Chairmanship: Czech Republic

928th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. **Date:** Wednesday, 23 October 2019
   
   **Opened:** 10 a.m.  
   **Suspended:** 1.05 p.m.  
   **Resumed:** 3.05 p.m.  
   **Closed:** 4 p.m.

2. **Chairperson:**  
   - Ambassador I. Šrámek  
   - Mr. D. Řezníček

3. **Subjects discussed** – **Statements** – **Decisions/documents adopted**:

   **Agenda item 1:** SECURITY DIALOGUE: VIENNA DOCUMENT – IMPLEMENTATION/MODERNIZATION
   
   -- *Presentation by Colonel (GS) H. G. Lüber, Swiss Armed Forces*
   
   -- *Presentation by Colonel (GS) J. Přerovský, Military Adviser, Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the OSCE*
   
   -- *Presentation by Lieutenant Colonel H. Zettermark, Swedish Armed Forces*

   Chairperson, Colonel H. G. Lüber, Colonel J. Přerovský (FSC.DEL/217/19 OSCE+), Lieutenant Colonel H. Zettermark (FSC.DEL/215/19 OSCE+), Germany (Annex 1), Finland-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/224/19), Spain (Annex 2), Sweden, United States of America (Annex 3) (Annex 4), Italy (FSC.DEL/227/19 OSCE+), Romania (Annex 5), Canada, Poland (FSC.DEL/216/19 Restr.), Slovakia (Annex 6), Finland (FSC.DEL/219/19 Restr.), Russian Federation (Annex 7), Azerbaijan, Ukraine (FSC.DEL/225/19 OSCE+), France (Annex 8), United Kingdom, Switzerland (Annex 9), Armenia, Ireland, FSC Co-ordinator for the Vienna Document (Sweden)
Agenda item 2: DECISION ON THE DATES AND VENUE OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

Chairperson

Decision: The Forum for Security Co-operation adopted Decision No. 5/19 (FSC.DEC/5/19) on the dates and venue of the thirtieth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, the text of which is appended to this journal.

Agenda item 3: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/226/19 OSCE+) Finland-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/223/19), Russian Federation, United States of America, Canada

Agenda item 4: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

(a) Symposium to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, held in Budapest from 16 to 18 October 2019: FSC Co-ordinator for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Romania), FSC Co-ordinator on Matters Relating to UNSCR 1325 (United Kingdom)

(b) 18th annual meeting of the Commission of the Concluding Document of the Negotiations under Article V of Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be held on 1 November 2019: Russian Federation

(c) Meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, to be held on 29 October 2019: Spain

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 30 October 2019, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY

Mr. Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Dear colleagues,

I should like to thank the Czech Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) for having chosen the Vienna Document as the topic of our Security Dialogue today, and also the panellists for their highly relevant presentations on how the Vienna Document is currently being implemented and on the need for it to be modernized.

The Vienna Document is undoubtedly of fundamental value in building trust and confidence within the OSCE area. Many participating States, however, agree that for several years now there has been an urgent need to modernize the Vienna Document; some have even made specific proposals for how to go about this.

Today I am pleased and privileged to be able to announce that a new proposal to modernize the Vienna Document will be put forward at the meeting of FSC Working Group A this afternoon. This is a substantive proposal and may truly be said to be a joint endeavour by no fewer than 32 participating States, for it is based on a number of existing proposals, which have now been consolidated into a single “package”. At its core are measures to increase transparency, to improve risk reduction, and to strengthen the arrangements for verification and for the annual exchange of military information.

In advancing this proposal the aforementioned group of participating States were actuated by their concern over the current security environment in the zone of application of the Vienna Document. We are convinced that it is essential to start rebuilding trust. With this proposal we want to demonstrate our continued willingness for dialogue within the OSCE on transparency and risk reduction.

We believe that this proposal offers considerable security-related benefits to all OSCE participating States and that they should all take up this invitation to become involved in substantial and fruitful dialogue on modernizing the Vienna Document.

The presentation of the proposal in Working Group A this afternoon should be the starting point for engaging in a substantial and fruitful dialogue on this issue. We see it as an
excellent opportunity for us all to begin the process of jointly tackling the many security challenges within the zone of application of the Vienna Document.

We would very much like to see the FSC fully engaged in this process. Like many other participating States, Germany is willing to commit itself unreservedly to the task that lies before us.

