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## **Finland's Comprehensive and Military Defence doctrines responding to Emerging threats and new technologies**

The initial ideas and execution models for Finland's *Total Defence Concept* were born during the Second World War, when the whole of society was forced to participate in the defence of her existence. On the other hand, the military doctrine was based on the experience of three wars in the course of WW II. With a limited understanding of future technologies, the Defence Reform Committee was able to publish the lasting main lines for a national defence principle and system in 1949 after more than three years of intensive work. Construction of the essential elements of the system took place between 1952 and 1965. Especially after the establishment of the Defence Council in 1957, development gained fair speed. By essential elements I mean the responsibilities of all the relevant ministries as well as the central agencies under the respective ministries, districts, municipalities and companies in key industries producing contributions to defence. Political realities and the adopted *policy of neutrality* brought a special addition called protection of neutrality to the defence principles, although secret plans, unwritten and less written, were drafted for the recognised threat from the east.

Later, the firm foundation of the comprehensive defence system has facilitated the adjustment of the defence strategy, security concepts and defence doctrines, their execution methods and their capabilities with the changing security environments and emerging threat scenarios and real threats during the previous six decades. When comparing developments in the Finnish defence with progress in other West-European countries, some critics of old-fashionism have arisen and they are still out in the open, but the basic structures have been able to sustain the revolutionary atmosphere of the late sixties and seventies as well as the collapse of the cold war era and the early stages of the so-called era of new or emerging threats. Methods of response have been based on the defence will as well as on a certain kind of consensus society and democratic processes in re-adjusting the responsibilities of the authorities according to these changes. Assessment and recommendation cycles, were first conducted using the guidance of parliamentary defence committees in 1970, 1976 and 1981, followed by a number of committees with different names until the current mechanism of Security and Defence Policy Reports (White Papers) 1997, 2001, 2004 and 2009 was established. Additionally, there have been more comprehensive and detailed papers, such as the *Government Resolution on Securing the Functions Vital to Society 2003*, *Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society 2009* and *Security Strategy of the Society 2010*, which all have contributed to the response against emerging threats with the technology available for a small country. This fundamental guidance has been supported by a vast number of planning documents counting all imaginable threats and challenges to the security environment which could have an impact on the country's independence, territorial integrity, and on society's basic values, and which would call on actions to maintain security and the welfare of citizens as well as sustain a functioning society.

On the military side, all these adjustments have meant the cancellation of the idea of protection of neutrality, especially when Finland became a member of the EU and NATO's partnership programs. Still today, the military strategic and operational doctrines concentrate on a reasonably high readiness to deploy for defence according to threat perceptions, to mobilize necessary or all forces, to delay adversary's operations, to keep decisive terrains in own possession and to counter offensives in order to stop and defeat the potential aggressor.

What have changed are the time requirements and technological means of the response.

Adjustment in the responsibilities, organizations and functional processes has been gradual. One can follow logical development phases from 1993 to the plans in making today. For example, the reduction of forces began earlier in Finland than in many other nations, but steps have been small and carefully planned. One can't find real revolutionary turning points on the security or defence fields of Finnish society, everything has advanced step by step. Almost all changes in threat perceptions have been followed by actions strengthening the old structures of security in the society. To my understanding, the most important improvement has taken place in leadership and management as well as in the command and control systems of the state and defence forces. The aim has been to facilitate the necessary processes and procedures needed for the response to emerging challenges. In many contexts this trend is nowadays globally referred to by using the terms *network centric defence* or *network-enabled defence* that usually lead to a kind of *effects-based response* or *operations*. This has been an intrinsic part of the Finnish defence reality already for decades in the sense that each branch of state and each regional and local administration is responsible for conducting its defence functions under all threat conditions supported by all other relevant entities of society. The network has been there, only the understanding of its existence and nature has strengthened. Responsibility to lead such a response belongs to the branch administering the functions that meet the main challenge. For example, in the case of a limited terrorist threat, the responsibility to lead belongs to the Ministry of the Interior, to its police and the frontier guards supported by the defence forces and other relevant actors.

The precondition for a deepening and quicker common response has been the *evolution in communications* and other networks. In the Finnish case, close cooperation with technologically advanced communications and the computer industry since the 1970's has enabled the use of modern C4 in facilitating physical networks as well as the means of leadership and management for relevant actors. We speak today about *network leadership and management*, where the leader is not tied to a geographical location, where he or she can lead where ever a knot of the communications net is available. There the respective minister or a nominated sub-leader can manage the necessary response. In the case of all or nearly all branches of state administration participating, the prime minister supported by the Prime Minister's Office is the focal point for managing the response.

Closely linked to C4 -issues, a new requirement for a common situational awareness and *common situation picture* has arisen. For the military defence such a requirement has been self-evident for a long time, but now all the Finnish strategy and doctrine papers speak about sharing this picture among all key command centres of different branches of administration. New technologies have also facilitated that together with shared communications nets and systems. The highest level in receiving all the necessary data is the PM's Office. Finnish doctrines already take into account needs for comprehensive regional, European and even wider situational pictures. One can see this in Finland's initiatives and participation in experiments and the creation of arrangements like SUCBAS, MARSUR, MARSUNO, FRONTEX and the whole European border management system.

Rethinking based on new threat scenarios, the need to network with other actors in society, the need for international cooperation, the need to exchange confidential and secret information, and cyber threat scenarios, have caused several adjustments in the responsibilities of authorities and doctrines. In this the PM's Office is responsible for the overall leadership of cyber security, together with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where the National Security Authority is positioned still today. There is a proposal to transfer it to the PM's Office. Inside the Defence Forces this has led to a refinement of security procedures as well as to the establishment *Centre for Network Defence*, which is responsible for the

development of network-enabled activities and counter means for cyber threats. The assigned leader and coordinator in the FDF for network defence as well as cyber defence is the chief of operations using his planning division (J5) to lead the experimental work of the Centre. Cyber defence is one of the fields, where international cooperation on capability developments is necessary in bilateral, NATO-, EU- and Nordic contexts.

