
Chairmanship: Austria**985th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM**

1. Date: Wednesday, 15 September 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference)

Opened: 10.05 a.m.

Closed: 1 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador F. Raunig

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: THE OSCE FRAMEWORK FOR ARMS CONTROL

- *Presentation by Mr. R. Aleixo, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Portugal to the OSCE (during the Lisbon OSCE Summit of 1996)*
- *Presentation by Lieutenant-General (retired) E. Buzhinskiy, head of the Center for Applied Politico-Military Studies, Russian Federation*
- *Presentation by Mr. M. Griffon, head of the Arms Control and OSCE Department – Directorate for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France*

Chairperson, Mr. R. Aleixo, Mr. E. Buzhinskiy (FSC.DEL/317/21 OSCE+), Mr. M. Griffon, Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/325/21), United States of America (Annex 1), United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey (FSC.DEL/321/21 OSCE+), Switzerland (FSC.DEL/322/21 OSCE+), Armenia (Annex 2), Russian Federation (Annex 3)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/317/21 OSCE+), Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/326/21), United States of America (FSC.DEL/319/21 OSCE+), United Kingdom, Canada

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *“Save the date” for a practical demonstration of small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition to be held in Vienna on 27 October 2021:* Chairperson
- (b) *Financial contributions to the OSCE Scholarship for Peace and Security training programme and to extrabudgetary projects in the fields of small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition in Ukraine:* United States of America, Ukraine, Representative of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
- (c) *Military exercise “Joint Endeavour 2021”, to be conducted from 22 to 30 September 2021:* Ukraine, Russian Federation
- (d) *Contact visit organized pursuant to Chapter IV of the Vienna Document, conducted from 5 to 11 September 2021:* Lithuania (also on behalf of Estonia and Latvia) (Annex 4)
- (e) *Matters of protocol:* Azerbaijan

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 22 September 2021, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference



985th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 991, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

We welcome the Austrian FSC Chairmanship's effort to spur a focused discussion in the month of September on the past, present, and future of arms control. We thank the distinguished speakers for their perspectives. We may not agree, but we welcome dialogue. Today's Security Dialogue provides us an opportunity to reflect on our past, specifically the 1996 Lisbon Framework for Arms Control, and compare it to the environment in which we find ourselves today.

The European security environment has substantially deteriorated since 1996. We find ourselves in this situation not as a result of a failure of arms control, but rather due to wilful contraventions of OSCE principles and commitments. In a number of cases, the decisions of individual governments to ignore Helsinki Principles and basic rules of international law was manifested in the use of conventional military force against sovereign States. In other instances, the aggressive conduct against neighbours has been more subtle, relying on hybrid methods to undermine political processes, civil society, and legitimately elected governments. In this environment where respect for basic norms of international conduct is lacking, arms control agreements and confidence- and security-building measures have been collateral damage. Attempting to repair that damage – including through proposals to relaunch regional conventional arms control negotiations – does not address the underlying problem. Nor does it address the most acute risks and threats to security that we face today, which increasingly occur below the threshold of armed conflict and are not susceptible to traditional arms control solutions.

1996 was a distinctly different era, indeed it was a golden age, full of promise for a positively transformed post-Cold War European security environment. In 1996, we spoke of positive trends in co-operation, transparency, and predictability, which we optimistically believed would further strengthen the web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments.

Participating States were not completely naive; the Lisbon Framework foresaw some potential challenges and risks to maintaining those positive trends, including lack of respect for human rights, ethnic tension, transnational organized crime, uncontrolled migration, and environmental damage. Other issues were unforeseen at the time of the Lisbon Framework, including cyber intrusions that affect basic societal functions and hybrid activity that undermines confidence in core institutions. These unforeseen threats – and the ubiquitous

threat of terrorism – have impacted every participating State. Now we, all of us, have begun to confront a new risk not only to our security and but even our existence: the degradation of the environment, failure of environmental governance, and climate change.

Even though its underlying principles remain laudable, the Lisbon Framework is more a reminder of what has not been achieved rather than a path for the future. Our most pressing task is less one of “building upon” trust than “rebuilding” or “building back” trust. Let us use the framework as envisioned to “enhance transparency and predictability as regards to military intentions of States.”

It is clear that the place to start – if we are to regain trust through small steps – namely modernization of the Vienna Document, which lies at the core of OSCE security as an instrument to foster transparency and predictability. The joint proposal on modernization, co-sponsored by 34 participating States, is a sound beginning.

