Switzerland is chairing the OSCE in 2014 under the leitmotiv of creating a security community for the benefit of everyone. Chairperson-in-Office Didier Burkhalter explains. p.4

Geneva, Switzerland. Rebel groups and de-facto states can sign an official agreement committing them to humanitarian norms, in Geneva’s Alabama Room in the Hotel de Ville, where the first Geneva Convention was signed. p.24

Kirkenes, Norway. King crab, iron ore, a deep harbor and the Snow Hotel are not its only claims to fame. For two decades, the Norwegian Barents Secretariat has championed people-to-people contacts across the Norwegian-Russian border. p.14

Vienna, Austria. Vera Gracheva tells the story of her engagement as Senior Adviser to the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. p.20
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Cover image © by Rune Guneriussen

Security Community
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Security Community nurtures the development of a community of people committed to furthering trust and stability across the OSCE area. Written contributions on aspects of politico-military, economic and environmental or human security are welcome. Texts are subject to editing.

The cover of Security Community is a space for a visual debate on the idea of a security community and related issues. Artists are invited to contribute. Copyright remains with the artist.

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Rune Guneriussen is a Norwegian artist working in the transition between installation and photography. His works have been photographed on location all over Norway. As an artist he does not want to dictate a way to understanding his art, but rather indicate a path to understanding a story.

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“Improving people's lives” is one of the main goals of the Swiss Chairmanship. How do you plan to do this?

The welfare of the region’s people has always been at the heart of the OSCE’s mission, right back to its origins in Helsinki in 1975. In its everyday work, the OSCE is about building trust and building bridges between people, whether it be fostering confidence between officials working at the highest level on defence issues, promoting true grassroots democracy where everyone has a say, or working with communities that lack access to resources to make sure they get the essential wherewithal for daily life. Our aim is to use the OSCE at its best, making the most of its potential to bring security, prosperity and peace to communities across the region. Our leitmotiv is to create a security community for the benefit of everyone, with our actions carried out with the philosophy that it is for all and by all, by all countries and for all countries.

Your Chairmanship began at a challenging time with the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine. How do you see the role of the OSCE?

The OSCE is an inclusive forum of 57 participating States that seeks to solve security problems through dialogue. It is the only security organization where all the countries concerned by the current crisis are at one table. The situation in Ukraine represents a difficult challenge and also an opportunity for the Organization. From the beginning, I pointed to the expertise and the toolbox of the OSCE available to assist Ukraine in overcoming the crisis.

A crucial step forward in dealing with the crisis was the decision taken by the Permanent Council to send an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The monitors, deployed throughout Ukraine, will contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security. Initially, the mission will consist of 100 civilian monitors and may expand up to a total of 500 monitors. Such a Mission makes the best use of the tools the OSCE is known for: impartiality, objective reporting and a focus on human rights and minority rights.

Already prior to the decision for the Monitoring Mission, I was glad to see the Organization gradually stepping up its activities to support Ukraine and to expand its presence on the ground in various ways. I give a few recent examples: the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) opened
its election observation mission for the 25 May 2014 early presidential election. Eighteen election experts will be based in Kyiv and 100 long-term observers will be deployed all over the country. On election day, 900 short-term observers will monitor the proceedings. A Human Rights Assessment Mission is in preparation: ODIHR, in co-operation with the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, is making arrangements for deployment. Furthermore, the OSCE launched a “national dialogue” project. The project, under the lead of Ambassador Hidajet Bišcevic of Croatia, aims at facilitating dialogue between different parts of Ukrainian society with the intention of contributing to a sustainable transition process, in particular addressing political, humanitarian and minority issues.

**How will you involve young people in the OSCE?**

I am personally committed to seeing young people play a much stronger part in society. So often, society gives lip service to the young, acknowledging their opinions, but providing no real means to become involved and engaged in decisions about their own lives. I intend to change this during the Swiss Chairmanship year. We have launched a Model OSCE series, in which 57 young people coming from the participating States are simulating two specific decision-making bodies of the OSCE. The intention is to develop a “Youth Action Plan”, which will be presented to the foreign ministers of the OSCE during the Ministerial Council at the end of the year. This is a very different approach, which I believe will not only enrich the OSCE as a whole, but also motivate participating States to understand the needs and wishes of young people better and find the best way to engage them in the political process.

**Democratic and professional police services and security forces are central to security. Will you promote good governance of law enforcement?**

Good governance is essential in building trust in general, not just in the police and security forces. Here, the human dimension of the OSCE’s work is of particular importance. I am aware, though, that decisions at the political level can only have an impact when implemented properly. This is why we want to focus on the implementation of existing commitments, rather than proposing new ones. Special efforts will go into combating torture, strengthening the rule of law in the fight against terrorism, promoting democratic elections and ensuring respect of minority rights. It is also important for us to make sure we are working together to counter the many transnational, increasingly global threats, such as trafficking in drugs and people, cyber-attacks and terrorism.

**Switzerland has named response to natural disasters as an important area of co-operation. Why is this important?**

Natural disasters have been increasing in frequency worldwide over the last number of decades. This is due to a number of factors including climate change and environmental degradation, not to mention a lack of preparedness. As a security organization this is something we are obliged to look at and engage with as these natural disasters do affect security and particularly economic and environmental security. I believe that the OSCE has a role to play in this field. Natural disasters can have a massive cost in terms of human lives and livelihoods on national and transnational levels. We have seen some devastating examples of this across the OSCE region, from earthquakes in Italy and Turkey to flooding in Central Europe and wildfires in the South Caucasus. The OSCE’s comprehensive definition of security places it in an excellent position to tackle this subject head on and this is exactly what we will do in our Economic and Environmental Forum this year.

**What are your plans for promoting reconciliation in South-Eastern Europe? Your intentions in the South Caucasus and in Transdniestria?**

Our aim is to promote reconciliation and regional co-operation in the Western Balkans and ensure that the OSCE plays a supporting role in the implementation of the Belgrade-Pristina agreement. Work in the Western Balkans will be led by our Special Representative Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann.

In the South Caucasus we want to support the existing formats, which are the Minsk Process with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Geneva International Discussions addressing the consequences of the 2008 conflict in Georgia. With our Special Representative, Ambassador Angelo Gnädinger, we will support dialogue and confidence building in the region. We are working for an environment conducive to discussions and will also conduct projects to encourage people-to-people contacts.

The Serbian Ambassador Radojko Bogujevic acts as my Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, where we are striving for progress within the established 5+2 format. These three special representatives will be working intensively in their areas of responsibility. While we are fully aware that progress can only be made step by step and lasting solutions may not come...
overnight, we can promise that Switzerland will do everything in its power to strengthen the potential of the OSCE in both preventing conflicts and mediating lasting solutions.

**What can the OSCE do in 2014 to modernize conventional arms control and confidence and security building regimes?**

Arms control and confidence and security building measures are integral to the OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative concept of security. The system of conventional arms control is now in crisis and this has led to an erosion of trust and confidence in the military field across the OSCE. Military stability, transparency and predictability cannot be taken for granted indefinitely. In view of the current situation, Switzerland is ready to support the OSCE’s role as a platform for exchange of ideas and discussion on conventional arms control in Europe and to enhance confidence among OSCE participating States. There will be no miracles or fast solutions, but Switzerland will strive to build bridges among the participating States.

