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Front Cover
"The Syrian Exile" Composition by Moustafa Jacoub

Moustafa Jacoub is a Syrian artist living in Houston, Texas, United States.
#OSCE

## Military Doctrine

“Wars belong in the museum”, the slogan that graces the entrance of the Army History Museum in Vienna, remains sadly relevant. The OSCE High-Level Seminar on Military Doctrine took place there and in the Vienna Hofburg on 16 and 17 February 2016.

The seminar is the only event of its kind that brings together senior military and government officials from the 57 OSCE participating States for frank discussions on military intentions. It is organized every five years by the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, chaired in the first third of this year by the Netherlands.

In his opening address, General Tom Middendorp, the Chief of Defence of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands, asked: “Why not make meaningful changes? Why not tackle the modernization of the Vienna Document [the OSCE’s military confidence- and security-building measures] to start with? Why not increase mutual trust in the military field, no matter how deep our perceived disagreement?”

Watch the opening session here:
www.osce.org/fsc/222696

## Making Cyberspace More Secure

The OSCE participating States made cyberspace a little more predictable on 10 March 2016, when they agreed to expand the first ground-breaking set of OSCE confidence-building measures (CBMs) to enhance security and stability in the cyber domain.

The new set of cyber/ICT CBMs adds five new measures to the 11 adopted on 3 December 2013. Participating States agreed to organize exchanges to investigate the spectrum of co-operative measures they could take to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs. They decided to support the facilitation of authorized communication channels to prevent and reduce the risks of misperception; to promote public private partnerships; encourage collaboration between authorities responsible for security critical infrastructures; and encourage responsible reporting of vulnerabilities and remedies. Like the first set of cyber CBMs, all measures adopted are voluntary.

So far the OSCE is the only regional security organization with such a diverse constituency that has managed to reach agreement on CBMs focusing on the cyber domain.

View the full list of OSCE cyber/ICT CBMs here:
www.osce.org/pc/227281

Read the article by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier on the first set of CBMs in Security Community 2/2014
www.osce.org/magazine/2014/2
Protracted Conflicts: Transdniestria

For the first time in two years, OSCE-mediated talks in the so-called 5+2 format for the settlement of the protracted conflict over Moldova’s breakaway Transdniestrian region resumed in Berlin on 2 and 3 June. The 5+2 format includes Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United States and the European Union.

“Following two days of focused discussions, I am happy to say that we moved forward on a number of substantive issues to the benefit of both sides, including in the areas of telecommunication, transportation and education,” said Ambassador Cord Meier-Klodt, Special Representative of the German OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process.

Fighting Terrorism

“One thing is clear – understanding security in a purely repressive sense is not going to fly. We have to have prevention, which is sometimes seen as the softer approach, combined with resolute criminal prosecution,” said German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière at the opening of the 2016 annual OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference in Berlin on 31 May 2016. Over 300 experts attending the two-day conference considered not only preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism but also the reintegration and rehabilitation of returning foreign terrorist fighters. They reviewed the OSCE’s work against terrorism, from expert seminars organized by the OSCE Secretariat’s Department on Transnational Threats to projects implemented by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and field operations – such as the Parents against Terrorism training project in Tajikistan.

Watch the opening session of the 2016 OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference here: http://www.osce.org/cio/243856

See info on the OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism (#UnitedCVE) Campaign here: http://www.osce.org/unitedCVE

Education and National Minorities

“The arrival to Europe of men, women and children trying to escape the violence of conflict is posing a new challenge to education,” said OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Astrid Thors, setting the scene for the expert conference to commemorate the 20th anniversary of The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Educational Rights of National Minorities which she hosted in The Hague, Netherlands, on 20 and 21 April.

“Education is in many ways the space where issues of equality, national identity and the concept of nationhood are being negotiated,” she observed.

The Hague Recommendations, issued by the first High Commissioner Max van der Stoel, together with the 2012 Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, are important tools for the High Commissioner as she works behind the scenes with governments and schools to improve the situation of national minorities in OSCE participating States.

Watch the winning videos of the contest “Our school, our diversity”:
www.osce.org/our-school-our-diversity

An Experiment in Connectivity

Close to a thousand business leaders and high-ranking government officials convened in the German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin on 18 and 19 May for an open dialogue hosted by the German OSCE Chairmanship about connectivity for commerce and investment across the entire OSCE region and beyond, as far east as China.

“This conference is an experiment,” OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, “because we want to speak about political visions – in times of serious political upheavals. It is an experiment because we want to speak about concrete co-operation – in times where violent conflicts in our common space is costing human lives almost daily. And it is an experiment because we want to speak about business practice – in times when many believe that our visions of a common space of security and stability have been shattered.”

For more information see: www.osce.org/cio/240046 and (in German) www.osceconnectivity.org

OSCE Security Days

“Refocusing Migration and Security - Bridging National and Regional Responses”, Rome, 4 March – see in this issue p. 26

“From Confrontation to Co-operation: Restoring Co-operative Security in Europe”, Berlin, 23 and 24 June

More info: www.osce.org/sg/secdays
In the summer of 2013, Tunisia, the country that just two years before had kick-started the Arab Spring with its “revolution of dignity” that ousted the autocratic ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, was rocked by a series of assassinations and violent protests that seemed to forebode civil war. Instead, by the end of the year, the cabinet had voluntarily resigned and the conflicting parties had signed a roadmap committing to the creation of a non-partisan government, the adoption of a new constitution, creation of a new electoral management body and electoral law, and holding of parliamentary and presidential elections – all of which were implemented.

Four civil society organizations that united to form the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet were largely responsible for turning the country around and bringing it back onto the path of democratic transition. For their work they received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.

Representatives of the four organizations – the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers – visited the OSCE in Vienna in February 2016 to address the year’s inaugural session of the Mediterranean Contact Group under the chairmanship of Austria. In the conversation below they speak about their achievements and also about the challenges which Tunisia, an OSCE Partner for Co-operation, faces today.
You are four very different organizations, even historical adversaries, representing workers and employers, lawyers and human rights activists. How did you come to join forces?

**Houcine Abbassi, Secretary General UGTT:** First of all, our co-operation as members of civil society has a history. In 2011, to assure a smooth transition to a new political order after then-president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled, political parties and civil society groups created the so-called Higher Authority for Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition. My colleague Ghazi Gherairi, professor of constitutional law, who is also with us today, advised us and acted as our spokesperson. Our work led to the election of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) on 23 October 2011. Once the NCA formed a government, the Higher Authority was dissolved.

But unfortunately, after a year, there were again conflicts and a serious political crisis developed. There were attacks on public personalities, officials and the police, assassinations and a growing danger of terrorism. Two important political figures were assassinated: Chokri Belaïd [co-ordinator of the Democratic Patriots’ Movement] and Mohamed Brahmi [leader of the People’s Movement]. We were watching what was happening in other states, where there had also been revolution and which were descending into chaos. We told ourselves that we could not just stand by as passive observers if we did not want our country to go down the same route. Tunisia needed to find its own solution for putting an end to the situation. So our four organizations convened to find a way out of the impasse – to initiate a national dialogue. That is how our story started.

**Ouided Bouchamaoui, President of UTICA:** Sometimes one forgets, but it is useful to recall that there had been direct contact between UTICA, the union of bosses, and UGTT, the union of workers, before we started the national dialogue. In 2012, when there were a great number of sit-ins and strikes and a rather difficult social situation, the two syndicates met and we prepared the ground for this dialogue. Certainly, it was not easy at first. I think it was due to our personalities, and also to the situation in the country, that we were able to set this first milestone.

**Abbassi:** We invited many political parties to join the national dialogue, and quite a few of these parties contacted either Madame Bouchamaoui or myself to warn us against joining forces, believing that what divides us is greater than what unites us. But our answer was clear: the interest of the country goes before everything. We sent strong message to the conflicting political parties: we, as traditional adversaries, have been able to come to an agreement, so you, too, must overcome your internal disagreements for the wellbeing of the country that is dear to us.

