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OSCE Summits in changing times
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ON THE COVER: The Palace of Independence in Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan, venue of the OSCE Summit on 1 and 2 December 2010 (Bekzat Kalkabay)
It is with great pride that Kazakhstan welcomes the OSCE Heads of State or Government and their delegations to our capital city of Astana for the 2010 OSCE Summit on 1 and 2 December. After a long climb, we have finally reached the summit.

Since assuming the OSCE Chairmanship in January, Kazakhstan has been driven by the conviction that a summit should be held this year, the year of the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. We have been convinced that, after a hiatus of 11 years, it was high time for OSCE leaders to meet in order to assess the situation in the OSCE area, and develop a road map for the Organization’s future work.

The world has seen truly tectonic changes since OSCE Heads of State or Government last met in Istanbul in 1999. International terrorism, armed conflicts, climate change, the financial crisis and other transnational threats — these are the challenges that urgently call on the OSCE leaders to find adequate responses. The Astana summit gives us a unique opportunity to do that.

A traditional focus on Euro-Atlantic security has now been expanded eastwards to also incorporate a Eurasian perspective.

It is therefore fitting that this OSCE Summit, at our initiative, takes place in a Central Asian capital.

We have great expectations for the Summit. We hope that in Astana OSCE leaders will show unity in adherence to their commitments in all dimensions, in their realization of the need to strengthen the Organization and improve confidence among its participating States, and in looking for adequate responses to challenges and threats we all face. It is in this context that, for the past several years, discussions have been taking place within the OSCE, including as part of the Corfu Process and Review Conferences.

It is time to convert the energy of words into the energy of concrete actions. One such action could be a decision by the Astana Summit to begin creating a united and indivisible community of security in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

That would be an impetus for the future successful work of our common Organization to continue strengthening security and co-operation. This way, the Astana Summit would naturally and logically ensure the continuity and development of the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Final Act given the new geopolitical realities and will move the OSCE towards new achievements in the twenty-first century.
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was perceived in Moscow as the culmination of the Soviet détente policy and a masterpiece of multilateral diplomacy.

At the multilateral level, this document was supposed to ratify what Moscow sought to also solidify through bilateral avenues, particularly with the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany: a status quo in Europe. Not only the territorial status quo as manifested in the principle of the inviolability of frontiers — the single most important goal of Soviet diplomacy at that time — but, also, the political and the social status quo, or the maintenance and the coexistence of the East and West blocs, representing different principles of social and political order.

In this regard, the CSCE and the Helsinki process were not expected in the Soviet Union to help transcend the Yalta order, which manifested itself in the division of Europe and of Germany. On the contrary, it was supposed to legitimize and solidify this order. Senior Soviet diplomats compared the CSCE of 1975 with the Vienna Congress of 1815, and largely considered it as a substitute for the peace treaty with Germany pending since the end of World War II. Blessing the outcome of the Conference, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union — the central political decision-making body in the country — emphasized on 7 August 1975 that the CSCE had collectively drawn the line under the outcome of World War II.

Nevertheless, in the marathon of negotiations from 1972, when multilateral consultations on the agenda and the modalities of the Conference began, through 1975, when the Helsinki Final Act was signed, the Soviet leadership was confronted with the choice of whether or not it was prepared to pay a price for the success of its endeavour. It finally decided to do so. It accepted the idea of extending the agenda of the CSCE to include the human dimension chapter, which sought to facilitate human contacts and the information flow between East and West, and a set of confidence-building measures. It also agreed to the inclusion of the respect for human rights and individual
freedoms into the Final Act’s Decalogue of principles governing relations between States.

Speaking in Helsinki on 31 July 1975, the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, acknowledged that the Final Act was based on a compromise — a reasonable one from his perspective. However, he also acknowledged different and even diverging assessments of the Final Act and particularly of its human dimension provisions within the Soviet leadership. He made it clear what was the bottom line of this compromise for the Soviet Union: “no one shall, based on whatever foreign policy considerations, attempt to dictate to other peoples how they shall arrange their affairs domestically. It is only the people of each State who have the sovereign right to decide over their internal affairs and to establish their domestic laws.”

Following this logic, the Soviet Union regularly appealed selectively only to certain principles of the Final Act: the inviolability of frontiers, the sovereign equality of States — which also called for respecting the right of each participating State “to determine its laws and regulations” — and non-intervention in internal affairs. At the same time, it sought to escape behind many caveats built into the text of the Final Act to justify a rather symbolic implementation of provisions on the respect for human rights and the facilitation of human contacts and a freer flow of information across state borders. Every move towards these goals tended to be presented in Moscow as a gesture of goodwill rather than as an overdue implementation of its respective CSCE commitments.

Two arguments were advanced to support the Soviet reading of the human dimension provisions of the Final Act: the inviolability of frontiers, the sovereign equality of States — which also called for respecting the right of each participating State “to determine its laws and regulations” — and non-intervention in internal affairs. At the same time, it sought to escape behind many caveats built into the text of the Final Act to justify a rather symbolic implementation of provisions on the respect for human rights and the facilitation of human contacts and a freer flow of information across state borders. Every move towards these goals tended to be presented in Moscow as a gesture of goodwill rather than as an overdue implementation of its respective CSCE commitments.

The Soviet Union, or rather its military establishment, was not a champion of the military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed upon in the Final Act, either. It constantly emphasized their voluntary nature — until the adoption of the package of mandatory CSBMs by the Stockholm Conference in 1986.

For almost 15 years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union pursued a rather restrictive policy with regard to the implementation of those CSCE commitments which were considered too liberal for

Communist societies. And for almost 15 years, the debates in the CSCE Follow-up Meetings were marked by constant controversy over the implementation of the principles and other commitments of the Final Act. Step by step, these discussions clarified and extended the limits of the 1975 compromise. This debate repeatedly put the Helsinki process at risk of being interrupted, since it was not properly institutionalized.

Only in 1990 did the collapse of Communism in Europe, followed by the break-up of the Soviet Union itself, temporarily put an end to this debate and pave the way for the emergence of a community of values based on the explicit commitment of the participating States to pluralist democracy, rule of law and the respect for human rights.

Until today, however, the full implementation of all commitments and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and of the subsequent CSCE/OSCE commitments remains unfinished business. As the European security dialogue triggered by the 2008 proposal by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reveals, the debate over how the final status quo in Europe could and should look is still going on. Still, the foundational nature and the basic value of the Helsinki Final Act have remained unchanged during the last 20 often turbulent years in Europe. This despite the fact that its usefulness was often contested and that, contrary to the expectations of the Soviet leaders 35 years ago, it proved to be a tool to manage a modus vivendi rather than one to ratify the status quo in Europe.

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Europe 1990. The winds of change have blown across the continent at a speed that no one could have anticipated. Within a few short and turbulent months, the Berlin Wall has been breached, the Iron Curtain has been torn down, and one Communist regime after the next has collapsed. Soviet republics are calling for independence. German reunification is imminent.

Amid these dramatic and historic changes, President François Mitterrand of France invited CSCE leaders to Paris. The agenda was clear: Heads of State or Government needed to stop and assess the significance of what was going on, and to define their relations in an environment that had changed almost overnight, and was still in a state of flux.

The pace of change itself made it difficult to prepare for the Summit. Yet the very act of calling for a Summit helped to focus attention in capitals on issues like settling the German question, and finalizing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Looking back over the speeches of the Summit and the landmark Charter of Paris for a New Europe, there was a clear sense at the time that Europe was ending one phase in its history, marked by confrontation and division, and entering a new era of hope and unity. This was like a peace conference to end the Cold War.

All of the giants of the age came to Paris for the Summit between 19 and 21 November: George H.W. Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, Helmut Kohl, Margaret Thatcher and Vaclav Havel, to name a few. Mitterrand, as host, graciously said that the Paris Summit was unlike other peace conferences of the past since there were neither victors nor vanquished. He also pointed out that, whereas in the past, peace conferences had involved adjusting the balance of power, the CSCE would be based on the solidarity of values. Indeed, the Paris Charter is a keystone in defining the OSCE as a community of values, every bit as much as a community of security.
The repeated references to human rights, democracy and economic liberty demonstrate the extent to which a shared world view had become ascendant. What is most remarkable, in hindsight, is that one of the most outspoken champions of this new world order was Mikhail Gorbachev. In his speech, he underlined how the Soviet Union was moving away from totalitarianism towards freedom, pluralism and democracy, away from state-dominated economic monopoly towards a market economy, and from unitarianism to a truly federal system. The dramatic changes that he introduced in the USSR, and which he facilitated in Eastern Europe, allowed for a radical shift in the way that CSCE States perceived, and interacted with, each other.

Another notable feature of the Charter of Paris, and the spirit of the time, was the extent to which the CSCE and its principles captured the public’s interest. The Helsinki Final Act had inspired groups like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and KOR in Poland, as well as dissidents in the Soviet Union. It is therefore fitting that the Charter of Paris acknowledges “the courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of ideas of the Helsinki Final Act”.

The Charter of Paris was designed as a blueprint for a new Europe. It updates the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act, taking into account the new possibilities that existed at that unique moment in history to make rapid progress on arms control, economic co-operation and human rights and fundamental freedoms. And it sets forth a vision of an indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area of, at that time 34 countries, free of dividing lines where relations would, henceforth, be characterized by respect and co-operation.

The events of 1989/90 vindicated the CSCE and demonstrated its important and unique role in fostering security through co-operation. As President Mitterrand said, “the CSCE remained the only place, during the years of the Cold War, where dialogue among all could be initiated and pursued.”

At the same time, there was a sense of sobriety that — despite the enormity of the changes — many challenges lay ahead. That’s why, instead of dissolving the CSCE, it was decided at Paris to institutionalize the CSCE process. Regular consultative bodies were established, like the Committee of Senior Officials (the predecessor of today’s Permanent Council). It was agreed that a Secretariat would be opened in Prague, and a Conflict Prevention Centre would be set up in Vienna. An Office for Free Elections (the forerunner of ODIHR) was created in Warsaw, and it was agreed that a Parliamentary Assembly would be established. It was further agreed that expert meetings would be held on democratic institutions and national minorities. This put the CSCE in a stronger position to assist states in the process of democratic transition, for example in monitoring elections and preventing conflicts.

The 20th anniversary of the Paris Summit is significant, not only in marking a turning point in European security, but also for providing inspiration for the Astana Summit. We should seek to recapture the hope of that heady time, and realize the vision of an OSCE community at peace with itself and facing the future with hope and determination. Drawing inspiration from our predecessors, we should also regard OSCE Summits as an opportunity to chart a strategic course for the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, not just to improve the internal working of the Organization.

In the same way that the Paris Summit is regarded as the peace conference of the Cold War, it would be wonderful if historians one day would look back on the Astana Summit as the end of the post-Cold War period, and the beginning of a new era of genuine co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This is an opportunity to build a true sense of community in Europe in order to face common threats, unlock common opportunities, and strengthen common values. Let us hope we are writing a new chapter in European history.

Marc Perrin de Brichambaut is Secretary General of the OSCE. He participated in the Paris Summit as a member of the French delegation in the capacity of Counsellor to the Minister of Defence of France.
The final document adopted at the 1992 CSCE Summit, also referred to as “Helsinki II”, received a well-fitting name, *The Challenges of Change*. It is a sobering catchphrase that accurately encapsulates the socio-political context of the time. The euphoric feeling that enaptured Europe on the threshold of the 1990s simmered out quickly in political circles. New constitutions needed to be drafted and new governments formed. Many of the newly independent States sought membership in the CSCE for its swift, non-restrictive and co-operative recognition. Meanwhile, the CSCE was just breaking in its new institutional “shoes” and struggling to keep abreast of the potential conflicts engendered by the transformations that were sweeping the continent.

The Summit Declaration, entitled “Promises and problems of change”, captures the excitement of those years, together with the uneasy anticipation of what the future would hold: “We have witnessed the end of the Cold War, the fall of totalitarian regimes and the demise of the ideology on which they were based. All our countries now take democracy as the basis for their political, social and economic life. [...] Still, the legacy of the past remains strong. We are faced with challenges and opportunities, but also with serious difficulties and disappointments.”

As mentioned in another paragraph, “The aspirations of peoples freely to determine their internal and external political status have led to the spread of democracy and have recently found expression in the emergence of a number of sovereign States. Their full participation brings a new dimension to the CSCE.” This geo-political dimension became obvious when the seating arrangement around the negotiating table expanded by 28 seats (14 times two) in the spring of 1992. The first to join the initial 35 CSCE States was Albania. This occurred during the Ministerial Council in Berlin in June 1991. The accession of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania took place during the first additional Ministerial Council, convened in Moscow right before the third Human Dimension Conference in September 1991. During the second Ministerial Council held at the end of January 1992 in Prague, ten more countries became fully fledged participating States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Then, by the time the fourth Follow-up Meeting was about to start, exactly on 24 March 1992, an additional Ministerial Council meeting was convened to accept the request of accession from Croatia, Slovenia and Georgia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted to the CSCE on 30 April 1992 on the basis of a decision of the Committee of Senior Officials, running in parallel with the Follow-up Meeting. A week after this admission, the Emergency Mechanism was triggered and a meeting convened on the side of scheduled meetings to discuss the involvement of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. Finally, one day before the Summit, on 8 July 1992, the participating States reached a “consensus minus one” decision, suspending the participation of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the CSCE negotiation process until further notice.