The Annual Security Review Conference, which will take place in June, aims at making progress in the field of arms control. The participation of senior-level representatives will provide a framework for enhancing security dialogue and for reviewing security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States; this conference aims at providing an opportunity to exchange views on issues related to arms control and confidence and security building measures, and at promoting the exchange of information and co-operation with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

**Mediation is an area in which Switzerland has strong expertise – will you be working in this field?**

Yes, mediation is an important topic for Swiss foreign policy and also for the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship. One could say that mediation is part of the DNA of the OSCE. The peaceful settlement of disputes was already included in the Helsinki Final Act, and this remains one of the core tasks of the OSCE today. The Swiss Chairmanship wants to strengthen the OSCE’s role in mediation in the long term. This is why we are contributing to building a systematic mediation support capacity in the OSCE Secretariat. The aim is to capture knowledge about mediation processes and make sure OSCE mediators are supported with training and thematic expertise. To achieve this, Switzerland has already seconded a mediation expert to work on this. A number of activities were organized with our support as well. For example, a mediation training course was held in Switzerland in October for 25 participants from the entire OSCE family.

Together with the 2015 Serbian Chairmanship you will be responsible for charting a way forward for the OSCE in the Helsinki +40 process. What do you aim to achieve?

The OSCE’s 40th anniversary next year is a major landmark. The signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 was unique in history and seen by many as instrumental to breaking the Cold War stand-off and changing the map of Europe. Since then, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe changed to the Organization, rising to new challenges and proving itself by giving the means for participating States to respond quickly, flexibly and appropriately to the changing climate in the region.

The world today looks very different than it did in 1975, and the OSCE has proved its strength in adapting to the many changes brought not only through a shifting political landscape, but by changes in the way that people and societies relate to each other. The Helsinki +40 process involves all participating States in a long-term exercise of sharing ideas and thoughts on how the Organization will respond to challenges beyond the 2015 watershed. It has started already and will be one of the red threads running through the Swiss and Serbian consecutive Chairmanships. At the Ministerial Council in Kyiv, the Ministers of Ukraine, Switzerland and Serbia presented the roadmap for the Helsinki +40 process during 2014 and 2015. This roadmap identifies several thematic areas for discussion, covering all three OSCE dimensions and cross-dimensional issues. It is our aim to guide these discussions in a way that will help to create an Organization that can be instrumental in ensuring peace and stability for all in the future.
Ministerial Council
Kyiv, 5 and 6 Dec. 2013

Decisions

No. 1 Extension of the Mandate of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
No. 2 Appointment of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
No. 3 Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief
No. 4 Enhancing OSCE Efforts to Implement the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti Within the OSCE Area, With a Particular Focus on Roma and Sinti Women, Youth and Children
No. 5 Improving the Environmental Footprint of Energy-Related Activities in the OSCE Region
No. 6 Protection of Energy Networks from Natural and Man-Made Disasters
No. 7 Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
No. 8 Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition
No. 9 Time and Place of the Next Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council

Declaration on Furthering the Helsinki +40 Process
Ministerial Declaration on Strengthening the OSCE’s Efforts to Address Transnational Threats
Ministerial Statement [regarding the work of the Minsk Group to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict]
Ministerial Declaration on the Update of the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation

Monitors to Ukraine

The Permanent Council decided in a special session on 21 March 2014 (PC Decision No. 1117) to deploy an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission of international observers to Ukraine. Its aim is to contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security. Initially consisting of 100 civilian monitors, the mission may expand to a total of up to 500 monitors. Throughout the country, the monitors will gather information and report on the security situation as well as establish and report facts regarding incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments. They will also monitor the human rights situation in the country, including the rights of national minorities. Facilitating dialogue on the ground to promote normalization of the situation is a further task of the mission. The Monitoring Mission will be deployed for a period of six months; its mandate can be renewed for further six month periods by decision of the Permanent Council if requested by Ukraine.

Read the decision: www.osce.org/monitoringmission

For more information on OSCE activities in Ukraine see: www.osce.org

If we fail to prepare, we prepare to fail

Are disasters ever natural? What can be done by governments, civil society, the private sector and international organizations, including the OSCE, to make industrial accidents, floods and landslides less frequent and devastating? These were the questions explored at the First Preparatory Meeting of the 22nd OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum in Vienna on 27 and 28 January. The Second Preparatory Meeting will take place on 20 and 21 May in Montreux, Switzerland.

Not for sale

“What we need now is not only good anti-trafficking policies but also to pay attention to the quality of our societies, which should not condone exploitation and slavery,” said Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, at the conference, Not for Sale – Joining Forces Against Trafficking in Human Beings, organized by the OSCE and the Council of Europe in Vienna on 17 and 18 February.

See the Kyiv Final Ministerial Council Document at: www.osce.org/mc/kyiv
The stakes are profound

By Paul Schulte

Conventional arms control is low on the Euro-Atlantic political agenda.

Publics have largely forgotten about it because there has been no risk of major war in Europe. Yet the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, a key achievement of the immediate post-Cold War period, has broken down. NATO and Russia failed to agree on how to adapt the Treaty to reflect the new era. Disagreements over issues such as the principle of host nation consent for Russia's external military deployments, and continued limits on force concentrations within the Russian Federation's Northern and Southern “flanks” proved unbridgeable. Russia suspended participation in 2007 and (while believed to be kept informed by Belarus) does not provide information or allow CFE inspections. NATO imposed reciprocal restrictions in 2011 vis-à-vis Russia, but still implements the Treaty with Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia exchanges information and inspections under the Vienna Document and Global Exchange of Military Information processes, and conducts and allows overflights within the Open Skies Treaty. But those ground-breaking arrangements are not being updated. These are all symptoms of a deteriorated, increasingly distrustful relationship between Russia and NATO, with many causes.

At today's lower force levels, Europe is not facing military build-ups which need to be prevented by CFE territorial limits. There is even a contrary likelihood of uneven, perhaps destabilizing, “disarmament by default” through budgetary cuts. But international predictability, confidence and stability have begun to suffer. Military manoeuvres apparently positing NATO-Russia conflict are resuming. It would be desirable to re-establish the comprehensive conventional military transparency once hailed as the “post-modern” strategic condition, achieved in the 1990s. Russia, too, could gain from new conventional arms control arrangements, hedging against future arms races, possibly re-examining restrictions on its “flanks” and limiting NATO forces stationed in new, ex-Warsaw Pact Baltic allies.
Experts have consequently proposed various options for progress, in alternative sequences:

• Preliminary consultations, some possibly sponsored by the OSCE, on the scope for a conventional arms control agreement, including an assessment of existing mechanisms and identification of gaps in transparency, limitations and verification. This process might also need to address future military balances and doctrines, especially interconnections between nuclear and conventional weapons and impacts of new weapons technologies such as missile defences and global prompt strike.

• Discussions, leading to negotiations, on a replacement agreement or series of agreements for CFE, perhaps considering limits over especially sensitive geographical zones within revised security architecture. Conceptual difficulties might mean that solutions would have to focus largely on transparency rather than numerical balances – although Russia has indicated little interest in transparency alone and would seek limitations on NATO forces.

• Meanwhile, resolving or mitigating individual protracted conflicts, through case-by-case political prioritization and local arms-control restrictions, developing status-neutral transparency and verification of key military assets in the so-called “grey zones” created by these conflicts.

But refusing engagement over conventional arms control has become an established way for Russia to emphasize discontent over relations with NATO. As with other security issues, such as negotiating confidence building measures and reductions for tactical nuclear weapons, there may consequently be little chance of short-term progress. The task facing NATO in its long-running internal discussions has therefore been to devise a collectively acceptable set of new ideas for conventional arms control, including potential linkages with other areas of strategic interest, and then agree how and when best to launch the package.

The timing and form of reengagement over conventional arms control will be deeply dependent upon the serious and still developing crisis over Russia and Ukraine. Although early movement is clearly now impracticable, the stakes remain profound.

