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Session on Transatlantic Security

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The OSCE Summit in Astana was at the same time a success and a failure. On the one hand, the holding of the summit in Kazakhstan demonstrated the OSCE’s adherence towards Eurasia and its security challenges. The debates at the summit showed that 20 years after the end of the bipolar world, numerous unresolved territorial and ethnic conflicts threaten the stability of the transatlantic or euroatlantic security architecture. While the NATO Summit in Lisbon seems to have overcome many of the previous conflicts between Russia and the West and endorsed some very important steps for future cooperation, like a joint missile defense shield, the Astana Summit further deepened the existing rifts between NATO and EU states on the one hand and the post-soviet states on the other hand concerning the current functions and goals of the OSCE as a global institution.

After the end of the Cold War, the West and liberated Central Europe achieved three major goals. First, they united themselves in terms of security firmly with the United States by making NATO the principle pillar of European security. Second, they created -- through the Lisbon Treaty -- the necessary institutions for governing the European Union internally and externally. Third, they entrusted the OSCE with the task of creating a democratic and market economic system from the Atlantic to the Pacific, based on liberal values which proved their validity in combating communism and totalitarianism during the Cold War. They, however, failed to achieve another historical task, namely to incorporate Russia and other post-soviet states into a joint architecture. The West has committed errors in its relation with the post-soviet countries. The latter should have been stronger rewarded for the overthrow of Communism. When hailing the 25th anniversary of Perestroika, it is useful to remember that the real changes towards democracy started not in Central Europe but in Moscow. As of today, the three largest countries of the European-Eurasian continent – Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – remain isolated from the major Transatlantic and European institutions.

The West exploited the post-soviet countries’ weakness and loss of orientation in the 90s in order to build a Europe too much on the interests of Western elites. The West did not take into account these countries’ wish to participate in the process of all-European unification. They held them at the doorstep, because these countries’ ignored failed to introduce a liberal democratic system. The struggle over the right “values” distorted the view on common challenges.

The chances for a new European war are almost zero. Defense, as the Lisbon NATO Summit has shown, is being built against threats from outside Europe. Since the times when the West had to deter the Soviet Union are over, the post-soviet states should be further engaged and finally integrated in a joint Transatlantic and European architecture. This seems to be the only way to preserve Big Europe as a relevant actor in the new competition within the emerging
multi-polar world. Due to global challenges facing the West in the Greater Middle East (Islamic terrorism) and the Asia-Pacific rim (Rise of China), the U.S. and EU cannot continue to keep a “geopolitical front” on the Eastern border of Europe.

Get stuck in new rivalries over disputed territories, energy, or different values is yesterday’s strategy. If ordinary Russians, Ukrainians or Kazakhs think that law and order are for them more important than liberal democracy – let accept this for the time being. Azerbaijan and Armenia will only constructively work on a solution on Nagorny Karabakh, if they feel being integrated into something bigger, such as a Common European House, where sovereignty rights over territorial entities will not play such a role as of today. Some frozen conflicts in the post-soviet space can probably only be solved along the Kosovo model. The Astana Summit could have shed a fresh view on the conflicts and develop a road map on more effective resolution.

To forge an alliance U.S. – EU – Russia/Ukraine – Eurasia one needs to reinvigorate the OSCE as an organization equal to NATO and the EU. Such a step would achieve the crucial goal of overcoming the isolation of the West from its East. The post-soviet states would not need to become NATO or EU members in order to be full-fledged participants of the creation of a broader Europe. Dmitri Medvedev’s proposal of a new “collective security system” for Europe is not in the interest of the U.S. and EU because it implies two different hemispheres on the continent and may throw Europe back into the conflicts of the 20th century. The member states of the OSCE clearly need a more workable mechanism in order to deal with the challenges of the 21st century. Today, only the OSCE can offer its eastern members a format of cooperation where they can feel as equal members of an alliance and participate in operation decision-making concerning global and European security. The stabilization of Afghanistan would proceed more successful, if Russia and Central Asian would have been stronger engaged. Only with Russia the U.S. can hope to rescue the present regime of NPT. Only with Russia and Central Asian states as partners will the EU gain the necessary energy security in case of supply interruptions from the Persian Gulf.

There are many short-term measures which could be introduced immediately. First, the OSCE could support NATO in its efforts to develop the idea of a joint missile defense system which will protect the whole OSCE space from possible missile attacks. Second, the OSCE could initiate a revival of CFT process and initiate a complete removal from European soil of American and Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Third, the OSCE should establish an Energy Directorate to deal with energy security questions on a larger scale with the aim to secure future energy, raw material and technological exchange on the European continent. If South Stream seems to make more sense than Nabucco – let Gasprom build it, as long as Europe’s energy supplies are not endangered. Fourth, the OSCE should foster stronger links with the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The OSCE needs to concentrate more on the challenges facing its Eurasian member states. Fifth, the OSCE need to revive its economic dimension and deal more effectively with investment and infrastructure projects in Siberia and the Caspian region, areas, which significance for the future economic development and sustainability of welfare states in the OSCE area cannot be underestimated. In future, the OSCE could think about becoming a platform for fighting
global warming – perhaps the greatest challenge of mankind in the second half of the 21st century.