Such was the backdrop to the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. These were extremely turbulent and hectic times for Europe and for all the national delegations that traveled to Helsinki to prepare the Summit. Expectations were high, the agenda exacting. Meetings were held around the clock, leaving little time to reflect on the overall situation in Yugoslavia or study incoming reports from the first CSCE “rapporteur missions”, launched in agreement with participant States in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Unlike the three previous Follow-up Meetings, which had each lasted several years, participants in Helsinki were on a count-down to work out a document ready to be gaveled at the Summit on 9 July 1992.

While this review exercise also aimed at tightening the institutional nuts and bolts of the CSCE, as designed and assembled in Paris in 1990, a brand new institution was being carefully crafted to address the root causes of existing and potential ethnic conflicts: the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. In addition, new and more specific commitments for each of the three dimensions were formulated. In the politico-military dimension, the function of the Forum for Security Co-operation was consolidated and the Conflict Prevention Centre was tasked with new duties pertaining to early warning and the deployment of field missions. In the economic and environmental dimension, the scope and mandate for an Economic Forum was defined. With regard to the human dimension, the Office for Free Elections was renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights — a name change that also implied a much larger scope of action: as of 1992 the Office is mandated to hold annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings in Warsaw and regular seminars.

The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting did not produce a consolidated summary or report, but all the fruit of its efforts are contained in *The Challenges of Change*. In addition to the Helsinki Summit political declaration and all of the foreseen enhancements listed above, the Heads of State or Government endorsed the revision of the CSCE’s relations with international organizations and non-participating States and paid tribute to the role of NGOs, not to forget the adoption of a set of guidelines for a co-ordinated support of the integration of recently admitted participating States into the CSCE process.

The 1992 Summit is often overshadowed by the glitter of the Paris and Budapest Summits, but it is worth remembering that this Summit was instrumental and vital to the political success of both previous and subsequent events. *The Challenges of Change* anchored and refined the implications of many major decisions taken in Paris, and a number of issues raised during the 1992 Follow-up Meeting became key decisions further adopted by Ministerial Councils in Stockholm in 1992 (establishment of the post of Secretary General) and Rome in 1993 (development of capabilities of the CSCE in conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as subsequent readjustments of CSCE structures and operations).

The Heads of State or Government of the CSCE returned to the birthplace of the Helsinki process to adopt a document their appointed experts worked out under tremendous time and political pressure. The decision concerning Yugoslavia’s suspension based on the “consensus minus one” principle can be interpreted as a matured response to a challenge that cannot be met, while on the other hand, one can easily see how *The Challenges of Change* prepared the Conference to weather more storms and changes until its fundamental transformation into an Organization two years later in Budapest.

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As Heads of State or Government gather for the first OSCE Summit in eleven years, Budapest will not be at the top of their minds. Who will recall the declaration in 1994 that the CSCE should “play a cardinal role in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century”? In fact, claims that the CSCE was of the greatest, fundamental importance in European security architecture and a “primary instrument” for conflict resolution rang hollow at the time. Serbs had launched an offensive against the United Nations-proclaimed “safe area” of Bihac, a Muslim enclave in northwestern Bosnia, shortly before the summit. An embittered President Alija Izetbegović refused to join consensus for any text that did not condemn them as aggressors. The declaration on the conflict crafted by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Hungarian President Arpad Goencz is not part of the official record.

Bill Clinton (United States), Kohl, John Major (United Kingdom) and François Mitterrand (France) were preoccupied by relations with Russia and divisions in NATO on how to stop the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The NATO summit in January 1994 had confirmed that the Alliance was open to new members. Enlargement would “reach to democratic states to the east of NATO”, albeit not including Russia. The Russians could see that their vision of transforming the CSCE into a fully fledged international organization at the apex of a hierarchy of regional security organizations, with legal personality and its own security council consisting of the United States, Russia and the European Union (EU), would not become reality. At Budapest, Boris Yeltsin spoke of a “cold peace”. But the Russian economy was weak, and Yeltsin’s commitment to working together with Western partners strong. In 1994, the last Russian forces withdrew from Germany and the Baltic states. Yeltsin agreed to withdraw the 14th army from Moldova. The British and Russian foreign ministers wrote a joint article on European security, published in the Financial Times and Izvestia.
Against this less than propitious backdrop, the outcome of the Budapest Summit was in fact substantial, and deserves to be better known than it is. To name five achievements:

- adoption of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the locus classicus on democratic control of armed forces, without which liberal democracy and the rule of law cannot prevail;
- agreement to strengthen the role of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in election observation. ODIHR's methodology is now the gold standard for this crucial element in the democratic process;
- agreement to support the French-inspired EU initiative for a European Stability Pact based on OSCE principles of good neighbourly relations (and the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities);
- The decision that took effect on 1 January 1995 to establish the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This decision included a provision for major meetings to take place not at the beginning, but at the end of each Chairmanship year. As a result, Hungary hosted not only a summit before its Chairmanship year, but also a meeting of foreign ministers in December 1995. By this time, the OSCE had established a presence in Chechnya, where Russian regular forces were deployed on 10 December 1994, and it had also been assigned a greatly expanded role in promoting democracy and human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider Balkan region. Perhaps it was, after all, a “primary instrument” for conflict resolution;
- agreement to launch discussions in the OSCE on a European security model for the twenty-first century. These would lead, after five years of further discussion including a summit at Lisbon in 1996, to signature of the Charter for European Security and agreement on the adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty at the Istanbul Summit in 1999. The Budapest tradition lives on in the Confo Process discussions on the future of European security launched under the Greek Chairmanship in 2009.

Budapest was a theatrical event. Yeltsin and Clinton were accompanied by vast entourages and intimidating bodyguards. Mitterrand, ill and sphinx like, nonetheless delivered a masterly address expressing sympathy and understanding, both for countries that aspired to join NATO and for Russia, which felt threatened by the prospect of its enlargement. Kohl angrily expressed dismay that the CSCE, which had done so much to end the Cold War and unify Europe, especially Germany, could not put a stop to the carnage in Bosnia. Nor should we forget nuclear disarmament. On 5 December 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Budapest provided the stage for Clinton, Major, and Yeltsin to provide Ukraine with security assurances relevant to its territorial integrity. Will this become a topical issue in the period ahead? Nagorno-Karabakh, sadly, remains topical. The Budapest decision on intensifying action in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh envisaged the despatch of peacekeepers under OSCE auspices. Planning for a peacekeeping force continues to be on the OSCE’s agenda, as does this protracted conflict.

Before the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, Henry Kissinger said to his staff that, “if anyone in this room can convince me that just one word of this document will be remembered two weeks after its signature, I will take it seriously.” At Budapest, Heads of State or Government did still take the CSCE seriously. But it was evident already then, as the processes of EU and NATO enlargement gathered momentum, that its future place in European security architecture would be uncertain. The expansion of the Balkan missions after Dayton gave it a new lease of life and raison d’être. Later, the United States led efforts to turn it into the lead organization in the fight against anti-Semitism — a subject that was also on the agenda at Budapest.

The Budapest decision to turn the CSCE into the OSCE was a compromise, between the United States, which at that time could not envisage its Senate ratifying any treaty, and Russia, which wanted a treaty-based OSCE to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This decision has stood the test of time surprisingly well.

I doubt if any Head of State or Government present in Budapest would have taken seriously the suggestion that their colleague, the President of Kazakhstan, would host a summit in Astana in 2010, on the 20th anniversary of the Paris Charter. It is encouraging indeed that a State that did not exist twenty years ago should have succeeded in reviving OSCE summits.

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At first sight, Lisbon was a Summit “light”, indeed. The most important participants were missing, the absence of president Boris Yeltsin, due to illness, meant that the United States President, Bill Clinton, also stayed away. The short time for preparation and the decision to exclude the conclusions of the Review Conference resulted in a shorter and pithier Summit Document with comparatively less substance.

Nevertheless, the OSCE had been strengthened by its successes in Bosnia and Herzegovina — where it had deployed its largest mission to date — and in Chechnya — where Head of Mission Tim Guldimann had mediated a meeting between Yeltsin and Chechen acting president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. The Summit participants, meeting in warm and sunny Lisbon, delivered a performance that proved that the Organization was able to stage, even in a situation that was not easy, a Summit with modest but useful results. Useful indeed with regard to overcoming confronting views on the future European security order.

Let’s remember the political context. A few days after Lisbon, the NATO Council was to make its definitive decision to hold a Summit in Madrid in July 1997, at which the first round of NATO enlargement to include Central and Eastern European countries would be settled. Throughout 1996, work was going on to achieve an agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO. Until Lisbon, Russia insisted on the condition that an agreement would have to precede the decision on NATO enlargement. NATO, on the other hand, wanted to develop the security partnership in parallel to the opening up of the Alliance. This disagreement was without doubt the most important single issue preceding the Lisbon Summit.
Two other problems led to confrontations in Lisbon between Russia and Western countries. One was the situation in Belarus, where President Alexander Lukashenko had de facto abrogated the democratic separation of powers. The other was the wave of demonstrations in Belgrade against President Slobodan Milošević in the aftermath of his manipulation of the local elections in Serbia. The Western countries, interested in a good atmosphere in Lisbon in view of the forthcoming decisions within NATO, accepted very watered down compromises on these issues.

THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS: A START ON A SECURITY CHARTER AND CFE ADAPTATION

At the Budapest Summit, Russia had reacted to NATO’s 1994 decision to enlarge by producing its own proposal for elaborating a security model for the twenty-first century. The discussions had become concrete and, at the same time, controversial when Russia, in its memorandum of March 1996, made a number of far-reaching proposals for ensuring a strong role for the OSCE. One proposal that remained on the agenda was the adoption of a European Security Charter as a fundamental document comparable to the Helsinki Final Act.

The Baltic and Scandinavian States as well as some Central and Eastern European countries feared that the Charter was designed to give Russia a voice in European affairs. The United States and the United Kingdom never swerved from their negative position. On the other hand, the French President Jacques Chirac, in a meeting with Yeltsin in April 1996, came out in favour of a pan-European peace order on treaty basis, with the OSCE as its foundation. Germany also was supportive of the Charter. As a result of sharp-witted negotiations, the following statement was retained in the Lisbon Declaration: “Drawing on this work, remaining committed to the Helsinki Final Act and recalling the Charter of Paris, we will consider developing a Charter on European Security which can serve the needs of our peoples in the new century.”

The second major question at the Summit was whether the states parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) would be able to agree on a negotiating mandate for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. The main issue for Russia was to exclude in advance any transfer of allied forces to the territory of future NATO members, while the Western countries did not want to deprive new members of full participation in alliance guarantees. The agreement on the extent and modalities of the adaptation negotiations finally succeeded when all states parties to the treaty obligated themselves to exercising restraint with regard to any changes in the size or deployments of their forces after NATO expansion, as long as the CFE adaptation negotiations were going on.

When Russian Federation Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov — at the North Atlantic Co-operation Council a few days after Lisbon in Brussels — explained his country’s decision to enter into negotiations on the formalization of its relations with NATO, he pointed to the successful course of the Lisbon Summit, emphasizing the agreement on CFE adaptation negotiations and the characterization of the OSCE in Lisbon as a “key organization”.

Lisbon was therefore the catalyst for the security decisions of the following years that were to provide a basis for an inclusive security order in the OSCE region.

OTHER DECISIONS

The Summit adopted, among other decisions, an initiative for the appointment of an OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. The participating States pledged themselves to provide all necessary resources, financial and personnel, for the Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfil its mandate, which had already been prolonged by the Permanent Council. When the adoption of the Summit Declaration was put at risk in a dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the inclusion of a Minsk Group passage on Nagorno-Karabakh, the Swiss Chairperson-in-Office, Flavio Cotti, found a courageous and innovative way out by appending his statement, which contained the contentious passage, as an annex.

After the fall of the Soviet and Yugoslav orders, the OSCE fulfilled basically two functions: as the most comprehensive forum, it helped to assure the transition of Europe from confrontation to co-operation; with its broad set of flexible conflict management instruments, it was available for quick and adequate actions in conflict situations. The appointment, for the first time, of a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office in the person of Felipe Gonzalez, who carried out a successful mission in Belgrade less than three weeks after Lisbon, was an additional example of this.

As the Lisbon Summit showed, the potential of the OSCE and its Summits can be just as relevant for its security role as real actions. It might be wise to keep this specificity of the Organization in mind in view of the future.