**Noureddine Allègue, Tunisian Order of Lawyers:** The Tunisian Order of Lawyers, in a general assembly, decided to go ahead and engage in this matter. It was clear that we needed to address the political situation and could not leave things as they were. Our co-operation with the Tunisian Human Rights League was natural – its head, Abdessattar Ben Moussa, is one of our colleagues, an ex-battonier [head of a legal bar association], and the league itself is composed of quite a number of lawyers. So there was already a relationship, and also a good relationship with the other two organizations, and that facilitated our task.

**Abdessattar Ben Moussa, President of the Tunisian Human Rights League:** All four organizations had been active already at the time of the dictatorship and had participated in the revolution. So they had the support of the population and of other associations and organizations. Another thing we had in common is that we were independent of the political parties – and also of foreign influence. The embassies wanted to intervene, but we refused.

**You managed what may seem to be the impossible: as civil society actors, you convinced the government in power to voluntarily step down and together with the opposition to agree to a roadmap for a new**
political start. What was the secret of your success?

Ben Moussa: Indeed, convincing the three parties who made up the government to step down was difficult. Tunisian society was deeply divided regarding the NCA. There were thousands of protesters at a sit-in outside the NCA building and throughout the country demanding the departure of the government and the dissolution of parliament, and there was the other camp, which demanded the keeping of the status quo. What to do? We decided that, since the NCA was an elected body, it was necessary to respect its legality. But at the same time, the government needed to be held responsible for the security situation and the series of attacks. So we proposed a roadmap that charted a middle way, leading to a new constitution, a non-partisan interim government, a new electoral law and parliamentary and presidential elections. We insisted that the roadmap be accepted, immediately. “We cannot remain in this situation of civil war and chaos,” we said, “otherwise, what will there be left for you to govern? We need to have a dialogue now.” This was the tactic that we used for getting the parties to sign the roadmap. And it was accepted.

Afterwards, for the implementation of the roadmap, we sometimes made use of street appearances, holding demonstrations together with the population and with activists.

Abbassi: We had the popular support of civil society: that gave us strength. And all four of us could draw on our previous involvement: we had the experience and the expertise to make the dialogue work.

Bouchamaoui: The secret of our success? Mutual respect, determination and a strong faith in peace. We set clear priorities: the national interest came first and that of our organizations second.

Ghazi Gherairi, Secretary General of the Tunisian International Academy of Constitutional Law: I am close enough and at the same time outsider enough to be able to say: the Quartet succeeded because it represents the new Tunisia. Even if its members draw their legitimacy from their previous experience – the two unions from the time of their appearance in the 1940s, the League of Human Rights from its role in opposing the authoritarianism of the 1970s, the legal profession from its profound history (we need to go all the way back to the Latin and Greek writings to be able to say that Carthage is a ground on which nothing grows but lawyers) – what is interesting, in my opinion, is that the Quartet demonstrates the capacity of civil society to transcend its own conflicts and fundamental differences, to give precedence to the national interest before the particular interest, be it partisan or corporate.

How do you perceive the challenges that Tunisia faces today?

Bouchamaoui: All of the elements of the roadmap have been implemented: we have elected the assembly; we have elected the president of the republic and we have adopted the new constitution. So, frankly, we have successfully achieved the political transition. However, it is still fragile, and it will remain so as long as we don't succeed with the economic transition. Because the young people, when they went out into the streets, demanded not only dignity and freedom, but also work. Today we are a democratic country; we have all the freedoms and there is a strong civil society for defending these freedoms. But the one demand of the people that we have not yet managed to satisfy is to offer the young people who are unemployed the work they so desperately need.

We, as a small country, do not have the resources to do this alone, especially as the majority of Tunisian enterprises are not large. Ninety per cent are small- and medium-sized enterprises – and the majority are very small, one-person enterprises. So our country alone is incapable of offering sufficient opportunities to the young. That is why we are inviting investors from abroad to come and invest in Tunisia. But – and this is a crucial distinction – we are not looking for sub-contracting: what we want is colocation. We are looking for investment in Tunisia in a spirit of true partnership. Not for people who come to Tunisia for a low-cost solution, far from that. We are looking for opportunities for innovation in technology, in healthcare, in education – there are many sectors that require research, creativity and innovation, and I am more than certain that Tunisians are capable of offering these opportunities to foreigners.

Radical extremism and jihadism are growing among young people, also in Tunisia: what can civil society do to prevent it?

Bouchamaoui: Yes, a certain number of young people are leaving to join the jihad. There are reports that Tunisia is the first country of exploitation for radical extremists, and that frightens people. First of all, one needs to be sure of the figures. Secondly, we need to listen to these young people, enter into dialogue with them, discuss with them the reasons that are pushing them to go. If we listen to them and talk with them, there will always be an answer. There is a material side to it, of course, there are young people who are poor, who
are looking for work; there are also some who for lack of a social network or for lack of distraction or lack of something else are attracted to those who call themselves Islamist devotees, although it is not true. So we need to try to convince them, to tell them that there is a better future, that there is happiness beyond. It is a matter of employing all the means at our disposal to listen, to create adequate conditions of life and, above all, to offer young people the dignity they deserve.

What can the partnership with the OSCE offer Tunisia?

Gherairi: I believe that the OSCE, as an organization of peace-seeking countries, is aware of what is happening around it – OSCE can make to international opinion is first of all to understand what is happening in Tunisia. Above all, to understand. Understand that there is a nation that decided to brave all odds and stand up as a democratic nation, virtuous and autonomous. Today we find ourselves in a certain international context. If that is understood, we do not even need to tell you what you should do, it is obvious. It is in line with the very meaning of the OSCE as an organization that cares about peace, peace not just as the absence of conflict but as the establishment of a permanent state of non-conflict.

What are your future plans?

Abbassi: The Quartet has completed what it set out to do. With the national dialogue, we found a solution that allowed the state institutions to take root and establish themselves. We have been requested to institutionalize this dialogue. But we have declined. Because that would be a parallel effort to the declared will of the electorate; that would weaken the democratic institutions. Our task is done and it is now up to these state institutions to continue.

But the Quartet will always be watching what is happening in Tunisia; we will be vigilant, all four of us, until our country finds its balance – on the political and socio-economic level but equally on the level of security, as far distant as possible from terrorism. Our role is to intervene if ever we see signs of destabilization. In such a case, we need to move quickly, because if we don't, the consequences will be dire. That is what still unites us. We will intervene if our country needs us.

Ben Moussa: Let me add that our organizations continue to participate in the reforms. The Human Rights League is working in many areas: educational reform, legal reform, the reform of the security system, also the fight against unemployment, against terrorism and violence. We have a lot to do as an organization of persuasion, but we don't replace the political institutions.

“The contribution that an organization like the OSCE can make to international opinion is first of all to understand what is happening in Tunisia.”

and Tunisia is a country in geographical proximity where important things are happening. On the one hand, Tunisia has what you honoured this morning: a civil consensus in favour of democracy. But Tunisia also shows other potentials, including social demands that have not been met and that can lead either to migration flows – you will recall that in the first weeks after the revolution there was a migration flow to Europe, in particular to Italy – or to what certain media, without verifying the data, purport to see happening in the country, given the presence of a certain number of Tunisian contingents training for the jihad in the Middle East. I believe it would be an error to separate these potentials; they have to be seen together. There is a virtuous process, of democratization, of societal integration, but it takes time to achieve public satisfaction, recognition, stability. We are surrounded by an international environment which is not always in favour of peace, which is not always in favour of democratic values. And often these non-democratic leitmotifs are supported by money – not to say petrodollars. And it is established in Tunisia that certain groups that choose radicalism – they are several dozens of persons – are linked to these sorts of networks. So today, the contribution that an organization like the
In the current context of geopolitical tension in the OSCE region, the measures for military security co-operation adopted during the Cold War by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE – predecessor of the OSCE) hold some useful lessons.

During the past decade, the security acquis of the OSCE has deteriorated, with the cornerstone of European conventional arms control, the 1992 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, unraveling and no replacement in sight. Instead, a new sense of geopolitical competition has developed, emanating from growing crisis potentials and new security challenges, in particular the crisis in and around the Ukraine. These developments have changed the European security landscape and called into question fundamental principles of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security co-operation. They have also led a number of participating States to believe that enhanced deterrence and defense measures are needed to counter perceived threats against their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Indeed, during the past two years the number of close-border overflights, army exercises and fleet maneuvers reached a level in terms of number and size unknown since the end of the Cold War.

