



Chairmanship: Kyrgyzstan

## 674th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 15 February 2012

Opened: 10.05 a.m.

Closed: 11.35 a.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador L. Imanalieva  
Mr. M. Baihodjoev

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS

(a) *Issues related to the implementation of the Vienna Document 2011*: Denmark-European Union (with the acceding country Croatia; the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland and Montenegro; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/13/12), Russian Federation (Annex 1), United Kingdom, Austria, United States of America, Sweden (Annex 2), Poland, Luxembourg

(b) *Recent changes regarding female service members in the armed forces of the United States of America*: United States of America

(c) *Mongolia's security policy and armed forces, their functions and activities*: Mongolia (Partner for Co-operation) (FSC.DEL/12/12 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 3)

Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE

*Presentation by Mr. A. Kruglov, Deputy Director of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*: Chairperson, Mr. A. Kruglov (FSC.DEL/15/12 OSCE+), Denmark-European Union (with the acceding country

Croatia; the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland and Montenegro; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia; the European Free Trade Association countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra and Moldova, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/14/12), Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, United States of America

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Matters of protocol*: Ukraine, Portugal, United States of America
- (b) *Matters related to the Points of Contact on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)*: Spain

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 22 February 2012, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/680  
15 February 2012  
Annex 1

ENGLISH  
Original: RUSSIAN

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**674th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 680, Agenda item 1(a)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

Our delegation has listened attentively to the statement by the esteemed representative of Denmark on behalf of members of the European Union (EU) and the countries supporting them regarding the refusal by Russia to accept two evaluation visits in accordance with the Vienna Document 2011 and feels obliged to make the following comments.

Information about the reasons for the current situation (I would recall that our legal problems with implementation of the Vienna Document 2011 arose less than six weeks ago), about the justification for the application of the term *force majeure* to it and about the state of affairs as it now stands has been presented by the Russian Federation on more than one occasion to our esteemed partners, including in this room. We do not see any sense in repeating ourselves. I should merely like to add that work on the problem continues in Moscow. In particular, the corresponding draft legal instrument is currently being considered by the relevant federal executive authorities.

We do not consider it necessary to comment on the “doubts” that anybody might have about the “real motives” for the temporary non-fulfilment by Russia of the Vienna Document 2011 for the simple reason that these arguments come under the category of idle conjecture.

Likewise, we have no intention of conjecturing on which day of the week this problem will be solved. We assume that when it comes to adopting any document, no self-respecting representative in this room will indulge in reading coffee grounds or attempt to make a decision for his or her government. It goes without saying that our esteemed colleagues may rest assured that we shall inform them in good time about the adoption of a decision in this regard by the Government of the Russian Federation and about other possible steps to resolve this problem.

At the same time, we should like to commiserate with those colleagues who feel obliged to adhere to “double standards” in their statements, an attitude that has been most clearly displayed at today’s meeting.

I should like to ask my esteemed colleagues whether they don't feel any moral discomfort at the fact that many co-sponsors of the statement we have heard today, who have the same rights and obligations in the OSCE as Russia, have for years been failing to fulfil their obligations.

Everyone will no doubt recall that at the last meeting we refrained from talking about the countries concerned, whereas today they themselves are opting for a frank exchange of opinions. So, let us look at the reports of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) as the most objective and, we hope, accurate source of information. What do we see there?

Austria did not submit answers for three years (2007–2009) to the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms.

Belgium has not presented information about its defence budget and planning for three years (2009–2011). Obviously, this can be partly explained by the absence for a long time of a government. However, our esteemed Belgian colleagues do not think that administrative and/or technical difficulties are sufficient reason for invoking *force majeure*. In that case, what reason do they have for not fulfilling their obligations? Incidentally, for three years (2007–2009) this country did not provide information on conventional arms transfers and for at least five years (2006–2010) failed to reply to the questionnaire on that subject. It has not yet provided information regarding a number of one-off exchanges relating to small arms and light weapons (SALW) – on end-user certificates and illicit transport of SALW by air in 2009 and on brokering in 2011.

Bulgaria failed to answer the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms in 2008.

The Czech Republic did not reply to this questionnaire in 2007.

Estonia failed to provide data on conventional arms transfers in 2006 and, as far as we recall, on its defence budget and planning in 2008.

Hungary failed to reply to the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms in 2007.

Ireland did not provide information on its defence budget and planning in 2008 and 2011 and on the import and export of SALW in 2011.

Italy did not provide information on conventional arms transfers in at least three years (2008 and 2010–2011) and failed to complete the corresponding questionnaire in 2007, despite the fact that this State is a relatively large exporter of arms. What are the “real motives”, as some of our esteemed colleagues like to say, for such a casual treatment of its obligations?

Luxembourg did not reply to the questionnaire on the Code of Conduct in 2009.

Portugal has not presented information on its defence budget and planning for four years now (2008–2011) and failed to answer the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms in 2009.

Romania did not answer this questionnaire either for two years (2009–2010).

Slovenia did not provide information on its defence budget and planning in 2011.

The United Kingdom did not answer the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms in 2007.

Thus by our reckoning on the basis of the CPC data, 13 members of the EU, around half of the total membership, did not comply with their obligations at least once in the last five or six years, and six of them, or almost a quarter of the membership, did so systematically, i.e. in more than one year. This, Mr. Chairperson, is the real value of some of the statements that have been heard in this room.