Raimund Kunz served as Head of the Swiss Chairman-in-Office Co-ordination Unit in 1996. He is at present Ambassador of Switzerland to Turkey.
Looking back to the last OSCE Summit, eleven years ago in Istanbul, it is tempting to think of such an event as a remnant of a bygone era, when the sense of shared purpose among OSCE participating States was stronger, their willingness to compromise on important issues greater. After all, not only did Heads of State or Government agree at Istanbul on a comprehensive Summit Declaration, addressing virtually every issue on the OSCE agenda, they also adopted a series of landmark accords. These included the *Charter for European Security*, which outlined common challenges in the OSCE area and an ambitious set of common approaches and instruments designed to address those challenges; the *Platform for Co-operative Security*, which sought to establish the OSCE as the hub of Europe’s network of interlocking security institutions; the adapted *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)*, which sought to ensure a reliable, legally binding foundation of military transparency and predictability from the Atlantic to the Urals; and the *Vienna Document 1999*, which updated and strengthened the continent’s most inclusive confidence- and security-building (CSBM) regime.

What’s more, the impact of Istanbul went well beyond the headline agreements. The CFE adaptation agreement was possible only after difficult compromises between NATO Allies, Russia, Georgia and Moldova, which required meaningful changes to realities on the ground. Beyond the formal agenda, the Istanbul Summit also served as an inclusive forum in which agreements among subsets of OSCE participating States — most notably the deal to launch the *Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline* — could be reached. The venue permitted the NGO community to engage the host country in an honest dialogue on specific human rights concerns. The conscious decision of key participating States to address such issues in the setting of an OSCE Summit served to reinforce the Organization’s role at the centre of Europe’s security architecture, and its comprehensive, multi-dimensional security concept. Surely, it would be difficult to resuscitate that level of political will and that sense of common purpose in the world of 2010.

From the perspective of 1999, however, the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security landscape did not look so harmonious. Consider the events that dominated the months leading up to the Summit:
In March, reacting to widespread ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO launched air-strikes against Yugoslavia, in the absence of an explicit mandate from the United Nations Security Council. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov was famously ordered to turn his aircraft around in mid-air, cancelling a planned working visit to Washington. President Yeltsin announced that NATO-Russia relations would be "frozen" until further notice. The Chairman of the Russian State Duma announced that Moscow had re-targeted its nuclear arsenal on NATO capitals (a claim later denied by the Kremlin, but still the cause of much concern and confusion).

In April, NATO's 50th anniversary Summit in Washington finalized the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement, with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland participating for the first time as full members of the Alliance. Allies also launched the Membership Action Plan process, clearly signalling their intention to continue the Alliance's eastward expansion. For many in NATO countries and aspirant states, this process was the ultimate expression of the promise of the Charter of Paris, of "a new era of peace, democracy and unity." For many in Russia, however, it underscored the deepening divide between East and West.

In June, roughly 200 Russian troops slipped away from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to seize Kosovo's Pristina Airport. For all of the controversies of the past two years, over the war in Georgia and large-scale Russian military exercises on the borders of the Baltic states, never since the end of the Cold War have NATO and Russian forces come closer to a direct military confrontation.

In July and August, Russian forces repelled an attack by Chechen forces on Dagestan, and pursued the separatists into Chechnya, reigniting a brutal armed conflict in the North Caucasus.

In September, Moscow blamed Chechen rebels for a series of apartment block bombings in Moscow and Dagestan.

In October, Moscow intensified its assault on the Chechen rebels, crossing the Terek River and displacing an estimated 200,000 civilians.

It is important to remember this complicated history, not because we can draw direct parallels between 2010 and 1999, but rather because we should resist the temptation to diminish the challenges of the past, and exaggerate those of the present. How were the leaders of the OSCE able to reach such meaningful agreements in such a toxic environment? Why have they been unable to repeat this achievement for more than a decade? And what lessons can we learn from their experience as we head toward Astana? The key is to understand not only what happened at Istanbul, but what came before and what followed.

What preceded Istanbul was careful preparation. The Summit agenda capped several years of dedicated, structured negotiations along several tracks. The Charter for European Security was the end product of the "Security Model" process launched prior to the 1996 Lisbon Summit. The CFE adaptation agreement also traced its roots to 1996, and that year's CFE Treaty Review Conference. Like Rome, Istanbul was not built in a day. In the years that preceded the 1999 Summit, even in the most difficult of times, all OSCE participating States remained committed to multiple processes designed to resolve differences, find difficult compromises and enhance the security of all. Even in a best-case scenario, the Astana Summit will not see the culmination of such processes, but it can launch them, and it can offer the OSCE's political leadership the opportunity to reaffirm their determination to see them through to completion.

What followed Istanbul also offers useful lessons. Less than two months after the Summit, President Yeltsin surprised the world with his resignation. A similar changing of the guard would soon sweep across European and North American capitals. The terrorist attack of 9/11, the war in Afghanistan and the international crisis over Iraq broadened our geographic perspective, but left little energy for following through on the Istanbul agenda. The very scope and complexity of the agreements reached on the shores of the Bosphorus made differences in interpretation inevitable, and in the absence of sustained political engagement, those differences were allowed to deepen and grow. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, OSCE Ministerial Councils grew more and more contentious, with individual disputes taking primacy over the underlying consensus of the OSCE security community. Summits became a distant memory.

Astana offers us the chance to reverse this trend, to draw lessons from the experience of the past, and to set our Organization on a solid course for the future. This is an opportunity that cannot be missed.

Paul Fritch is Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General. In 1999, he served as a member of the United States Delegation to the Istanbul OSCE Summit, working primarily on issues related to the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999

A new start for the Vienna Document

by Colonel Wolfgang Richter

Last December at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens, foreign ministers called on the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) to explore ways to strengthen current arms control agreements and confidence-and-security building measures (CSBMs), including the Vienna Document 1999. In the same decision, they asked the FSC to contribute to improving OSCE crisis management procedures and mechanisms.

The FSC has set about this task with vigorous and serious discussion. On 19 May 2010, it adopted a decision to launch an incremental process of regularly revising the Vienna Document 1999 while maintaining the continued functioning of the existing document until its replacement by an agreed modified version. On 29 September, the FSC decided to focus as a matter of priority on Chapter V, which treats prior notification of certain military activities, and Chapter IX, on compliance and verification.

With these developments, the OSCE participating States are finally beginning to fulfil their commitment, already enshrined in the Charter for European Security adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit, to “seek the timely adaptation” of the Vienna Document 1999 and other FSC documents (paragraph 30). In the eleven intervening years, the political will to fulfil this commitment has been lacking in the OSCE. Now that new impetus has been given to strengthening the Vienna Document, it seems timely to recall the basic functions and undiminished relevance of the most important security- and confidence-building document within the OSCE’s politico-military dimension of security.

THE VIENNA DOCUMENT’S SIGNIFICANCE
Ever since détente began to thaw the Cold War freeze in Europe, arms control and confidence-building agreements have played a crucial role in overcoming suspicion and distrust among States. They have provided a framework of politico-military stability and strategic reassurances, which — together with political agreements — have allowed for a historical change of paradigm from all-out confrontation through peaceful co-existence to full-scale political and security co-operation.

In the late 1980s, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries negotiated the CFE Treaty, which aimed at numerical parity of land-based conventional forces in Europe at lower levels. The objective was to abolish military capabilities for launching surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations. This necessitated not only asymmetric reductions but also the creation of a “dynamic balance of forces” providing for regional and sub-regional limitations, in order to scale down concentrations of opposing military forces at former frontlines, ensure geographical distances between them and prevent their rapid redeployment.

In this context, all of the CSCE participating States felt an urgent need to prevent the periodic large-scale deployment of military forces during military exercises of the two alliances from being used for surprise attacks or large-scale military offensive operations on short notice. The aim was early warning, transparency and limitation of unusual military activities rather than geographical limitation of military holdings. Herein lie the origins of the Vienna Document.

Participating States adopted the first Vienna Document in 1990. It built on CSBMs agreed previously, in Helsinki in 1975 and in Stockholm in 1986. The Helsinki Final Act already contained a provision which required early notification of military exercises involving 25,000 or more military personnel, with an optional observation clause. At the CSBM conference held in Stockholm in 1986, further measures were agreed that still form the core of the Vienna Document’s early warning function: prior notification and observation of military exercises and unusual military activities, annual calendars and constraining provisions, strengthened by verification measures.

The Vienna Document 1990 added important
new provisions: an annual information exchange on force structures and major weapon holdings, including verification; a set of military contacts; a communication system; an annual implementation assessment meeting and a risk reduction mechanism for de-escalation in case of unusual military activities and incidents.

The culture of openness, mutual trust and cooperation established by this document served both long- and short-term goals. The transparency it provided on force structures, major weapon holdings, introduction of new equipment and defence planning made it possible to predict long-term development of military capabilities. Its requirements for prior notification of certain military activities and constraints on large-scale military exercises entailed the potential to make short-term build-up of military offensive options transparent.

During the precarious transition that took place in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document were an anchor of stability. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, CFE rules were applied for the division of its military heritage among the successor states, and eight of these, which had territory in the area of application, acceded to the CFE Treaty in 1992. During the war in the former Yugoslavia, powers in Europe refrained from exploiting the crisis for geo-strategic competition and instead, France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States formed the “contact group” to search for a peaceful solution. The CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document were used as blueprints for the stabilizing Article II and Article IV Agreements following the Dayton Peace Accord. All successor States joined the CSCE (OSCE) and adhered to the agreed CSBMs.

It is doubtful whether such joint action would have been possible without the restrictions of military options and political ambitions secured by the provisions of these arms control and confidence-building agreements. The Vienna Document became particularly important as a tool of transparency and early warning belonging to all OSCE participating States, and it has been implemented and modified despite the continued existence of unresolved territorial disputes, which has constituted a major obstacle in the way of further progress on the adapted CFE Treaty.

PAST MODIFICATIONS OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT

The changes in the OSCE area’s politico-military landscape challenged the conceptual foundations of these key arms control and confidence-building agreements, however. Especially the CFE Treaty, with its bipolar structure and numerical parity concept, was geared to stabilizing a bloc-to-bloc confrontation that had become obsolete. The Vienna Document, with its multi-polar structure and inclusive OSCE membership, its lack of limitations of military holdings and its non-legally binding nature, seemed better adaptable to these changes, all the more as it did not require lengthy ratification processes. Consequently, the Vienna Document was modified three times between 1990 and 1999.

In 1992, it was updated to take account of the fifteen new participating States on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Lower thresholds for observation of military exercises were defined, which to some degree reflected smaller sizes of divided and restructured forces. In addition, more detailed provisions for verification were incorporated.

In 1994, after the collapse of former Yugoslavia, participating States modified the document again, adding additional parameters for prior notification and observation.

At the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, political preparations for NATO’s enlargement, overshadowed by renewed crises over Kosovo and in the North Caucasus, triggered the adaptations of three major European security documents. All three were included in the Summit’s final document: the Charter for European Security (a follow-up to the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe); the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1999.

The Vienna Document 1999 included a chapter on regional measures, which was a response to sub-regional conflict. Also, a new chapter on defence planning aimed to improve long-term predictability of military developments.

THE NEED TO UPDATE THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 1999

In contrast to the frequent modifications in the 1990s, and in spite of the pledges given in Istanbul, the Vienna Document has not been updated since 1999. New threats and challenges have emerged; unresolved territorial conflicts, recurrent violence and military action have created new distrust; and further enlargement of NATO and the EU have changed the political landscape in Europe. While the general trend of force reductions in Europe has persisted, there has been a sharp increase of major weapon holdings in the Caucasus area. At force levels which would have been assessed “minor” in Cold War times, a war was fought. One might legitimately ask why the Vienna Document
1999 and other CSBMs have not played their expected role in early warning and conflict prevention during recent conflicts.

All of these changes suggest that, if the Vienna Document is to keep its relevance to maintaining the culture of transparency and predictability as well as early warning and crisis prevention, further modifications are overdue. The following are just a few considerations in this regard.

In Chapter V, “Prior notification and observation of certain military activities”, the threshold values for prior notification and observation of military exercises and unusual force deployments still reflect the past bloc-to-bloc confrontation. In Cold War times, a force deployment exceeding the size of an army corps or at least a division was deemed “significant”. Today, national military holdings have become smaller and often do not even reach these thresholds. Yet, in the context of territorial disputes, they obviously are still too high to ensure stability. Dangerous force deployments that preceded the August 2008 war did not even require the invitation of observers, according to Vienna Document 1999 provisions.

Similarly, manpower and hardware involved in modern exercises normally do not exceed Vienna Document 1999 threshold values for notification. Consequently, there is less transparence with respect to routine military activities. Yet, given the higher efficiency of forces through net-based and multinational operations, which can take place simultaneously on the territories of several participating States, they are not militarily insignificant.