Against this backdrop, it might be worth recalling that even at the height of bloc confrontation in Europe in the 1960s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held that détente, coupled with the offer of security co-operation, should complement deterrence, as recommended in its “Harmel Report” of December 1967. This attitude, matched by the Soviet Union’s declared objective of ensuring “peaceful coexistence” between different political and ideological systems, provided the basis for the convening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1973. Thirty-five states – members of one or the other military bloc or neutral and non-aligned states – participated. The road to Helsinki was paved by a number of bilateral agreements between West Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the two German states’ accession to the United Nations and the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) by the Soviet Union and the United States and the initiation of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks on conventional arms control in Central Europe.

The conference ended in 1975 with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, which specified a wide range of measures for co-operation, grouped into three main “baskets”: security; economic and technological co-operation and humanitarian and other issues. The first basket contained not only ten principles guiding relations between states (interpreting existing international law as to their concrete meaning and application in a divided Europe) but also a set of military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).
Helsinki measures

While the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks concerned NATO and Warsaw Pact member states only, the CSBMs contained in the Helsinki Final Act took account of the risk perceptions of all 35 CSCE participating States. The measures responded to concerns that recurrent large-scale military exercises and force movements could be used for launching surprise attacks or preparing for large-scale offensive operations on short notice.

A provision was agreed requiring prior notification of military exercises involving 25,000 or more troops (including amphibious and airborne troops), with an optional observation clause. The notification was to be given no later than 21 days prior to the beginning of the exercise, with an exception made for short-notice snap exercises, which had to be announced as early as possible. For airborne or seaborne (amphibious) operations, it was suggested that the levels required for notification should be significantly lower, but they were left unspecified. These provisions referred to personnel strength; the Helsinki Final Act did not include any thresholds for armaments or equipment. However, participating States were encouraged to provide additional relevant information on the exercises, such as their purpose, number and components of troops involved, schedule, timeframe and geographical areas covered.

The Helsinki CSBMs took account of the particular political sensitivity and operational relevance of unusual military activities in border areas. For smaller maneuvers involving fewer than 25,000 personnel but taking place in close vicinity to other participating States, notification was also advised. For a participating State with territory extending beyond the European continent, the Helsinki CSBMs only applied within 250 km from the border with a European participating State.

While the exchange of observers and additional contacts such as mutual visits of military delegations were not mandatory under the Helsinki Final Act, they were advised and the principle of reciprocity underlined. Moreover, the CSCE envisaged that the experience made with the initial application of the measures agreed in Helsinki could lead to the development of further more detailed provisions.

Limited implementation

Unfortunately, the political climate worsened in the years following the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. The crisis regarding the fielding of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe approached its nadir; the Soviet Union deployed forces to Afghanistan; martial law was introduced in Poland; and progress in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks was blocked. In addition, sharp differences in the interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, deepened mutual distrust.

For more than a decade after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, therefore, its CSBMs were implemented in a limited and selective manner only. Seventy-two large-scale maneuvers were notified between 1975 and 1986, of which 47 were observed, though under narrowly defined restrictions. In addition, 53 smaller exercises were notified during this period, of which 19 were observed. No tangible progress on the development of new CSBMs was possible during the CSCE follow-up conferences in Belgrade (1977-1978) and Madrid (1980-1983). In Madrid, participating States did, however, agree to convene a conference in Stockholm in January, 1984, to promote the implementation and further development of CSBMs.

The Stockholm Document

The negotiations at the Stockholm conference received an unexpected boost when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev began to revise the policies of the Soviet Union towards reform. This led to mutual signals of détente, including offers of compromise on conventional arms control and intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles. In Stockholm, the CSCE participating States succeeded in 1986 in adopting a package of revised CSBMs, enumerated in the Stockholm Document, which still today form the core of the early warning function of the Vienna Document which succeeded it: prior notification and observation of military exercises and unusual military activities; annual calendars and constraining provisions, strengthened by verification measures.

The Madrid mandate for the Stockholm Conference specified that the area of application for new CSBMs should cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining air space and sea area, which was understood to also cover ocean areas adjoining Europe. This last specification was new as compared to the Helsinki CSBMs. In the adjoining sea area and air space, CSBMs would be applicable to military activities of all the participating States only when these affected security in Europe and constituted a part of their notifiable activities within the whole of Europe.
The advance notice required for certain military activities was increased in the Stockholm Document from the 21 days specified in the Helsinki Final Act to 42 days. Again, an exception was made for snap exercises: they were to be announced at the time when the troops involved commenced such activities.

The Helsinki threshold of 25,000 troops engaged in such activities was reduced to 13,000 if they were involved in the same exercise, conducted under a single operational command and organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/ regiments. These troops (now termed “land forces”) were defined to include not only army, amphibious and airborne but also airmobile forces. Also, an additional threshold of 300 battle tanks was introduced. Smaller exercises had to be notified as well if amphibious landings or parachute drops involved at least 3,000 troops. For the first time, the participation of air forces had to be included in the notification if, in the course of the activity, 200 or more sorties by aircraft (excluding helicopters) were going to be flown.

The information to be included in notifications was spelled out in detail: designation and general purpose of the activity; names of the states involved, level of command, start and end dates, types and total number of troops, divisions, amphibious landings, parachute assaults and major weapon systems participating (including battle tanks, mounted anti-tank guided missile launchers, artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers of 100 mm calibre or above, helicopters and envisaged sorties by aircraft and naval ship-to-shore gunfire).

With regard to multinational exercises, the Stockholm Document stipulated that the host country on whose territory the activity took place had to notify the exercise if the combined number of various national forces exceeded the thresholds, even if national contributions stayed below the notifiable level. Also, the arrival of significant forces transferred from outside the zone of CSBM application to within the zone or from inside the zone to points of concentration in the zone had to be notified. These provisions ensured the transparency of military reinforcements arriving from outside of Europe or of significant operational reserves being transferred within the zone of application.

The rather vague recommendations for the observation of unusual military activities in the Helsinki Final Act were replaced in the Stockholm Document by concrete provisions. Participating States were required to invite observers from all other participating States to notifiable exercises and force concentrations whenever the numbers of troops involved met or exceeded 17,000 personnel. For amphibious landings or parachute assaults, the thresholds were set at 5,000 troops engaged. Each participating State had the right to dispatch two observers. Their mission was to confirm that the military activity was not threatening in character. To that end, they were entitled to use appropriate maps and observation equipment, receive daily briefings about the developing situation and the daily schedule, visit geographical key positions in the area of operations and get in contact with commanders and troops of major combat units. In the case of snap exercises, inviting observers was mandatory only if their duration exceeded 72 hours.

Another new element of the Stockholm Document was the requirement that participating States provide an annual calendar by 15 November of each year for notifiable activities during the following calendar year, together with detailed information on the dates, general characteristics, purpose, size and duration as well as number and type of troops engaged. In addition, constraining provisions were included: planned military activities involving 40,000 troops or more had to be communicated for the second subsequent calendar year together with the pertinent information, and no military activities involving more than 75,000 troops were to take place unless they had been the object of such communication; participating States would not launch military activities involving more than 40,000 troops unless they had been included in the annual calendar. These provisions ensured that snap exercises exceeding such thresholds were not allowed without prior long-term information and thus sought to prevent the development of scenarios which could be used for surprise attacks.

As a further confidence-building measure in cases in which compliance was in doubt, participating States were given the right to conduct challenge inspections on the territory of other participating States within the zone of application. No state, however, was required to accept more than three inspections on its territory per calendar year. Inspection requests had to specify the area where a notifiable military activity was believed to be taking place, and the specified area was not to exceed that required for an army-level military activity. The inspected state had to grant unhindered access to inspectors, except for sensitive points or small restricted areas such as defense installations, military vehicles, aircraft or vessels. Responses to inspection requests had to be given within 24 hours. The inspection team was to be received within 36 hours at the latest, at a point of entry as close as possible to the specified area, and was to be granted the right to inspect for a maximum of 48 hours, on the ground or from the air or both.
The final section of the Stockholm Document contained an explicit reference to the implementation of the CSBMs, emphasizing the contribution that it would make to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities.

