Chairmanship: Tajikistan

915th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 15 May 2019
   
   Opened: 10.10 a.m.
   Suspended: 1.05 p.m.
   Resumed: 3.05 p.m.
   Closed: 4 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador I. Kalandar

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

   Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540: “A RESOLUTION OF INCREASED IMPORTANCE IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF ERODING SECURITY”
   
   – Presentation by Mr. I. Mirsaidov, Director of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan
   
   – Presentation by Mr. I. Cartagena Núñez, Deputy Director General for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, Spain
   
   – Presentation by Mr. V. Pavlov, Senior Counsellor, Department of International Security and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belarus

Chairperson, Mr. I. Mirsaidov, Mr. I. Cartagena Núñez, Mr. V. Pavlov, Romania-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/95/19), Kazakhstan, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine (FSC.DEL/100/19 OSCE+), Armenia, Switzerland, United States of America, FSC Co-ordinator
on Matters Relating to UNSCR 1325 (Italy), FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues (Spain) (Annex 1)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) Briefing on the military exercise “Saber Guardian 2019”, to be conducted from 2 to 24 June 2019: United States of America (FSC.DEL/97/19/Corr.1 OSCE+), Romania

(b) Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/101/19 OSCE+), Romania-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova and San Marino, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/102/19), Russian Federation, Canada, United States of America, Poland

(c) Replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security provided by the Russian Federation (FSC.EMI/57/19): Moldova (Annex 2)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS


(b) Briefing on a military exercise to be conducted from 19 to 25 May 2019: Belgium

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 22 May 2019, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal
915th Plenary Meeting  
FSC Journal No. 921, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE  
FSC CO-ORDINATOR ON NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES (SPAIN)

Mr. Chairperson,

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairperson, for devoting the Security Dialogue at today’s meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) to the theme of “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: A Resolution of Increased Importance in the Present Period of Eroding Security”.

I would like to say a few words in my capacity as the FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues to illustrate how the OSCE, as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, has been actively supporting participating States by assisting them, in accordance with relevant FSC decisions, with the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) over the last nine years. This work, and in particular the tasks being carried out by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), has been officially recognized by the FSC, as witnessed by the adoption, in July 2015, of FSC Decision No. 4/15 (FSC.DEC/4/15) on the OSCE’s role in support of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Following the adoption, in December 2011, of FSC Decision No. 19/11 (FSC.DEC/19/11) on Points of Contact on UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the CPC duly established a directory of national and OSCE Points of Contact on the resolution. Currently, 52 participating States have officially appointed national Points of Contact; they regularly provide the OSCE with updated information on these.

I should like to mention here the regional seminar on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540 organized by Belarus in Minsk in April 2018 – an event on which the Belarusian delegation has reported extensively within the FSC. The discussions and recommendations from that seminar, which are contained in the Chairperson’s summary, provide an excellent basis for continuing the interaction between countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), on the one hand, and international and regional organizations and bodies, on the other, in order to enhance the implementation of UNSCR 1540. The importance of such interactions in general was stressed in the 2016 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), whose findings were endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolution 2325 (2016). In this
respect, I would very much recommend participating States to read the summary of the Minsk seminar attentively.

However, the OSCE’s work on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery should go even further, particularly with regard to the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation of 1994, which were updated in 2013 by FSC Decision No. 7/13. Significantly, this year marks the 25th anniversary of this reference document, which established a political framework for the OSCE in the area of non-proliferation. The FSC might therefore like to consider forwarding to the Ministerial Council meeting in Bratislava in December a draft Ministerial Council declaration highlighting the strong commitment that participating States have shown over the years in combating the proliferation of WMD.

As indicated by my predecessor in his statement at the last Security Dialogue on UNSCR 1540, held on 17 October 2018 (see FSC.JOUR/901, Annex 1), the CPC, with the assistance of a technical consultant, as well as that of the FSC Co-ordinator on Non Proliferation Issues, has initiated the preparation of Best Practice Guides for the implementation of UNSCR 1540, which are intended to serve as an OSCE compendium of suggested implementation practices, in line with the relevant food-for-thought paper released in 2007 (FSC.DEL/246/07 and FSC.DEL/246/07/Rev.1).

Participating States can find additional information on how they can contribute to this future reference series on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in the letter by the FSC Chairperson that was recently distributed under document symbol FSC.DEL/89/19. If your delegation is interested in sharing national experiences and lessons learned to be incorporated into relevant chapters of the Best Practice Guides, please do not hesitate to approach the FSC Chairperson, the CPC or myself. The CPC is able, thanks to funding from the European Union, to offer technical assistance with the drafting of these chapters. The Informal Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 could serve as a forum for discussion, consolidation and finalization of the chapters to be included in the Best Practice Guides.

We look forward to working with you all on the preparation of this important set of documents.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF MOLDOVA

Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to draw the attention of the participating States to the information presented by the Russian Federation on an issue related to the Republic of Moldova under reference number FSC.EMI/57/19 dated 11 April 2019 in response to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

As in previous years, in response to point 2.1 of the Questionnaire related to the deployment of military forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law, the Russian Federation has made an inappropriate reference to the Agreement on the principles for a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova signed on 21 July 1992.

We would like to recall that the Agreement does not in any manner provide a basis for the stationing of the so-called Operative Group of Russian Forces on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. There is not a single reference in the Agreement that could serve as an endorsement of the stationing of the Operative Group of Russian Forces on our territory. The primary goals of the 1992 Agreement were to halt the military hostilities in the conflict area and to establish the Security Zone and the peacekeeping mechanism. The Republic of Moldova makes a clear distinction between the Russian military contingent participating in the peacekeeping mechanism and the illegally stationed military forces, weapons and ammunitions. The necessity of the unconditional withdrawal of the Russian military forces and armaments was most recently endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/282 of 22 June 2018.

The only reference in the 1992 Agreement to the units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation appears in Article 4, paragraph 2 of which runs as follows: “… the procedure and schedule for its gradual withdrawal shall be settled through negotiations between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation.” The Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on withdrawal of Russian military troops from the territory of the Republic of Moldova was signed on 21 October 1994 but not ratified by the Russian side which represents a clear proof of the lack of legal status of these military forces on Moldovan territory. Moreover, as a signatory of the OSCE Istanbul Summit
Declaration of November 1999, the Russian Federation legally committed itself to a complete withdrawal of its troops and armaments by the end of 2002.

Therefore, we conclude that 1,199 Russian soldiers are still stationed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, with their armaments and ammunition, without the consent of the host country. Our position on the issue of the Operative Group of Russian Forces remains unchanged and we reiterate the need to complete the withdrawal of the Russian military forces, weapons and ammunition from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

It is not acceptable for the 1992 Agreement to be used as a reference under point 2.1 of the Questionnaire related to the deployment of military forces.

I kindly ask you, Mr. Chairperson, to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.