Understanding the importance and potentiality of emerging threats was one of the initiators for redrafting the tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces. In the form of a new Defence Forces Act 2007, the package of responsibilities was regrouped and collected into three main functions. The first and primary task is still the military defence of the territory and independence of the country. The main goal is to maintain a credible military defence capability in order to prevent and counter military offensives against Finland. The second task is to support other authorities in their security tasks, which is closely related to the functionality of the comprehensive defence concept. The third task is participation in international crisis management.

The latest white paper declares “Finland maintains credible national defence and prepares to repel any use of military force against it as well as counter the threat thereof. The primary objective is to maintain such defence capabilities and readiness which make it unprofitable for an aggressor to use military force against Finland”. This quotation declares the primacy of the first military defence task, although the appearance of a conventional threat in the short or medium term is not in any way expected. Behind these expressions there is the understanding that when preparing for the worst case scenario, the military will also be prepared for other scenarios and actions, including those connected to the second and third tasks. Over 90 % of military resources are and will be directed to fulfil the first task. Still, there have been some remarkable changes within the execution of the obligation. The increased range, speed and effectiveness of a potential adversary, together with changes caused by political reasoning, have had some impact on fighting doctrines. One example among others is the Ottawa Convention on personnel mines – when fulfilling obligations of the treaty by 2016 Finland, with its vast land area, will have to create substituting methods that will lead to the procurement of long range ammunition artillery pieces and rocket launchers, as well as missiles, air-to-ground capabilities, fighting vehicles with increased speed and protection, and so on. So, even after the foreseen the next phase of the defence reform in 2015-16, we will see a Finnish territorial defence system, forces based on conscription and reasonably large reserves, with better operational effectiveness facilitated by technological advancement. Part of this development also supports participation in crisis management operations abroad.

With regard to responding to the emerging challenges it is worth to dig in to the FDF’s second task. In many cases the primary responder is some other actor in the state administration besides the Defence Forces. This is the case with terrorism, collateral damage caused by nuclear strikes and by defence against WMDs in the neighbourhood of Finland, accidents in neighbouring or Finnish nuclear plants, organized crime, interference in availability of energy, consequences of climate change, natural or manmade catastrophes etc. In planning for the second task the defence forces have made requirement assessments and developed a list of capabilities that can be used to support other authorities. Although the discussion, for example, within the EU on the solidarity and mutual assistance clauses of the Lisbon Treaty has not gone much further, there exists the *EU’s strategy for internal security* that speaks about all the available resources for responding to emerging threats. This fact is already understood, and it can create requirements not only for the use of civilian means but also for support from the military capability side in order to direct assistance to the impacted MS.

Finland has been a kind of super power, at least in comparison per capita, within traditional UN-led peace keeping. Several factors have changed Finland’s behaviour from a contributor of large infantry and military observer contingents towards a country contributing highly

specialized skills and, to a small extent, special operation forces. The main motive to participate in crisis management remains the aim to prevent emerging threats from impacting on the security of Finnish society. When these potentially influencing crises nowadays take place far away from Finland's borders, there is a need to contribute not only with the special skills of the military, but also with other means available in a highly developed society. It is only natural that the comprehensive nature of the defence of our own territory has developed into a similar approach in crisis response abroad. Terms like *civilian crisis response*, *civ-mil coordination and cooperation*, as well as the new *Comprehensive Approach*, are deeply knitted in to the Security and Defence Doctrines in Finland, and these also have an impact on the Finnish way of planning for peace and stabilization operations internationally. This coincides with the needs to respond to threats caused by collapsing or rogue states, including terrorism and terroristic use of WMDs.

Commonly recognized emerging threats, together with experiences from stability operations, have emphasized the need for a number of specific capabilities. There is a permanent requirement for renewing materiel for traditional defence tasks. These together with more and more expensive defence capabilities and the increased political pressure to decrease defence spending have led to more open thinking in the context of *pooling and sharing* (P&S), i.e. developing and using together with other states. In her foreign and defence policy Finland supports and in practical terms participates, not only in the Nordic NORDEFSCO –cooperation but also in the work of the European Defence Agency, EU's P&S-initiatives and as a partner in the multinational solutions approach in NATO. Similar multinational cooperation in the field of civilian crises management capabilities is taking place, as well as a joint civilian-military effort to find synergies in capability issues. Finland supports this as well as initiatives for increasing EU-NATO capability development.

Maybe it is worth under the heading of this session to say something more about capability development in the FDF. Cyber area was already mentioned. Counter-IED capabilities have gained a lot of new space, as well as other means of Force Protection, this all after lessons learned in Afghanistan. Earlier Finnish forces largely relied on good relations with local populations and good services in the form of society projects. Nowadays also hard means of FP have got more importance.

In capability development we follow NATO procedures and standards. The latest issue was that our Partnership Goals were drafted to a large extent on the basis of needs arising from our own development plan, and not just picking up something offered by the organization. Finland has a large capability plan with seven sub-plans. These goes well together with the aim to direct 1/3 of the defence budget to the procurements in the future, too.

In the international arena one can see today that Finland's contributions in crisis management can include naval assets (vessels, amphibious units), and Finland has prepared her first air force unit for international use by an evaluation to NATO evaluation level 2.

As a summary, I would say both the emerging threats and the technological development have been gradually included in the defence doctrines of Finland. The future reform of the defence forces will bring some additional adjustments in this sense, but it is obvious the country will not face any revolutionary change in her defence policy or military doctrines.