**Follow-up**

By the time the conference in Stockholm ended, détente was making rapid progress. In May, 1987, the Warsaw Pact announced a change in its military doctrine towards a defensive strategy. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States was signed in December of that year. A new mandate for negotiating conventional arms control was agreed in January 1989, leading to the conclusion of the CFE Treaty the following year.

The first mutual observations under the Stockholm Document were carried out in Central Europe in 1987. The results were encouraging: compliance with the Stockholm provisions could be confirmed and the first professional military-to-military contacts helped to develop mutual trust.

In early 1989, at the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference, participating States decided to continue negotiations on strengthening the Stockholm CSBMs. The deliberations took place in Vienna and resulted in the Vienna Document 1990. It was the first in a series of Vienna Documents, the latest being the Vienna Document 2011, which incorporates the OSCE’s current CSBMs.

**Lessons learned**

The early CSBMs of the CSCE, as contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Stockholm Document, focused on unusual military activities and provided for early information, notification and verification. Although they were based on threshold values that corresponded to the high quantity of armaments and large military bloc capabilities which existed up to 1991, the principles applied for introducing and implementing them could still be of value in our time and deserve due consideration.

1. Of the 72 notifications, 36 were by NATO members, 27 by Warsaw Pact members and nine by neutral and non-aligned states; of the 47 invitations of observers, 31 were by NATO members, eight by Warsaw Pact members (from 1975 to 1979 only) and eight by neutral and non-aligned states.

2. Thirty-seven smaller exercises were notified by NATO members, six by Warsaw Pact members and ten by neutral and non-aligned states; 13 invitations of observers were made by NATO members, one by a Warsaw Pact member (from 1975 to 1979 only) and five by neutral and non-aligned states.

(1) The early CSBMs could be enhanced and implemented once a general understanding about détente was in place, together with the political will to promote open dialogue and co-operative security based on common norms and reciprocal restraint commitments. Also today, a co-operative security environment would be conducive to further developing CSBMs in order to increase transparency and trust.

(2) Reciprocal restraint can best be attained through conventional arms control aiming at concrete limitations of offensive military capabilities. Therefore, in parallel to the early CSCE deliberations on CSBMs, conventional arms control was pursued with a focus on the key armaments needed to conduct offensive combined warfare operations. Also today, revitalizing conventional arms control would have a positive effect on the prospects for the OSCE’s endeavors to enhance transparency.

(3) Early CSBMs were militarily relevant because they responded to realistic scenarios and predominant risk perceptions. Special attention was devoted to unusual military activities, particularly in border areas. Such a focus is still valid today. However, threshold values for multinational observations and quota for inspections need to be adapted to the realities of present-day Europe.

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Special Section: Migration

While working regionally to make migration a positive force, the OSCE together with its partners is engaged in the search for a co-operative global response.
A Moral Opportunity

By Peter D. Sutherland

Our collective efforts to manage large migration flows have largely failed, says Peter Sutherland, the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for International Migration. Ahead of the United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants in September, the international system has the opportunity to recognize what has gone wrong and how it must be fixed.

Every so often a macabre headline captures our attention and awakens our conscience. Consider the devastating image of Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian toddler who washed up dead on a Turkish beach last summer, or the eight hundred souls who perished on a single weekend last April when their boat sunk tragically in the Mediterranean. As these headlines fade in a toxic haze of resurgent nationalism and tribal instinct, it is our duty to hold strong on the moral responsibility of the world’s leaders.

The consequences of a renewed and aggressive nationalism are damaging for all. Refugees seeking safe haven from violent conflict — the first victims of terrorism — are particularly vulnerable. They arrive often to face razor wire fences and can remain stranded in terrible conditions for prolonged periods. Those who find themselves detained are thus faced with two options: either recoil back into the hands of their smugglers in a desperate attempt to find safe passage around borders or continue existing in a state of limbo. “Existing” entails surviving in ever-growing and often unsanitary camps. This situation is morally unfathomable and unacceptable in a civilized world.

Behind all of this is a fear spreading across Europe and over the Atlantic that outsiders might in some way compromise traditions and values. In fact, in some countries, fuelled by the tropes of nationalism, citizens and
their leaders are doing this themselves. Far-right parties are making *de facto* political gains and nationalist protesters are putting European values to the test – values that were given expression so nobly following World War II: tolerance, plurality and non-discrimination.

Such an attack on the European project will abet authoritarian governments and usher in a culture characteristic of Huntington’s dystopian clash of civilizations wherein xenophobia prevails and the innocent are persecuted. All this while Europe again becomes divided (and not just through the manifestation of re-imposed physical borders). Similar forces of nationalism and nativism appear to be influencing the debate in the United States with Donald Trump, as a forerunner in the presidential race, proposing a ban on Muslims entering the country.

Between the outright hostility towards taking refugees in some countries, and a much more welcoming stance in others, collective efforts to manage large migration flows have largely failed. A global crisis demands an urgent global response with strong leadership.

Over the course of this year the international system has an opportunity to recognize what has gone wrong and how it must be fixed. World leaders must accept their responsibility by the time they convene at the United Nations Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants in September.

First it must be accepted that this is not a problem that will dissipate or a crisis that can be averted to other shores, as some leaders would appear to prefer to assume. We must look to the future with tenacious realism. Migration is a global reality that will continue unabated. Almost 60 million people currently live displaced, 20 million as refugees needing sanctuary, according to the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) Global Trends Report released in June last year; countless more risk displacement with more conflict and disasters on the horizon.

Our capacity to protect must grow also to embrace not only those strictly defined as refugees. Consider children exploited for labour, or communities at risk from the unevenly distributed burdens of climate change. In Bangladesh alone, a typhoon in the Bay of Bengal could forcibly displace millions who reside in low-lying coastal areas. This demands a global response capacity and a long-term approach.

Secondly, we need specific improvements to the international protection system so that the international community is not responding merely on an *ad hoc* basis. This requires, *inter alia*, an acceptance that proximity does not define responsibility. Rhetorical responses need to be translated into concrete deliverables that uphold international law. These have to be both transparent and verifiable.

This means assessing and defining what it costs to support forced migrants and the front-line states who host them. This will only work as part of a long-term humanitarian plan requiring an expansion in both financial aid and resettlement capacities at each respective national level, globally. It is not an either-or scenario.

As the high-level UNHCR conference on pathways for admission for Syrian refugees in Geneva on 30 March showed – with few states announcing any new plans to take in refugees –, there is a markedly uneven effort to host the

Photo: © Espen Rasmussen/Panos
displaced. Many wealthy countries fall short on resettlement pledges. It is unfathomable that 86 percent of refugees reside in developing countries, as documented in the above-mentioned UNHCR report. Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey host almost 4.5 million refugees from Syria alone, according to research by Human Rights First. In the absence of adequate responsibility-sharing, this has led to deteriorating conditions in, and access to, frontline countries. We live in a world interconnected and ineluctably integrated, and this must be reflected through a collaborative and shared policy on migration.

At the same time, the international community must work collaboratively to generate safe and legal pathways for refugees, creating a balance against our absolute objection to irregular and illegal movements of migrants. With criminal smuggling enterprises in Europe estimated by Europol in its February report “Migrant Smuggling in the EU” to have reaped between three and six billion Euros in 2015 alone, we need to provide alternative channels, so that desperate people are not forced to make the perilous journey across the Mediterranean and through hazardous terrain. Regular channels should be created to integrate migrants and refugees in society as active members. Humanitarian visa schemes should be implemented, private sponsorship should be coordinated and scholarships should be granted.

Brazil’s humanitarian visa programme for Haitians, as facilitated by the International Organization for Migration, can be seen as a model for how legal pathways can be operationalized. Canada’s 38-year-old “Private Sponsorship of Refugees” programme is another model for good practice. This programme co-ordinates organizations and groups of regular Canadians to privately sponsor refugees during their first year of settlement, and now takes charge of resettling about 40 per cent of the country’s displaced arrivals. This private sponsorship process has become a global model, with some refugee advocates in the United States wanting to replicate it, which should be encouraged.