Moreover, the situation is no better in some of the States supporting this statement.

For example, Albania did not provide information on conventional arms transfers for two years (2007–2008).

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not present information on its defence budget and planning in 2011. For at least four years (2006–2009) it failed to answer the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms and, in 2008, the conventional arms transfer questionnaire.

Croatia did not reply to the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms in three years (2008 and 2010–2011) and did not provide information on conventional arms transfers in four years (2007–2008 and 2010–2011). What is the reason for such a long silence?

Georgia has not provided information on its defence budget for four years (2008–2011) and on its defence planning in three years (2008 and 2010–2011). It failed to reply to the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms in 2009, and did not provide information on conventional arms transfers in 2007 and 2010.

Montenegro did not provide information on its defence budget and planning for four years (2007–2010). In five years (2006–2007 and 2009–2011) it did not answer the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms, and it did not present information on conventional arms transfers in three years (2006 and 2010–2011). Finally, it did not answer the questionnaire on anti-personnel mines in three years (2007–2008 and 2009).

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has not provided information about its defence budget and planning for at least five years (2007–2011). It did not reply to the questionnaire on its policy regarding the export of conventional arms in five years (2006–2007 and 2009–2011) and nor did it provide data on conventional arms transfers in

three years (2006–2007 and 2009). Moreover, it did not reply to the questionnaire on anti-personnel mines in 2010.

Thus, Mr. Chairperson, if I am not mistaken, there have been 114 cases in the last five or six years of non-compliance with obligations by 19 of the co-sponsors of today's statement.

I hope we have not made any major mistakes in this list, which is merely of exchanges of information based on the CPC data. We should like to apologize in advance to anyone we have included in this list by mistake or, conversely, left out.

Finally, if I may paraphrase from today's statement by the countries of the EU, we hope that the problems faced by a number of the participating States mentioned by our delegation will be solved as soon as possible with the aim of ensuring full and unimpeded compliance with their obligations. This is vitally important if we are to avoid long-term negative consequences in connection with the implementation of agreements in the politico-military dimension as a whole. In that regard we would be extremely grateful if the participating States in question would provide additional information in the near future in particular on the estimated time it will take them to meet their obligations and the efforts undertaken by them in this regard.

I would ask that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/680  
15 February 2012  
Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

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**674th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 680, Agenda item 1(a)

## **STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SWEDEN**

Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to provide a clarification in respect of the request by the Russian Delegation concerning the Swedish information exchange on conventional arms transfer (CAT) 2008. Happily, I don't need to wait until next week to respond.

Looking into the CPC Annual Survey on information exchange for 2008 concerning CAT, the Swedish "box" on the CAT questionnaire is coloured grey.

The quick response, including a timescale in accordance with the request, is that, if you check the information exchange from Sweden, you will see that the information was given on 27 June 2008. I quote the Note Verbal (FSC.EMI/271/08, 27 June 2008): "... to inform that the answers to the Conventional Arms Transfer Questionnaire as submitted 30 June 1999 are still valid."

I would like to request the CPC to correct the matrix for 2008.

I hope we have made clear that the information was provided on time, and that Sweden fulfilled its commitment in accordance with the decision on the questionnaire on conventional arms transfer (FSC.DEC/20/95, 29 November 1995). So I hope we can agree that there is no need for a timeline for Sweden to fulfil this commitment.

I would like to request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
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**674th Plenary Meeting**

FSC Journal No. 680, Agenda item 1(c)

**STATEMENT BY  
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

Our delegation is pleased to welcome the esteemed Ambassador Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan of our friendly neighbour Mongolia to this hall. We thank him for his brief but very succinct statement, which has given us all a better understanding of the most important aspects of Mongolia's security policy and the structure and task of the Mongolian armed forces.

We listened with interest to the concluding part of the statement by Ambassador Enkhsaikhan about Mongolia's application for the status of an OSCE participating State. We take note of the willingness of Mongolia to "work closer with other participant States and the Secretariat on the modalities of implementation in good faith of the politico-military obligations and commitments". However, we are not convinced that the best time to start this work would be only after a decision has been made on the application mentioned by the esteemed Ambassador of Mongolia. It would probably be useful for both the State wishing to join the OSCE and for the existing participating States to clear up beforehand what obligations are to be fulfilled by that State and to what extent in the event that its intentions are realized.

With regard to the politico-military dimension there are a number of complex issues resulting from Mongolia's particular geographical situation. It is well known that the Madrid Mandate defining the parameters of the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) was the outcome of protracted negotiations and a difficult compromise. We also recall that this zone, covering Europe and the adjoining sea area and airspace, did not include all of the territories of the OSCE participating States. As we are looking in this case at the territory of Mongolia, which is not part of Europe and not even contiguous with the present zone of application for CSBMs, should it come under the Vienna Document? And this is probably not the only question that we and our capitals will have to consider. It is clear that work on achieving a balanced resolution to this complicated problem will demand considerable intellectual effort and time.



Having said this, I should like once again to thank Ambassador Enkhsaikhan and wish him success in dealing with the responsible tasks facing him.

I would ask that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.