I would kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you for your attention.
928th Plenary Meeting  
FSC Journal No. 934, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SPAIN**

Mr. Chairperson,  
Esteemed colleagues,

I thank the Czech Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation for this opportunity to reflect on the implementation and modernization of the Vienna Document, and on the proposal announced by Germany and endorsed by a large number of countries in this room.

Spain fully aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and I wish at the same time to make two additional comments in a national capacity on the proposal to modernize the Vienna Document.

The first is about its timeliness:

- The OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 was the pinnacle at which the Vienna Document as we know it was adopted. The new version of the Vienna Document of 2011 simply incorporated some cosmetic and procedural changes, its fundamental elements were left untouched. While it was possible at that time to agree on the “how”, no consensus was reached on the “what”.

- Today, after 20 years of major changes in the field of security and defence, we remain in a very similar situation, but with agreements that fail to adequately reflect the realities and needs of the twenty-first century.

- For various reasons, given the evolution of the security situation, combined with the transformation of States’ armed forces, the modernization of the future conventional arms control regime will take longer than first thought. Despite the fact that the agreements are different in terms of their nature and objectives, although they are complementary, the most practical solution is to strengthen the Vienna Document so that an acceptable level of transparency and predictability can be achieved, and also to improve its performance as an effective tool for early warning and conflict prevention.
Spain therefore considers it urgent to create a space to negotiate the modernization of the Vienna Document: we believe it is an initiative that can be very beneficial for all OSCE participating States, especially if we consider the political and security context in which we find ourselves.

The second comment I want to make is about its content:

– The positions held during the discussions on the necessary modernization of the Vienna Document have often been influenced by political tensions, which divert the proposals from the necessary military-technical debate, an area which Spain believes should drive the modernization of the Vienna Document, and in which there would possibly be more room for consensus.

– A possible incentive is that the Vienna Document has, in its nature and structure, comparative advantages over other agreements, but it also possesses many characteristics on the basis of which conventional arms control should be developed.

– Consequently, Spain is confident that these advantages and characteristics, many of which have been taken into account in the drafting of the proposal announced by Germany, may encourage the willingness of the OSCE participating States to modernize the Vienna Document. We need it to become a modern and strategic tool, capable of contributing to the common and indivisible security of the OSCE area.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that we consider this proposal to be a very good basis for negotiations that are necessary and timely, and we hope that other participating States can consider it on the basis of its technical merits, depoliticizing this debate.

Thank you very much.
STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson,

And thank you for including the important topic of the Vienna Document on the agenda during your chairmanship; we are grateful for your leadership. I would also like to thank our keynote speakers today, from Switzerland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic, for highlighting the importance of the Vienna Document and the necessity of its modernization. The United States, along with many participating States of the OSCE, is concerned about the erosion of reciprocal arms control across the European continent, and we believe it is important to take steps to prevent that erosion from continuing.

As you all know, the security situation in Europe has deteriorated sharply since 2014. States increasingly engage in behaviour that raises threat perceptions and threatens general stability, such as large-scale, no-notice military exercises near the borders of their neighbours. The exploitation of loopholes, selective implementation, and blatant non-implementation of the Vienna Document has brought increased scrutiny to the Vienna Document’s effectiveness as a confidence- and security-building measure. Full implementation and modernization of the Vienna Document is one of the most effective steps we can take to increase security and transparency across the entire OSCE region.

As my German colleague has introduced here today, several participating States have developed a set of proposals for updating the Vienna Document to better address the current security environment. The goal of this package is to identify specific steps we as a community can take to begin to re-build trust in Europe and increase confidence among neighbours.

The 32 participating States listed as sponsors of the modernization proposal have agreed to a comprehensive package to strengthen the Vienna Document, which we hope will serve as the basis for negotiation toward consensus at 57 within the OSCE.

You immediately will recognize some of this package’s major ideas that aim to create a more robust Vienna Document: lowering thresholds for advance notification and observation of large military activities; a modest increase in inspection and evaluation opportunities; a modest increase in team size (I would like to note that this was originally an idea of the Russian Federation); steps to facilitate real-time, impartial information-gathering
in situations where questions have arisen about unusual military activities; and a proposal to provide greater transparency regarding large military activities conducted without prior notice to the troops involved. These proposals are not new; in fact, we have reviewed many of these ideas as individual proposals over the past several years but taken together they help to frame a comprehensive and balanced approach to updating the Vienna Document.