We must also remember that, according to UN figures, more than 41 per cent of the world’s refugees are children, and about 36 per cent of those risking the treacherous journey between Greece and Turkey are also children, as reported by UNICEF. Often these children spend undefined periods of time held in detention without recourse to judicial review. As well as guaranteeing family reunification, we must ensure that a child’s mental and physical well-being is regarded as a top priority with an absolute ban on the detention of children. This must be set as protocol for the future, by which the world is legally bound.

Finally, we must also help the world rethink the very idea of what our duties to refugees and vulnerable migrants actually are. The international community is in need of a reformed narrative, which can respond to the changing nature of migration. Rather than seeing refugees as a security threat to be averted, we must demonstrate that they can be positive contributing members of society, and integrated into communities, markets and schools.

The international community must not succumb to the barbaric fears of far-right nationalists, but must use this moment as an opportunity to improve the conditions of countless lives today, and many more yet to come.

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1. unhcr.org/556725e69.pdf
2. www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFSyrianRefCrisis.pdf
4. www.unicef.org/media/media_90000.html
Migration is hotly debated in these times of increasing unregulated flows of persons across the world, including in and around the OSCE region. Media headlines are dominated by alarmist reports of threats to our security and lifestyle; populist politicians leverage anxieties about growing unemployment and economic inequality to fuel negative attitudes towards refugees and foreign workers. In such an atmosphere it is difficult to speak about migration as a resource. Yet, in line with its mandate, this is exactly how the Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OSCE/OCEEA) sees migration, and with good reason.

Towards more legal migration

Migration patterns have changed in the last twenty-five years – shaped, accelerated and magnified by globalization. While the circulation of people has been made easier by the low cost of transportation and the fall of former political and ideological barriers, states have taken a progressively more rigid approach to human mobility. In our increasingly inter-connected economies, this is a paradox. The mobility of skills and capacities is an integral part of a business world that strives for ever greater efficiency and productivity.

A five-year study on the determinants of migration by the International Migration Institute has confirmed that restrictive labour migration policies worsen the problems they are intended to prevent, triggering, for instance, a deflection into irregularity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, greater human mobility is part of the solution. In a world where one out of seven people lives and works outside her/his home country, developing effective legal channels of migration has a positive transformative effect on the lives of individuals and national economies alike.

More legal migration makes our societies more secure. It reduces exploitation and counteracts the social exclusion of regular and irregular migrant workers that can lead to social unrest. The International Labour Organization estimates that 20 million people are victims of forced labour worldwide. This is unacceptable from a human rights point of view and carries a social and economic cost the global economy cannot afford.

Allowing more legal migration increases our social protection. It preserves our welfare systems, thanks to the injection of young and motivated talent into our aging societies. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs predicts that by 2050 the share of people aged 60 year or older in the global population will, for the first time in history, match that of people younger than 15. According to the Munich-based Institute for Economic Research, Germany alone in theory would need an additional 32 million persons by 2035 to fund its current pension system.

More legal migration makes us richer, because we can benefit from the investment of migrant workers’ savings in countries of origin and destination. The World Bank, in its Migration and Development Brief published in April, states that migrant workers send home 583 billion dollars in remittances annually, three times the amount of governmental overseas development assistance. This illustrates their sizable contribution to global prosperity.

Finally, more legal migration makes us more resilient. In today’s world, migration is no longer a once-in-a-lifetime experience. It is a coping strategy in the face of growing uncertainties deriving from an increasingly flexible global labour market, a tile in an ever-changing mosaic of work and life options. Open migration doors tend to be revolving doors that increase circularity, from migration to return, to re-emigration.
Rethinking policies

The migrant crisis we are currently experiencing offers an opportunity to re-think existing migration tools and policies. We would be mistaken to consider one category of migrants, the refugees who flee war or persecution, as "good" and another, the economic migrants who seek a way to secure their livelihood abroad, as "bad". Migration is a diversified phenomenon and the tools for managing it must be adapted to the different motives that push people to move.

Some of the most powerful drivers of migration are people's aspirations, dreams, creativity, spirit of challenge and sacrifice – the same forces that drive economic innovation and growth. It is important to recognize that among those who currently claim international protection, there are many in search for an opportunity to demonstrate their value to society. Establishing accessible and realistic labour migration channels should be a priority, so that receiving economies can benefit from this resource.

What can the OSCE do?

There is a strong need for good migration governance with a vision to expand legal channels of migration. This can only be a collective effort. The OSCE/OCEEA, in line with its mandate, offers participating States the opportunity to benefit from its long-standing experience and expertise, always aware that it is the prerogative of the state to determine who enters and stays in its territory and under what conditions. The Office builds its policy advice on three pillars: knowledge, capacities and co-operation.

Knowledge: To have a positive impact, labour migration policies need to be grounded in economic evidence and analysis. The OSCE/OCEEA produces policy guides, handbooks and training material on improving migration legislation and policies. It has pioneered innovative methods to address aspirations and vulnerabilities of men and women migrant workers, as well as effective systems to collect and exchange migration data and statistics. It also uses occasions such as the meetings of the Economic and Environmental Committee, the annual Economic and Environmental Forum, expert meetings and seminars to brief participating States on critical research and practices.

Capacities: Migration challenges require pragmatic responses at national and local levels. To turn theoretical knowledge into operational practice, the OSCE/OCEEA provides training to relevant ministries, local authorities, representatives of trade unions and the private sector and migrant communities. By involving all of these stakeholders, it fosters an exchange of ideas that leads to the development and implementation of pilot initiatives, such as the Migrants' Resource Centres established in Tajikistan in co-operation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which provide pre-departure and post-return orientation.

Co-operation: The ever-changing nature of migration flows imposes a continuous search for common ground and shared solutions among different players: countries of origin and destination, the private sector, local authorities, trade unions, hosting and migrant communities. Effective labour migration governance systems need to balance different concerns related to border control, demographic shifts, needs of national economies, skill-specific demands of labour markets and private businesses. The OSCE/OCEEA facilitates the exchange of information and the understanding of key tools to assess, monitor, adapt and implement effective labour migration policies. Its aim is to support political decisions that are based on economic evidence rather than on emotional or, even worse, demagogical approaches.

Making migration an asset for the economic development and growth of sending and receiving economies is a political responsibility, and it is a shared responsibility. It takes co-operation and a change in mind-set to turn challenges into opportunities. We need to understand that restrictive migration policies are part of the problem and not the solution. Together, we need to embrace migration as a structural feature of the global economy. And together, we need to pursue policies that make migration a tool for shared prosperity. If we work hand in hand, we can make migration a resource for all.

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Special Section: Migration

The OSCE/OCEEA’s Mandate on Migration

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 includes a chapter on “Economic and social aspects of migrant labour” as an area of co-operation for participating States.

Ministerial Council Decision No. 2/05 on Migration (Ljubljana, 2005) tasks OSCE structures to work on migration issues, which it describes as increasingly “diverse and complex”; the Ministerial Statement on Migration of the following year (Brussels, 2006) goes a step further, calling migration a “positive force”, acknowledging “the potential contribution of migration to sustainable development.”

Migration-related activities are spelled out in Ministerial Council Decision No. 5/09 on Migration Management (Athens, 2009), in which the Ministers task the OSCE executive structures “to assist the participating States to promote effective migration management, including exchange of best practices, and to facilitate legal migration and fight illegal migration, while paying particular attention to bilateral and multilateral co-operation in this field.”

OSCE/OCEEA Publications on Migration

2006: Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour Migration Policies in Countries of Origin and Destination (English, Russian)


2009: Strengthening Migration Governance (English)

2009: Guide on Gender-Sensitive Labour Migration Policies (English, Russian, Spanish)

2012: Training Modules on Labour Migration: Sensitive Labour Management - Trainer’s Manual (English, Russian)

2012: Gender and Labour Migration Trainer’s Manual (English, Russian)

2014: Towards Evidence-based Migration Policy (Russian)

Access publications online here: osce.org/secretariat/111294
Labour Migration in Central Asia

By Yelena Sadovskaya

Labour migration within Central Asia brings benefits to both receiving country such as Kazakhstan and the poorer sending countries, but both sides could profit even more if regulation challenges were met.
In the decade of economic crisis in Central Asia following the breakup of the Soviet Union, all of the newly independent republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – were migrant sending countries. The departure of a large number of qualified specialists in the 1990s resulted in a brain drain that is still felt in the region today.