In terms of broader security issues – including many topics little recognized or understood at the time the Framework for Arms Control was adopted – we believe there is genuine value in frank discussion of security concerns, threats, and possible ways ahead. The Structured Dialogue on security issues has proven to be an effective venue for such exchanges, and it should continue. We look forward to discussing ways to improve the Dialogue at the retreat this fall.

Mr. Chairperson,

For all its vision, I would be remiss not to observe that the 1996 Lisbon Framework was imperfect in an important regard – in so far as it failed to address gender perspectives that are today so integral to our work in this Forum. Likely this is a reflection of an era prior to the adoption of the women, peace and security agenda. As the Austrian FSC Chairmanship rightly noted, women, peace and security must be mainstreamed in the FSC agenda – to include arms control. Times have changed since 1996, and 20 years of progress with women as the framers and negotiators of arms control agreements cannot be rolled back. For our part, the United States is proud to have a woman of colour, Bonnie Jenkins, as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and proud of the role women have played in leading arms control negotiations, including New START, over the years, no doubt contributing to their success.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

May this reflection on our past help to refocus and reinvigorate our path forward.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/991
15 September 2021
Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

985th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 991, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Mr. Chairperson,

The delegation of Armenia thanks the keynote speakers for their interesting and thought-provoking presentations. We also thank the Austrian Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation for devoting this Security Dialogue to the OSCE Framework for Arms Control in its historical context. At a time of growing mistrust and evolving crisis, recalling the objectives that back in the 1990s united us in our efforts to overcome the security challenges in the OSCE area is a timely and useful initiative.

Issues of arms control and disarmament have always been in the focus of the OSCE's activities. Since the early 1990s the OSCE started developing the conventional arms control regime in Europe thus going beyond the security model of the Cold War era and enhancing the confidence-building measures stemming from the Helsinki Final Act. During that period, the Organization was striving to improve its own effectiveness by gradually expanding the scope of the security issues it dealt with through further enrichment of its politico-military toolbox. In 1996, the OSCE participating States adopted the Framework for Arms Control, thereby establishing the conceptual basis for existing and future arms control arrangements.

Regrettably, we see how the geopolitical interests of participating States have been gradually replacing the ideas of co-operation with confrontation. This has resulted in violations of our commitments, eventually leading to the current crisis in the field of arms control. Nevertheless, we believe that even today, when security and stability in the OSCE area are being directly challenged, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures are the instruments for ensuring military stability, transparency and predictability – as long as they are implemented in good faith.

Mr. Chairperson,

The security situation in the South Caucasus underscores the importance of implementing the OSCE commitments on arms control and once again demonstrates their relevance.

Violations of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document – such as the destabilizing accumulation of offensive weapons greatly

in excess of the ceilings established in the CFE Treaty, the conduct of unnotified large-scale military exercises, and the exclusion of a significant proportion of States' armed forces from the verification regime – are the main reasons that within the last five years have twice led to the use of force in our region. The unapologetic use of force as a means of “resolving” conflicts and disputes has undermined the arms control regime immensely. It is obvious that making technical improvements to the existing tools without strong political commitment will not safeguard their application.

The delegation of Armenia is convinced that only a strong and principled position of the OSCE participating States with regard to the systematic violation by certain participating States of their OSCE obligations and commitments can prevent further erosion of security and stability in the OSCE area.

Thank you. I kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/991
15 September 2021
Annex 3

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

985th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 991, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

We are grateful for the preparation and holding of this meeting on a highly relevant topic that is at the core of the mandate of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). This year marks the 25th anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control. We concur with the Austrian Chairmanship's view regarding the importance of using this important date to stimulate reflection on the past, present and future of conventional arms control in Europe, a process that is currently not going through the best of times. We thank the keynote speakers for their professional analysis of the topic, which has highlighted its complexity and depth.

It is well known that the Framework cannot be separated from the other "outputs" of the OSCE Lisbon Summit of 1996, in particular the Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, which was subsequently transformed into the Charter for European Security at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. The purpose of these instruments is "to contribute to the further development of the OSCE area as an indivisible common security space". To achieve that end, the Framework calls for focusing on "the elaboration of further arms control measures".

At all stages, our country has been and remains committed to the objectives of arms control and of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). In the 1990s, we made what was without exaggeration an unprecedented contribution to eradicating the legacy of the Cold War. In record time, Russia withdrew troops and weapons from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and disbanded large troop concentrations in Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States – numbering over 800,000 military personnel in all. Implementing the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), it destroyed and disposed of tens of thousands of pieces of heavy weaponry and equipment.

We have always believed that in the OSCE's area of responsibility there are no irreconcilable differences, let alone issues that would require a military solution or call for politico-military blocs to have a significant presence here. However, it seems that other assessments and approaches were followed in the West. As a result, we are regretfully

obliged to note that many goals and targets enshrined in the Lisbon Document 1996 have remained mere words on paper.