We call on all participating States to join in this modernization effort and to engage constructively with the goal of reaching full consensus on an update to make the Vienna Document more relevant to the current security environment before the 2020 Ministerial meeting. We in the United States are not discouraged by reluctance by any of the 57 countries. It is necessary, as the Swiss military representative cited, to be ready when the window of opportunity opens.

Mr. Chairperson,

We do not believe that introducing voluntary reporting measures will contribute to improving the security situation, nor will it increase transparency among participating States. The problem with voluntary measures is that they are almost certainly not going to be implemented by all, or equally. They are not a substitute for the politically binding measures in the Vienna Document.

We need to restore trust among the measures of this community. To get there we need a serious, results-oriented Vienna Document modernization discussion. The package the 32 participating States have proposed is not a take it or leave it proposition; it also is not likely the full answer. But it is a major effort and a significant offer of engagement on military security issues. The ideas contained in the proposal directly address concerns that have been voiced in this community over and over again – about large military exercises that are not notified in advance; about the insufficiency of clear processes for avoiding military incidents or avoiding an escalation of tension as a result of incidents; and about the need for impartial information about unusual military activities.

We do not believe it is time to explore new arms control architecture in the OSCE. We should instead focus on updating those frameworks already in place to achieve a more effective and robust implementation.

We urge all participating States to join in a constructive process to update the Vienna Document, and we welcome proposals to address priority concerns from other participating States. We understand that negotiation will take time and could stretch well into 2020. The important thing is that we get Vienna Document modernization underway.

The United States would welcome a Ministerial Council decision this year that notes the intent of the participating States to negotiate a substantive update of the Vienna Document in 2020; however, we do not want to pursue essentially pointless OSCE Ministerial Council decisions or statements positing potential voluntary steps that would distract from development of the Vienna Document, Europe’s primary set of reciprocal military confidence- and security-building measures.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, and thank you particularly to the German delegation for introducing this Vienna Document package here today.
STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

We note that Russia injected other issues in the FSC debate. The United States reminds that Russia violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by developing and deploying prohibited missiles long before US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Treaty. We also assure the Russian Federation and participating States that NATO actions are in reaction and response to the actions of the Russian Federation and that they are defensive in nature. The United States aligns itself with the statement of the United Kingdom in this regard.
928th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 934, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ROMANIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

In addition to the European Union statement, which we fully support, I would like to share a few additional remarks in my national capacity:

Romania values the Vienna Document 2011 as one major pillar of Europe’s security architecture and the OSCE’s most relevant framework for confidence- and security-building measures.

In addition, we continue to believe that it is vital to modernize the Vienna Document, in order to increase military stability, transparency and predictability between participating States.

The new proposal for Vienna Document 2011 modernization introduced by Germany comprises and combines the existing proposals into a unitary package, focusing on the transparency over certain and no-notice military activities, on risk reduction measures and verification provisions in order to reflect the current practice across the different areas of its implementation.

Romania stands behind the new proposal, which already enjoys a wide and diverse range of support, and recommends to all participating States to engage constructively in negotiations, at both political and expert levels, so that the modernization process is of benefit to the security of the OSCE area.

Romania notes with interests the idea, put forward by the US Ambassador, of a Ministerial Council decision on the modernization of the Vienna Document. By so doing, we shall reconfirm our joint commitment and responsibilities.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SLOVAKIA

Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Distinguished guests,

I should like to join everyone else in welcoming today’s invited speakers and thanking them for their insightful presentations.

Slovakia fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union and its Member States. However, please allow me to add some remarks in my national capacity and as a representative of the OSCE Chairmanship.

The Slovak Chairmanship supports every effort to improve the OSCE acquis of commitments and principles, and to promote their full implementation.

The Vienna Document 2011 is crucial for security in the OSCE area and we believe that there is still room for improving its implementation. Similarly, it is obvious to many participating States, including Slovakia, that the existing provisions of the Vienna Document do not fully reflect the current state of our armed forces and recent developments in the military sphere; nor do they fully take into account current relations between our countries and threat perceptions. What is therefore imperative is a demonstration of political will by all participating States so that we can work together to improve our shared security architecture by making the Vienna Document even more effective.

As conflict prevention is a key priority of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, we have been encouraging participating States to comply fully with all the relevant Vienna Document provisions.

