

FSC Chairman's Report to OSCE Review Conference

Mr. Chairperson, dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my special pleasure to take the floor, as Chairperson of the Forum for Security Cooperation, at this session of the OSCE Review Conference. The Review Conference offers us two major opportunities. Firstly, it enables us to review the work of the OSCE in the political-military dimension, including in the FSC, since the last summit in 1999. Secondly, it offers us an opportunity to consider the possibilities for future developments and to feed into the Summit itself, concrete ideas and proposals.

Over the past ten years the Forum has paid greater attention to enhancing its effectiveness within the overall work of the OSCE. The new security threats and challenges of the 21st century, especially those of a cross-dimensional nature, required much closer coordination of the OSCE decision-making bodies. The extension of the duration of the FSC Chairmanship in 2001 has greatly helped in ensuring that the FSC's work is better integrated into, and coordinated with, the overall work of the OSCE.

Since the last Review Conference and in particular since 2001, the FSC has played a crucial role in contributing to the key achievements of the OSCE. This role has been marked by an ever improving level of cooperation with the Permanent Council. And these achievements have been important ones. They include the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism and the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st century.

In addition the FSC has continued its day to day work in an effective manner. Its assessment of OSCE capacities to conduct peacekeeping operations, Annual Security Review Conferences, implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and Code of Conduct have and continue to buttress the work of the OSCE.

The routine work of the FSC in monitoring the implementation of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and all other agreed measures deserves particular mention. A number of new important initiatives, including on SALW, security threats posed by outdated stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA), cyber security, facilitation of UNSCR 1540 and gender issues relevant to politico-military aspects of security have been developed within the FSC since 1999. These new policy and project initiatives have contributed greatly to raising the profile of the OSCE.

Vienna Document 1999

Perhaps the greatest achievement of the OSCE since 1990, and certainly the most unique, has been the establishment and reinforcement of the Confidence and Security Building Measures. These measures are contained in the Vienna Document and commit our defence establishments and political systems to transparency, including military transparency, information sharing and inspections. Thankfully, the Vienna Document 1999 continues to operate.

Indeed the importance of the continuation of full and unconditional implementation of all agreed CSBMs has been recognised by all participating States throughout the eleven Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings held by the FSC. Participating States' commitment to the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 provisions has traditionally been high. The following verification statistics for the years 2000-2010 speak for themselves. To date participating States have conducted about 950 inspections and 490 evaluation visits. In addition, 123 inspections and 266 evaluations were conducted at the regional CSBM level. With few exceptions, the results of evaluations are reported as positive or extremely positive.

Unfortunately, despite a number of implementation problems and various AIAM proposals, the past ten years have witnessed a long period of stagnation in terms of further developing and updating the document. Recent developments have however been encouraging. The agreement of two recent decisions on the methodology for updating the Vienna Document are very positive signs of a renewed momentum within the FSC. The challenge now is to build on that momentum, and the Irish and subsequent chairs of the FSC will make determined efforts to craft consensus.

In this regard, I would stress that an incremental approach is far more likely to be productive than an all or nothing approach. Proposals on which a consensus seems to be within reach have thus far been made regarding Chapter IV on contacts, Chapter V on thresholds for prior notification of certain military activities as well as Chapter IX on verification activities. A number of other practical implementation aspects, including those raised at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, need to be addressed in further negotiations.

While the continued implementation of CSBMs at OSCE level has been encouraging, sadly the experience at the local level has produced more mixed results. It is a matter of profound regret that the useful discussions carried out by all participating States under Chapter III of the Vienna Document in 2008 did not help to prevent armed conflict.

No institution, no more than any man or woman, is an island. The FSC and the OSCE are inextricably linked with, and dependent upon, the political and security climate in the OSCE region. The general mood within the Organisation and the CFE has not been helped by stalemates concerning European arms control and the armed conflict in August 2008.

The Corfu Process launched by the Greek CiO in June 2009 has however transformed both the atmosphere and the substance of debate within the OSCE, including in the FSC. This new mood has enabled the participating States to actively engage in negotiations on a targeted update of the VD99 and to reach the decisions I have already mentioned.

Code of Conduct

Since the last Summit, the principles and implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security have been examined by the participating States on a regular basis. The recent discussions on the future of security in the OSCE area have demonstrated that the principles of the Code of Conduct – such as solidarity, indivisibility, sufficiency, co-operation and implementation of existing commitments - remain relevant in the evolving security environment.

The new security situation has, however, created new challenges in the implementation of the Code. The changing roles and missions of security and intelligence services as well as the increasing responsibilities of private military and security companies require new approaches

from the participating States. Ensuring the democratic civilian control of this transformed security environment is perhaps the key challenge facing all our governments when seeking to implement the principles underpinning the Code of Conduct.