If the repeatedly invoked goal of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community is ever to be achieved, then some form of consensual military transparency and verification will in due course have to be re-established to make its own contribution to renewed stability and the bridging of the East-West geopolitical divide.

### A new agenda

By Evgeny Buzhinskiy

Does Russia need conventional arms control in Europe? At first glance, the answer seems obvious: of course it does. But in the Russian view, the situation is not that simple.

The Russian Federation’s interest in conventional arms control in Europe has been decreasing during the past years, certainly since it suspended its implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 2007.

In principle, there are three possible ways out of the present deadlock.

First, a return to a legally binding treaty. Frankly, I am not optimistic about this option. Some years ago I was a proponent of a new treaty, but now I have strong reservations about the value of such a document for Russia.

Let me explain why. The three main purposes of the original CFE Treaty – establishment of a stable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels; elimination of disparities that threaten security; elimination, as a priority, of the potential for surprise attack and large-scale offensive actions – have been reached.

The chances of a large-scale military conflict in Europe with the use of large numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces are practically nonexistent.

Moreover, the experience of all regional military conflicts of the past twenty years show that military success is achieved through the use of combat aviation (ground and sea based), cruise missiles and drones. If a new treaty were to be negotiated, therefore, some new treaty-limited equipment would have to be included. But my personal negotiating experience tells me that years can be spent working out proper definitions for such equipment.

The two cornerstones of any arms control treaty are limitations and verification. There is no need now to limit conventional arms in Europe, especially for Russia (here I do not even want to mention any additional limitations for any part of Russian territory, such as the famous “flank” zones).
As for verification, the present practice of on-site inspections, which has actually turned out to be an instrument of collective control of Russia’s armed forces, does not correspond to Russian national security interests.

In short: for conceptual, technical and political reasons, working out a new treaty might be quite a difficult task. What is the way out?

This is where the second option comes in: a substantial adaptation of the Vienna Document 2011. When we discuss arms control issues such as missile defense, the weaponization of space or the prompt global strike programme with our American partners, their position is very clear: the Cold War is over; we are partners now, not enemies; there is no need for legally binding documents; the most important thing is transparency. The Vienna Document is just the right instrument to provide transparency.

Of course, in its present form, the Vienna Document 2011 is not viable and needs substantial adaptation. When I say substantial, I not only mean lowering thresholds for military exercises and concentration of forces, and possibly increasing the number of inspectors and duration of inspections. First and foremost, I mean adoption of confidence and security building measures for naval activities. And not only provision of information, but also a system of notifications. Some arms control experts may still remember the famous exercise of the mid 1990s called “harmonization”, which aimed to marry the information exchange regimes of the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document. I think that some elements of that exercise could be brought back onto the table for renewed consideration.

And, of course, there is the third option: pursuing military co-operation on a bilateral and multilateral basis, as the preferred means of increasing transparency and predictability of military activities on the European continent.

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**Verifiable transparency**

By Hans-Joachim Schmidt

In the internal talks that NATO countries launched last year to develop a proposal for a new framework for future conventional arms control negotiations, Germany has introduced the new idea of verifiable transparency.

The goal of this new approach is to make conventional forces transparent in such a way that their military capabilities can be identified and evaluated. This should allow states to offer a better view of what they can but also of what they cannot do with their military forces, thereby preventing wrong estimations, overestimations and miscalculations. It would supplement the traditional mechanisms of conventional arms control and is fully compatible with constraints and limitations in other areas, should they be necessary.

Which military capabilities should be covered by this new approach? This would ultimately have to be decided by the states that are party to a future agreement, of course. However, it is safe to say that military capabilities that allow the rapid movement and deployment of conventional forces and the high-speed concentration of conventional military firepower have an enormous impact on military stability and security. Therefore, strategic airlift of air and land forces could, for example, be an important capability to include.

What would be required to evaluate this military capability? First, one would need a definition of strategic airlift. Second, one would have to determine the capacity of all available strategic transportation aircraft, including civil and multinational systems used by military forces in peacetime. Third, one would have to know the number, structure and peacetime deployment of the units to be moved and the key technical data (length, width, weight) of their equipment. For the fast transfer of fighter aircraft you need tanker aircraft, which should therefore be included. Finally, it would be necessary to verify, observe and evaluate how many strategic transportation aircraft and fighter aircraft can be handled both on the home and the receiving airbases. This is only a rough description, of course, but it gives an impression of what would be involved.

The evaluation of military capabilities also requires observation of training and exercises. In the case of strategic airlift, it would be essential to observe the loading and unloading of transport and tanker aircraft. To facilitate this, notification of training activities would have to be included in the information exchange. The figures for personnel and
equipment of the portable units of land and air forces and the strategic transportation aircraft, including tankers, could be verified on site using traditional mechanisms.

Verifiable transparency would be more complex than traditional arms control, combining verification of data and evaluation of capabilities, including qualitative aspects and observation of training and exercises. But it would not necessarily be more expensive. As the buildup of military capabilities takes time, they would not have to be evaluated every year.

Discussions of this new approach are still underway and the final outcome is uncertain. If it is adopted, it will enhance the transparency of conventional forces, particularly on the qualitative level. It could help to reestablish military confidence among the states that are party to a new conventional arms control agreement, especially between the NATO member states and Russia.

The current crisis in Ukraine regarding Crimea shows how necessary the modernization of conventional arms control is, for two reasons. Firstly, without it, we lack the means for ensuring full transparency of military activity in the region, particularly of special forces. Secondly, the events of the crisis reveal how little traction the old provisions still have.

For instance, from 26 February to 3 March, the Russian Federation conducted an unannounced comprehensive exercise to test the combat readiness of troops, for which it provided notification as required under Chapter V of Vienna Document 2011. Although the drills involved more than 150,000 troops, only 38,000 fell under the Vienna Document's notification requirements, as reported by Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov to foreign attachés. This real-life example shows what military experts have long been arguing: the thresholds set by the Vienna Document 2011, which requires prior notification for only those combat formations under a single operational command that exceed 9,000 troops or certain levels of equipment (such as battle tanks or artillery), are too high. If they were lowered, more of the formations taking part in such military activities would fall under the threshold, resulting in a more accurate notification and thereby increased transparency.

The crisis gives us time for further discussions, as the NATO states will most probably not present a new framework proposal next fall as originally planned. It should be used as constructively as possible.

A Latvian perspective

By Raimonds Rublovskis

Conventional arms control remains one of the most important security issues in the 21st century, and the existing framework urgently needs improvement. But mistrust among participating States keeps the OSCE from moving forward. Differences in size and location, historical background, legal, political and military thinking and threat assessment all contribute to the incongruity among countries’ approaches to arms control, and certainly also affect Latvia’s view. Cold War thinking seems very much alive.

Latvia regained its independence in 1991 and is therefore not party to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was concluded a year earlier. The breakup of the Soviet Union, enlargement of the EU and NATO and Latvia’s membership in both of these organizations have shaped the security environment in the Baltic region. Russian threat perception has been closely linked to the expansion of NATO into the former Soviet sphere of influence. Mutual mistrust makes it very difficult for Latvia and the Russian Federation to see eye to eye on conventional arms control, despite some progress in the area of confidence building, such as information exchange.

Latvia is a relatively small country with limited resources allocated to state defence. The impact of global and regional security developments is proportionately large. That is why Latvia attaches importance to reinforcing any overall agreement on conventional arms control with sub-regional arrangements for areas with protracted conflicts. The continuing decline of European defence budgets and, consequently, conventional military capabilities, the strategic shift of the United States’ attention to the Pacific region and NATO-Russia relations are all key aspects for Latvia to consider in developing its position on conventional arms control.

Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt is a Senior Research Fellow of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. See also his forthcoming publication: Verifiable transparency of conventional military capabilities – Some conceptual considerations, Frankfurt/M 2014, PRIF-Report 125.
Getting going again

The OSCE and Conventional Arms Control in Europe

By Rüdiger Lüdeking

Conventional arms control has been a hallmark of the OSCE from the very beginning, starting with the first confidence and security building measures adopted in Helsinki in 1975. It was crucial for ending the Cold War and overcoming the division of Europe. In the 1990s its role in creating new security relations based on trust and co-operation as well as its providing the foundation for stability and predictability in the military sphere were emphasized. But for the past 14 years, conventional arms control in Europe has been stalling or even suffering significant setbacks. The adapted CFE Treaty has failed to enter into force. We have also seen no significant progress, apart from some technical adjustments, in further developing the Vienna Document, nor have we been able to create any significant additions to our arms control toolbox. Political attention to conventional arms control has drastically declined. Some even question its continuing relevance.

The current crisis in Ukraine over Crimea has revealed the potential of the tools the OSCE does have at its disposal, for effectively and rapidly addressing uncertainties, clarifying the situation as regards unusual military activities and contributing to de-escalation and confidence building. But this potential can only be unlocked if there is a readiness for co-operation as provided for in the relevant documents, in particular the Vienna Document.

The key question remains: do we in the OSCE share a common understanding of the contemporary security environment and the challenges ahead? Is there a common vision of the purpose of arms control?

Arms control should not be pursued as an end in itself. Nor, however, should we be lulled into complacency by the period of relative stability that we have enjoyed in Europe over the past two decades.

Missile defense, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global reduction of nuclear capabilities are issues closely linked to conventional arms control, making a comprehensive approach more important than ever for a modernized regime fit for the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, conventional military capabilities are increasingly used in expeditionary, out-of-area military operations. Technological advances in the development of powerful sub-nuclear conventional weaponry are making it possible to achieve decisive results without running the risk of escalating conflict to the nuclear level. Such emerging conventional capabilities should be included in the negotiation of a new agreement.

It is important that small states like Latvia be assured of equal status in any future negotiations on conventional arms control. There is no doubt that more powerful actors will weigh in heavily. But one thing is certain: Latvia, perhaps even more than others, is intent on building a strengthened conventional arms control regime characterized by transparency, openness, inclusiveness and an enhanced system of information exchange, verification and confidence building.

Raimonds Rublovskis is a Colonel (retired) in the Latvian Army and currently a research fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in Riga.
As we prepare for the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, it is only natural to revisit the issue. In doing so, we can base ourselves on some key OSCE documents setting out the fundamental conceptual framework for the pursuit of conventional arms control in Europe, such as the 1992 Helsinki Document and the 1996 Framework for Arms Control. In many respects, these documents are as relevant and topical today as they were then.

As we chart the way forward beyond 2015, we should consider the following:

**New uncertainties**: Since the end of the Cold War, the security landscape in Europe has become more fragmented, complex and deregulated. This would in principle require more regulation by means of arms control.

**An insurance policy**: The Cold War marked the end of the risk of large-scale conflict but not the “end of history”. Arms control can serve as an insurance policy against the re-emergence of military threats or against new threats. As such, it is an instrument of “proactive conflict prevention”. In view of rising tensions between East and West over the past few years, arms control can fulfill a key confidence building role, providing mutual reassurance.

**Sub-regional conflicts**: The risk of virulent armed conflicts still persists in the OSCE area today at the sub-regional level. The existing overarching arms control agreements are not specifically tailored to address this. Nor should they be instrumentalized to resolve frozen conflicts, lest they themselves be put in jeopardy – as experience during the last two decades has shown. Tailor-made arms control can play an important role at the sub-regional level. The elaborate Dayton regime, which has brought stability and security to the western Balkan region, testifies to that. In the short term, however, it might also be useful to resort to less ambitious confidence and security building measures to stabilize crisis situations in a status-neutral manner, leaving the conflict resolution to political processes.

**New technologies**: Military technology and capabilities as well as overall physical arrangements of weapons have considerably evolved over the past decade, but arms control instruments have not been adjusted accordingly. As change usually gives rise to concerns and carries the risk of misperceptions and miscalculations, there is a strong case to be made for enhancing transparency. To this end, a review of how existing measures and agreements need to be adapted, including with respect to limitations and verification, and a reconsideration of their coverage (in terms of military activities, weapons systems and capabilities) could be undertaken. Improved transparency would increase predictability, thereby also helping participating States to create a cost-effective basis for their long-term defence planning.

**Security community**: More broadly, an effective and modernized “web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments”, as foreseen in the Framework for Arms Control, would underpin or be a pillar of the envisaged security community, to which the Heads of State or Government recommitted themselves at the OSCE Summit meeting in Astana in 2010. It would also give expression to such fundamental notions as “indivisible security for all participating States.”

**A world leader**: The arms control provisions in the OSCE area stand out as an unrivalled achievement. The OSCE can rightly claim to be a role model for other regions of the world, where – despite significant risks of armed conflict – arms control measures are blatantly absent. But it can only maintain this claim if it demonstrates that it continues to be committed to and is willing to adapt its own agreements to evolving security requirements.

The Helsinki +40 process provides an opportunity to take stock and chart the way forward in line with the basic understanding contained in the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration, that “conventional arms control and confidence and security building regimes remain major instruments for ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency, and should be revitalized, updated and modernized.”

My hope is that as we review the principles and objectives for arms control and the role of the OSCE, we can agree on an agenda for further work – and possibly a strategic document to be adopted on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 2015.

Ambassador Rüdiger Lüdeking is the Permanent Representative of Germany to the OSCE and Co-ordinator of the Helsinki +40 working group on arms control. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Government.
Cross-border co-operation on the shores of the Barents Sea

By Ursula Froese

At the northern edge of the European continent, the Barents Region is putting itself on the map as a pioneer in cross-border co-operation. People living near the Norwegian-Russian border are benefiting from a visa-free regime that has set a precedent for the Schengen Area. The Norwegian Barents Secretariat, based in Kirkenes, is working to build a self-affirming regional culture that can defend its interests in a globalized world.
Kirkenes, Norway. The name means “church on the headlands”. Located at the northern tip of the Scandinavian Peninsula on the coast of the Barents Sea, this mining and fishing settlement is nothing if not remote. People have sometimes heard of it because it is the endpoint of a cruise holiday billed as a voyage to the edge of the world that takes passenger meandering along the Norwegian fjords for a week. They spend the day in the town before being flown back to their southern homes. Nowadays there is a modern variant: in the winter you can fly directly from Paris or London to the Kirkenes airport and have a dogsled pull you to the Snow Hotel, where you spend the night on an ornately carved bed of ice. There is also a summer here, when the sun never sets. So the hotel disappears and is built anew each year.

What really puts Kirkenes at the edge of the map, more than its northern location, is its proximity to the border between Norway and Russia. Today it is a 196 kilometre-long Schengen border, which runs up the middle of the Pasvik river and out into the sea a few kilometres east of the town.

For centuries, the interests of East and West collided along this line. It was drawn in post-Napoleonic times, when King Carl John of Sweden and Norway – alias Charles Baptiste Bernadotte, a former Marshall in Napoleon’s army – and the Russian Czar Alexander I were engaged in carving out their empires. Kirkenes owes its existence to the exercise: the church erected here in 1856 and others built on both sides of the border served to mark their respective territories.