Kazakhstan’s economy was the first to find itself on the road to recovery. Around the year 2000 it emerged as an attractive destination for labour migrants from other Central Asian countries. Disparities in economic development and standards of living, as well as geographic closeness and visa free travel (with some exceptions) within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) encouraged workers from neighbouring Central Asian countries, where the supply of labour was excessive and the wages low, to migrate not only to Russia but also to its southern neighbour.

In the mid-2000s, over one million people were coming to Kazakhstan annually as labour migrants, contributing an estimated ten to 12 per cent to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although their number has dropped in recent years due to the economic slowdown, Kazakhstan continues to benefit economically from the presence of migrant workers.
The sending countries are benefiting, too. According to the World Bank, remittances transferred officially to the poorest Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in 2013 constituted 32 and 49 per cent of their GDP, respectively; the value of money and goods brought in unofficially is even higher.

A considerable share of the economically active population of the Central Asian countries is working abroad: in Uzbekistan, the most populous, 20 per cent are working in Russia, Kazakhstan or a Western country. The emigration of excess workers balances local labour markets, preventing social tension and unrest. For migrants, the major gain from working abroad is an improvement of their family’s economic situation. They also gain professional and social experience and are likely to get better jobs upon returning to their home country.

Regulation Remains a Challenge

While the benefits of labour migration in Central Asia are beyond doubt, it is to a large extent an irregular phenomenon. The widespread provisions for visa-free travel and the geographical proximity between countries in the region stimulate spontaneous, temporary and circular migration, which is often seasonal. The level of legal awareness among migrants is generally low. They may arrive in the host country legally, but are often employed illegally, without an employment contract. That leaves them without social protection and the state without tax revenues from their work. There is a need for provisions that stimulate legal temporary employment, including simplified entry and exit procedures.

Kazakhstan took an important step towards legalizing irregular migrant workers when it passed an amnesty law in 2006 granting legal status for three years to migrants who had arrived in the country before June of that year. One hundred and sixty-five thousand irregular labour migrants had been legalized by the end of 2006, a great achievement for Kazakhstan and a unique experience in the CIS. In 2013, Kazakhstan amended a number of national laws on the recruitment of house workers, again permitting the legalization of a considerable share of formerly irregular migrants and at the same time increasing the state budget through migrants’ tax payments. But these are exceptions in Central Asia. Generally, the institutional basis for migration in Central Asia remains weak. National legislation is insufficiently developed and does not always comply with international standards.

There is also a need for better institutionalization of recruitment mechanisms so that migrants can more easily access the labour market of destination countries. Currently, labour migration is organized mostly by migrants’ own support networks. According to a survey conducted by the author in 2005, 31 per cent of labour migrants in Kazakhstan found a job through friends and acquaintances, 22 per cent through relatives and 20 per cent on their own. By contrast, only five to seven per cent were employed through recruitment agencies. Illegal employment networks prevail, with middlemen operating in spontaneous and black labour markets. Self-regulation of recruitment and employment could be facilitated by a free and easily accessible electronic database of available jobs.

Respect for migrant workers’ rights is crucial for legal and civilized migration, but they are routinely violated. A sociological survey
conducted in Kazakhstan by the author in 2011 revealed massive violations of migrants’ labour and social rights. Forty-seven point five per cent had experienced employers refusing to sign a job contract or formalize their legal status, 53.5 per cent had received wages with delay, 17.8 per cent not at all. Twelve point nine per cent had been forced to do unpaid work; 30.7 per cent had had their passports confiscated; 41.6 per cent had been prohibited from leaving their work place and 17.8 per cent denied access to medical services. Social infrastructures in the destination countries are inadequate. The system of property rental in Kazakhstan, for example, remains largely undeveloped. There is a need for kindergartens, schools and health care services, as well as a system by which migrants could upgrade their professional skills.

Co-operation between governments and civil society in addressing migration and other issues is insufficient – a legacy of the totalitarian past. A dialogue, which should also include international organizations, experts and media, is needed to explore possible new mechanisms of co-operation on labour mobility and migration governance. These mechanisms could include working groups for drafting laws, public hearings, monitoring of law implementation and programme and project assessment missions. There should be a special focus on research, awareness-raising, influencing public opinion and advocacy campaigns on issues concerning migrants and their contribution to communities and national economies.

Countries of origin need to be even more active than destination countries in managing labour migration. They should provide pre-departure professional and language training, create legal awareness and provide information about the destination country’s culture and traditions. Labour market access should be provided publically and free of charge, not only through migrant networks.

**Policy responses**

In spite of these challenges, there have been positive initiatives in migration governance that deserve consideration and dissemination. Kazakhstan, in addition to the 2006 migration amnesty and the 2013 legal amendments noted above, has signed a number of readmission agreements and bilateral agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on regulating labour migration and protecting migrants’ rights. Agreements on the protection of migrants’ economic and social rights have been signed within the framework of the CIS and the Eurasian Union.

This experience can be useful for Russia and other countries that host a large number of irregular migrants. Making the most of it calls for continued trans-border co-operation between ministries, governmental agencies, experts, non-governmental organizations and international organizations, including the International Organization for Migration, the International Labour Organization and the OSCE.

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The Way Forward

OSCE Security Days, Rome, 4 March 2016

Refocusing Migration and Security - Bridging National and Regional Responses was the topic of the OSCE Security Day in Rome on 4 March 2016. “What are the key challenges posed by migration, the critical points that you see from your own positions, and how do you see the role of the OSCE?” OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier asked panelists at the concluding session. Here are six answers.
William Lacy Swing, Director General, International Organization for Migration:

We're living in the most mobile period in humanity in recorded history: there are more people on the move but also more forced migrants than at any time since the Second World War. So what do we do? I think the first thing would be a change in perception, look inside ourselves a bit. Surely, since we didn't do a very good job of preventing all of these conflicts, and we've done an even poorer job of resolving them, somewhere there must be a growing sense of shared responsibility.

“We are going to have to learn to manage inexorably growing multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversity.”

The second thing required, frankly, would be a change in policies: we need a more resourceful and creative use of our policies if we are going to deal with this issue in shared responsible and humane terms. And the final thing is that we’re clearly in it together. We all need to work in partnership to address what is a significant challenge, one that is perfectly in the capacity of all our countries to resolve, if we are willing to do two things. We’re going to have to learn somehow to change the very toxic public narrative on migration we have right now. And we are going to have to learn to manage inexorably growing multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversity. We may say we don’t like it, but it’s coming, it is a reality.

Dora Bakoyannis, Member of Greek Parliament, former Foreign Minister of Greece, former OSCE Chairperson-in-Office:

There are emigrants and there are refugees, and I want to make this distinction. Because I feel that Europe has an obligation. Not only because of the Geneva Convention, but because part of us also has a responsibility for the situation that exists in places like Syria and Libya. We have an obligation to receive these refugees. But we cannot afford all the immigrants of this world. It’s impossible. So we must make a clear distinction between immigrants and refugees.

“I believe that political initiatives which can be taken by the OSCE are very important.”

Europe must have a common policy and, in my opinion, the OSCE countries have to have a common policy. I strongly believe in the capacity of this Organization. I believe that political initiatives which can be taken by the OSCE are very important. And I believe that initiatives can be taken on which the members of this Organization, which is a lot broader than the EU and has a lot more countries involved, can agree.

Tomáš Boček, Special Representative on Migration and Refugees, Council of Europe:

In public discourse, human rights and security are often juxtaposed as opposites. We need to move away from such perceptions and acknowledge in action that human rights must be at the core of our notions of security.

“If we international institutions do not speed up our collaboration and exchange, then we cannot remain credible when we call for individual member states to work together.”