The implementation of the Code of Conduct is monitored mainly through the annual exchange of information which was first introduced in 1998. The latest version of the Questionnaire, which was adopted in 2009, now reflects the comprehensive nature of the Code itself and covers a wide range of issues from national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism to implementation of international humanitarian law. Participating States' commitment to the information exchange has traditionally been high – for example between years 2005-2010 fifty (50) or more participating States provided information.

Promoting further discussion on the principles outlined in the Code of Conduct is crucial to enhanced implementation. While outreach and awareness-raising activities have been bolstered in the past few years, organising a follow-up conference in 2011 could be worthwhile. The last such conference was held in 2002.

SALW and SCA

Mr. Chairperson,

The OSCE was one of the first international organisations that recognised the threats and risks posed by the excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The OSCE has shown the determination and political will to negotiate within a short period of time a comprehensive document on SALW. Ten years after its adoption, the OSCE Document on SALW (2000) is still considered a landmark document in the field. Participating States have, under this document, committed themselves to undertake measures to control manufacturing, transfers and storage of SALW. These measures include the destruction of surpluses so as to prevent the access of these arms to illicit markets. The transparency measures accompanying the Document have been essential to building confidence amongst participating States and in greatly reducing the threat of SALW within the OSCE region.

Furthermore, the OSCE has made significant steps to control the trade by means of stringent export control measures. The FSC has adopted a series of supplementary decisions to address the supply side, focusing on the export of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems, the standard elements of an end-user certificate and principles for brokering controls. Also, first moves have been made towards ensuring stricter controls of the aviation transport of weapons. In this context, the OSCE Handbook on SALW covering each stage of life of a small arm promoted the implementation of agreed norms by providing a model for national policy makers.

The benefits of the OSCE's work to control SALW are therefore visible throughout the world, be it in the areas of export, brokering or stockpile management and security. Bearing in mind that the OSCE region includes major producers of small arms, the issue has been rightfully placed at the top of the Organisation's agenda.

The OSCE has recognised from the beginning the need for close co-ordination with other international actors, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Concrete results of the co-ordination

and co-operation that has been established over the years are now visible in terms of concentrated efforts to avoid duplication and cross-fertilisation. Appropriate SALW initiatives have also been undertaken in other fora, and at experts meetings and joint events.

Over the past ten years the OSCE has successfully managed to establish itself globally as one of the pioneering organisations committing States to a set of comprehensive SALW control measures. The Forum has actively worked to retain this prestigious status by identifying problem areas and closing gaps both on the implementation side and in the context of a global set of measures.

The Plan of Action on SALW that culminated as a result of the OSCE review process on SALW in 2008-2010 is a clear sign of the Forum's continued commitments in this field.

The Plan identifies the priorities envisioned by the FSC with regard to SALW work for the next two years. The facilitation of the full implementation of agreed measures along with the consideration of possible new measures in the areas of export and brokering, stockpile management and security as well as destruction of surplus SALW constitute the main milestones of the Plan. The active engagement of participating States over the next two years will be important to successfully implement the Plan of Action.

The valuable work of the FSC on SALW led to a general recognition by participating States of another serious problem that had been left untouched by the international community, the security threat posed by outdated stockpiles of conventional ammunition. This recognition led to the development of the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) in 2003. The complementary Handbook on SCA from 2008 provides a compendium of relevant policy guidelines related to the safe and secure stockpile management and destruction of conventional ammunition. In 2010, a proposal on treating destruction as the preferred method of disposal of SCA was initiated. If adopted, it could make a substantial contribution to the international process of conventional ammunition controls.

Assistance projects

Mr. Chairperson,

Policy papers and decisions are of course only the first steps in tackling any problem. And in the case of SALW and SCA, the problem was a very challenging one indeed. In 2003, the FSC began turning its policies into concrete projects. These projects have helped tackle excess, unstable, loosely secured or otherwise at-risk stockpiles of SALW and conventional ammunition in OSCE participating States. They are important for the security of the OSCE area. A growing number of successful projects of appreciable magnitude and complexity and a steadily expanding portfolio of FSC projects on SALW and SCA showcase the Organization's effective capability to make a real difference on the ground.

Over 20 projects have been undertaken under the aegis of the FSC. These projects reflect both the political will of the participating States involved and the effectiveness of the procedures that have been established under the aegis of the FSC for the administration and funding of these extra budgetary projects.