An adaptation of the provisions of Chapter V of the Vienna Document therefore seems necessary. As an example, one could consider personnel and equipment figures equivalent to the level of a reinforced brigade for prior notification and observation.

Regarding Chapter IX, “Compliance and verification”, the number of evaluation visits to participating States has declined sharply. This is due to the fact that smaller States have emerged and forces have been reduced, while the Vienna Document 1999’s quota for visits — a minimum of one visit per 60 units a year — has remained unchanged. This in itself means a loss of the culture of transparency.

The number of inspections is similarly low. A participating State is obliged to accept only three per calendar year. That means that after the usual run on inspections at the beginning of the year, there is no more possibility for observation of military activities during the rest of the year, since they rarely exceed the current high threshold values for required observation of certain military activities under Chapter V.

Lower force levels have also led to a wider geographical distribution of units, which therefore cannot be easily visited by the rather small number of inspectors during defined time limits.

Increasing the number of evaluation visits and raising the inspection quota, their reasonable distribution over the calendar year, extending the time available for evaluation and inspection and providing for a higher number of inspectors allowing for two sub-teams to work in parallel could help to improve the situation.

CONCLUSION

Several valuable proposals for modifying the Vienna Document 1999, with an emphasis on Chapters V and IX, have been tabled in the FSC by participating States and are currently under consideration. As consensus is reached on individual “packages” of provisions, they will supersede the relevant sections of the current version of the document. In future, more areas requiring modification might be tackled in line with the ground-breaking FSC decisions of 2010. Special attention might be given to crisis prevention and crisis management.

The renewed determination among participating States to improve the key document on security and confidence-building across the entire OSCE area indicates a significant change of climate and a general political will to work constructively on promoting the OSCE’s politico-military security dimension. The Vienna Document 1999 is likely to become an important topic during the OSCE Summit in Astana. The Summit Declaration might take note of this positive development and encourage further deliberations and consensus building which could conceivably lead to the replacement of the current Vienna Document 1999 by an updated version - perhaps a “Vienna Document 2011”.

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A United Kingdom Vienna Document 1999 inspector on mission to Kazakhstan

by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Richardson

In the military, we all get used to early starts, and departing from Henlow, the home of the United Kingdom Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG) at 0330 on a Monday morning has become something of a habit. So it was a pleasant change to find that our deployment to Kazakhstan in May for a Vienna Document 1999 inspection was midday on a Sunday. The downside was that our time of arrival in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, was 0530 the following morning.

But what a capital; and what a country. Our courteous hosts readily agreed to our team’s request for a few hours’ rest in the hotel before going through some Point of Entry procedures. After we had specified an area on the east coast of the Caspian Sea for inspection, our Senior Escort Officer made arrangements for our onward travel and then, since we would not be staying in Astana, showed us around the city. Though that sort of thing is just a by product of arms control work, it is always fascinating to see other cultures and their way of life. It tends to be a reminder that common understanding is something that has to be worked on quite hard — we all come from very different perspectives and histories. Nevertheless, everywhere I have been as part of an inspection team, our escorts have always done their utmost to make us feel welcome, and Kazakhstan was no exception.

We were in Kazakhstan for a Vienna Document 1999 Specified Area Inspection, the main purpose of which is to check for military activity that requires notification under the terms of the document. In recent years, notifiable levels of activity have been rare and it is more common now to identify an area where lesser levels of activity (perhaps battalion, regimental or brigade training) are thought to be taking place. In addition, inspection teams are entitled to receive briefings from any units or formations that are based in the Specified Area. A normal inspection programme extends over two days, taking in an overflight of the area to check for activity and some time on the ground getting briefings from commanders.

We flew out to the Specified Area on a military flight, in an AN-26 aircraft. We were seven people in the back — the five members of our inspection team, including one auxiliary, and...
the Escort team of two. The Kazakh military had decided to use the flight for training a new crew, and with them and their instructors on board, the cockpit was full compared to the spacious hold. We flew in two legs, from Astana to an air force base at Aktobe for refuelling and then on to Aktau on the Caspian Sea.

Having reached the Specified Area the aircrew flew us around it at an altitude of 1,000 metres, on a route that we had indicated to our hosts the day before. The overflight went like clockwork. Visibility was good and there were reasonable sight lines from the back of the aircraft. We had taken plenty of Google Earth imagery with us, so it was easy enough to keep track of where we were.

Finally, we landed at Aktau Airport, where we were met by the commander of 390 Separate Coastal Defence Brigade and some of his officers. The inspection team, national Escorts and local Escorts were loaded into three different cars, and we headed off into town to our hotel accommodation. I had a fascinating conversation with the young junior officer driving me, who had sufficient English to be able to paint a very vivid picture of his life and career thus far.

We completed the first day’s work with a trip out to 390 Brigade, where we were briefed by the commander, with plenty of input from General Major Tazbulatov, the Chief of Staff of Regional Command West and, as it happened, a former commander of the Brigade.

The following day was spent on ground travel around the Specified Area. Since there is only one Vienna Document 1999 Notifiable Unit in the area, we had time to return to 390 Brigade for a more detailed visit. If one compares the size of a Specified Area with the size of Kazakhstan, it becomes quite clear why it is rare to see more than one or two units per inspection trip. But we found that the Brigade was thriving: more soldiers than I had seen in any other unit in a country that had formerly been part of the former Soviet Union; more equipment; more training facilities; and a much better infrastructure. It was clear that the Brigade was in very good shape.

After spending the night in Aktau, we were off early the next morning, again on an AN-26 aircraft via Aktobe to Astana. We landed at the international airport and immediately boarded our commercial flight back to the UK — backtracking to cross back over the Caspian Seal. If this was confusing for us Brits, spare a thought for either our Turkish or Canadian Guest Inspector who had seen rather too many time zones for comfort in the space of just a few days. But that is very much part of the life of an Arms Control Inspector, and a very interesting one it is too.

Though in the United Kingdom Agency, JACIG, we tend to change over much more quickly than in most other countries, I still feel we get plenty of opportunity to inspect, to escort and to meet and better understand our colleagues from nearly all European and Central Asian States. Where this helps build trust and defuse potential difficulties or misunderstandings, it strikes me as well worth the while.

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Richardson is in command of the Ground Team of the United Kingdom Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG).
INTERVIEW WITH THE INCOMING CHAIRPERSON-IN-OFFICE

Lithuania, an active member of the European and global community

Audronius Ažubalis, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Lithuania and incoming Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, spoke with the OSCE Spokesperson and Head of the Press and Public Information Section, Virginie Coulloudon, about his vision for Lithuania’s Chairmanship in 2011.

Virginie Coulloudon: Lithuania will be chairing the OSCE in 2011, following the first OSCE Summit since 1999. What do you see as the main opportunities and challenges of chairing the Organization just after a Summit?

Audronius Ažubalis: The OSCE Summit in Astana, held after an interval of 11 years, is going to be a very important event in the life of the OSCE. The Organization’s commitments will be reconfirmed and its strategic goals set for the future. I believe the Summit will provide a strong impulse of renewal to the Organization and a new impetus for more effective performance. Its outcomes will set the agenda for the Lithuanian Chairmanship. We feel privileged to have the opportunity to lead the Organization at this time, and look forward to a challenging year ahead. We will also be responsible for the process of appointing a new Secretary General and an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Director, which are important tasks. This will be an excellent opportunity to assess how far European security has evolved and how much more still needs to be done to develop indivisibility of security throughout the OSCE area.

How do you see the dialogue on European security progressing in 2011?

The Astana Summit is an excellent opportunity to define a new vision for Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security and co-operation. There are also other interesting debates going on, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and as a result of initiatives put forward by some countries.

I hope that at Astana, we can agree on a common roadmap for the future. The Action Plan should reflect a balance among all three OSCE dimensions and maintain our overarching goal of rebuilding trust and confidence...
to strengthen security in Europe. In 2011 and beyond, we should aim at putting these initiatives into practice. That will be one of the biggest challenges for our Chairmanship.

Protracted conflicts and conflict resolution have been a priority of several Chairmanships. Could you tell us about Lithuania’s approach in conflict resolution? Do you think the Chairmanship should have more flexibility to respond in case of potential conflict?

The conflict in Georgia in 2008 and the crisis this year in Kyrgyzstan put the OSCE under the international spotlight and shaped perceptions of the Finnish, Greek and Kazakh Chairmanships. I believe that every Chairperson-in-Office wants to advance a solution to the so-called protracted conflicts. In the Corfu Process discussions, many states have built a solid case for giving the Chairmanship and the Conflict Prevention Centre more flexibility and early warning tools to avert a crisis or a conflict in their initial stages. It is also expected that the Chairperson-in-Office will act quickly, consult key actors and mobilize political, financial and other available tools to address a conflict situation.

It is the job of the Chairperson-in-Office to turn words into deeds. Fine rhetoric is not sufficient on its own. The protracted conflict in Transnistria will not go away tomorrow, and I will work with partners to resume formal 5+2 meetings. The proposal by Chancellor Merkel and President Medvedev is a sensible basis to work on. The confidence-building process and the real economic reintegration of the country should continue. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, we see a lot of red lights flashing and the situation is worrying for several reasons. The Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group should speed up the engine of negotiations that is driving a negotiated political settlement. The OSCE has an important role to play, in particular through the promotion of understanding and tolerance between the societies which are parties to the conflict. I would like to see a more active OSCE role in the South Caucasus and especially in Georgia.

Lithuania celebrated the 20th anniversary of the re-establishment of its independence last year. The year 2011 marks the 20th anniversary of independence for many Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. What significance do you see for the OSCE in the development of these countries?

When celebrating the 20th anniversary of Lithuanian re-established independence in 1990, our national slogan was: “In freedom we believe”. This simple phrase contains a deep message, not only for Lithuania, but also for other Eastern and Central European states. I believe that the main achievement for all of us has been freedom. Freedom to create, to think, to move, to express ourselves, to take decisions regarding our own lives and our own security. Lithuania has re-emerged as an active member of the European and global community. In 1990, when the Heads of State or Government of the CSCE gathered in Paris, Lithuanian representatives could not be present there. Just 20 years ago, the Lithuanian Parliament called upon the world community to recognize our country’s independence, and today we are about to start chairing the world’s largest regional security organization. Isn’t it a remarkable turn of events? Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship is also an important example of recognition of OSCE countries that have had to travel a long road through history to become sovereign and independent. The faster all CIS countries proceed towards democracy, economic prosperity, regional security, respect and support for human dimension issues, the stronger the OSCE, and each and every participating State, will be.

I have seen that the CIS countries attach high importance to the OSCE. The European security dialogue, energy security, economic and environmental challenges and freedom of movement are tangible issues for which, jointly with the CIS countries, we can contribute to finding common solutions. I will seek their further engagement also on other issues.

Will Lithuania bring a special Baltic perspective to the Chairmanship?

OSCE is a forum of 56 participating States, and I think that Lithuania as the OSCE Chairmanship should not have special preferences. On the other hand, all Chairmanships bring a degree of distinctive experience, thinking and practice to the office. Lithuania is a part of the Baltic Sea region and Lithuania shares the values of its Baltic neighbours, has similar development ambitions and understands that only joint regional activities can help us develop common principles, for instance in the energy field. We see stronger engagement in sub-regional co-operation as one of the priority directions for the Lithuanian Chairmanship.

As a member of both the European Union (EU) and NATO, what role do you see sub-regional organizations playing in the security of the OSCE region?

Since 1999, the Platform for Co-operative Security adopted at the Istanbul Summit has not been used to its full potential.
Fundamental institutional and regional developments in Europe over the last decade may be part of the reason for this. Yet, in the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area, all players — big or small — matter. My belief in the potential of sub-regional organizations stems from the Nordic-Baltic experience. Building on co-operative approaches, the Council of the Baltic Sea States linked people and ideas, EU and non-EU members, and transcended political agendas. It has been a huge success, contributing to mutually reinforcing confidence, openness and trust. On a pan-European scale, I believe that a web of sub-regional organizations, complementing each other’s activities and those of the OSCE, will be more than the sum of its parts and contribute more effectively to building a strong security community.

We can encourage further bilateral or regional initiatives aimed at developing good neighbourly relations and inter-regional co-operation. Greater regional co-operation in the South Caucasus is vital for building long-term stability in this volatile region. Central Asia could also make further joint efforts in responding to common challenges at the regional level.

Next year, we are considering bringing various regional and sub-regional organizations to one table under the aegis of the OSCE, to discuss together the added value that they can bring to European security.

What role do you see for the OSCE in international efforts in Afghanistan?

Instability in Afghanistan affects us all. Threats emanating from Afghanistan — drugs, extremist ideology, terrorism — undermine both the security of bordering states and of the OSCE region. Indeed, I am extremely concerned by the corrupting influence of drug trafficking on the development of societies in Central Asia and beyond.

The Kazakh Chairmanship went an extra mile to strengthen the engagement between the OSCE and Afghanistan. Efforts will fall short, however, unless the OSCE participating States provide the necessary update to the Madrid Ministerial Council Decision of 2007. The Astana Summit is a golden opportunity to do this.

