in institutionalized politics, suggesting that opinion climates affect various participatory acts differently.

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\(^{122}\) Jacobs, Delmotte and Herman, *op.cit.*


\(^{125}\) A. Just and C. J. Anderson, *op.cit.*
5. MIGRANT RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Recommendations emerged from the POLITIS interviewees’ answers to the following question; “If you became the political leader of this country, what would be the first action that you would take to address the issue of migrants’ active civic participation?” An migrant’s gender, country of origin, or country of residence did not discernibly affect the type of recommendation they made for improving participation outcomes. The most frequent recommendations were:

- greater opportunities for consultation and political participation
- access to positions of responsibility and representation

The one general pattern across the different recommendations was greater fairness in migrant matters that brought to an end unjustified differentiations between groups, slow and inefficient bureaucratic procedures, and discriminatory behaviours.

What is apparent from the projects and empirical work analysed in this report is that despite the move towards inclusive political rights for migrants, together with increasingly favourable naturalization process and accessible political parties, a striking distance remains between the level of diversity in society and migrants’ presence in public organizations and government structures in general. At the root of nearly all participation and representation research, namely the building blocks of governance in democratic systems, lies the issue of diversity and the, so called ‘diversity gap’. While this issue is relevant within a broader discussion of participation, such as in public organizations, trade unions and political bodies, a great responsibility lies with political parties in their policies towards migrant involvement, democratic legitimacy and framing of the discourse around the topic. Political parties are crucial actors in this process and therefore have a responsibility to strengthen and invest in different modes to achieve political inclusion of migrants.
ANNEX 1 – INDICATORS FOR POLICY AND PROJECT EVALUATION

Indicators can cover the political opportunity structure, both mainstream (political system) and targeted for migrants (policies on political participation and access to nationality, i.e. MIPEX), financial and administrative inputs and outputs, and the outcomes of migrants and nationals.

The IMISCOE report put forward indicators of migrant participation in public life\textsuperscript{126}. The IMISCOE indicators are:

**Conventional participation**
- Voter participation rate
- Party membership rate
- Demographic representation on electoral lists
- Demographic representation in elected offices
- Demographic representation in non-elected leadership positions
- Demographic representation in internal party positions
- Migrants’ political associations
- Migrant representatives or associations participation rate in consultative bodies on integration

**Non-Conventional participation**
- Trade union membership rate
- Demographic representation in internal trade union positions
- Migrants’ civic or community associations
- Participation rate in mainstream associations and social movements

To this list an indicator on the “naturalization rate” could be added.

\textsuperscript{126} M. Martiniello, \textit{op.cit.}
ANNEX 2 – WORKS CITED


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ABOUT THE OSCE/ODIHR

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) is the OSCE’s principal institution to assist participating States “to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (...) to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society” (1992 Helsinki Summit Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.

The OSCE/ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed to reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today it employs over 130 staff.

The OSCE/ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of election observation. Every year, it coordinates and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE region are conducted in line with OSCE Commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, the OSCE/ODIHR helps participating States to improve their electoral framework.

The Office’s democratization activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. The OSCE/ODIHR implements a number of targeted assistance programs annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.

The OSCE/ODIHR also assists participating States’ in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This is achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide expertise in thematic areas including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing the human rights protection of trafficked persons, human rights education and training, human rights monitoring and reporting, and women’s human rights and security.

Within the field of tolerance and non-discrimination, the OSCE/ODIHR provides support to the participating States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance. The OSCE/ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and non-discrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring, reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.

The OSCE/ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on Roma and Sinti. It promotes capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages the participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.

All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.

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