These projects have enabled the Organization, over a short period, to develop strong technical, managerial and legal capabilities in responding to an array of complex challenges posed by securing and destroying hazardous stockpiles. The solid expertise developed is

being put to good use in producing technically complex and large-scale projects. A good example is a recently completed project to destroy all cluster bombs in Moldova (2010) and a large-scale OSCE-UNDP SALW Stockpile Management Project currently underway in Belarus.

Nor is the OSCE restricted to stand-alone projects like the MANPADS destruction project in Cyprus (2009). The OSCE is now well equipped to run complex multi-phase projects and programmes where several related projects are managed concurrently. This approach provides for a more comprehensive treatment of SALW and ammunition risks and consolidation of existing resources. Some projects, such as Phases I and II of the SALW and Ammunition Programme in Tajikistan and the Mélange (toxic liquid rocket fuel component) project in Armenia, have been successfully completed and are recognized as models of good practice in the above mentioned commitments.

As SALW and conventional ammunition issues often have appreciable environmental and humanitarian aspects, FSC work with SALW and conventional ammunition projects should be regarded as cross-dimensional in nature. It is a politico-military and security problem, but also frequently it's as much a humanitarian and an environmental and economic problem. Consequently, a cross-dimensional approach to the projects marked a real milestone helping to duly recognise and neutralise major human and environmental risks. A multi-phase mélange disposal project underway in Ukraine is currently the largest OSCE extra-budgetary project. This flagship project showcases how a cross-dimensional project can, once and forever, deal with a hazardous Cold War legacy and concurrently improve environmental security for near-by communities.

One more important trend is the increasingly effective coordination and co-operation with other international actors active in this field. This interaction has allowed the OSCE to streamline available resources, avoid unnecessary duplication and seek complementarity of efforts. Following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the OSCE and UNDP, both organisations launched and implemented several successful joint projects in Belarus and Montenegro and are set to continue their co-operation.

The lack of funds however remains one of the most pressing challenges in the implementation of such assistance projects. There has been a substantial decrease in available extra-budgetary funding in the past two years. Ensuring full implementation of projects in the two years to come will require raising an additional EUR 20 million. I would appeal to participating States to give full consideration to funding these projects.

Non-proliferation/1540

At the OSCE level, the participating States' commitment to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was first outlined in the 1994 OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation. These Principles affirmed and outlined the commitment of the participating States to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Special Meeting on Non-Proliferation in June 2005, called for a greater OSCE role in assisting states in implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on Non-Proliferation of WMD. Accordingly, in 2006 the FSC adopted a decision on supporting the implementation of the resolution. The participating States agreed to further the UN efforts to promote non proliferation by identifying lessons learned, sharing experiences and facilitating the identification of assistance needs for national implementation. This was subsequently

endorsed by the Ministerial Council. Next January, a Workshop will take place to help to identify the proper role of the OSCE in the facilitation of UNSCR 1540. This is a welcome and timely initiative.

Athens Ministerial Council Decision 16/09 on Issues Relevant to the FSC called on the FSC, in 2010, to facilitate the fulfilment by OSCE participating States of the provisions of UNSCR 1540 (2004), UNSCR 1673 (2006) and UNSCR 1810 (2008). Furthermore, in the Athens Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation participating States reaffirmed their adherence to the international treaties and conventions aiming at preventing and prohibiting the proliferation of WMD and reiterated their readiness to further enhance and strengthen existing international legal instruments against the proliferation of WMD.

The Athens Ministerial Council documents provided for the necessary political mandate to develop OSCE action on non-proliferation. As a follow-up, some participating States have expressed an interest in updating the 1994 Principles Governing Non-proliferation in order to reflect developments since their adoption.

Also, in 2010, a four-year extra-budgetary project to support regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 was created to strengthen OSCE expertise and to transform existing political taskings into concrete assistance activities and support for global processes.

Based on the experience acquired in the OSCE region in the national implementation of UNSCR 1540, a number of participating States have been actively developing an OSCE Handbook of Best Practice Guides for Implementation of UNSCR 1540. The first Best Practice Guide, addressing export controls transshipment, was endorsed by an FSC Decision in 2009. Forthcoming guides will focus on: practices prohibiting non-state actors from acquisition and use of WMD, effective accounting and security of WMD materials, developing physical protection of WMD materials and establishing border controls in relation to WMD materials.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairperson, Ladies and Gentleman,

Over the years, since the Istanbul Summit, the OSCE and the FSC have made substantial progress. However, much remains to be done at the OSCE and regional levels. The aim must be to deepen the security of all our people by building confidence, trust and security amongst our states. The FSC can play a substantial part in achieving that objective. This Review Conference can also play its part by identifying issues and areas where practical progress is both desirable and possible. I know I speak for us all when I wish the Review Conference every success.