In this respect, I may recall the politico-military retreat successfully organized by the Slovak Chairmanship earlier in October. Its objective was to promote implementation of the Vienna Document 2011, focusing on Chapter IV.

It is worth noting that the quality of implementation depends to a great extent on the level of multilateral co-operation among participating States. For example, Slovakia is involved in verification activities only as a member of international teams. Slovakia has also
organized and actively participated in the training and education of personnel for international verification units.

By stepping up efforts in relation to Chapter X, “Regional Measures”, it is possible to enhance implementation of the Vienna Document as a whole. Existing bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements established under that chapter have significantly broadened the scope of the tools provided in the Vienna Document 2011. For example, the bilateral agreement between Slovakia and Ukraine has proved to be an invaluable complement to the Vienna Document, improving the quality of its implementation as well as mutual transparency and relations between the two countries.

There is scope for further improvement in relation to Chapter IV, since voluntary measures, in particular, are currently not used as often as they could by participating States. Moreover, a well-balanced distribution of visits to air bases and military facilities during each five-year period would be helpful.

In 2014, for example, Slovakia organized a joint contact event with Austria that consisted of a series of visits to air bases and military facilities on the territory of both countries. In 2012, the Visegrad Group adopted a regional agreement on military contacts, focusing on co-operation under Chapter IV. Last year, in connection with the Polish-led multinational exercise “Anakonda 2018”, Slovakia organized the demonstration of a new major weapon and equipment system on the territory of Poland.

Discussing ways of improving the implementation of our existing confidence- and security-building measures is undoubtedly a worthwhile endeavour. Yet such discussions should be accompanied by a sincere exchange of views on the various proposals that have been made for modernizing the Vienna Document 2011. Against the backdrop of an ever-changing security landscape and constant developments in the composition of armed forces and in military technology, Slovakia is convinced of the urgent need to improve the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011. In particular, the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship believes that the Vienna Document should be updated to tackle such shortcomings as a lack of transparency over military activities, ineffective co-operation on reducing risks – especially risks arising from unusual military activities and hazardous incidents – and, last but not least, inadequate verification regimes.

Slovakia’s long-standing views on these matters translated into concrete action at the beginning of 2018, when we assumed the Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation. We have continued our efforts this year as part of our Chairmanship of the OSCE, most notably by organizing, during the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, a side event dedicated to Vienna Document Plus proposals, which highlighted the desirability of updating the Vienna Document. A summary of the goals and outcomes of this side event was circulated in a Chairmanship report under reference number FSC.AIAM/12/19 on 1 April 2019.

I should like to close by reiterating that our discussions also need to consider the question of resources. Despite the repeated talk about improving implementation of the Vienna Document 2011 and modernizing it, the fact is that for the past several years participating States have been cutting their budgets for implementation of the Vienna
Document provisions and reducing the number of personnel available for implementation. We believe that it is equally important to reverse this negative trend.

Mr. Chairperson,

Allow me to thank you once again for devoting today’s Security Dialogue to this timely topic, and to express my country’s hope that relevant discussions will continue at the meeting of Working Group A this afternoon.
928th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 934, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

We are grateful to you for preparing and holding a meeting devoted to a very important topic at the heart of the Forum’s mandate – the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. We thank the keynote speakers who have presented their vision of this complex and multifaceted issue.

Since the statements we have heard from the distinguished delegations were mainly devoted to the document circulated on 18 October 2019 on behalf of 32 participating States with a set of proposals for the modernization of the Vienna Document, we are also ready to express our attitude towards this initiative.

During the current session, our delegation has repeatedly outlined its position of principle that the strategy for the military “containment” of Russia, which is being implemented by NATO and is set out in the Alliance’s documents, makes it impossible to reach agreements on the modernization of the Vienna Document. This position is well known to our esteemed partners in the negotiations; it remains unchanged and unequivocal and was communicated to the representatives of the embassies of a number of Western countries during meetings in Moscow with senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia last week.

In our statement, we intend to touch on the following points: we should first like to recall some important historical milestones in the process of agreeing on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe, then to describe the current security situation and the state of affairs regarding the Vienna Document and, finally, to focus on issues concerning its current implementation.