There are no viable solutions to the current refugee crisis without concrete international co-operation. This is not a meaningless phrase. What this actually entails is that all of us here are jointly responsible. We cannot blame failure only on others. If we international institutions do not speed up our collaboration and exchange, then we cannot remain credible when we call for individual member states to work together. Historic failure is ours, too, if we do not move ahead collectively. Why not create a crisis management task force of international organizations? I must say that we are ready to be part of it.
George Okoth-Obbo, UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner – Operations:

Apart from a refugee crisis, we have a humanitarian crisis today, which requires a massive response to save lives, to avoid that people are exposed to the danger of death on the territory of this continent because of wanton abandon. With respect to the OSCE, I want to mention, first, early warning. Very often things are hidden in plain sight. What I think is necessary is more disaggregated, more granular early warning, that would be able to tell us for example, what are the dynamics in the smuggling universe that contribute to these movements? The other thing I would mention is border management. It is important that border management is administered in a way that is protection and humanity sensitive.

“What I think is necessary is more disaggregated, more granular early warning.”

By far the weakest link in this whole situation is in the countries of origin. What I would like to emphasize is that stability needs to be assured in the front line countries of asylum, most notably Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. It is fundamentally important to drive forward measures that will allow people to be stable, to have security, confidence and the opportunity for livelihood.

Ettore Greco, Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, New-Med Network Co-ordinator:

I think the OSCE can stimulate a debate on the very complex and thorny problem of the migration-security nexus. By addressing the issue from the perspective of its comprehensive concept of security, the OSCE can contribute a lot to countering the narratives that increasingly tend to securitize the migration problem. Also important I think is the norm setting role of the OSCE. It would help if the OSCE became increasingly vocal in asserting some fundamental OSCE principles and commitments linked to the management of the migrant/refugee crisis. Closely linked to that is a contribution the OSCE can make by addressing the human dimension aspect of the crisis. In this regard the OSCE institutions in particular the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights can play an important role.

“The OSCE can stimulate a debate on the very complex and thorny problem of the migration-security nexus.”

The OSCE, as a confidence builder and an early warning and conflict prevention actor, can play an important role in preventing the crisis of trust among states from evolving into something more serious and destabilizing. The wide number of states participating in the OSCE is another important asset: the OSCE includes countries such as Turkey, Russia, the United States and Canada – but also East European, Caucasian and Central Asian states. They are or can become an integral part of the equation to solve the crisis.

I would also emphasize the more concrete, albeit complementary, operational role the OSCE can play. A number of OSCE activities, border management training for law enforcement agencies, for example, are very relevant. An important asset is also its long lasting experience in field presences in areas affected by the flow of refugees.

Gerald Kraus, Founding Chair, European Stability Initiative:

What we have at the moment is really an unprecedented situation where some European Union Schengen members are supporting the building of fences to keep out refugees in another Schengen country. This must be one of the lowest points in European solidarity ever. The fences will not work – as people look for other routes. So what is the alternative? The only way is to start by recognizing that, while it is imperative for European leaders to create an orderly flow because the sense of chaos and loss of control is emboldening a new coalition of radical populists, even in old Europe, this can only become realistic if it involves resettlement in large numbers of Syrian refugees directly from Turkey.

“This is in fact a battle for Europe’s soul, a battle for the values on which the OSCE is built.”

Unless we focus on the details, on programmes that offer no fake solutions while at the same time we are committing unprecedented acts of lack of solidarity, we will fail. This is in fact a battle for Europe’s soul, a battle for the values on which the OSCE is built, the Paris Charter and the belief in human rights, for the future of the Refugee Convention. So we’d better get it right.
Not a crisis about migration: a crisis about the governance of migration

Good governance, border management, tolerance and non-discrimination: the OSCE works in many areas to help participating States make their societies more resilient as they rise to the challenge of managing the movement of people and receiving migrants who come to seek protection or a viable economic livelihood.

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is providing training on migrant rights, most recently in Estonia and Armenia. The Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe educates senior border officials from across the OSCE area on keeping borders open and secure. The Office of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities, besides providing policy advice on legal economic migration, assesses the impact of environmental degradation and climate change on migratory pressures. The Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings has initiated a simulation-based course on identifying cases of human trafficking along migration routes and assisting victims. Anti-terrorism, police training, inter-faith dialogue and fighting hate crime are other fields of work for the OSCE, its institutions and field operations.

Parallel to these well-established activities, the OSCE participating States are engaging this year in an intensive discussion on the current crisis. Since March, the informal working group on migrants and refugee flows chaired by Swiss Ambassador Claude Wild, is seeking possible new responses that build on the OSCE's comparative advantages. “As a regional security organization, we reject the ‘securitization’ of migration and abhor the toxic narrative propounded by populist and xenophobic forces. The crisis is not about migration. Rather, it is about the governance of migration, which needs to be updated and reformed,” says OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier. “Legal channels for economic migration have to be expanded. Rights of migrants have to be better codified. Borders have to remain open, but be more smartly managed.”

“Migration flows are not a national or even a regional issue,” Zannier says. “There is a need to establish global principles of migration governance to deal with what is rapidly becoming a defining phenomenon of the 21st century.”

Action lines from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

The past year has seen migration become a major focus of the work of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). Searching for best practices and concrete lines of action for OSCE engagement on countering the migration crisis, it has worked extensively in the field – in Sanliurfa in Turkey, Lampedusa and Mineo in Italy and Presevo and Miratovac in Serbia. “We have heard heart-breaking stories, stories of human trafficking, gender violence, human dignity violation and economic hardship. We have also heard stories that strengthened our conviction that we, as Europeans, can do better. And the OSCE, with its multi-faceted approach to security, is a potent tool for that,” says Maria Chepurina, OSCE PA Presidential Advisor.

In February 2016, the OSCE PA’s General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions presented the report, “Migration crisis in the OSCE area: towards greater OSCE engagement”, which shines a spotlight on the urgent need for a comprehensive OSCE-wide approach to dealing with the issue. The OSCE’s primary strength is in the joint forces of its bodies, fully using the unique potential of its parliamentary dimension, it concludes. View the report here: www.oscepa.org/news-a-media/press-releases/2454-osce-pa-debates-crisis-of-migrants-and-refugees-as-special-report-released
Creative thinking by three faith communities and the Italian Government has led to a procedure for issuing special humanitarian visas for Italy to potential asylum-seekers in transit in Lebanon, Morocco and Ethiopia. They are fully screened before entering the country and immediately integrated into a community network, all without cost to the government budget. The project is awakening interest in other European countries and deserves to be replicated. Cesare Zucconi, Secretary-General of the Community of Sant’Egidio, explains.

**How did you come upon the idea of creating humanitarian corridors?**

It was not possible for us in the Community of Sant’Egidio to look on any longer at so many people dying at sea while trying to reach the shores of Europe.

**Fast-track humanitarian corridors to Italy are giving safe passage to 1,000 of the most vulnerable refugees fleeing conflicts in Syria, the Sub-Sahara and Eritrea.**

After the tragic shipwreck off the coast of Sicily in October 2013, in which hundreds of migrants drowned, and the visit of Pope Francis to Lampedusa, we began to study European law, looking for safe ways for refugees to reach the European Union. We discovered that Article 25 of the European Union’s Visa Code gives member states the possibility of issuing at their discretion visas with limited territorial validity, for humanitarian reasons or national interest or because of international obligations. So there was a legal provision for bringing refugees to Europe safely, but apart from a few isolated cases, it was not being implemented.

Together with the Waldensian Church and the Federation of Evangelical Churches in Italy, we proposed to the Italian Government to issue a certain number of these humanitarian visas. After negotiations with both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, we – the
three faith communities and the two ministries – were able to sign a memorandum of understanding in December of last year. According to the agreement, we are allowed to open two and next year a third humanitarian corridor for refugees currently residing in transit countries – first Lebanon and Morocco and then Ethiopia. The Government has committed to issuing 1,000 entry visas to particularly vulnerable persons identified by the Sant’Egidio Community and its partners, who will provide them with safe transportation to Italy and host them until their applications for asylum have been approved. The visas are of limited territorial validity, for Italy only.

When did the first refugees come through the corridor?