I think there are areas where the OSCE is on the cutting edge and can bring much-needed expertise and ideas to the table: border management, customs training, improved election processes through ODIHR assistance, providing assistance for defenders of human rights, improving legislation, advising on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), gender education. The OSCE Secretariat and field operations in Central Asia have developed excellent projects and more are in the pipeline.

There are many things that could be done. Consolidation of all OSCE Afghan-related activities into one set of hands within the OSCE Secretariat might be considered. Stronger commitments regarding regional co-operation between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan are needed. The OSCE can facilitate this process by “building bridges” — facilitating visa regimes, organizing joint training and other measures. We could agree to develop more substantial OSCE-run projects to tackle drug trafficking and trade across borders or small-scale economic projects for border communities. Yet all this rests on the willingness of participating States to enhance OSCE engagement with Afghanistan.

How do you see the OSCE’s work to improve relations between ethnic minorities? What is your view of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)’s Bolzano Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations?

I could speak about various problems regarding national minorities, as this is a matter of both national and international security. I could speak also about the reality of our days — the emergence of new minorities due to migration processes. The quiet diplomacy and persistence of the HCNM, Ambassador Knut Vollebaek, bring good results in this sphere. Hate crimes, racism, xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination are important topics which require our further attention. Constructive work has been done by ODIHR, which has organized numerous events and roundtables on these topics, urging the OSCE participating States to increase their efforts in fighting intolerance and discrimination as well as preventing hate crimes.

During our Chairmanship, tolerance and education will be among the highlighted topics. Lithuania has considerable experience in developing Holocaust research and education. Tolerance education curricula need to be further developed, school environments improved and the role of civil society in tolerance education strengthened. We see the need to discuss best practices in tolerance education, to exchange experiences in promoting mutual respect and understanding and combating racism and other forms of intolerance. This would enable us to integrate diversity in multi-cultural societies, both East and West of Vienna.
Freedom of the media will be one of your priorities next year. As a former journalist, this priority must be close to you personally. Why do you think freedom of the media matters for security, and what particular aspects of freedom of the media will you focus on?

For citizens of a democratic society, it is essential to be informed, to voice opinions and exercise choice. Responsible media professionals exercise high pluralistic standards and play a key role in taking a critical approach towards governments and politicians. They report corruption, human rights violations, concerns of minorities and manifestations of intolerance. Media pluralism is particularly crucial during election periods. Unfortunately, we see many examples where journalists do not feel safe while performing this watchdog function, where they are threatened, imprisoned, even risk their lives.

We all agree in the OSCE that human rights and fundamental freedoms are at the core of security, so if freedom of expression is undermined or challenged, I see a serious threat to security. I think governments have to do more to protect their journalists. Here I have touched on only one aspect of why media freedom is so close to me as a politician and a former journalist. Another important thing is the extremely rapid technological change of the media landscape. We have to ensure that in the new media as well, freedom of expression and other fundamental human freedoms are properly guaranteed, especially for those who are the voice and conscience of our societies. With freedom comes responsibility.

Lithuania has been active in the OSCE dialogue on energy security and hosted the Energy Security Conference in Vilnius in September 2010. How can the OSCE contribute to energy security?

Energy security is a complex issue, directly related to climate change, environmental security and sustainable economic development. To cope with these challenges, consolidated efforts and solutions are needed as well as the broad involvement of all stakeholders, including industry and civil society. The OSCE can promote dialogue for better understanding and various forms of cooperation — regional and cross-dimensional. Baltic countries have long been structurally dependent on imported energy. Therefore, we understand the necessity to jointly develop common principles in the field of energy. Use of energy resources must generate economic prosperity, while transparency and non-discrimination have to be rooted in any transaction. Infrastructure development projects must follow strict environmental requirements, while promotion of low carbon technologies is key to mitigating the effects of climate change. The Secretary General’s report on the outcome of the Vilnius Energy Security Conference is an important milestone.

What are your personal expectations for the Chairmanship year?

Foremost, it is the year of the European basketball championship to be held in Lithuania! I hope good fortune will be on the side of Lithuania’s national basketball team. On a serious note, I look forward to the OSCE participating States building on the Astana Summit outcomes. It will be a difficult, hectic and inspiring year for my country and my small Chairmanship team. In the same way that our basketball team demonstrated that a country can excel on the world stage at the recent world championship in Turkey, our Chairmanship has high hopes for building a reputation for Lithuanian diplomacy, as transparent, effective and fair.
International migration is on the rise. There are currently 214 million migrants worldwide, and more than half of these are in the OSCE region. In richer countries, migration is a contentious public issue often driven more by emotions and preconceived ideas than by facts and statistical evidence. Public opinion tends to brand migrants as “job takers” if employed and as “living off the taxpayer” if unemployed.

The truth is that empirical evidence points in the opposite direction. A survey published in April 2009 by the World Bank has found no evidence to support the contention that migrant workers in European Union countries contribute less in taxes than the native-born population or consume significantly higher benefits. Both multi- and single-country studies find little or no impact of migration on the average wages of local people in Europe. On the contrary, statistical evidence suggests that migration can stimulate local employment and businesses.

The potential for positive economic impact of international labour migration in countries of origin and destination deserves greater attention from governments, international organizations and civil society.

MORE WOMEN ARE PRINCIPLE MIGRANTS
One source of potential gain is the niche of female labour migration, which accounts for approximately half of all migrants, and nonetheless has been overlooked for many years. A new literature has challenged conventional views about the subordinate role of women in migration decisions. Whereas historically most principle migrants were men, in the present day it is often women who make the decision to support their families by seeking employment in another country. The shift to post-industrial economies and higher educational achievements among women in origin countries are two factors that help account for this change. The so-called “feminization” of migration has economic consequences, and holds potential gains which have not yet been realized.

Although many female migrants are well-qualified in their professions, most are engaged in low-paid jobs, typically in care activities, paid domestic work and the informal sector. A study of international health care recruits in the United Kingdom found that nurses as well as doctors enter the labour

Over-qualification rate of native- and foreign-born populations by gender and country

market at levels well below those they occupied before migration. As verified by a 2007 OECD report, migrant women tend to be more over-qualified than their male counterparts. Furthermore, this over-qualification persists over time. According to the latest Eurostat analysis, most female migrants are still working at jobs far below their qualification levels ten years after arriving in their destination countries.

Female migrants thus represent a persistently untapped economic potential for the host countries’ economies. The fact that the demand for skilled labour is growing in Western Europe as the population ages makes this issue all the more relevant. And many of these migrants work in the informal sector, meaning lost contributions to the national tax revenue and social security systems, with consequent fiscal losses for the economy.

This suggests that destination countries could gain from granting female migrants improved access to the formal labour market and easing the process of getting skills accredited. Some of this may involve supporting regularization of the existing labour markets, granting better recognition to diplomas and qualifications and making information on education acquired abroad readily available to employers. Helping women to adapt their skills by providing them with more childcare assistance and improved access to language classes could help them to contribute more effectively to the economy.

IMPACT ON ORIGIN COUNTRIES

For origin countries, the benefits of the trend towards a higher proportion of female migrants are more ambivalent. Female migrants have traditionally meant financial gain for origin countries because of the remittances they send. Empirical data suggests that women send a larger proportion of their incomes home, on more regular basis, than men.

However, the fact that an increased number of highly educated women are deciding to migrate represents a significant brain drain for the countries of origin. It is in the interest of these countries to encourage women to realize their economic potential and, if they do seek employment abroad, to facilitate a successful migration experience and offer them attractive reintegration programmes when they return. The OSCE’s Guide on Gender-Sensitive Labour Migration Policies, published last year, is a useful source of information on planning such services, for example facilitating the transfer of pensions and other social benefits obtained abroad, granting low risk loans for business ventures, or offering access to training to the returning migrants.

CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

The 2009 Athens Ministerial Council Decision on Migration Management encourages the OSCE participating States to “incorporate gender aspects in their migration policies, noting the recommendations of the OSCE-produced Guide on Gender Sensitive Labour Migration Policies. Both that guidebook and the 2006 OSCE-IOM-ILO Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour Migration Policies in Countries of Origin and Destination have proven their value as tools for developing and implementing more effective gender-sensitive labour migration policies. The OSCE has also developed two manuals for trainers on the gender aspects of migration.

Statistical evidence shows that migrants are net contributors to the economy and play an essential role in supporting social security for future generations. In order to increase their economic gains, countries of destination should find ways to capitalize more effectively on the human resources of skilled female migrants. Countries of origin should offer women better opportunities to use their skills. Gender-sensitive labour migration policies can help states realize an important yet neglected economic potential, especially needed in these times of crisis.

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For further reading:


Transnational threats and the OSCE

With growing global mobility and advances in electronic communication, a shift to threats that derive neither from tensions between states nor from repressive conditions within them, have been gaining in importance. These new threats defy geographical borders and affect all participating States alike; their origin is hard to track but is often located beyond the OSCE region; their perpetrators are difficult to identify but more often than not are non-state actors. These transnational threats include terrorism, organized crime, cyber crime and trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings.

Participating States have recognized the growing danger these threats represent since the end of the 1990s, but it was after 9/11 that they appeared more prominently on the OSCE agenda. The most recent document addressing transnational threats is Ministerial Council Decision No. 02/09 on Further Efforts to address Transnational Threats, adopted in Athens in December 2009.

OSCE activities to counter transnational threats go way back to the early 1990s, even though they were not called transnational threats at the time. Preventing uncontrolled violence from seeping across the border from Kosovo motivated the establishment of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje already in 1992, and in 1999 the Mission to Georgia launched its large scale operation to monitor the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. Participating States adopted the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism in December 2001 and formed the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) in the Secretariat four months later. For decades, the OSCE has promoted good governance, strong democratic institutions, accountable law enforcement and healthy economies among its participating States, all attributes needed to thwart corruption and other trappings of organized crime.

In fact, ever since the participating States signed the Helsinki Final Act 35 years ago, embracing a comprehensive approach to security, the OSCE has been developing the tools needed to effectively counter transnational threats. The Secretariat has units dealing with anti-terrorism, border management, police support, anti-human trafficking and economic good governance. It has an expert and experienced Conflict Prevention Centre. The OSCE’s extensive network of field operations can monitor unstable situations on the ground and intervene locally.

Transnational threats form a complex, interconnected web. Terrorism is financed by organized crime. Trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings often uses the same routes and feeds into the same criminal networks. Responding effectively requires the best possible co-ordination of the tools at the OSCE’s disposal.

The document of reference that gives the OSCE the mandate to act comprehensively to counter transnational threats is the Maastricht Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, which participating States agreed in 2003. The strategy clarified the conceptual and political framework for a multidimensional, long-term approach. Since its adoption, the OSCE has taken its agenda forward on several fronts.

The ATU has, since its formation, promoted the ratification and implementation of universal anti-terrorism instruments and enhanced travel document security. It expanded its work in 2004 to include countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes and enhancing container security. In 2005 it began working to improve international legal co-operation in criminal matters and supporting the IAEA on security of radioactive sources. Since 2007 it has been promoting public-private partnerships in the fight against terrorism, protecting critical energy infrastructure from terrorist attack and countering violent extremism that leads to terrorism.

Borders take on a new meaning in the fight against transnational threats. They become instruments that two states can use co-operatively to thwart the illicit passage of weapons or persons, for the greater security of the larger region.
The OSCE supported the Ohrid Border Process from 2003 to 2008 with the South-Eastern Europe Cross-border Co-operation Programme. A strong borders team has been formed in the Conflict Prevention Centre. It advises the Secretary General and assists field operations with capacity building and training to improve border management and security, in line with the Border Security and Management Concept adopted at the Ljubljana Ministerial Council in 2005.

Following a Ministerial Council decision in 2006 to better co-ordinate activities against organized crime, the Secretary General created a task force in the Secretariat with the Special Police Matters Unit (SPMU) as its central contact point. SPMU has created the Policing OnLine Information System (POLIS), which provides access to reports, legislation events and training relating to organized crime. The Office of the Special Representative on Trafficking in Human Beings promotes multi-lateral co-operation and national co-ordination mechanisms and has prepared an analysis of the business model of human trafficking. The Office of the Co-ordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities is engaged in programmes to combat corruption and money laundering.

Transnational threats evolve quickly. Crimes committed in cyberspace are a growing and potentially devastating danger for participating States. An OSCE workshop held in Vienna in March 2009 made recommendations for a comprehensive OSCE response to the threat of cybercrime.

Another new area for the OSCE is combating nuclear terrorism based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Many participating States have emphasized the need to step up OSCE activities in this field.

Countering transnational threats also means reaching out beyond the borders of the OSCE area. The armed insurgency and economic distress in Afghanistan, an OSCE Partner for Co-operation since 2003, has made this country a source of instability for the entire OSCE region. Since 2007, the OSCE has intensified its engagement with Afghanistan, for instance by training customs officials and border guards.