The armies of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany clashed here in World War II. Kirkenes, one of the most-bombed cities during the war, was liberated – half a year earlier than the rest of Europe – by the Soviet Red Army on 25 October 1944. The retreating German army burned it to the ground, with only the iron mine headquarters and a few other buildings left standing.

During the Cold War, this was one of two places where the territories of the Soviet Union and NATO were contiguous (the other was the border between the Soviet Union and Turkey). The powerful Soviet Northern Fleet was stationed off the Kola Peninsula in the Murmansk Oblast just a few kilometres from the border to Norway and the whole area was highly militarized.

Mistrust was so high that a wall built around the town of Zapoljarny on the Soviet side shielded the residents from information broadcast from the West. The grey, concrete apartment blocks there and in the nearby town Nikel (home of the mining giant Norilsk Nickel) were in stark contrast to the painted one-family houses of wood being built at the same time in Kirkenes. But a whole generation grew up not seeing the difference first hand.

All the more surprising, then, that today, these same residents have become beneficiaries of a pioneering visa-free regime that has set a precedent for Europe.

According to a 2012 agreement that was the first of its kind between the Russian Federation and a Schengen country, citizens living within 30 kilometres from either side of the border are eligible for a certificate that lets them travel freely inside this zone. (A similar visa-free zone now exists near Kaliningrad.)

Another arrangement, the Pomor Visa, lets Russian citizens from the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts and the Nenets Autonomous District obtain multiple-entry visas to Norway, initially for a year, then for two and eventually five. The visas give them access to Norway and the entire Schengen Area, without prior invitation from a Norwegian partner.

These innovations, together with a new modern road to Murmansk, have led to an explosion in cross-border traffic. In 1990, around 8,000 people passed through the Storskog/Borisoglebsk border crossing point just east of Kirkenes. In 2013, it was a record number of 320,042.

How has this turnaround been possible?
Building a region

An important part of the answer lies in an ambitious programme of regional integration called the Barents Co-operation, which celebrated its 20th anniversary last year. Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden are working together for peaceful development and cross-border exchange in a vast area covering the northern parts of their countries, with a population of 5.23 million.

The impetus was given at the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union opened up to the West in the interest of modernization. An unclenching moment was Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987 calling for more regional co-operation in the High North.

Six years later, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, invited the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, who was from Murmansk, and their Finnish and Swedish counterparts to Kirkenes to institutionalize their co-operation. On 11 January 1993, they signed the Kirkenes Declaration, officially establishing the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.

The Barents Co-operation works at the national and regional levels. Ministers and government officials convene every two years. Governors of the region’s 13 administrative entities meet more frequently – three times a year. Working groups dealing with special thematic areas – economics, customs, the environment, transport, rescue, health, education, energy, culture, tourism, youth and indigenous peoples – meet even more often. The emphasis on regional contacts is unique in Western European relations with Russia.

First the region, then the border

The same year the Barents Co-operation was established, the Norwegian Barents Secretariat was set up in Kirkenes to support particularly its Norwegian-Russian component. It belongs to the three northernmost Norwegian counties and receives funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To the national and regional levels of co-operation it has added a third: people-to-people interaction.

The Secretariat is headed by Rune Rafaelsen. A native of Kirkenes, he grew up in the shadow of the Cold War border. The approach he takes in his work, however, is to focus not on division but on a long tradition of co-operation.

“Take, for example, the way the border was drawn,” he says. “You may be surprised that it meets the sea not where the Pasvik River flows into the fjord, but a little to the east. The reason is that Norwegian fishermen living on the treeless western side traditionally got their firewood from the opposite shore. The border was shifted to let them continue the practice. In return, an enclave was created west of the Pasvik River to allow a Russian Orthodox Church to be included in Russian territory.”

“Even in the Cold War when tensions were highest, there was a sense of common regional interest. In 1956, our Prime Minister, Einar Gerhardsen, went to see the Russian Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, in Moscow and they agreed on the joint development of hydropower in the Pasvik River. Over the next decades, seven power plants were built, four of them on the river,” he says.

“Another longstanding area of Norwegian-Russian co-operation has been fishing. There is a scientifically developed system of quotas and the sea is in excellent shape. It is a good precedent for the joint exploitation of hydrocarbons in times to come,” he adds.
Connecting people

“Two hundred years ago, it was easy to live here. The people – mostly Sami from Finland – could move across the border freely: they could fish; they could hunt; they could follow the reindeer herds. It was very civilized, more civilized than today,” Rafaelsen says.

One way to describe the work of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat is that it aims to recreate this kind of civilized life: a regional culture that combines effective cross-border regulation with the opportunity to pursue one’s livelihood freely.

Rafaelsen and his team work on many different levels to promote the common interests of the Barents Region’s people. Since the Secretariat’s inception, they have implemented 5,000 projects for NOK 100 million (around €12 million).

They provide business support – ranging from funding cross-border startups to creating networking opportunities for the big oil and gas investors – for instance, at the Kirkenes Conference last month.

They promote culture, funding small community art projects and a large-scale cultural grants programme called BarentsCult.

The Secretariat provides administrative support to the Barents Co-operation Working Group of Indigenous Peoples and advises the Sami, Nentsy, Veps and other peoples (there are 41 groups in Russia) on exercising their political, linguistic and cultural rights.

Sports are among the most successful ways of bringing young and old together. In 2013, the Secretariat allocated more than NOK 2.3 million (€275,000) to sports activities involving more than 3,000 people. Swimming is very big: swimmers from all four Barents countries meet every year to compete. Wrestling – men’s and women’s – is popular, too.

The Barents Ice Hockey League has been in action since 2008. It includes junior and senior teams from Norway, Russia and Finland, with figure skaters also performing at every game. The matches are played on outdoor rinks – sometimes at 30 degrees below zero. “Actually, hockey is an example of Russian influence in Norway,” Rafaelsen says. “The game that used to be played here in Kirkenes was bandy – also played on ice, but with bowed sticks and a ball, an even faster game.”

The Norwegian Barents Secretariat has offices on the Russian side, in Murmansk, just two hours’ drive from the border, Archangelsk, a further 21 hours by car, and Naryan-Mar in Nenets, more distant still.

The Archangelsk office recently collaborated with a Norwegian art collector to organize an exhibition of European maps of the 15th to 17th centuries, demonstrating the common historical and cultural roots of northern Russia and northern Norway.

One of the Secretariat’s newest initiatives, Patchwork Barents, is a mapmaking project for the 21st century. It pools public data from throughout the region and presents the results on an Internet portal with an interactive map. Visitors to the portal can view visual presentations of data on anything from income levels or export figures to sea ice concentration and embed them into their own stories, which they can post on the site. The result is a crisscross of narratives, in which the border is one, but not necessarily the determining factor. Like the Secretariat’s news site, the BarentsObserver, the portal is creating a new sense of belonging among the region’s inhabitants.
An exportable commodity

The Barents Sea may be remote, but the abundant fossil fuel reserves it is believed to hold have not escaped the notice of the petroleum industry worldwide. On 15 September 2010, Norway and Russia successfully concluded around forty years of difficult negotiations on the delimitation of their maritime border, opening the door to exploration and drilling. The times when the Kirkenes harbour served mainly for ships carrying iron ore or king crab are long gone. Geological research vessels from as far away as China are keeping the harbourmaster busy these days.

Articulating the needs of the region to would-be investors is an important part of Rafælson’s work. “I am against oil and gas if all I get is measures to prevent oil pollution. If I get better roads, betters schools, universities, then I am all in favour of development,” he says.