Mr. Chairperson,

The Vienna Document 2011, which we are currently using, was preceded by more than two decades of negotiations, during which the interest of individual countries and groups of countries in the development of confidence-building measures in Europe changed dramatically from active support to complete opposition.
The most intensive negotiations on CSBMs were held in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when they proceeded in parallel with the negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), which merely confirms the close link between the two processes. In the second half of the 1990s, alongside the agreement of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty, the OSCE participating States developed a subsequent version of the Vienna Document, which was adopted at the Istanbul Summit in 1999.

In the 2000s, the development of the Vienna Document was not a priority for the States to the west of Vienna, and this process actually reached an impasse, as a result of which the Document was not updated for ten years.

The discussion process on future CSBMs gained fresh momentum owing to the crisis in conventional arms control in Europe, in which the original CFE Treaty had lost touch with reality and the adapted CFE Treaty had never actually entered into force because the Western group of States refused to proceed with its ratification. In this context, Russia was forced to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty, which led to a dramatic shift in the position of these countries towards the need to strengthen the Vienna Document.

It is noteworthy that the consensus rule and the principle “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” played a major role in the negotiations on confidence-building measures at all stages. Perhaps most importantly, the participating States never regarded the reissuing of the Vienna Document as a purely technical process – unfortunately, this is often the most common approach nowadays.

Over a period of many years, the Russian Federation made a significant contribution to the negotiations on CSBMs in Europe. Between 2003 and 2014, we put forward a total of 25 proposals (not counting the individual versions) on modernizing the Vienna Document and improving its implementation.

In a number of cases, initiatives were developed together with our allies from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). For example, in 2003, the delegations of Russia and Belarus submitted a comprehensive document, presenting their “model” of a modernized Vienna Document 1999. In 2009, in co-operation with our colleagues from Belarus and Kazakhstan, we submitted a proposal for a separate draft decision on the modernization of the Vienna Document for the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens. Incidentally, it received very broad support, but it was never actually approved because of opposition from the United States of America and several countries that supported them. In 2010, the Russian Federation submitted to the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) for discussion a draft OSCE programme for further actions in the field of arms control and CSBMs.

---

1 FSC.DEL/172/03 of 14 May 2003.
3 FSC.DEL/140/10 of 1 November 2010 to FSC.DEL/140/10/Rev.6 of 27 October 2011.
This is by no means a complete list of the steps taken by Russia to strengthen security and stability in Europe at a time when the members of the North Atlantic Alliance had long been shying away from a substantive discussion of issues raised by us.

The history of the security system on the continent testifies to the fact that the Vienna Document does not exist in a vacuum and does not develop in isolation, but is closely linked to the conventional arms control regime in Europe, the overall security situation and comprehensive stability.

Unfortunately, we are obliged to note that the crisis in the European security system is continuing. The current state of affairs means that attempts to launch a substantive process for improving the security architecture are being met with resistance from some countries that are not ready to talk openly without confrontation and accusations. We are convinced that the transition to discussing serious issues is possible only by returning to constructive dialogue and by building up a “critical mass” of positive co-operation.

Let us turn to the facts characterizing the current security situation.

It is clear to us that the military infrastructure of the United States and NATO has moved closer to Russia’s borders. Military contingents are permanently deployed in the Baltic States, Poland and Romania. There has been an intensification of naval and air force activity of the NATO countries in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea and also in the airspace over their waters. The establishment of storage facilities in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States to support the deployment and operation of an additional several thousand troops and the enhancement of “military mobility” to rapidly increase the strike capability of NATO forces in the east – all this is perceived by us as offensive preparations by the Alliance.

Let us look at the most recent example. There was a news report today citing a press release by the command of the US armed forces in Europe, which stated that two B-52H strategic bombers of the US Air Force had conducted a training flight over the Black Sea and one of them had carried out a simulated bombing of Crimea. It seems that this glaring example is the best testimony to the real intentions of the NATO strategists.

Mr. Chairperson,

Let me highlight a few factors that do not fall within the direct purview of the FSC, but have a direct impact on strategic stability. We all see that the current situation in the field of international security, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is characterized by growing tension and unpredictability, the exacerbation of previous threats and challenges and the emergence of new ones.

Such factors include, among other things, the unrestricted unilateral deployment of global anti-missile defence systems by one State or a group of States without taking into account the legitimate interests of other countries; the development of high-precision, non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons; the prospect of stationing strike weapons in outer space; and the destruction of the system of international arms control treaties and agreements.