Transnational threats are a formidable foe for the OSCE. Their perpetrators are elusive, technologically savvy, well-organized and have economic clout. But there is one heartening aspect. Since transnational crimes affect all participating States alike, consensus for measures to combat them is likely to be within reach. Co-operating to maximise the OSCE’s defences is fast becoming a matter not just of political will but of necessity.
Frane Maroevic: How did you become involved in the fight against human trafficking?

Maria Grazia Giammarinaro: I became engaged in this field in 1997 when I was the legal advisor of the Minister for Equal Opportunities in Italy and the head of the legislative office. At that time, trafficking started to be a concern for the government, especially in the field of sexual exploitation, so we drafted new legislation on trafficking, focused on human rights, which is still in place and functioning today.

Most people associate human trafficking with sexual exploitation. What other forms of exploitation are there?

One of my priorities is to raise awareness that trafficking today is not only trafficking for sexual exploitation, but very often trafficking for labour exploitation. Unfortunately, this is one aspect of trafficking which is growing and growing. There are many other forms of exploitation and I would like to mention one of the most serious which is forced begging massively involving children.

Exploitation of people is not a new phenomenon. Trafficking is often referred to as “modern day slavery”. What is new about this particular problem?

We call this modern day slavery because people are actually entrapped in a net of multiple dependencies and this is something new. When we use the word slavery we think about historical slavery, people in chains or locked up, completely deprived of freedom of movement. This is not necessarily a feature of modern day slavery; the victims of trafficking are not always locked up in an apartment, workplace or a brothel. The traffickers take advantage of their social vulnerability. People are socially isolated and often do not speak the language of the country they are in. They are not able to ask for help, do not know their rights, and do not know whom to trust and where to report abuse. This dependency results in a situation in which the person thinks there is no alternative but to submit to exploitation. These are new, more subtle means to subjugate people and exploit them.

You mention that this is a problem on a massive scale. What are the estimates of the number of people affected?

Worldwide at least 2.5 million people are victims of trafficking. This is the most reliable, but conservative estimate by the International Labour Organization (ILO). Since the OSCE region includes the most important destination countries, a significant number of these victims are trafficked within the OSCE region.

What are the most effective ways of fighting this phenomenon? Is it prevention, tougher border controls, more stringent policing powers?

Such a complex phenomenon requires a complex response. There are two important areas I would like to highlight. One is...
victim protection, which includes prevention of trafficking and protection of potential victims, but also assistance and support to the victims. This is not only a human rights issue, but has also proven effective for the second area, criminal justice. When the victims are reassured about their situation, about their residence status, about the possibility of an alternative to their life, they are usually very keen to co-operate with law enforcement and judicial authorities.

The OSCE understands human trafficking as a transnational threat. Are in addition the criminal elements involved in human trafficking involved in other crimes?

Absolutely, trafficking is mostly run by organized criminal groups. Not always, because there are other forms of trafficking, such as domestic servitude, which involves private individuals. However, trafficking on a massive scale is very much about criminal groups recruiting people and then exploiting them. It is not always the same organization which runs the whole trafficking chain; more often different criminal groups are connected, running different phases.

What is important to be aware of is that these criminal groups are gaining more strength and power and even political influence through this very lucrative business. We have indications that trafficking is becoming an inexhaustible source of profits which are being reinvested into other criminal activities including weapons and drugs. So we have to think about trafficking in terms of something which hampers the economy and democratic institutions. This is new and is not to be underestimated.

Is human trafficking taken as seriously as some of the other crimes you mention, such as drug and arms smuggling?

Unfortunately, trafficking is not yet tackled with the same level of awareness and force as other forms of organized crime such as, for example, drug trafficking. Unfortunately, trafficking is still a very low-risk crime. This business generates high levels of profit and as a consequence it flourishes. This is the sad reality we are facing every day. We need to be more effective in fighting this crime.

The majority of OSCE participating States today recognize that trafficking in human beings is an important issue, and many have adopted new legislation, action plans and national co-ordination mechanisms. The challenge we face is to make the anti-trafficking legislation and machinery established over the past years work effectively on a much larger scale.

What is the role of international organizations in the fight against trafficking and how does the OSCE co-operate in this field?

International organizations play an important role in strengthening the fight against human trafficking. I consider the improvement in this co-operation an achievement in my first six months here. We co-operate very closely with the United Nations (UN) and I recently addressed the UN General Assembly. We have a close relationship with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other UN agencies such as UNICEF. The OSCE is also a member of the steering committee of the UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT). We also work very closely with the Council of Europe, exchanging ideas and information with their Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA).

Internally, we are also working closely with all the OSCE structures, in particular with our Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), providing training for law enforcement officials on a regular basis, most recently in Dushanbe. With the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), we are preparing a seminar on trafficking and money laundering, which is an important area we would like to explore deeper. With the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), we are working on assistance to returned victims and access to remedies, including compensation, and at the end of October convened an important regional meeting of national co-ordinators from South-Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, thus strengthening our co-operation with the field operations.

When you talk about action plans and co-ordination, it is often difficult to understand how such activities improve the lives of those who are threatened.

Action plans have an essential role in ensuring that all competent agencies, ministries and social actors are involved in the fight against human trafficking. To be successful in the fight against trafficking requires a multidisciplinary and multi-agency approach. We have to consider that on the government level, it is not only an issue for the ministries of internal affairs, but also the ministries of healthcare, justice and labour; it is a gender issue, and all these institutions must be involved in co-operation and co-ordination. An action plan ensures that there is a vision and rationale in the action of all these actors which normally would not be co-ordinated. An action plan identifies who does what and in which framework. This also means that the actions will be measurable. An action plan enables the strategic involvement of grass roots NGOs and social actors who play a crucial and pioneering role in anti-trafficking, and this has a direct and positive impact on the real lives of victims.

What are your plans for the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings?

We want to focus more on the prevention of trafficking. For example, it is important to establish child protection systems reaching every child at risk, such as unaccompanied children, separated children and asylum seekers. We also want to promote corporate social responsibility where every company should take responsibility for what happens in their supply chain, as exploitation often takes place at the subcontracting level.

Our second priority is to improve the criminal justice response, using more sophisticated investigation techniques such as financial investigations, normally not used in trafficking cases, essential to identify links between criminal groups and subsequent money laundering.

And thirdly, as trafficking in human beings is modern day slavery, and one of the most appalling violations of the fundamental rights, we plan to further strengthen protection of victims’ rights, by promoting appropriate identification and adequate assistance to every presumed victim and by supporting the access to justice, and in particular to compensation, and the social inclusion of trafficked persons as a final outcome of the rehabilitation process.
Combating the threat of illicit drugs is at the heart of what my organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) does. I wish to highlight a few areas of concern and some important fields of co-operation between UNODC and the OSCE.

Opium production has been decreasing in Afghanistan in the past years and due to a blight affecting the opium crop, there was a further decrease this year. In 2009, total production was 6,900 tonnes. This is well over global demand, which is around 5,000 tonnes. That means there is an overhang, which is not accounted for, and is probably accumulating in stocks.

In 2008, Afghan farmers earned just under 438 million Euros — a little less than half a billion. At the borders, the price increases by a factor of five or six, to two and a half billion. The total global value for Afghan opiates is 55 billion. I ask you to consider these three figures. The final price of opium is 100 times what the Afghan farmer earns. Where is all this money going? Not to the farmers; it is not accumulating in Afghanistan. It is all accumulating in the hands of criminal groups and traffickers who move the drugs from the border to the main markets, wherever they are, in Russia, in Western Europe. This is a transnational threat that needs a multilateral solution. In areas where border controls are lax and the rule of law limited, the possibility of these areas becoming safe havens for trafficking is great.

The two main drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan are the Balkan route — out and westward — and the northern route through Central Asia. This vulnerability is what multilateral solutions can help resolve.

Seizures of opiates or heroin are unfortunately very low close to areas of production: 66 tonnes in 2008 (one percent of the total) in Afghanistan; five per cent in all neighbouring countries of Central Asia. This tells us: we need to do more to improve law enforcement in those areas. It also tells us something else I would like to emphasize. We tend to forget that law enforcement is not the exclusive solution. Drugs are a threat to the health of the individuals who take them. We need to do enough to prevent harmful consequences of drugs from spreading across societies: provide treatment systems, balance law enforcement with drug demand reduction strategies.

In addition, there is the problem of precur- sors. This sometimes reminds one of the needle in the haystack. A lot of chemicals are made for industrial use. One small fraction of those chemicals is used to make or to extract illicit
drugs. These chemicals are called precursors. But you cannot control the whole chemical industry to target one small part of it. What we have to do is target specific chemicals, and look at the total market. Acetic anhydrate is the main precursor for making heroin. It is not produced in Afghanistan. Yet large amounts are coming in. Here it is fairly simple to define the problem, and we need to do much more about controlling it. Here we have a point where we can choke the illicit drug production industry.

Another problem is of course that of political instability, civil war, terrorism, financing of terrorist political movements. It is no new thing to say that drug trafficking takes to political instability like fish to water. If you have one, you draw in the other. It is a symbiotic relationship. Afghanistan’s own internal problems, the fact that it has suffered from civil war for many years, this is directly related to the fact that it is the biggest opium producer in the world. This instability tends to spread in concentric circles. Our capacity to stop this depends on how we can bring the rule of law to operate in adjoining areas. This is an area where the OSCE and the UNODC can and do work together.

Another area in which UNODC and OSCE co-operate, in close consultation with the five Central Asian governments, is the promotion of co-operation on drug demand reduction and law enforcement. The two organizations co-sponsored a regional workshop in Astana last July on international co-operation in criminal matters to facilitate capacity building in national criminal justice systems.

We also co-operate with the OSCE on border control. Because rule of law is limited in Afghanistan, instability tends to spread. Approximately one quarter of Afghan opium production, 100 tonnes, transits Central Asia every year on its way out to markets in Russia and Western Europe. Afghanistan has three northern borders, with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. There are strong ethnic and cultural ties across these borders. When you have ethnic or national or tribal ties across national borders, one of the things that is likely to happen is that criminal networks spread. People have travelled across the borders between Afghanistan and some Central Asian states for a very long time, particularly Tajikistan. Many people from Tajikistan have moved north to the cities of Western Russia. Through this diaspora, drug trafficking can operate much more easily. Not particularly surprisingly, in modern history this happens over and over, but we need to pay attention to this, not only to drug trafficking and other forms of trafficking, but to various forms of political extremism.

The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARRICC) has been a flagship project. I express my gratitude to Kazakhstan for hosting the centre in Almaty. Thank you to countries for signing up — I encourage each OSCE participating State to second liaison officers, help the centre start delivering on cross- border co-operation and strategic intelligence which it was set up for.

Together with the OSCE, we work in the area of organized crime. We have co-operated on developing a criminal justice assessment toolkit. We have just published the first threat analysis of transnational organized crime: The Globalization of Crime: a Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. I commend this publication to readers who would like a global overview of the subject.

In the area of terrorism prevention, we work with the OSCE on UNODC’s container security initiative in the littorals of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. We need to work more on cyber crime, an emerging threat. We welcome the involvement of the OSCE in the Paris Pact Initiative against the drug problem.

In conclusion: I would like to make one fairly obvious point that bears restatement. We all sometimes worry that sharing of information and co-ordination of efforts compromises the sovereignty of countries. When we do this, we forget that if we tolerate a situation in which criminals can cross borders freely, we have already compromised our sovereignty. We need to establish the necessity of having multilateral systems to counter international problems like drug trafficking, production and illicit consumption. Sovereignty is strengthened and not weakened by exchanging information across borders. Let us do our best to ensure that co-operative arrangements continue and the multilateral system is strengthened.

Sandeep Chawla is the Director of the Division for Policy and Public Affairs at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna. This article is based on a presentation he gave at the OSCE Conference on combating the threat of illicit drugs and strengthening control of precursor chemicals, held in Vienna on 8 and 9 July 2010.
OSCE Engagement with Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been an OSCE Partner for Co-operation since 2003. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has been sending Election Support Teams to assist with organizing elections in Afghanistan since 2004.

At the 2007 OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid, the Foreign Ministers adopted a decision on OSCE engagement with Afghanistan, which tasked the Secretary General with developing a programme of OSCE assistance to Afghanistan. The projects, which were developed later in 2008 by the Secretariat and funded from extra-budgetary resources, focused mainly on strengthening borders between the Central Asian participating States and Afghanistan, training of Afghan border guards, counter-narcotics and customs officers and facilitating trans-border co-operation and networking.

Also in 2007, the Permanent Council established a Partnership Fund to sponsor the participation of Partners for Co-operation, including Afghanistan, in OSCE activities.
For a little over a year, our team of seven from the OSCE Centre in Bishkek has been working daily in the building of the Kyrgyz State Customs Service. In collaboration with the head of the Customs Service’s training centre and the eight permanent trainers appointed in February, we are implementing the OSCE Customs Training Development Project, whose goal is to develop the training capacity of the Service.