Minerals, seafood and hydrocarbons are not the only commodities the Barents Region has to export. The expertise the Norwegian Barents Secretariat has developed over the past two decades in regional co-operation is itself a valuable resource, which it has begun to share. Since last year, the Barents Secretariat has been assisting Slovakia and Ukraine in developing a trans-Carpathian region, through a programme of cross-border projects funded by an EEA/Norway Grant. An opening conference was held in Košice, in eastern Slovakia, followed by a matchmaking seminar in the neighbouring town of Mikhalovce. Rafælson recently met with regional representatives amid the growing turmoil in Ukraine, sharing his experience of the stabilizing and peace-promoting role of the Norwegian-Russian co-operation.

Also under a Norway Grant, the Norwegian Barents Secretariat is helping Bulgaria to develop a data-pooling project similar to Patchwork Barents with Turkey, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The problems these countries face may be quite different from those encountered on the shores of the Barents Sea. But the secret to successful cross-border co-operation remains the same, says Rafælson: “The key is engaging people – not from one, but from both sides of the border.”

“Co-operation in the Barents Region is Norway’s most important peace project.”
Looking to the future

Opening up the Schengen border between Norway and Russia has worked remarkably well. The Norwegian law enforcement authorities report no rise in trafficking or other offences. Visitors from Russia populate the Kirkenes shopping malls; they account for around sixteen per cent of the retail turnover in the town and its surroundings. Norwegians drive over the border regularly to buy petrol – at a third of the price they would pay at home. The Rosneft petrol station in Nikel reports around thirty cross-border customers a day.

Still, for true cross-border integration, much remains to be done. Russian citizens living nearest the border are often the least likely to cross it. Many find the two-hour trip to the Norwegian consulate in Murmansk to apply for visa-free status too costly and time consuming. The consulate has begun piloting Saturday opening hours so that people can present their personal documentation without taking a day off work.

Tourism’s potential for bringing new prosperity to the border region has yet to be unlocked. Cruise passengers visiting Kirkenes could cross the border to Russia and spend their money there if border controls were simplified and a suitable infrastructure set up. A Norwegian public-private initiative is exploring ways of streamlining passport control through information-sharing and technological innovation.

The visa-free regime does not permit taking employment on the other side of the border. Rafaelsen thinks that should change. “Norway plans to award four new drilling licences this spring. And Stolt Nilsen is considering plans for building a large new terminal on the Norwegian side if contracts with Russian companies come through. Labour will be in high demand. Why not open up the market, for the good of the region and the prosperity of its people?” he asks.

“This is the future we are working towards. Co-operation in the Barents Region is Norway’s most important peace project,” he says.
A personal responsibility to fight human trafficking

You were involved in the OSCE’s first steps to address the issue of human trafficking as a member of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE. How did it all start?

In the year 2000 the OSCE took its first MC [Ministerial Council] anti-trafficking decision. This was just days after the United Nations adopted its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo Protocols, which established the universally recognized definition of human trafficking. So the OSCE’s engagement was truly timely. And it has continued to be known for its ability to take an innovative approach and open new chapters in the fight against trafficking. For example, the OSCE was the first among international organizations to adopt a Code of Conduct for its staff with a strong anti-trafficking component.

Speaking of the OSCE’s first steps, it is important to mention the pioneering work of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in promoting a victim-centred approach, which paved the way to many subsequent decisions. For example, the Porto Ministerial Declaration of 2002, still worth reading for its clear, strong, emotional language, which tasked the Permanent Council with developing a new draft OSCE Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

I had the honour of co-chairing, together with the Belgian Ambassador, Danielle del Marmol, the Informal Working Group on Gender Equality and Anti-trafficking, which proved to be an extremely effective arrangement for drafting the Action Plan. We met as often as possible; each meeting was a kind of mini-conference with guest speakers, and each was result-oriented and rich in substance. It was great teamwork. I will never forget the strong support and enthusiasm from Sabine Noelke (Canada), Janice Helwig (the United States), Nilvana Darama (Turkey), Christophe Kamp (the Netherlands), Cornel Ferută (Romania) and many other human rights advisers and officers. Helga Konrad, at that time the Chair of the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking, who was to become the first OSCE Special Representative a year later, also contributed. And wonderful Danielle del Marmol, who tirelessly negotiated the draft with each and every ambassador. The OSCE Action Plan was adopted in July 2003, a document we can be proud of one decade later.

The OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings is a unique position that combines a high-profile political role with executive functions. Please tell us about your role in creating it.

The final provisions of the Action Plan tasked the Chairmanship with conducting discussions on augmenting current structures and examining the need for a new mechanism. The delegations had two contradicting views: some strongly preferred a purely technical unit in the Secretariat, while others advocated the creation of a high-profile political position. The two approaches, each justified in their own right, seemed irreconcilable. And the draft Maastricht MC Decision that was supposed to endorse the adoption of the Action Plan was pending. In fact, the delegations had already arrived; they were all in Maastricht, and the MC was to start the next morning!

At midnight, in my hotel room, I took a piece of paper and started to draw boxes and arrows: one box represented the Permanent Council, with its decision-making power, another the Chairperson-in-Office,
who was free to appoint a future Special Representative and Co-ordinator, a third the Secretariat, as the executive structure. The arrows started moving in all directions, connecting these boxes – and the puzzle was done!

The next morning, I went to Ambassador Alexander Alekseyev [the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE from 2001 to 2004] and uttered the words, “I have a solution.” He did not even ask me about its substance. He just said, “sell it to Andrey Rudenko [at that time Senior Adviser of the Russian Permanent Mission, responsible for the preparation of MC decisions].” I did. Together we went to the Dutch Chairmanship, to Christophe Kamp, and with him to the United States delegation advisor, Janice Helwig. We were on the same page! The anti-trafficking mechanism started to take shape. Yes, it was a compromise, but a decent one and the only feasible one for the moment. It was to be composed of a Special Representative, appointed by the Chairperson-in-Office, and a unit in the Secretariat that was fully at the disposal of the Special Representative. The draft formula was presented to the Norwegian Ambassador, Mette Kongshem, who was then co-chairing the Informal Working Group, approved, submitted to the PrepCom and, finally, following the usual procedure, it led to the Maastricht MC Decision. Two years later, in 2006, the mechanism was transformed into the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and became an integral part of the Secretariat.

Eleven years ago, you told the OSCE Newsletter in an interview that trafficking is “more tragic, more complex, more risky and has a deeper impact on European security than I ever thought.” How has it changed since you joined the Secretariat as Senior Adviser to the Special Representative in 2004?

At that time, trafficking in human beings was known mainly as trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Since then, it has evolved into a serious transnational threat, with new forms of exploitation, new methods of recruitment, infiltrating new sectors of the economy. Today, trafficking for labour exploitation is a prevailing trend. The 2012 International Labour Organization’s figures estimate 20.9 million persons in forced labour globally. Child trafficking is increasing. Other forms have emerged that were underestimated in 2003: trafficking for forced begging, for forced criminality, for organ removal – and trafficking for domestic servitude. We can be proud that the OSCE was the first to vigorously address this most hidden form of slavery, including, unfortunately, in diplomatic households.

What is most sobering is that this evolution is happening irrespective of the quantity and quality of international anti-trafficking instruments and national mechanisms. Why? Because trafficking in human beings is not an isolated phenomenon. It is closely linked with corruption and many other forms of organized crime, such as document fraud, smuggling of migrants, drug trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, even terrorism.