As a responsible State, Russia has no interest in new “missile crises”. We have decided not to deploy ground-based short- and intermediate-range missiles anywhere until the
United States deploys missiles of the same class. I would remind you that it was the United States that sounded the death knell of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), having launched the procedure for its unilateral withdrawal from it. Russia has done its best to save the INF Treaty: we have repeatedly tried to bring our US counterparts into a constructive discussion and have proposed a number of initiatives to settle counterclaims, the implementation of which would make it possible to preserve the Treaty. However, all our efforts were ignored or blocked by the US Government.

With the collapse of the INF Treaty, there is only one agreement still in force in the field of nuclear missile control – the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. We have repeatedly expressed our readiness to seriously consider all issues connected with the possible extension of the Treaty, but we hear only arguments about the pointlessness of extending it from the United States.

The continued existence of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, accompanied by the destabilizing practice of NATO’s “joint nuclear missions”, during which non-nuclear States of the Alliance are involved in planning the use of nuclear weapons and take part in training to learn the relevant skills, also hinders further steps towards the reduction of nuclear weapons. We note in particular that today the United States is the only nuclear power possessing forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons outside its territory.

Mr. Chairperson,

A reduction in the Alliance’s military activity near Russia’s borders and the withdrawal of already deployed or “continuously rotating” troops to their permanent locations, and the rejection of a policy aimed at achieving military superiority would help to de-escalate the situation and reduce the risk of unintentional incidents. We believe that sanctions, accusations and the curtailment of military co-operation are deeply at odds with a policy of confidence-building in the military sphere.

We remain open to dialogue with the Alliance and to tangible steps to de-escalate tension, as testified by the address to the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on strengthening mutual trust and developing co-operation, adopted at the meeting of the Council of CSTO Foreign Ministers in Bishkek on 22 May this year. It was also distributed in the OSCE.

We should like to draw attention to one further point. Co-operative security is one of the most important pillars of the activities of our Organization as a whole and the Forum in particular. It has always been an OSCE tradition to submit proposals that would unite the participating States in the first place, rather than creating additional division and tension, and would not become a source of reproaches and accusations. If this proposal by 32 countries is to be used for that purpose, as an instrument for exerting pressure on anyone, we would like to warn that such a path is counter-productive.

Mr. Chairperson,

We believe that in the current circumstances, the OSCE participating States need to focus on the practical aspects of the implementation of the Vienna Document 2011, the creation of the necessary conditions to resume constructive discussions on strengthening the
politico-military framework for European security. We take the position that the Document provides for a wide range of political and military measures that would ensure openness and predictability in the military activities of the OSCE participating States, strengthen trust among them and reduce the likelihood of armed conflicts in Europe. The transparency and control mechanism set out in the Document makes it possible in general to obtain the necessary information on the armed forces of the OSCE participating States.

At the same time, we see some examples of the failure to fully implement key provisions of the Vienna Document 2011, in particular those concerning the provision of notifications regarding an increase in the number of personnel, units and formations, including “irregular” ones, and also notifications of major military activities below the thresholds.

Since the Forum periodically hears about the “concerns” of certain delegations regarding sudden inspections of the combat readiness of our troops, we should like to point out that the Russian Federation has voluntarily sent notifications to the OSCE participating States on numerous occasions detailing the parameters of such inspections and has also informed them of major military exercises below the Vienna Document thresholds. I could mention, for example, the joint Russian-Belarusian “Zapad-2018” exercise and the Baltic naval exercise in July this year, which did not fall under the provisions of the Document at all.

Mr. Chairperson,

Modernization of the Vienna Document 2011 can be considered only if the NATO countries abandon their unfriendly policies, recognize and respect Russia’s interests, and restore normal relations, in particular at the military level.

In conclusion, we should like to confirm the intention of the Russian Federation to continue the practice of holding voluntary additional events to inform our partners about the day-to-day activities of the Russian armed forces and the conduct of exercises on its territory that are below the parameters of notifiable military activities, and also the practice of inviting representatives of military attachés accredited in Moscow to observe these exercises. We will hold the relevant briefings in the Forum as and when required. We look forward to similar steps being taken by our partners.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF FRANCE

Mr. Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Dear colleagues,

First of all, I should like to thank the Czech Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation for dedicating a meeting to the Vienna Document, giving us the opportunity to discuss the challenges of its implementation and modernization. I also thank the German Ambassador for her presentation of the proposal to modernize the Vienna Document. Lastly, I should also like to pay tribute to our speakers for their very informative presentations, which were at the same time practical, educational and forward-looking in nature.