For our colleagues it is embarrassing to recollect how fervently they assured us at the time that joining NATO would deliver the countries of Eastern Europe from the phantom pains of their historical legacy, improve relations with Russia and give the Alliance an outer “belt” of States well disposed towards us. That did not happen. The enlargement of NATO has laid the political and material foundations for the emergence of a new Iron Curtain in Europe. Allusions have been made here to a certain country on account of which the climate of trust in Europe is allegedly deteriorating. I would remind you that that climate began to be eroded long ago by countries whose representatives are present in this room. Remember who it was that destroyed OSCE principles by carpet-bombing Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and then Afghanistan too. All this has put a big question mark over the idea of building a “common European home”, so in this case it is hardly appropriate for any of those present to lecture other countries.

In its official documents, NATO nowadays proclaims the “containment” of Russia as one of its principal objectives. Moreover, our colleagues do not wish to take in our security concerns and do not respond to constructive proposals for the reduction of military risks in Europe. In view of the lamentable experience with the containment of a certain group in Afghanistan, NATO should evidently start thinking already now about where it could “run away” to after “containing” Russia.

I shall now move on directly to arms control and CSBMs, which, as was already noted by the distinguished keynote speakers today, constitute the main elements of the Lisbon Document. It is affirmed therein that the basis for a system of equal and indivisible security already exists, namely, the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Code of Conduct and regional CSBMs. Two of the aforementioned pillars, the CFE Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies, are today in a state of profound crisis – the former owing to the refusal by NATO countries to ratify the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the latter because of a strikingly short-sighted decision by the United States of America. As for the implementation in good faith of the other instruments mentioned, there is evidently still considerable room for improvement.

We call on our partners to return to the full implementation of their international commitments, which is essential to restore confidence and transparency in the military sphere and to increase predictability.

We hope that in Europe there will eventually be a revival of genuine interest in the future of conventional arms control. Such a conversation should probably begin with a discussion of the “frame of reference” for European security into which updated or new instruments could be incorporated. In so doing, it is important to demonstrate political realism, rather than indulging in wishful thinking.

In closing, allow me to reiterate that the Russian Federation is invariably open to discussing issues related to international security and stability on the basis of equal rights and mutual consideration of interests. The inertia of the past few years can undoubtedly be overcome through the joint efforts of all States interested in promoting trust and predictability in Europe. This is something that the ancient motto “*viribus unitis*” (“with united strength”),

on display in the Hofburg palace, may well remind us of, too. One can only hope that, in these present times, our partners will manage to interpret these words correctly, transcending the bounds of a bloc mindset.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/991
15 September 2021
Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

985th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 991, Agenda item 3(d)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF LITHUANIA
(ALSO ON BEHALF OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA)**

Mr. Chairperson,

Thank you for giving me the floor.

Dear colleagues,

On behalf of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, I would like to inform you that last week we conducted the combined Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian trilateral contact visit, which was organized pursuant to Chapter IV of the Vienna Document 2011. The event started on 5 September in Estonia, continued in Latvia, and ended on 11 September in Lithuania.

Let me stress that this was the first contact event of this year, and the first after interruption caused by the pandemic. When conducting this visit, due to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania followed safety requirements and measures to prevent the spread of the virus.

We are pleased to note that this combined trilateral contact event was widely attended: 43 participants from 22 States and from the Conflict Prevention Centre took part at this event. I would like to use this opportunity to thank all those participating States and the Conflict Prevention Centre for responding positively to our invitation.

During the combined contact event participants visited the 1st Infantry Brigade in the military facility in Tapa (Estonia), the Land Force Mechanized Infantry Brigade in the military facility in Adazi (Latvia), and the Mechanized Infantry Brigade Geležinis Vilkas in the military facility in Rukla (Lithuania).

In the interests of fostering transparency and openness, Latvia invited participants of this contact event to observe the military exercise “Silver Arrow 2021”, in addition to their visit to the Land Force Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Adaži on 8 September.

Lithuania also arranged the demonstration of the infantry fighting vehicle Vilkas (Boxer), in conjunction with the visit to military facility in Rukla on 10 September.

I trust that the participants had a good chance to be familiarized with the three brigades and with their tasks. Moreover, the participants were briefed by high-level ministry representatives and military commanders about security and defence policies of three Baltic countries, structure and activities of the armed forces.

A detailed briefing about the visit will be presented in December at the annual meeting of the Heads of Verification Centres.

Mr. Chairperson, thank you.