The notion of so-called vulnerable groups is changing – no one is safe, there are no age limitations, no clear correlation to level of education, financial status or profession. Traffickers exploit any misfortune, be it a natural disaster, a conflict situation, dissatisfaction with quality of life or personal circumstances, physical or mental disability or social exclusion. A sort of gender “equality” has developed – men and boys constitute 45 per cent of trafficked victims. The familiar and schematic division into countries of origin, transit and destination is blurred and countries now “combine” these three features plus internal trafficking.

What have OSCE efforts achieved?

We can definitely say that awareness has increased. At the turn of the century, quite educated people still tended to blame sexually exploited persons for their own victimization. Nearly no one took the connection between labour migration and the vulnerability of labour migrants seriously. This has changed.

Within the past decade, most participating States have adopted special anti-trafficking laws guaranteeing state protection to victims and criminalizing all forms of trafficking. The majority have established national co-ordinating mechanisms; a few created national monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Some already have state funds to ensure that victims of trafficking are compensated for the harm suffered. The media is
paying much more attention to the problem. The private sector is demonstrating signs of social responsibility in the prevention of labour exploitation and human trafficking at all stages. National action plans have become a widely accepted form of strategic response helping to unite the efforts of executive structures at the national level and engage with civil society. I would not say that all participating States have taken this constructive and responsible approach, but many, the vast majority have, and I sincerely hope that these ABCs of anti-trafficking will spread all over the OSCE region. They are indeed the basics.

An important achievement of 2013 was the adoption of the Addendum to the Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings: One Decade Later by the Ministerial Council in Kyiv. Once again, the format of a special working group, established by the Ukrainian Chairmanship for drafting the document, proved very useful. I would like to pay tribute to Nataliia Galibarenko and Maryana Betsa, who moderated the meetings of the group and led it to the success we all managed to achieve together.

What gaps does the Addendum address?

The gaps in the Action Plan were natural – they appeared in the course of time due to the new forms of exploitation and the absence of specially designed supportive measures for the victims. For example, there are nearly no shelters for men and for victims of labour exploitation. The Action Plan contains no recommendations on how to provide assistance to the victims of trafficking for organ removal, forced begging or forced criminality. Important groups are missing from the list of recipients of specialized training – airline attendants, for example.

And there is one more gap that I would mention – the lack of attention to partnerships. They are the subject of a special chapter in the Addendum, which highlights the role of the Alliance against Trafficking in Persons established by the OSCE in July 2004, a unique partnership among major international organizations and NGOs. The Alliance has become an OSCE brand, a platform that attracts new partners every year.

I would like to emphasize that the Addendum is not a revision of the Action Plan. This strategic document is still valid. Any revision would have been too risky, as it could have led to its weakening. The Addendum is an update that accumulates the most relevant political commitments taken by the participating States from 2004 to 2011 and translates them into concrete and detailed recommendations that will contribute to their implementation.

What will be your fondest memory of the time spent at the Secretariat?

Looking back, I feel each and every moment was precious. In our everyday life we often don’t notice what a gift life is, how beautiful the people around us are. Even walking from the Hofburg to the Secretariat – many people travel thousands of miles to see this beauty, to make photos, to breathe the air of Vienna and hear the melodies of the street musicians!

There are special moments to remember, of course. When an idea that obsessed me and seemed impossible became reality. I am thinking, for instance, of the roundtable meeting on anti-trafficking action that we, the OSCE, were able to organize in St. Petersburg with the Council of Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. It marked a new level of cooperation between these organizations. Or when one of our interns, capable of accomplishing any professional task, got an excellent job after her time with us. Or our staff meetings and brainstorming under the leadership of Maria Grazia Giammarinaro. The list of such events is endless. Dear to my heart is each member of our terrific team; they all are professionals of the highest level, wonderful, kind, friendly people, ready to give a helping hand at any moment, to celebrate the success of others and to contribute to it far beyond their direct responsibilities.

I have been lucky to work with three OSCE Special Representatives: Helga Konrad, the “godmother” of the Alliance against Trafficking in Persons; Eva Biaudet, who, after leaving Vienna, became National Rapporteur in Finland; and Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, who has been promoting social justice, the principle of non-punishment for offences committed by victims of trafficking under coercion and unconditional assistance to trafficked persons. It has been an outstanding opportunity to learn from all three and admire their dedication.
What is the most urgent task ahead?

My ten years of service, contacts and dialogue with state officials, with civil society, with victims of trafficking and with ordinary people who are not at all engaged in anti-trafficking have led me to a simple conclusion: ignoring the problem will never eliminate it. In the fight against modern-day slavery there is no in-between. Taking no action is equal to a silent blessing, and traffickers certainly get the message.

It is absolutely insufficient to just conclude treaties, no matter how sophisticated and enlightened they may be. They are concluded to be implemented. There is a dramatic gap between the advanced level of OSCE anti-trafficking commitments and the awareness of them on the ground. There is a multitude of manuals, training material, opportunities to learn from each other – and they are significantly underused.

Implementation has to be funded. Governments and all of society need to be engaged in creating a zero-tolerance climate against the exploitation of human beings, for whatever reason.

Our consultations on the draft Addendum will, unfortunately, be remembered not only for the overall desire to reach consensus, but also for the manifestation of a decreased knowledge among delegates of existing commitments or internationally agreed human rights principles and terminology. No wonder: human dimension officers are often overloaded with ten or more topics, and trafficking in human beings is a rather complicated subject that requires time and lots of reading. The Office I was honored to work with is mandated to provide consultations on recent developments to any delegation. Use this opportunity, and you will save time for other matters.

Another problem is the lack of OSCE monitoring mechanisms. The word “monitoring” is a taboo for many delegations, but there is no other instrument to assess the effectiveness of implementation.

The legally binding documents of the United Nations or the Council of Europe do have such mechanisms. The OSCE’s Human Dimension Implementation Meeting recommendations are not binding. I am not calling for creating a monitoring mechanism; this would be a utopia. The challenge of implementation has to be dealt with by the participating States themselves at the national level. The Addendum tasks the OSCE structures to provide participating States with assistance in the implementation of the new, updated recommendations (yes, “upon request”, of course, and “within existing resources”), and they will do so. But they cannot do the job designed for national authorities.

There can be no illusions about the complexity of the problem, or its links with other forms of organized crime, its global scope and its intrusion into the global economy. No illusions about the obstacles on the way to the elimination of slavery. I do believe in personal responsibility, and I know that each person has a mission to accomplish. That is why on my bookshelf I have been keeping a piece of paper with the following well-known words by the American poet Robert Frost: “The woods are lovely, dark and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep.”


Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings
www.osce.org/actionplan

Addendum to the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings: One Decade Later
www.osce.org/addendum
The Swiss NGO Geneva Call helps armed non-state actors – groups involved in internal armed conflict that operate outside state control – to commit to humanitarian norms. Co-founder Elisabeth Decrey Warner explains.

*How did you get the idea to set up Geneva Call?*

It all started when the Ottawa Treaty, the convention banning anti-personnel mines, was signed in the late 1990s. There was a lot of excitement about it, but not everyone was enthusiastic. I remember being approached by some people – one from the Philippines and another from Colombia – who feared it would change nothing in their own countries, where irregular armed groups were continuing to use anti-personnel mines. We soon realized that we would need a way to make such groups respect the same norms. That is how the idea of Geneva Call was born.

*Are there many organizations similar to yours?*

There are many organizations that work with these kinds of groups to negotiate access to deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians in conflict – Médecins Sans Frontières, for instance. But these agreements are usually very short-term. What makes Geneva Call different is that we engage armed groups in the long term. We acquaint them with humanitarian principles, train them and invite them to publicly sign an agreement to comply with a specific humanitarian norm, which we call a Deed of Commitment. And we help them to implement the agreement. In this sense, I think we are the only organization of its kind.