France aligns itself with the statement by the European Union but would like to add a few considerations in a national capacity.

Dear colleagues,

For several years now, the European security climate has been deteriorating and is subject to increasing degrees of volatility and unpredictability, reducing trust among the stakeholders. However, this trust that is being eroded is what motivated us, the participating States, to establish the confidence- and security-building measures that are embodied in the Vienna Document. Meeting the current challenges requires not only the full implementation, in letter and in spirit, of our instruments but also their substantial modernization.

This is why France calls on all States, taking a constructive approach, to enter into negotiations to modernize the Vienna Document on the basis of the proposal that you have before you today and to which we have contributed.

After listening to the delegations that have already spoken, including those with much greater historical experience than mine, I am more convinced of the utility of the Vienna Document and the need to modernize it. Working towards de-escalation, reducing risks and strengthening mutual understanding is indeed the purpose of this proposal. Since NATO has been mentioned, this proposal, which has the support of the allies and several other countries, is indeed a gesture of goodwill, the willingness to invest in confidence- and security-building measures and to open up a discussion among the 57 participating States on this matter. The
issue of political deadlock should not prevent us from working on this while waiting for the right moment to approve the text.

As has already been said, but it is worth recalling, this proposal brings together and standardizes proposals already made by the participating States. The measures contained therein are aimed at increasing trust, reducing risks and strengthening verification provisions and the annual exchange of information. As you will see, they take into account the concerns and interests of every participating State in the Eurasian area. In fact, some of the proposals grouped together here are long-standing ones and have been formulated or reformulated by other States. Ultimately, this initiative aims to restore a climate of trust in Europe that is conducive to conventional arms control and, indeed, to our common security.

This proposal is the starting point for a negotiation process. This is in no way a “take it or leave it” proposal, but rather a process that is expected to evolve. We therefore encourage every State to formulate and develop its comments, suggestions and questions regarding this proposal.

Thus, besides supporting this proposal, agreeing to enter into negotiations and ultimately discuss matters is already in itself a confidence-building measure and a significant step in the realization of a collective project, necessary for our common security. This will demonstrate our ability to engage in dialogue and the willingness of each of us to further reduce tensions in Europe.

I thank you for including this statement in the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SWITZERLAND

Mr. Chairperson,

Switzerland appreciates the continuing discussion of so important a topic as the Vienna Document.

Regarding its implementation and modernization, I should like to make the following comments.

First, on implementation: The Vienna Document 2011 contains a wide range of provisions aimed at enhancing transparency and confidence among participating States in the politico-military dimension. As emphasized during the Swiss Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) in the first trimester of 2019, all the existing tools should be used to their full potential. We believe that the exchange of views on transparency, risk reduction and incident prevention that has taken place so far under the Structured Dialogue has helped to identify several aspects that are worth exploring further in future discussions on the implementation of the Vienna Document. The adoption of additional transparency measures and the investment of further efforts in improving implementation should significantly promote security and stability in the OSCE area.

Second, on modernization: Switzerland is of the view that the Vienna Document 2011 does need to be reviewed and updated in order to meet the participating States’ current needs for verifiable transparency on military information. This process should be undertaken within the OSCE framework as a joint effort by the participating States. We are ready to engage constructively in this process while upholding the OSCE’s well-established acquis of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Furthermore, we should always keep the broader picture of collective security in mind throughout this process. Accordingly, while discussing ways of modernizing the Vienna Document, which is a cornerstone of the OSCE’s CSBM regime, we should also look at CSBMs and transparency measures that are applied elsewhere in the world, as there may be valuable lessons to be learned for the strengthening of conventional arms control in the OSCE area.

In closing, I wish to observe that Switzerland as a neutral State has noted with interest the proposals for modernization of the Vienna Document that were presented this afternoon within FSC Working Group A and that have secured the support of 32 OSCE participating States. Switzerland encourages all participating States to engage in a constructive discussion.
of these proposals. However, I must also emphasize that Switzerland strongly believes that we should not leave existing instruments unused or underused while we are engaged in reviewing and updating these.

Switzerland requests that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.
DECISION No. 5/19
DATES AND VENUE OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),

Decides that the thirtieth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) will be held on 3 and 4 March 2020 in Vienna.