We began our work last autumn by conducting a nation-wide assessment of the most pressing training needs of the Kyrgyz customs administration. This formed the basis of the entry-level curriculum we developed this year. Seventy per cent of the curriculum deals with duty collection and procedures and 30 per cent with the fight against smuggling. The newly trained instructors prepared 68 presentations — 200 academic hours of lessons — under the close supervision of the OSCE training advisors, taking account of international standards and best practices. I think that this method of developing the curriculum, structured around lesson plans and using a wide range of teaching materials including power point presentations and practical exercises, makes for an excellent learning experience.

It is important to emphasize that we, the OSCE team members, advise, mentor and train the trainers but do not write or develop the courses for them. “Sustainability of the training scheme” is a key phrase we keep present in our minds every day as we work with the Customs Service.

The actual training started in June. The trainers conducted advanced and specialized training courses in Bishkek and in the regions, covering procedures, such as different customs regimes, the customs transit document “TIR carnet” and automated systems of customs registration, and skills to fight smuggling: how to process documents in cases of customs rules violation and how to use contraband team (CT-30) search kits.

They also conducted four-week entry-level courses. In September, for the first time, this course was taught exclusively by the team of trainers that we OSCE advisors had trained. It was held in Bishkek for all the newly recruited customs officers in the country — 42 in all. The experience was very positive in terms of harmonization, standardization and equality of training. It was also very challenging. Upon completion of the sessions, all participants had to take a written examination and answer questions posed by a commission headed by the Chairman of the State Customs Service. For the trainers, it was a good opportunity to assess difficulties encountered and identify improvements needed.

Another important aim of the project is to provide training for Afghan customs officers. This is one of the activities the OSCE is undertaking in response to the 2007 Madrid Ministerial Council decision to increase engagement with Afghanistan. The first of these courses, taught for and by Afghan officers, was organized from 12 July to 13 August 2010. For the second course, from 13 October to 12 November, we increased the number of participants from ten to 14. The next course, for 20 customs officers, is planned for January. This project offers regular training opportunities for customs officers who have not attended the Afghanistan National Customs Academy course, with a similar curriculum.

Edwige Presle-Weiss is the Project Manager of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek’s Customs Training Development Project.
In 2009, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat facilitated two extra-budgetary joint customs training projects. Turkmen customs officials who had spent two months training as instructors for their countrymen completed the project by travelling to Atamyrat in south-eastern Turkmenistan and conducting a one-week training course for a group of eight Afghan customs officials. Training centred on risk management, current trends, border crossing processing and future developments in customs trade facilitation.

Later in 2009, two groups of Turkmen border guards and one group of Afghan border police received training in field activities designed to strengthen capacity along the green borders between border crossing points. Living together in the desert, the officers learned to drive small cross-country vehicles, operate specialized surveillance equipment, conduct first aid, use maps for patrol planning and enhance communications in the technical area of border patrolling.

These projects were the first of the OSCE border projects actually implemented in support of the 2007 MC decision on engagement with Afghanistan, and proved useful to all stakeholders, as the co-operation and co-ordination they established has continued through all other engagement activities.

An Afghan customs trainer in Bishkek
by Mohammad Farhad Ahmadzai

In 2010, my colleague Aimal Omari and I came to Bishkek twice to deliver entry-level customs training as part of a joint training programme for Kyrgyz and Afghan customs officers organized by the OSCE Centre in Bishkek and the State Customs Service of Kyrgyzstan. Aimal and I are trainers at the Afghan National Customs Academy in Kabul.

In Bishkek, we developed and taught a five-week entry-level training course to customs officers from Afghanistan who perform diverse duties at our border crossings with Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Iran, in airports and at our headquarters. The course will continue through next year on a regular basis.

The course we deliver develops skills in curbing the illegal cross-border movement of goods, services and people while at the same time facilitating legal movement and trade. The curriculum was developed together with the Afghan National Customs Academy. We have tailored the curriculum to meet international standards and take account of best practices and have also developed lessons in ethics and good governance.

Both my colleague and I deliver courses, but I would like to underline that 40 per cent of the curriculum is taught by Kyrgyz customs trainers. The perspective they offer increases our understanding of Central Asian issues. As an example, I would like to mention the presentations relating to border management or multilateral issues.

This course is an invaluable opportunity for Kyrgyz and Afghan customs officers to exchange experiences. Of course, language is a barrier, but for the joint courses we work through an interpreter. And we all speak the same "customs" language.

I would like to underline that the training conditions in Bishkek are very good. The State Customs Service of Kyrgyzstan provides an auditorium in the Customs Headquarters. The trainees can also easily visit customs border check points such as the airport, the border crossing with Kazakhstan and the customs railway post, where practical inspection exercises are held. Furthermore, the accommodation in comfortable apartments and the green city of Bishkek offer good conditions for us as trainers to prepare the lessons, and for the participants to focus on the courses.

I see this activity as an important capacity building and development tool for Afghanistan. The OSCE project allows us to gain experience in teaching and to become trainers of trainers. The trainees all agree that this entry-level course is an excellent opportunity to increase their knowledge and skills, to understand the broad scope of customs officers’ activities and to further their careers.

Mohammad Farhad Ahmadzai is a trainer at the Afghan National Customs Academy in Kabul.

Joint customs training in Turkmenistan

In 2009, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat facilitated two extra-budgetary joint customs training projects. Turkmen customs officials who had spent two months training as instructors for their countrymen completed the project by travelling to Atamyrat in south-eastern Turkmenistan and conducting a one-week training course for a group of eight Afghan customs officials. Training centred on risk management, current trends, border crossing processing and future developments in customs trade facilitation.

Later in 2009, two groups of Turkmen border guards and one group of Afghan border police received training in field activities designed to strengthen capacity along the green borders between border crossing points. Living together in the desert, the officers learned to drive small cross-country vehicles, operate specialized surveillance equipment, conduct first aid, use maps for patrol planning and enhance communications in the technical area of border patrolling.

These projects were the first of the OSCE border projects actually implemented in support of the 2007 MC decision on engagement with Afghanistan, and proved useful to all stakeholders, as the co-operation and co-ordination they established has continued through all other engagement activities.
Engagement with Afghanistan in Tajikistan

The OSCE Office in Tajikistan started implementation of a number of Afghan-related projects in late 2008. It added a provision for the training of Afghan customs officers to its project to provide customs assistance and build a modern customs terminal on the outskirts of the small town of Murgab, in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badkhshan district on the Pamir plateau. The extra-budgetary project, with an estimated cost of nearly €1 million, is financed by Japan, with contributions from Belgium and Germany. Afghan customs officers were trained in risk assessment and the detection of the illegal movement of goods, including precursor chemicals, in the spring of 2010 in Dushanbe.

Some months earlier, in October 2009, a first contingent of a dozen Afghan border police detachment commanders crossed into Tajikistan to take part in a workshop designed to revive the mechanisms of the border delegates. These are mechanisms that were put in place between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in 1958 and have been on hold since 1991. The cross-border cooperation workshop, which runs under the unified budget of the Office in Tajikistan, was repeated in 2010 and will be held again in 2011, advancing further each time towards reviving the cooperation mechanisms.

Border Management Staff College

The Border Management Staff College (BMSC) based in Dushanbe was conceived from the very beginning as an institution that would invite the participation of Afghan border officials. Since its launch in May 2009, it has conducted 11 training events and received 241 participants from 19 OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation, including Afghanistan. So far, 60 Afghan officials from the Afghan Border Police and Customs Service have participated in seminars on border control, detection of forged travel documents, traveller profiling, international co-operation, risk analysis and training on chemical precursors to illicit drugs. The Afghan colleagues have expressed their great satisfaction with these seminars and feel very much at home in Dushanbe, sharing a similar language and culture with their Tajik neighbours.

Collaborating with Afghanistan to fight terrorism

The OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) places great importance on collaborating with Afghanistan in addressing transnational security concerns. In 2010, it facilitated Afghan participation in the Workshop on the 2005 Universal Legal Instruments against Terrorism and the Implementation of their Provisions in National Legislation in Vienna on 29 and 30 April, the OSCE Workshop on Promoting the ICAO Public Key Directory in Vienna on 27 and 28 May and the Expert Conference on Successful Strategies, Effective Policies and Best Practices to Prevent Terrorism in Astana on 14 and 15 October.

It organized training for 20 Afghan border control officers at the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, from 27 September to 8 October 2010, in co-ordination with the Conflict Prevention Centre’s borders team. Led by document advisors from the Austrian Federal Ministry for the Interior, the course provided participants with skills to detect forged documents and further disseminate these skills. Preceding the training in Dushanbe, the participants underwent a preparatory course in Kabul led by the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the German Police Project Team (GPPT). This was the 15th training of its kind conducted in the OSCE region since September 2007 as part of the ATU’s travel document security programme.
Training Afghan national police in counter-narcotics

The Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) has been conducting counter-narcotics training for Afghan police in Domodedovo, Russian Federation, in close co-operation with the International Drug Fighting Centre at the All-Russian Advanced Police Academy, since November 2007. Thirty-three Afghan police officers have been trained so far, most recently in March 2010.

In February and March 2010, at the Police Academy and the Drug Control Agency in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the SPMU conducted two simultaneous courses in counter-narcotics for 35 Afghan police officers, co-operating closely with the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, the Tajik Ministry of the Interior and the Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan. The courses were fully financed by the Government of Japan.

In a two-week course that began on 1 November in Almaty, the SPMU is training 10 Afghan Police Officers to train further officers in counter-narcotics at the Police Academy of Kazakhstan. The €75,000 course is fully funded by Kazakhstan.

A further 15 Afghan police trainers will be trained under an extra-budgetary project co-funded by Belgium and Turkey in a two-week course at the Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC) in Ankara.

Election support in Afghanistan

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Support Team to the 18 September 2010 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, tasked by the Permanent Council following an invitation from the Afghan Foreign Minister, Zalmai Rassoul. It was funded through extra-budgetary contributions from 15 participating States and one Partner for Co-operation.

The eight experts from six OSCE participating States, led by Hannah Roberts from the United Kingdom, spent five weeks in Afghanistan, from 9 September to 15 October.

The OSCE has supported all Afghan elections since 2004 and issued reports in 2004, 2005 and 2009 with recommendations on how to improve future processes. The 2010 team reviewed this large body of recommendations and identified priority areas for future electoral reform. ODIHR will soon release a report addressing the legal framework, protection of electoral rights, election administration, voter registration, delimitation of electoral boundaries, political parties and domestic observation, with the aim of stimulating further electoral reform in Afghanistan.

Engagement with Afghanistan under the OSCE Partnership Fund

In 2010, ten Afghan officials, including the Deputy Minister of the Interior in Charge of Counter-Narcotics, took part in the Workshop on Combating Illicit Crop Cultivation and Enhancing Border Security and Management: Thailand as a Case Study, held from 24 to 28 January 2010 in the Chiangmai and Chiangrai provinces of Thailand. They were sponsored with contributions from Finland under the Partnership Fund, established in 2007 to sponsor Partners for Co-operation to participate in OSCE activities.

Contributions from the United States, also under the Partnership Fund, permitted a further 14 Afghan representatives to attend events including the 2010 OSCE — Korea Conference in Seoul in May, the OSCE Economic and Environmental Form in Prague in May, a regional seminar on customs and border services in Almaty in July and three anti-terrorism activities [see p. 36]. The Partnership Fund also finances activities to encourage Partners for Co-operation to implement OSCE norms, principles and commitments. Currently, documents related to OSCE commitments, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election observation methodology and recommendations issued by the ODIHR Election Support Teams following their deployment in Afghanistan are being translated into Dari and Pashtu. Also, an expert is being recruited to further OSCE engagement with Afghanistan, including by developing targeted extra-budgetary projects.
The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina turns 15: towards an exemplary multi-ethnic society

by Valerie Hopkins

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Organization's second-largest field operation. It was established under the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) drawn up in Dayton in late 1995 and signed in Paris in December 1995 to end close to four years of conflict.

The OSCE Mission is one of the key agencies responsible for helping Bosnia and Herzegovina with the daunting task of rebuilding itself as a multi-ethnic, democratic society. It began its work in December 1995, with a specific mandate to organize free and fair elections, promote regional stabilization and ensure human rights. It currently has 14 field offices and operates 12 thematic programmes.

Below are some personal stories from long-time Mission members.

WORKING WITH A COMMON SENSE OF PURPOSE

"I was 18 when I first entered our old headquarters building in downtown Sarajevo, the war had just ended, and I had been offered a job as an assistant and interpreter in the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), the judicial body established by the OSCE Provisional Election Commission to adjudicate electoral complaints.

I travelled extensively with one of the EASC international investigators throughout the country to look into election-related complaints from political parties, independent candidates and regular citizens. Security was still fragile, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line very much present, both physically and psychologically. I remember vividly the adrenaline rush I felt every time we worked on a sensitive case.