*What is the Deed of Commitment and how is it signed?*

Because non-state armed groups cannot sign international treaties, we invented this special mechanism. The Deed of Commitment is an official document which is signed by the leader of a group as well as by the government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva. To date we have three different Deeds of Commitment, one on anti-personnel mines, one on protection of children and one on the prohibition of sexual violence. The signing ceremony takes place in Geneva in the Alabama Room in the Hotel de Ville, where the First Geneva Convention was signed. The idea is to convey the message to the leaders of the group:
“Look, we are inviting you to this historic room and the government of Geneva is witnessing and co-signing the document. We take your engagement seriously, and you have to take your commitment seriously.”

Geneva Call’s definition of an armed non-state actor includes “de facto governing authorities and non- or partially internationally recognized States.” Do you approach them differently from other armed groups?

Some entities object to being defined as armed groups, as they consider themselves to be de facto states. In such cases, we help them to adopt legislation based on norms of humanitarian law.

We did this, for instance, in Somaliland. As the de facto authorities refused to sign one of our Deeds of Commitment, we spent two days working with members of their parliament, and now they have their own legislation banning anti-personnel mines.

How often do representatives of armed non-state groups approach you with requests for training or guidance?

Ten years ago, when we were almost unknown, we always had to make the first step. Now groups approach us. For example, two years ago some people from the Syrian rebellion approached us saying: “Yesterday we were taxi drivers, teachers and students. We do not know anything about humanitarian law.” They asked us to help inform their fighters and provide educational materials.

Do you inform states about your engagement with armed groups operating on their territory and how do they react?

We always inform the concerned states. We tell them that we will start to engage with a particular group on their territory. All information about our work is on our website, in our annual reports – there is nothing secret. Yet we do not consider our activities to be subject to permission. We base our work on the provisions of the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which clearly states that humanitarian organizations have the right to “offer their services” to the parties to the conflict. Different states react differently. Some welcome us and support our work; some have even requested us to initiate engagement with armed groups on their territory. Sometimes there is no reaction at all, and we assume there is no problem. Only one or two countries are really unhappy with our work. In such cases we meet the groups outside the country.

Are there any red lines or limits when it comes to your engagement with armed groups?

In principle, there are no limits. If we speak only to the good guys, we will not change the situation of civilians in conflicts. If we believe that we can improve the behavior of a very bad guy, then we should try and do that. However, limits may be imposed by field conditions, considerations of our staff safety, or by the nature of armed groups. For instance, if there is no chain of command whatsoever. It does not make sense to speak to a so-called leader if in practice he cannot control his fighters.

How do you verify compliance?

This is a very important part of our work. We have several verification mechanisms. First, each group has to report on its progress and the challenges it encounters in implementing its commitments. We often have to provide support and bring in specialized teams, to demine areas, for example, or take care of demobilized child soldiers. Second, we learn from local NGOs and from the media in the region if there are any incidents that could constitute a violation. Finally, we go regularly to the field to assess progress and interview people. The level of respect for our Deeds of Commitment has been very high.

Geneva Call has been around for almost 14 years now. To what extent do you think it has been able to achieve its goals and what do you consider your biggest success?

We have testimonies from the field, numbers of Deeds of Commitment signed and respected, new civilian protection policies adopted. These numbers demonstrate that Geneva Call has an impact. But some things are difficult to measure. How many women were not raped because of Geneva Call’s work – one or a hundred? We will never know. Even if it is only one, that is already a good result. When an armed group agrees to demine a region which it controls and make it possible for people in a village to live normally, to go to school, to the hospital or the market without the risk of stepping on a mine – it is probably a success. Each mine destroyed is a potential victim saved.

The interview was conducted by Maria Kuchma.
Max van der Stoel Award 2014

This year, the sixth Max van der Stoel Award will be presented in The Hague. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is currently accepting nominations for this €50,000 prize.

OSCE missions and institutions and delegations of participating States are urged to nominate people, groups or institutions that have made extraordinary and outstanding achievements in improving the position of national minorities in the OSCE participating States. Other interested persons are welcome to forward names of candidates to these OSCE offices, who can choose to nominate them on their behalf.

The Award supports the work of the HCNM by drawing attention to national minority issues and rewarding efforts to address these challenges.

The Award was established in 2001 by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to honour Max van der Stoel, the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and a prominent Dutch statesman.

Nominations must be submitted to the HCNM by 20 April 2014. Please visit the website for more information and to make a nomination: www.maxvanderstoelaward.com.

1. Why is CH the abbreviation for Switzerland?
2. How many official languages does Switzerland have?
3. How many cantons are there in the Swiss Federation?
4. Since when has Switzerland had complete women’s suffrage?
5. Almost every Swiss home has a) air conditioning? b) a balcony? c) a bunker?
6. Are Swiss citizens allowed to serve in foreign armies?
7. What is the highest mountain in Switzerland?
8. What is Switzerland’s major energy source?
9. Which Swiss watchmaker invented the wristwatch?
10. Why is Swiss chocolate so good?

Answers:
1. CH is short for the Latin term Confoederatio Helvetica, the official name for Switzerland.
2. Four: Swiss German, French, Italian, and Romansh.
3. Twenty-six, each with its own constitution, legislature, government and courts. In the Swiss system of direct democracy, citizens are asked to vote on a wide variety of issues. In some special cases a national referendum is also used.
4. Switzerland has a federal system with a strong cantonal structure. The cantons have wide powers over education, health care, transportation, etc.
5. a) Yes, Switzerland is known for its high-quality air conditioning systems.
6. No, Switzerland is not a member of the United Nations and therefore does not have a nuclear bunker.
7. The Dom Mountain, the central mountain of the Préalpes d’Or, is the highest mountain entirely within Switzerland. The Dufour Peak of Monte Rosa is higher, but this mountain straddles the Swiss-Italian border.
8. Hydroelectric power – around 56 per cent. Nuclear power plants account for about 35 per cent. After the disaster at Fukushima in March 2011, the Swiss government decided to decommission all the nuclear power plants in Switzerland by 2022. This decision was made in the wake of public concerns about the safety of nuclear energy.
10. Swiss chocolate is known for its high quality and variety of flavors.

Your score
9-10: Swiss whizz
7-8: not bad
5-6: work harder
0-4: Swiss cheese
Book review

The CSCE backstory

CSCE Testimonies: Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act, 1972–1989

This book, published by the OSCE Prague Office, contains transcribed and annotated interviews with nine of the movers and shakers of the process that started the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, forerunner of the OSCE), from the Dipoli consultations in 1972 to the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki in 1973, through the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and more than a decade of preparatory and follow-up meetings: Belgrade – Madrid – Vienna, concluding with the establishment of the OSCE as we know it.

Most of the cast of characters have already passed on to their reward. The Prague Office caught up with them in the nick of time and interviewed them about their doings in those years of ferment. The compilation provides food for thought regarding the new – sometimes shaky – order that has arisen out of the rubble of the old one.

In 1989, when the global political climate was changing, the permafrost melting, some borders shifting and others fusing, it seemed to many like a miracle. We breathed a sigh of relief: the ultimate reset had taken place. Sweetness and light were on the horizon. Well, no! Resets are as rare as miracles. Nobody talks about three minutes to midnight anymore, but the conflicts and post-conflict situations are myriad, and cry out to be managed. The CSCE backstory brought about what seemed at the time to be a reset – almost a miracle.

So if you don’t believe in miracles and have an unquenchable curiosity for backstories, you couldn’t do better than to read this book.

The book can be ordered by writing to: docs@osce.org