The first family arrived in Rome from Lebanon on 4 February: seven-year-old Falak al-Hourani, suffering from a rare form of eye cancer, together with her parents and six-year-old brother. Falak had already lost one eye and there was a high risk of the cancer spreading also to the other. She had no chance of being treated in Lebanon. When the family arrived, she was immediately admitted to the children’s hospital in Rome. Now, four months later, her health is improving. The family is living in a house run by Sant’Egidio, together with other refugee families. The two children are going to school and already speak some Italian. The parents are also learning Italian at our school for language and culture.

Falak and her family were followed on 29 February by 93 Syrian refugees from Lebanon, among them 41 children. On 3 May another group of 101 refugees came through the corridor the same way. They had fled from Syria and Iraq – from Homs, Aleppo, Hama and Hassaka, near the Iraqi border not far from Mossul.

Why did you begin with Lebanon as country of origin?

Lebanon was an obvious choice because of the many Syrian refugees. In Lebanon, which has a population of around 4 million, there are 1.2 million refugees – that’s one out of five residents. There are the Syrian refugees and – this is sometimes forgotten – there are still half a million Palestinians living in camps like Shatila. Lebanon deserves recognition for taking them, but the country is utterly overwhelmed. Refugees have almost no access to health care or schools. We are speaking of around 400,000 children, most of whom have not been attending school for five years. What does it mean when children grow up with no school and no prospects? They can become the future soldiers of rebellion against wealthy countries.

I have spoken with many Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and most of them told me they had no desire to go to Europe; they were in Lebanon because they wanted to go back home as soon as the war came to an end. But now they are facing the fact that there is no end in sight to this war. Their homes are totally destroyed – the pictures of Homs or Aleppo today remind one of Berlin or Dresden after World War II. After five years or so in Lebanon, they are drained of their resources and need to move on. They are trying to go, but it is difficult.

How do you find beneficiaries for the programme?

We look for people who are particularly vulnerable: sick children, women in difficulties, handicapped people. Our criteria are similar to those of the United Nations for determining people worthy of refugee status. But we also consider people who may not fall under this category but have a proven condition of vulnerability due to their personal situation, age or medical condition. We try to help families stay together, not divide them.

The Sant’Egidio Community has many contacts in Lebanon; we know all the churches and the government and Muslim leaders. We also have links with Syrians outside of Lebanon, including in the European Union, who tell us when they know of a particularly difficult case. We meet the people, speak with them and try to determine if coming to Italy is really a solution for them. If we find that it is, we add them to our list of potential beneficiaries, which we pass on to the Italian consular authorities. The list is then checked by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. This is one of the characteristic features of our programme: the beneficiaries have given their fingerprints and gone through security checks by the Lebanese and the Italian authorities before even leaving the country. Once their files are approved, the consular authorities issue humanitarian entry visas and we put them on a plane to Rome.
What happens to the beneficiaries once they arrive in Italy?

Like every other asylum seeker entering our country, they have to go before a commission, which decides whether or not they can be recognized as refugees. If they are recognized, they get the right to stay. Until that decision is taken, they are entirely under our care. They are welcomed and hosted by us and our partner organizations. This is an important difference between our programme and, for instance, the United Nations resettlement programme: we take full care of the beneficiaries until they have been given refugee status. This means housing and feeding them and it also means letting them benefit from our network of solidarity. The Community of Sant’Egidio has been running schools of Italian language and culture for newcomers to Italy for more than thirty years. We have schools in a whole series of Italian cities today.

We find it very important to put the children in school immediately. After ten days, they already more or less speak Italian. Children are very quick, it’s not difficult for them to learn a language and adapt. But it is very important for them to be introduced into community life. Integration can only happen within a community – with both long-time Italians and other newcomers. This is very important. We help the families not only to learn Italian, but also to find a job, deal with legal issues in connection with being recognized as refugees and get help if they have health problems. We also do a lot to welcome their religious tradition. For instance, we provide space for the celebration of the Muslim feasts in our schools. We have nothing to gain from people losing their faith.

How are the humanitarian corridors financed?

All of the costs are borne by us – the three faith communities. We pay for the flight to Italy and we bear the full cost of hosting the families for the first period of their stay in Italy, until they are recognized as refugees, no matter how long it

“The humanitarian corridors don’t cost the Italian Government a cent. This, together with the fact that the refugees are fully screened before entering the country and immediately integrated into community life, is what sets our programme apart.”
takes. The Waldensian Church and the Federation of Protestant Churches are contributing the church taxes which citizens pay; they are providing most of the funding. We are also receiving help from generous citizens. The humanitarian corridors don't cost the Italian Government a cent. This, together with the fact that the refugees are fully screened before entering the country and immediately integrated into community life, is what sets our programme apart.

Obviously, we are aware that we are speaking of quite a small number of people – although, actually, one cannot say that 1,000 is a small number because every life which can be saved is important. But we are thinking of this as a pilot project, which may encourage other countries and institutions to do the same.

What is your message to others who might wish to follow your example?

I think others are watching our initiative and I hope they will be inspired by the results: the fact that people are entering in a safe way, are remaining in Italy and are being integrated. They are not just going through the official procedures and then left to fend for themselves, as unfortunately often happens with asylum seekers. I think also for the Italian Government, there is reason to be proud, because they did something very new, very creative, which other countries might follow.

I see a great willingness among citizens in the European Union, in Germany, for instance, and also in other countries, to do something for the refugees. We are receiving proposals of help from individuals and also from civil society groups, to host a family, for instance. This is the idea of private sponsorship, which in fact is also foreseen in the European laws but is hardly implemented. Maybe it can also be a solution for other European countries – together with organizations, civil society and churches.

In the end, if you are realistic, you cannot close the doors to Europe, they will not be strong enough. Also, it is against our own interests, starting with economic interests – even apart from the obvious ethical concerns. In a global world, you cannot live with closed doors.

“I think others are watching our initiative and I hope they will be inspired by the results.”
Umberto Eco: Softening the Tough Skin of Intolerance

The thoughts on migration that the renowned Italian semiotics professor and best-selling novelist Umberto Eco, who passed away on 19 February 2016, once published in a short essay entitled “Migration, Tolerance and the Intolerable” are, if anything, more relevant today than when he wrote them seventeen years ago as a reflection on the influx of Albanians into Italy: “The problem is that in the next millennium (and since I am not a prophet I cannot say exactly when) Europe will become a multiracial continent – or a “coloured” one, if you prefer. That’s how it will be, whether you like it or not.”

Eco writes that our worst enemy in dealing with migration is intolerance, which he defines as a natural human instinct: “Intolerance for what is different or unknown is as natural in children as their instinct to possess all they desire. Children are educated gradually to tolerance, just as they are taught to respect the property of others and, even before that, to control their sphincters.”

Our only hope for overcoming intolerance, he argues, is education, from the earliest age: “To inculcate tolerance in adults who shoot at one another for ethnic and religious reasons is a waste of time. Too late. Therefore uncontrolled intolerance has to be beaten at the roots, through constant education that starts from early infancy, before it is written down in a book, and before it becomes a behavioural ‘skin’ that is too thick and too tough.”


20 Years Summer Academy on the OSCE

It all began in Schlaining Castle in eastern Austria – with interest and faith in the OSCE and with an idea. In the 20 years that followed, some 500 young diplomats, mission personnel, academics and civil society members were trained within the framework of this unique programme: the Summer Academy on the OSCE, which takes place every June at the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Schlaining. Many high-ranking OSCE diplomats and countless OSCE experts have enriched the Academy with their knowledge and experience, many of them having been participants themselves.

The Summer Academy has been possible thanks to the support of the OSCE, the Secretary General, the Secretariat, the various OSCE bodies and the participating States, who also like to make use of this forum for educating their own diplomatic ranks. At the same time, the Summer Academy is independent, a secure space where politics, activities and decisions can be examined, questioned and commented in order to develop new ideas.

Interest in the Academy has risen enormously in the past few years – possibly due not only to the quality of the training but also to the world situation. The 20th anniversary was celebrated from 9 to 18 June 2016 in Schlaining Castle and the OSCE conference centre in the Vienna Hofburg.

*Academy Directors: Arie Bloed, Walter Kemp and Ursula Gamauf*

*More information: Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution www.aspr.ac.at*
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