Particularly busy were the periods preceding and immediately following the elections. My colleagues and I worked long hours, often pulling all nighters, working weekends and holidays, no questions asked. We all felt — and I don’t mean just the colleagues working on the elections but the entire Mission — that we were doing something valuable, something that would instigate much needed change and have a significant impact on our future lives. And we were right.

Today, almost 15 years later, I am still with the OSCE. Circumstances have changed, people have changed and goals have changed. Yet I want to believe that the spirit and the sense of purpose that were there in those early years are still present and pushing us towards new achievements. We owe it to ourselves to aim at nothing less.”

— Maja Soldo, currently working in Fund Administration at the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
BUILDING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

“When the war started, I was a student in Sarajevo and during the war I served in the police force. In early 1996, I got a job working for the OSCE as a driver. It was a great opportunity to work and earn some money after so many years of hard living. After a few months, I was given the opportunity to work for then-Deputy Head of Mission for Regional Stabilization, Brigadier General Per Skov-Christensen.

Our department had the very demanding task of working on confidence- and security-building measures under Article II of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Accord, but also to help with implementation of Article IV of Annex 1B, on arms control. It was hard to believe that it was possible to go again normally, without fear, to Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia in order build peace and confidence together. The OSCE Missions in the entire region stood firm on their impartiality.

I am thankful for this opportunity to express my gratitude to all those who have worked for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina team, for all their efforts to get my children’s country on the path to prosperity.”
— Semin Numić, currently serving as a Logistics Assistant in the Arms Control division of the Mission’s Security Co-operation Department

WORKING TO MAKE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AN EXEMPLARY MULTI-ETHNIC AND MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

“Working for the OSCE Mission as a property rights expert from 1997 to 2000, I saw how people hoping to regain their homes viewed the OSCE as their last resort. It was a tough process. As soon as we finished assisting with processing one repossession claim, a new process began for the family that was about to lose its temporary home. Nonetheless, the OSCE maintained its integrity and its image of neutral adviser and fierce guardian of the rule of law.

Afterwards came softer, but equally cumbersome, systemic reforms in education and public administration. As we work on furthering these processes, our hope is to move past the short-term compromises intended only to end the conflict in 1995, and to adopt new policies that will enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to become an exemplary multi-ethnic and multicultural society.

Recently I had the pleasure of supporting an initiative whereby officials from the least developed municipalities in my area, Teočak, travelled for 10 hours by van to learn from the experience of another municipality, Posušje [see story in OSCE Magazine 3 2010]. Neither ethnicity nor political affiliation played a role in the choice of destination — the only criterion was to find a good model to help Teočak with its development planning.”
— Faketa Pipal, National Programme Officer in Municipal Development in the Field Office in Tuzla

SHOWING THAT MULTI-ETHNIC EDUCATION IS POSSIBLE

“Brčko District is a neutral, self-governing administrative unit that is formally part of both entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 1996, the OSCE Mission has been building bridges between people from the separate parts of Brčko District. It helped to organize the first democratic elections, establish the first multi-ethnic assembly and create accountable and transparent democratic institutions. Brčko District is now recognized as a highly developed unit of local self-governance and a model for the rest of the country in the fields of multi-ethnicity, good governance and especially education.

The Mission promoted Brčko District’s multi-ethnic education system and facilitated the first study visits of teachers, parents and students from different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Brčko District. At a time when many people in the country do not believe that an integrated, multi-ethnic education system can work in practice, the smiling faces of Brčko students and their teachers of different ethnic background sitting together in the class, being taught the same curriculum, are unforgettable moments, showing the rest of the country that this is possible.”
— Karmelita Simić, National Education Officer, and Vanja Rikanović, Community Development Program Assistant, in the Field Office in Brčko

Valerie Hopkins is an Editor in the Press and Public Information Office of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the ten years since July 2000, when the OSCE Office in Baku first opened its doors, Azerbaijan has achieved remarkable social and political stability. High revenues from oil and gas exports have led to exponential economic growth, with the poverty rate down from 49 per cent in 2001 to 11 per cent last year. Azerbaijan has made new international commitments to the Council of Europe and the European Union.

All of these developments have naturally impacted the work of the OSCE Office. The first Head of Office, Alexander Cornelissen from the Netherlands, on a recent visit to Azerbaijan, was impressed by the Office’s work and the changes he observed in the country. “The tremendous vitality of the programme of activities over the past ten years testifies to the bond that has existed between Azerbaijan and the Office in Baku since its inception in meeting the challenges of the OSCE’s presence in the field,” he commented.

In the politico-military dimension of security, the emphasis of the Office’s work has been on law enforcement in all of its aspects — community policing, border control, public assembly management, gender equality and police training — and also on combating transnational threats — terrorism, organized crime, corruption and trafficking in human beings. The community policing project started as a pilot project in a single city in 2005 and has expanded to 11 locations across Azerbaijan, including the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.

The Office’s politico-military unit is headed by John Macgregor of Canada. He started working in the Baku Office in September 2007. “A few days after I arrived in Baku, I found myself driving more than halfway across Azerbaijan to visit the lone police expert of the Mission, who was working in Mingachevir to promote the establishment of community policing in this pilot site,” Macgregor recalls. “Since that time, our efforts have paid off, bringing decreased crime rates and increased public popularity of the police to that city. In view of the success of the programme in the pilot site, the President of Azerbaijan issued an order in May 2009 mandating the establishment of elements of community policing nation-wide. My staff and I now travel extensively throughout Azerbaijan, and three Office members work outside of Baku, helping the local authorities to implement the community policing programme,” he says.

The politico-military unit also implemented a five-year project to modernize police training, which culminated in the extension of the basic training period for new recruits from three months to six.

Due to the rapid growth of Azerbaijan’s economy, the Office’s work in the economic sphere has focused on promoting good governance and transparency and supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

The head of the economic and environmental unit, Jan Olsson from Sweden, believes that there is a lot of business potential in Azerbaijan. “I have witnessed this when our Office met entrepreneurs in regional centres such as Guba and Sheki,” he recounts. “They want to learn about the experience of other countries and this is why we have active participation by local entrepreneurs in our training courses. Through this work, our Office helps SMEs to improve their business practices. We also advocate a more transparent and
environmentally sustainable society,” Olsson says.

The Office has also succeeded in bringing major environmental concerns to the fore: water management, access to environmental information, environmental education and dialogue on energy policy — including on renewable energy. It supports Azerbaijan’s participation in the Environment and Security (ENVSEC) Initiative.

In the human dimension, the Office has, since its inception, promoted the rule of law by supporting legal and judicial reforms throughout the country. It monitors trials and detention procedures, provides training and raises awareness about mechanisms to ensure the full exercise of human rights.

“I am happy to see that we work in close co-operation both with the authorities and civil society towards further strengthening the rule of law and the respect for human rights in Azerbaijan. I hope that, with our contribution, these will progressively improve in the years to come,” says Monica Martinez from Spain, the head of the rule of law unit. “I am particularly proud that our training and capacity building activities have extended over the past years to all groups of legal professionals, including defence counsels, which I hope will lead to further protection of human rights in the country,” she notes.

Under its democratization programme, established in 2006, the Office has helped to strengthen election administration, democratic governance and media freedom through advocacy and capacity-building activities and projects with the Government, civil society and the media, especially the public broadcaster, ITV. It has also played an important role in developing and advocating for crucial legislation, including the Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence, the Law on Access to Information and ongoing efforts to decriminalize defamation.

“There are encouraging signs that the time for decriminalization has finally come,” says the head of the democratization programme, Jacqueline Carpenter from the United States. “We believe that this will be a big step forward for press freedom in Azerbaijan. Through our work supporting media self-regulation and developing legislation with the authorities and civil society, we hope to build momentum and move this process forward,” she says.

All this has only been possible thanks to a significant expansion of the Office. The number of international staff members has increased from five to 12, presently representing nine different participating States, and there are now 26 national staff members as opposed to the original five.

Ambassador Bilge Cankorel from Turkey is the fifth and current Head of Office, succeeding Ambassador Cornelissen and Ambassadors Peter Burkhard from Great Britain, Maurizio Pavesi from Italy and Jose-Luis Herrero from Spain.

He underlines that “the OSCE Office in Baku has enjoyed excellent co-operation and dialogue with the Government, civil society, opposition circles and mass media in fulfilling the responsibilities within its mandate, against a background of increasing challenges and rising expectations.”

“The Office will continue to support and engage the Government and civil society in their efforts to make progress in all three OSCE dimensions, based on Azerbaijan’s unique needs in each area,” Cankorel concludes.

Rashad Huseynov is National Press and Public Information Officer at the OSCE Office in Baku.
OSCE Office in Yerevan: Ten years on the path of democracy

by Gohar Avagyan

It was December 1999 when I was offered a job at the soon-to-be-established OSCE Office in Yerevan, a name which at that time did not say much to an ordinary Armenian citizen. I was warmly welcomed by a small group of foreigners from different countries. I could not imagine at that time that I would spend one third of my life in this Organization. The first question that shot through my head was: how are these people, all professionals in their field, but coming from such different backgrounds, going to be able to accomplish anything together? As my next ten years in the Office showed, they could achieve a lot.

The OSCE Office in Yerevan started as a small field operation with a staff of ten and currently has 56 staff members, including seven international officers. They have worked hard to develop a sound legislative framework in Armenia governing elections, media and trafficking, corresponding to international standards and OSCE commitments. Another important direction of the Office’s work has been to strengthen the professional capacities of central institutions.

In the politico-military field, the long-term police development activities are especially worthy of mention. The Office has helped to introduce community-oriented policing in Armenia. It has worked for the reform of police education and for the efficient democratic control of the armed forces.

The Office’s project to recycle 872 tonnes of the highly toxic rocket propellant mélange, a legacy from Soviet times, into a safe mineral dressing to be used in agriculture has been acknowledged as one of the most outstanding accomplishments of the Office in Yerevan and indeed of the OSCE. The project served as a precursor for similar projects throughout the OSCE region.

The Office has contributed to social stability in Armenia through economic measures to promote small- and medium-sized enterprises and to combat corruption. Its field office in the remote region of Syunik addresses economic and environmental challenges in that vulnerable area.

“The most successful activity during my term as the Office’s first economic and environmental adviser was the establishment of the first Armenian Aarhus Centre,” recalls Frank Evers, who served in Yerevan from 2000 to 2003. “It started with young Armenian environmentalists asking us to arrange a campaign with them for Armenia’s ratification of the UNECE Aarhus Convention and grew into a collective effort of many friends and colleagues in and outside the Government.”

The 15 Aarhus Centres operating in Armenia today play a crucial role in engaging especially the rural population in solving local environmental problems effectively and are a venue for hot discussions on environmental issues.

In the human dimension, the Office in Yerevan has supported the ombudsperson institution, promoted gender equality, encouraged youth participation in democratic processes and promoted freedom of the media. It has cooperated with state institutions and civil society to fight trafficking in human beings and develop and implement an efficient migration policy.

Among the main achievements of the Office in the criminal justice field was the establishment and operation of public monitoring groups for penitentiary institutions and police detention centres, jointly with the Ministry of Justice and relevant NGOs. “I especially remember the intense exchanges with all the active stakeholders,” says Christine Mardirosian, the Office’s first human rights officer. “This strongly contributed to breaking the isolation of the government institutions, to opening them to civil society and public scrutiny. The establishment of the prison monitoring group provided civil society organizations with a framework for working together,” she recounts. “When I returned to Armenia in 2009, I was extremely pleased to see that the group was functional and that a police...
monitoring group had also been established,” she adds.

Ambassador Vladimir Pryakhin was the Office’s second Head of Mission from 2003 to 2007. “I remember well how happy I was having got the communication of my appointment to Yerevan,” he recalls. “Ambassador Alexander Alexseev, the Russian Federation’s representative to the OSCE, called me from Vienna and said, “You’ve gone down in history as first Russian Head of an OSCE field mission.” It was a great honour and responsibility. The Yerevan team is not big in number. But it is a unique and excellent example of how an international team can represent the interests of the world community in assisting a newly independent country in strengthening national statehood and building democracy.”

Ambassador Sergey Kapinos, currently the Head of the Office in Yerevan, remarks: “Assessing the ten years of the Office’s operation is a challenging task. One can register successes and setbacks, both for the country’s development and for the activities of our operation. But what is important is the fact that Armenia now is definitely not the country it was ten years ago. It has progressed significantly in a number of important areas, like legislative reform, democratic institutions, greater public involvement in monitoring the Government’s actions. I do believe that our Office has played its part in contributing to these processes.”

“I also note that there are still things to do, and we stand ready to assist the Armenian Government, civil society and the public in overcoming any difficulties on the way towards building a democratic state corresponding to the OSCE core values and principles,” he concludes.

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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe works for stability, prosperity and democracy in 56 States through political dialogue about shared values and through practical work that makes a lasting difference.